Logic (2016)
Lecture 52: Equivocation, Amphiboly, and the Fallacy of Figure of Speech

Transcript
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So the parts out of which the conclusion is put together were in the premises, right? It's that middle term that made them get together, right? If you had no B, every C is B. Conclusion would be what? No C is A, right? Again, you have the same, what, the matter, right, is in the conclusion, but the middle term now is separated as C and A. It's the cause of being separated in the conclusion, right? Yeah, that's what happens, you know? So we've got to study equivocation and fibrillation next time here. Okay, now I can give you some more stuff here. I'm sure you're... and Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, cordon and luminary images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Help us to understand all that you are written. Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. I thought I'd begin with Shakespeare, you know. So on. Now you're all acquainted with the two gentlemen of Verona. And I remember once when the English professor was kind of surprised that I liked the two gentlemen of Verona, you know. It's kind of a nice little thing, huh? Now take the song here that's praising Sylvia, right? Who is Sylvia? What is she? That all our swains commend her. Holy, fair, and wise is she. That's quite a nice... Just to say, holy, fair, and wise is she. The heaven such grace to lend her that you might admire her be. Now struck by what it says here. The heaven such grace to lend her, right? If you're thinking about her beauty, I think the word lend is especially good, right? Because God gives a woman sometimes this beauty, great beauty, but she's going to lose it as she gets older, right? So it's appropriate to say that it's Lenten, right, huh? But it reminds me a little bit of all things Rush Limbaugh, right, huh? He said, With brains unloaned from God. That's one of his common phrases, right, huh? You know? With his brains tied behind his back, you know, to make it fair, you know? Half his brains. But I like the one, I always thought it was kind of nice, you know, with brains unloaned from God, right? And the same thing here, right, huh? So there he had holy, fair, and wise. Now that almost says the whole thing, right, huh? Is she kind as she is fair? For beauty lives with kindness. Well, that's not, huh? Love doth to her eyes repair. You know how we say love is blind? Love doth to her eyes repair to help him of his blindness in being helped in habits there, huh? Well, love is in the thing, what? Love. So, but knowledge is the cause of love, huh? And so when he's helped from his blindness, huh? Love, it happens there, right, huh? Then to Sylvia let us sing that Sylvia is excelling. She excels each mortal thing upon the dull earth dwelling. To her let us garlands bring, huh? I said, you know, if you look at the meta, at the rhyming here, huh? The first in the, it's in quintets, huh? And the first and the third and the second and the fourth rhyme, right, huh? Or I should say the first, the third, and the fifth, and then the second and the fourth, right? I could help but think about this damn, uh, Dixiones, right? Because excelling and dwelling are the, good morning, good afternoon. Excelling and dwelling are got the same ending, I-N-G, right? But excelling and dwelling would not be in the same category, would they? No, so I just got this, this darn thing on my mind, you know? Okay? Now, take another little passage here, huh? Now, if you know the thing here, huh? In the beginning of the play, Valentine is going off to study under the, uh, the duke, you know? And he's fallen in love with Sylvia, huh? And, uh, but Proteus is at this time in love greatly with Julia, right? And so he's always kind of making fun of him a little bit to Valentine, right? Well, now the thing is turned around because Valentine is taken up with Sylvia, right? Okay? Oh, gentle Proteus, love's a mighty lord, and hath so humbled me as I confess there is no woe to his correction, nor to his service no such joy in earth. Now no discourse except to be of love. How can I break, now can I break my fast, dine, sup, and sleep upon the very naked name of love? Proteus says, Enough! I read your fortune in your eye. Was this the idol that you worship so? Even she, and is she not a heavenly saint? And Proteus says, No, but she's an earthly prayer god. Valentine says, Call her divine! And Proteus says, I will not flatter her. And Valentine says, Oh, flatter me for love delights and praises, huh? I was pointing it out to my student there at the monastery there. Love delights and praises, huh? And I was talking about the prayer there where we say, um, Ionema Christi, right? What's the last line there, right? Yeah, yeah. Praising God, right, huh? Okay? Well, when you see God as he is, face to face, Thomas says, You will love God, right, huh? More than you ever did in this life, right? And you can't love God as much in this life as you can when you actually see him face to face, right? Well, then go back to what Shakespeare says, huh? Oh, flatter me for love delights in praises, right? And I'm always praising Shakespeare, you know? Because I love his plays. I'm always praising Mozart, because I love, you know, I praise Thomas, I praise the Surik and the Connick and the Ams, and so on. You love to praise, what? What you love, right, huh? So when you see God as he is, face to face, your love will be so great that you'll praise him forevermore. You'll never get tired of praising him, right? See, that was beautiful. He says that, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So he says, Oh, flatter me for love delights in praises. Proteus says, When I was sick, you gave me bitter pills, and I must minister the like to you. Now, this thing kind of struck me, huh? Then speak the truth by her, Allentine says. If not divine, yet let her be a principality. You know what that means? Yeah, that's the third order of angels, right? Yet let her be a principality, sovereign to all the creatures on the earth. Yeah, yeah. I usually call them the princes, huh? The archangels, and the angels of the lowest, right? But the princes, or principality is another name for that. They are, what? Might be in charge of a whole country, right? And there's some things in the scripture, right? Where the angel is in charge of this country, right? Now it gets into another discussion, shall we say, with another angel, right? And the footnote on that line there, in the Shakespeare, right, is very good, you know? Just go to principality, right? A member of the seventh order of celestial beings. The hierarchy of these beings may be arranged as follows. One, the seraphim. Two, the cherubim. Three, the thrones. So those three in that order are the, what, first hierarchy, right? Four, the dominions, the virtues. Six, the powers, right? Now, that's the second hierarchy. And then, seven, the principalities, right? Eight, the archangels. And nine, the angels, right? That's amazing, you know? No, you can't call her divine. Well, at least call her a principality, right? You know? That she might be a principality, sovereign to all the creatures on the earth, right? Okay? So I'll start with that. I didn't know stuff. I just, it's amazing, huh? How Shakespeare knew that? Okay? Now, I remember one time annoying my friend Warren Murray by saying, what one line in Shakespeare, what one line in Shakespeare best describes heaven? You can hit me with a couple of these things, you know, huh? But I was struck by the very last line in the whole play. Do you know that? Remember that? But it's, you know, they quote so many changes of affection and so on. At the end here, the Duke has been, with Valentine, have been rescued, you know, by Proteus who's taken over this group of thieves and so on. Anyway. We'll see you next time. Bye-bye. Bye-bye. Bye-bye. Bye-bye. So Valentine says at the end, these are the words, but it's the last line now. Come to. He says to the Duke, Please you, I'll tell you as we pass along, that you will wonder what a fortune. Come, Proteus, tis your penance, but to hear the story of your loves discovered. That done, our day of marriage shall be yours. Two weddings. Now the last line. One feast, one house, one mutual happiness. Doesn't that best describe heaven? You know how we speak of eating under the Father's house, right? In metaphorical course, but one feast, one house, with mutual happiness. Isn't that the best line describing heaven? So I don't know why this guy thought that, you know, strange I like the two gentlemen. I mean, I might like some of the plays even more, but I mean, it's, you only play this objective one, Shakespeare is probably Titus Andronicus, you know, but it's very popular in the time, but he throws everything in there, you know. Horrible things, you know, between people getting their tongues cut off and people, you know, being served up their children or something in a feast, you know, I just think it's a horrible big story, you know. And one edition I had a Shakespeare, you know, so this disgusting play. Dear son, I didn't play a Shakespeare. What? What did you play with him? Titus Andronicus. Oh, Titus Andronicus. Yeah, yeah. I think I met somebody at one of his conferences there he was talking about, he was kind of trying to write something in Shakespeare, you know, he was going to write something in Titus Andronicus because nobody else has written on it. I wonder why. Let's torture ourselves some more here with the figura dictionis, right, huh? Okay. As you recall, there was a, what, a distinction of the six kinds of fallacies from speech, right, into what three categories? Actual. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. And under the actual, there are what two? Amphiboli, yeah. Now, what's the difference between equivocation and amphiboli? Amphiboli is speech, right? So, in both, you have the case of one name that actually has many meanings, huh? Like the word before, right? Okay. The word being, right, huh? All kinds of words, huh? Okay. My teacher, Deconic, used to say, every respectable word in philosophy is a word, equivocal, by reason, right? Okay. And then you have, what, speech, right, that actually means many things, right? And I was talking there about my favorite examples of that. One was the word of God, right? And the word of God could mean, what, the Bible, for example, right? Or it could mean the Son of God, right? And just like in the case of an equivocal word, right, huh? By reason, there are some amphibities, right, that are like that, right? So you could say the word of God is about the word of God, most of all, right? And you'd be saying that the Bible is about the Son of God, most of all, but the Son of God made, what, flesh, right, huh? And the word of God, the Bible, is the word of God made flesh, in a sense, too, like the Vatican Council said, right? In Verbum Dei, that just as Christ took on human flesh and became truly a man, right, huh? So the word of God, huh, takes on the human way of speaking, right? And therefore has words that are equivocal by reason, has metaphors and other things that human language has, right? Or I'll take an example of how I like the Shakespeare's word for the philosophy of nature, which is the wisdom of nature. And the wisdom of nature could mean the wisdom about nature, in which case it would mean the same as what we call the philosophy of nature. Or it could be the wisdom, you know, that God has poured out into his creatures, and therefore the wisdom that you find in what nature does, right? And I like to quote the great Heraclitus, right? He says, wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature, giving ear thereto. And of course, the ear is the sense of what? Learning from your teacher, right, huh? So giving ear thereto, right, huh? Which is not doing much these days, huh? Okay? My friend, the word brewery, is writing an essay on, you know, the neglect of nature there in the moderns, right, huh? Okay. But I was giving another one there that I kind of like, too, and I would say that the wisdom of reason, what does that mean? The wisdom of reason. Yeah. So we could say that first philosophy is the wisdom of reason, right, huh? Theology is more the wisdom of God, right? It's kind of a share in the wisdom of God. But first philosophy is the wisdom of reason, the wisdom that reason can acquire by what? Its natural abilities, right? But could wisdom of reason have another sense, right? Well, I was reading Thomas' commentary in the third book of the Dianima, right? The third book about the soul. And he says, well, do they begin a new book here in the Greek, you know, the third and last book, right? Because from this point, Aristotle has now started into what? Instruct us about what reason itself is, right? Okay? And it's really beautiful where Aristotle leads into that, right? And you finally find out that reason is not the brain. The reason is, is what? Something immaterial, right? It's not in the body, right? And this opens up the door, you know, for seeing the immortality of the human soul, right? And for Aristotle seeing in his later book there on the generation of animals, right, that the human soul doesn't come from the parents, right? The soul of a dog or the soul of a tree comes from the parent, and your body comes from your parents. It comes from God, but through your parents, your mother and father. But the soul comes immediately from what? God, right? So I tell my students, the mother and the father begin this body, right? And then God creates the immortal soul that fits that body in particular, right? So my soul can't take over your body and make it a... Think of it, right? And I think I mentioned the horrible story of Lygia there, right? He's a famous guy, the American writer, Oh, you said that called... Yeah, Edgar Allan Poe, yeah? Edgar Allan Poe, I think it's called Lygia, I think his name was it. The man is married to this woman, right? Who's a very intellectual woman, right? A very powerful mind, right? But finally she dies, but she sees, you know, her mind is really grasping to get a reality. And he marries another woman, right? And if I remember the story I write, it's been so long since I read it, you know, that she, this other woman he writes, you know, she starts to act more and more a little bit like Lygia. I think that she's taking over the body, right? With this great mental power that she has, you know? So that's why I remember the story anyway. I think you can go back and read it again, but once in a while it's a good thing, you know, I mean, this is a horrible thing, it's kind of a horrible story, right? But Thomas says, you know, that, you know, when Aristotle talks about the soul, he says, you have to see that the reason why the soul of a man can't be, go in and be the soul of a dog or a cat, right? like Pythagoras was saying that, right? Somebody was beating a dog, stop, stop, you know, you recognize his friend, you know, his soul. That's the story anyway, you know? And even Shakespeare talks about that, in some of the plays, right? This is not orthodox, but, you know, one argument Aristotle gives is the soul is defined as the first act of a natural body composed of tools, right? So if the soul in some way is to the bodily tools that it's composed of, as an art is to the tools of that art. and the soul and the soul Well, one art can't take over the tools of another art and use them, right? My example is always that my wife and my brother-in-law, my brother-in-law is a carpenter in his spare time, he uses a hammer and a saw, my wife sometimes makes a dress or something, she uses scissors and a needle and so on, my brother-in-law can't take the needle and sew the wood together, my wife can't take a hammer and nail and make the dress that way, so Aristotle is very concrete, right? But the soul fits this kind of organic body, right? Well, the more you study the connection between body and soul, it's immediate, right? This one fits that, and so it extends even down to the soul of a man not become the soul of a dog or cat, but even the soul of my body, right, can't take over the soul, they take over your body, right? So, if you're not satisfied with your body, with you, I mean, you can't take over, some of you are handsome, some of you are stronger, or more healthy, whatever it is, it doesn't be good, I mean, yeah, and so it's kind of interesting, you know, that your mother and father began a body, and God creates your immortal soul to fit that body, so if you had not begun that individual body, then God would never have created your immortal soul, right? When you say, I got a soul here, I got some body to throw it in, it fits, it fits that one, you know? Yeah, I'll just find somebody else, oh, there, so Thomas says in the third book, the idea that Aristotle is beginning now to approach, you think about the soul, and he's already in the premium section, the question of whether the human soul can survive death, which we very much want to know, right? Depends upon whether it has any activity that is not in the body, right? And then Aristotle shows, you know, eventually that the activity of the, what, universal reason, is not in the body, right? And this is partly known, you know, from the fact that it knows things universally, not in a singular way, but, couldn't you say that the third book on the soul, then, at least that part that deals with reason, is the wisdom of what? Reason. If Shakespeare can use the expression, the wisdom of nature, right, which for wisdom about nature, right, as well as the wisdom that nature reveals in its behavior, you can say that the wisdom of reason could be what? Yeah, yeah. And it's really in the third book of the soul that we really learn the nature of reason is something, you know, that's not the brain, as people think, you know, but it's something, yeah. Okay, but then there's a third sense of the wisdom of reason would be what? The wisdom, yeah, that'd be first philosophy, right, is the wisdom of reason, right? There's a thought, so this is not the wisdom of God, right? Yeah, but that would be the wisdom of God, right? So you're partaking of the wisdom of God by faith, right, huh? But what about, they call this science logic, they call it in Latin, you know, rational philosophy, right? Well, this is the philosophy that directs what? Reason, right? You know, Hugo's definition of reason, remember that, huh? We have these two definitions of reason, and one is the great definition, Shakespeare, right? And Shakespeare's definition of reason is the ability for large discourse looking before and after. They don't add anything like that, but it was the brevity of what? You know, as you ascend up the, what, angels, you know, from, we got them there first. The angels, the archangels, princes, right? Powers, the virtues, the lords, the un-convenience, they call them sometimes, and then the thrones, and then the what? Yeah, Sarah. Yeah. When Thomas is, is, uh, to start talking about this, uh, when Thomas talks about God, right, how does God know what he knows, right? Well, he shows that God understands himself, right? He's the only one who understands himself perfectly, right? Completely, right? And everything else he knows is by understanding himself, right? Both is the cause of other things, right? And the exemplar, everything else is modeled after, right? So God knows himself perfectly in every way he can imitate. He's imitated even by the stone, more so by the tree, more so by the cat, more so by man, even more so by the angels. And then he talks about the angels, right? But the Greeks, you know, said know thyself, you know, that's, that's just a man, not, not to the angels, right? Because what an angel knows primarily is himself, right? But, friends, right? In knowing himself, he doesn't know everything else. So to know everything else, right? In some way, the angel needs an addition to knowing himself, suit another understandable forms, and the other thoughts, you might say, right? But, as you go up the hierarchy of the angels, right? They have fewer thoughts in addition to their own substance. As you go down, they have more thoughts, right? They get to this miserable human mind, this intellectus abugratus, you know, the overshadowed season, right? Where you need kind of a, a little thought for everything you want to think about, right? And you have to go running from one to the other with this discourse, right? And that's why you have to, there's no discourse like that in the angels, right? And so, as you ascend the angels, right, they get, what, more perfect, because with these fewer thoughts, they understand more than the low-rangers do with more thoughts. And Thomas, you know, something like that human beings, you got students not too bright, you got to multiply your examples, and so on. And, that's true, isn't it? You know, they, you see, the classical school, the little baby piece. Yeah, yeah. And since Dion is always, you know, you're talking about monodexio, right? Leading by the hand, right? I was thinking, you know, how Thomas has, you know, five ways, you know, for proof of the essence of God in both sumas, you know? And he said, that is really, leading by the hand, you know? Then he talks about the substance of God, he has five parts, in both sumas, right? Leading by the hand. But Thomas says, you know, leading, you know, the mind, with propositions, less universal, right? You got to break things down, right? from people. So, if you added in this definition, you're going to lose the brevity of wisdom, right? But the brevity of God's wisdom, of course, is the most, right? As you go up to the angels, the brevity gets, what? You get wiser, and wiser, and wiser. The seraphim are the wisest of all, right? They have what? Right? So you got to respect that in the definition. Now, Hugo's definition of reason, was what? Reason is, understand, reason, and direct itself, and others. Now, Hugo's definition of reason, is obviously involving, you know, plagiarism, and a little bit there, you know, because, Hugo, was thinking of what, Aristotle says, The abilities of the soul, must be known, by the acts, for which they are, what? ability, right? And the acts have to be known to their, what, objects, right? And so, this is kind of a general truth there that you find out in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, right? That's reason's wisdom, which is that ability is known to act, right? Ability is known to the act which is in ability, right? And so, in reading Thomas's framing to logic and so on, Thomas will speak of the act of reason as being what? Understanding, right? Or reasoning, right? Okay? But then he distinguishes two understandings, right? Understanding what something is, and Aristotle wrote the book called The Categories for this purpose, and then there's understanding the true or the false, right? Which Thomas often calls composition and division, right? Because you're putting together or separating in negative statements what you've understood in the first act, right? So, purpose, you know, not purpose, you know, you wrote, you say, well, understanding is the first act of reason, and those two kinds of understanding unfold, and then reasoning itself, and the third act. We should obviously define reason, right? By its acts, right? The ability to understand and reason. But you might think that reason is kind of, you know, sitting by itself in a corner or something. Understanding and reasoning, you've got to realize that it can direct itself and others, right? And Thomas says it's the art of arts. Now, why does he call it the art of arts? Yeah. So, in all the other arts, your reason teaches you, right? Or your reason learns how to direct the hand or even the feet, right, huh? So, and, um, I cooked steak yesterday from 11 to 15 people on steak. And I had just a nice pink, you know? So, I did okay, I did okay. No, my wife made some special potatoes and broccoli we had and so on. Just let me know next time you're gonna, next time you're gonna, next time you're gonna. Which one else? Give me a call. So, in Hugo's definition, we had, it directs itself and then others, right? Right? Meaning other, what? Abilities and soul, like the will, right? And the emotions and so on, right? And then the hands and so on, the feet and so on. And even other people sometimes, right, huh? The parents do or the government does, huh? So, um, going back to then the amphiboli, right, huh? The wisdom of reason could be what? It could be the third book of the Dianima, right? It could be the first philosophy in another sense, or it could be, what? Logic, right, huh? So, these three senses of the world are the reason, huh? I'm excuse me, though, the wisdom of reason. I'm very fond of those activities, right, huh? So, let's come back here to the fallacy of the figura dictionis, right? And let's look at the first page here, right, huh? Look at the species or modes here in the second text there, huh? I don't care much about that first mode, huh? Because I don't like that Greek and Latin, male and female, right, huh? But take the second mode, right? From this, that some diction signifies through the mode of one predicament seems to signify through the mode of another, right? Well, take the example I was taking from Shakespeare there, that I-N-G, right, huh? In what category would you put walking? Which one of the ten categories did you put walking? Yeah. I just want to be careful about that place stuff now. Because place is put in the category of quantity under continuous quantity. So, if you put it under place, you're... Oh, my goodness, you see? He's fallen into a trap. Oh, my God. He fell into a trap. That's right. We did this last week, so we're... What kind of... Walking is in the category of where? You remember my great teacher there, Roman to Zurich, right? I showed you this picture. I got this picture if you want to see this picture, but it's only going to be joining us unless he's overlooking us here, you know? But Kusurik, you know, knocked into my silly little head when I was freshman in college. In the categories, Aristotle doesn't call these categories place and time, right, huh? Place and time are actually species of continuous quantity, as we said. But he names them, what, concretely, where and when, right? And I remember Paul also insisting, you know, that he didn't say that one of the categories is relation, like all the logic books would be saying, right? But Aristotle calls it, what, prosti, right? And my friend Albert the Great there, right, in his thing on the categories, he'll translate prosti as ad-oliquid, right? And that would be translated into English as toward something, right, huh? And there's a reason why Aristotle says that, right, huh? Rather than relation, right? It takes the onus in part, right, huh? You know, relation seems to signify towards something in the manner of something absolute, doesn't it? It's a very strange reality, this towards something, right? Very strange, huh? What is it to be double, or to be half, or to be a grandfather, and so on, you know? And towards my wife, I'm a, what, husband, yeah. Towards my son, Paul, I'm a, yeah. But towards these nine little ones right around the house, you know, the first thing they want is to bring down the, what, the little plastic things, what do you call it? Oh, legos? Yeah, yeah. Oh, yeah. The whole dining table is covered with, with, with, with, uh, legos. I said, this, look, I said, I said to them, this looks like a world fair. I said, what is this? All these things, you know, towers and things, and kinds of things, huh? Okay? So, um, so I'm, I'm towards you guys, I said I'm a teacher, right, huh? That's a very, you know, very kind of reality, you know, towards something, right? And then I'm, you know, correcting Thomas of all things, right, huh? Poor man. He wasn't, he wasn't, uh, entirely at home in, in Greek, I guess he was, he was Augustine. And there's some awareness that they have in Greek, right, huh? But in the Gospel of St. John, what word did they use in Latin, right? Or, I mean, what did it? Opud. Yeah. Yeah. Opud is maybe not the, because the Greek says, what? An archaim, it was the word. An archaim, hologos, right? Caiologos, saying what? Prost, hologos, right, huh? It was toward God, right, huh? Well, that's already indicating whether Augustine would, teach, and what? What he used to teach, and Thomas would teach, right? That the members of the, as the Trinity are what? In ancient. I'm sorry, towards them. Oh my goodness. He can't huff himself, right? I know. I can huff himself, right? See? He wants to make towards something be something absolute, right? Because you just can't descend to the lowness of... Yeah, yeah, yeah. And you know when you're around children and grandchildren and so on, and sometimes the child, what, especially immigrants, he'll get taller than his mother or father, right? And so you can be taller than your child and then all of a sudden becomes shorter, who no changed all of you, but because he grew and maybe had better food than you had or something, if you're an immigrant or something, right? And so you see these, you know, tagging, you know, they had a rough time coming up, but the offspring are taller than the mother or the father, you know? But how can I go from being taller, say, to being shorter with no change in me at all? A strange reality this is, right? Now, Thomas, when he takes up the distinction of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, he says that it can't be a material distinction because that's based upon the, what, continuous, right? And so in our good friend Euclid teaches us how to bisect a line, right? You get, what, the distinction of two lines now, right? And you can bisect them again and go on doing it forever, big deal, but it's divisible forever, right? But there's no, what, quantity in God of that sort, right? And so it must be by a formal, what, distinction. And a formal distinction is by opposites, huh? And then Thomas says, well, the one who says I am who am, it can't be by being and unbeing. It can't be by lacking and having, right? It can't even be by contraries, because one contrary is lacking in something in comparison to the other one. So it must be by what? Towards something, right, huh? So, so walking is in the category of what? It doesn't make sense to me. Well, you see Aristotle in the fifth post predicaments, right? The fourth post predicament, right? The fifth post predicament is to have, right? To have. What if you're walking on a treadmill and you're not moving? What category is that moving? Yeah. But emotion is put in some category, right? But it's something imperfect in that category, right? So when I, when I'm walking into this room, right, huh? I'm not entirely here. You wouldn't be here if you were all there. Funny, huh? He's not entirely here. He said about somebody. He said, it's not all there. Yeah, no, there, yeah. He said, it means that, huh? Beautiful. So when I'm walking, you know, into the room, right, I'm not, what, fully there, right? But it's in the category of where, I'm changing where I am, you might say, right? I'm getting to be somewhere, right? I'm coming to be somewhere, but I'm not, what, there. Yeah. So it's put in the category of where, right? Okay. Now, what about standing? What category is that? Same thing, standing, right? Walking, standing, you know? Position. Position, yeah, yeah. And standing would be what? Be position again, right? But warming up would be what? Yeah. What about learning? You guys learning anything? Yeah. It would be different species of quality, wouldn't it, learning? And warming up, right? About being, right? Coming to be what category? Yeah. Coming to be some fidgetary, right? The fallacy can be involved in here, right? Fallacy outside of language. So you can see, you know, you're imagining something maybe to be in the wrong category, right? Or to be in the same category as something else, because it has the same, what, ending of ing, right? Walking and running, like being aware and thinking, huh? I don't know where that is, do you? Praise thinking. Now, it's another thing like this, huh? It's this thing that, a lot of these things, you say, I don't understand the importance of this fallacy, right? But take this here, my kicking you, that's one of the fair examples, right? Now, there's a certain connection between my, as a result of my kicking you, right? But what would you say about my kicking you, huh? It proceeds from me into you, right, huh? So kicking is in between me and you, isn't it? It's from me into you. Or hitting you, right, huh? Hitting proceeds from me into your face or something, right? Okay. What about my seeing you, though? Well, this dummy here might say, by seeing you, it proceeds from me into you, towards you, right? He's seeing in between me and you, my seeing you, just like my kicking is between you and me, in more of a nonsense between us. Well, Thomas says in knowing, right, huh? Like seeing, or even in loving, right, huh? Knowing or seeing or loving, right? Proceeds from what? Me to you? Or is there already a union of you and me, right, from which proceeds seeing, right? Because your color and your what? Size, right, and so on, have acted upon my what? Eye, my sense of sight, right? And the result of that union, right, of your color and size with my eye, results in what? Yeah, yeah. But because I see you, right, seems to be like I kick you. I might imagine, right, I see you to be like I kick you. Something from me to you. Like as if seeing goes out of my eye towards you and to you, you know? That's kind of interesting, right? I bet if you went out and talked to the average guy on the street that he's never had his mind corrupted by philosophy, right? He would probably, you know, think of I see you like, yeah, yeah. And he has some, you know, thinker that I see a little bit like that right now, as if seeing is going out from the eye, you know, to the object, right?