Logic (2016)
Lecture 54: The Fallacy of Accident and Per Se Predication

Transcript
================================================================================

So if I take a piece of clay that's in the shape of a cube and I mold it into a sphere, right, what is coming to be? A sphere of clay or a sphere? Yeah, yeah, strictly speaking, right? And the spherical shape comes to be in the sense that it's that by which the clay is a sphere. But it doesn't come to be per se. Because then the sphere, the shape itself would have to have a matter to come to be from, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh my gosh, it's on, huh? Maybe we should go on to page 8 next time. I'm going to give you indigestion. But it shows you how some of these things are, right? I mean, just to that one kind of feloncy, right? But Aristotle, I think I started to mention this, so I didn't mention it. I mentioned it the other day, but in the Dianima, right, Aristotle says that they tried to assign the reason for knowledge, right, but not the reason for mistakes or error. That seems to be the usual state of the human mind to be mistaken. And so there's something incomplete about their, you know, consideration of what takes place in man, right? You know, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I like to put these two things together from my master's Aristotle and Thomas. Aristotle says to be mistaken is usually a condition of human mind. And Thomas, to be mistaken is a great part of misery, right? I was thinking, you know, about the Latin word error and the English word mistake, right? And this definition is not error, but error comes to be from the Latin word for wander, right, huh? Okay. So if you knew literature, you know that there's one that's about knight errant, a wandering knight, huh? It goes around rescuing, you know, damsels from trade and whatever it is. And erratic, right? So the word error suggests that a disordered movement of reason, right, is the source of error, right? That's how it's named, right? That your mind wanders, right, into error, right? Some people who know this, you know, just attack the wanderer, they're named, you know. And so it tied up with the word, what, what definition of reason? Yeah, discourse, right? Because discourse means that you're, what, running? But when this running is disordered, right, huh? Then it results in a, what, error, right, huh? So that's the lack of the word error, huh? And so that's kind of a sign, right, that reason, that error is a result of a disordered movement of reason, right, huh? That's interesting, huh? But now how is, what is the word mistake coming from? It seems to be, what? Yeah, to miss, right? Intuitive, right, huh? Okay. So this one girl was acting in the play and did a very good job, right, huh? And I made a mistake, right? I complimented her sister, right, huh? So I took her sister for her, right? But taking goes back to the, what, more to understanding, right, you know, that you're trying to grasp something, right, huh? And so kind of mistake is like a misgrasp thing, right, huh? So it's kind of named from the activity that is more, what, like understanding, right, huh? What's a misunderstanding? Misunderstanding seems to me closer, in etymology, to mistake, isn't it? It's kind of like the, might be the end product of a discourse or reason, right? And, you know, when they talk about the God and the angels, right? Well, God doesn't make mistakes, right? But even the angels in their natural knowledge don't make mistakes. And Thomas, when he takes up the divine mind, he denies, you know, at least negatively, there's no discourse in God's mind. And we involve a kind of emotion in God's mind, right? There's no discourse. But the angel doesn't know by discourse, either. It's right away, the, what, what he knows through knowing himself and what he knows by these other forms. It's already formed, right? I remember, I think I told you that I had my son, Marcus, and my boy, why can't we be born just doing everything we need to know, right? I said, you want to be an angel, not a man. That's what it is, right? You've got more of this creature, the angel, right, huh? So, Thomas Link denies discourse in the angels, strictly speaking, right? He's not coming to know what he, he doesn't know through what he does know, right, huh? Doing so in a disorderly way that we need to mistakes, you know? This is laborious. Yeah. I mean, how many things do we misunderstand? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, the usual state of the human mind seems to be mistaken, right? You know, Thomas, I would say, when Thomas would say that, you know, to be mistaken is a great part of misery. You know, you argue from, you know, the context I think he's talking about, whether we can be happy in this life, you know, well, in some sense we can be happy, but not perfectly, right? And one of the reasons he gives is that, or even things that we know are not, there aren't really sufficient reasons. We've got a kind of, a reason for taking that, I'm not too sure about the reason I gave, you know? You're right at it, huh? I like those two definitions of reason, because I think they kind of have some brevity to them, and they kind of harmonize, right? You can say, well, Shakespeare doesn't talk about understanding, right, huh? And, but discourse carries the idea of what? Reasoning, right? But you have to reason from something you understand. I used to say to the students, you know, if you understood nothing, would you have anything to reason from? So when Shakespeare says you have, as someone said, you know, reason is the ability to reason, right? That's the way I do it, but we could say that that includes, right, understanding, right? Yeah, if you didn't have understanding, if you can reason, you must understand something, reason from nothing. Just like in looking before and after, it implies that you have, what, the ability to see distinction, right? So, included in looking before and after is looking for distinction. Included in discourse, right, is understanding, too, right? But in Hugo's definition there, where he says, directing itself and others, right, huh? That tied up with order, right, huh? So when you say directing itself and others, that includes what? Looking before and after, right? Because you have to see order in order to direct yourself or anything else, right? And if you'll discover, you know, what else is kind of implied in these things, huh? But it's good, I think, that the Hugo's definition of self-understanding is some reason it does, right? So... Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment. Move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our mind. Lord, illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Thank you, Jesus. And help us to understand all that you have written. Holy Spirit, amen. I was thinking about Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? And can you define reason without words equivocal by reason? Well, it seemed like every word in the definition of reason is equivocal by reason. The first word in the definition of reason is that it's an ability, right? An ability has many senses. Aristotle, in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, he takes up the abilities for motion first, and there's even many kinds of ability for motion. The ability to be moved, right? And the ability to move something, right? Two different abilities, right? And then there's the rational ability and the natural ability to move. So he's distinguishing all kinds of senses of abilities. In reference to motion. And then the second part of the Ninth Book of Wisdom, he brings out other senses of act besides motion. And then other senses of ability, right? So, oh my God, right? What sense of ability does Shakespeare have in mind, right? Well, this might be the ability to do something, right? Okay? So you've got a word equivocal by reason there. Ability. And then he goes to what? The second word in the definition. It's ability for discourse, right? And does discourse have more than one meaning? Well, it can mean running from one thing to another, right? Or it can mean coming to know what you don't know to what you do know, right? At least those two senses. So that word is equivocal by reason. And in both senses, reason is an ability for. Then you have large, right? Reason is capable of a large discourse. And that can mean a discourse that covers a large area because it's about the universal. Or it can mean a discourse about something great, like a discourse about the soul, which is a great discourse, right? Because the soul is the best thing here in this material world. Or a discourse about the angels, or ultimately a discourse about God himself. Then you come to the word looking. Well, that looking can mean the act of the eye. It can mean the act of the memory or imagination. It can also mean the act of reason. So that's the word equivocal by reason. And then finally you have the word, what? Looking before and after. And we know from the categories of Aristotle that the word before is equivocal by what? Reason, right? So it seems you can't define reason without words that are equivocal by reason, huh? But now does Shakespeare in defining reason tell you what it is to use reason? And in particular, what it is to use reason, for how you use reason, to know a word equivocal by reason? Well, you have to run from one of these meanings to another meaning, right? To start to understand the word, right? Before can mean before in time, right? It can mean before in being. It can mean before in the discourse of reason. It can mean before in goodness, right? It can mean the way the cause is before in effect, right? So I can run from one of these meanings to another. But in a word equivocal by reason is distinguished from a word equivocal by chance. There's an order among the meanings, right? And therefore you have to look before and after. Interesting, right? You can't define reason like Shakespeare does without using all these words equivocal by reason. But his definition also tells you how to use your reason to understand these words equivocal by reason. Isn't that tied up very nicely, right? Because you have to run from one sense to another. It's kind of beautiful. And then you have to look before and after, right? And when Thomas is in the fourth book of Aristotle's natural hearing of physics, and Aristotle distinguishes eight senses, eight central or chief senses, I call them, of in or to be in, right? Well, Thomas, of course, runs from one sense to another, right? But Aristotle hasn't ordered them except to say that the first meaning is what? To be in this room, right? To be somewhere. And then Thomas does what? He looks before and after and orders them from the first to the eighth sense, right? One, two, three, all, every perfect order, right? So he's following, he's using his reason, right? Aristotle and Thomas to what? Go from one sense of in or to be in to another sense of to be in and then looking before and after to order those senses, huh? It's kind of marvelous, huh? Shakespeare could write that because he followed Aristotle and St. Thomas. Or else he had natural genius, right? It could be that, so. Now, you could also run to the highest perfection of reason, which is called what? Wisdom, right, huh? And the discourse of the wise man, right, is the largest discourse of all, both in the sense that it's about the, what? Universal, because it's about the most universal. It's about being in one, which is a set of everything, right? So it's the largest discourse of any, in that sense, but also in the sense of the better things, right? The discourse of the wise man is about, what? Separated substances and ultimately about God, right? So, he's got the largest discourse of anybody. And he especially looks before and after, as Aristotle said, right? Sapientis est ordinari, right? And Thomas gives us the reason why the wise man most of all sees order, considers order, is because he's the highest, his wisdom is the highest perfection of what? Reason, yeah? But it fits exactly with Shakespeare's definition. It also reminds us of the importance now of words equivocal by reason, right? You can't understand them without following Shakespeare's definition of reason. And you can't understand or make the definition without using such words, right? But then when you get into statements, right? And we talked before how some statements are known through other statements. But then we ask, can all statements be known through other statements? Yeah, we know some statements through other statements. But are all statements known through other statements? If every statement was in need of being known through other statements, you'd never know any statement. Because any statements you use, right, to know something, some statement, you'd have to know them first, right? And before you could know them, you have to know other ones. So what? Hadnazium, right? I didn't do it yet. A statement. Yeah. So there must be some statements that are known through themselves, right? But what about the words in these statements that are known through themselves? What are called axioms, right? Statements that are known through themselves in some way by all men, right? Can you state these statements without words equivocal by reason? Well, the most common example of an axiom that you always give is the whole is more than a part, right? And are the words whole and part univocal or equivocal? Equivocal by reason, right? I remember how I was playing the sophist there with my students. I mentioned the assumption. And I start off in a nice, folksy way by saying that I said one day that man is an animal. My mother says, that doesn't sound good, Dwayne. She never went to college, but it doesn't sound good. I said, well, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. She says, well, that's better, Dwayne. She said, and so I said, animal is the only part of what man is. And I said, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant. So sometimes the part is more than a whole. Oh, oh, oh. Dr. Bristbist says so. It must be true. No, but I mean, it seems like, you know. Sometimes it is, right? Well, you're mixing up two different senses, right? A whole, the whole that is put together from its parts, the composed whole, the integral whole, as they call it sometimes, and then the universal whole, right? Which is not put together from its parts, but set of them. They're called subject parts for that reason, right? And the composed whole is more than one of its parts. It's composed or more than one of its parts. And the universal whole is set of more than one of its parts. But they're not the same sense of whole and part, right? So even to understand, it's always a common example of an axiom, right? I don't think it's so easy to say, right? Everybody knows what a whole and part is with, you know, because there's quantitative holes and so on. And so everybody knows that axiom, but even the students don't realize maybe at first that these words are, what, equivocal by reason. If you take the axiom, which Aristotle says is the natural beginning of all axioms, that something can't both be and not be at the same time in the same way. Well, of course, the word being is most very equivocal by reason, right, huh? That's kind of amazing, right? You can't understand most definitions, right, without words equivocal by reason. That's sort of the definition of reason you can't. And you can't even state the axioms without words equivocal by reason. But you can't understand words equivocal by reason, whether they're in definitions or in statements, without, what, running from one sense to another sense, at least the chief senses, and looking before and after that, Shakespeare said. What a marvelous man that Shakespeare was, huh? But it also helps you to know what wisdom is, right? That wisdom is the highest perfection of reason. You shouldn't be surprised that it's about the most universal things that is said of all, but also about the best things, right? And that the wise men will be looking for order, right, and ordering things more than anybody else, right? It's a marvelous definition of reason, right? Much more impressive than Hugo's definition, I think. Not that Hugo's definition is... No, no, no, but yeah. But this is kind of marvelous, this one here. Never heard the modern philosophers talking about words being equivocal by reason, huh? I don't think they talk about reason. Yeah. I always give an example, you know, that when I was a student at Laval University there, in the library there, there were bound copies of all the theses that people had gotten doctorates from, or maybe the master's too, but maybe doctoral theses. And sometimes you'd go and look at one of these theses if you're interested in the topic of it, right? Everybody was interested in Marxism, you know, at the time because of the Cold War and so on, right? And I remember reading one of the theses on Marxism, you know? Well, what's the official name of Marxist philosophy? Yeah, yeah. Materialism means that matter is the beginning of all things, and dialectical means that things develop out of matter by the war of the opposites, right? So opposites are what? Altogether essential for Marxist philosophy, right? It's one of the two pillars, you might say, right? Matter is the beginning of everything, and everything else develops out of matter through that conflict of opposites. Well, the word opposite is what? Equivocal by reason. And the Marxist never distinguishes the senses, right? Which Aristotle does in the categories, huh? Before we get to the word before, right, he takes up the word opposite and distinguishes between, you know, contradictories and contraries and having and lacking and then relatives, right? Well, it's something so fundamental for the Marxist philosophy, right? They shouldn't have been aware of the fact that the word opposites are what? Yeah, yeah. I mean, they might use the word contradiction, you know, for any kind of opposition, you know, or even, you know, contraries and so on. So this, this is ignorant, ignorant, right? Aristotle realized, you know, that these common words especially, right? Shakespeare's a large discourse, you know, you're very often, it's the common words that have these senses of being equivocal by reason, right? Like before, I think, for common words, that's marvelous, marvelous. Shakespeare's a wise man, right? He's really wiser than the modern philosophers. More entertaining, right? So we should look today a little bit at the fallacy of the accident, then. Everybody have anything, huh? Which one is it? Which one is the one that's on fallacy of the accident proper? Fallacy of the accident, the one that you've got, yeah. Now this is the first of the kinds of fallacies outside of what language? right now you want to take these up kind of one by one because it's very hard to understand the distinction of these kinds of fallacies well i start off here with a quote from my teacher in logic albert the great and he is a commentary in all these books of the uh as i go i'm not the uh yeah yeah but also the other books of aristotle right but notice he says here the fallacy of the accident is before all the others right in the order of fallacies right as fallacies are because plus haba it has more of the power right the vertute the cheapy andy right so this is a very important one right now a little text here from thomas aquinas and the 11th book after the books of natural philosophy the 11th book of wisdom there being 14 books of wisdom he'll touch upon the strength of this fallacy right now thomas says no science which is truly science and has suititude considers about being parachutins now what does that mean now what does the the eritmetician now consider about the number two does he talk about there being two chairs he talks about what belongs to two as such right now some things belong to two as such because they pertain to what two is so he considers that two is a number and he considers that two is what an even number right he considers it two is a prime number right what the only even yeah yeah he also considers that two is half of four maybe and a third is six right because it belongs to two as two to be half of four right to be a third of six right or the geometry right he considers what belongs to the triangle as such right well some things belong to the triangle as such that it has what three sides right then okay that it's a continuous quantity right and then he starts to show properties of triangle right so it belongs to triangles such to have three angles inside right and those three angles to be equal to two right angles proposition 32 in the first book of euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's e euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's euclid's Well, that's what Thomas is saying. No science, which is very, truly science, right, and has suititude, considers about being Pratchettians. It's only sophistica. Negotiates about it, right? And it uses it to what? Deceiving, right? And what is Pratchettians, it uses it as if it were per se. Some people can't see the distinction between the per se and the Pratchettians. Shakespeare touched upon, accidentally, when he said reason looks before and after, right? Because there's an axiom about what? Before and after. That nothing is before or after itself, right? It's like the axioms of beginning and end. Nothing is a beginning of itself. Is it? Can something be the beginning of itself? Can something be an end of itself? Yeah, you're your worst enemy, huh? But, you know, when Thomas takes up, you know, in the Summa Conte Gentiles, in the first book he considers God, what, in himself or by himself, right? And then in the second book he considers God as a beginning. And in the third book, God is the end, right? And, uh, but what is he the beginning, the end of? Himself? Yeah, yeah. So nothing is the beginning of itself, right? You know, when Hermenides and Melisius, you know, in the first book of the Physics, are talking about what, um, there could be no multiplicity, right, huh? Herstel says they're doing away with beginnings, right? Because nothing is the beginning of itself, right? So here's the axiom of, of before and after, that nothing is before or after itself, right? You'll see Thomas using that sometimes in the thing, right? Nothing is, hey, what? The cause of itself, right, huh? Can God have a beginning? It would be either himself, right, or something else that is causing his beginning. If something else causes a beginning, he wouldn't be the first cause, would he? And he can't be the beginning of himself because nothing is the beginning of itself, Thomas says. Okay? So, um, if you can't see certain distinctions, you're going to be deceived, right, huh? You can't see the different senses of the word, right? You know, there's a beautiful objection to, uh, creation. Uh, is creation, uh, to, to create, is that to be a cause in some way? It's a cause of the creature, right? Okay. But there are four senses of cause. Matter, form, mover, and end, huh? To which of these are you going to reduce the creator? Yeah, yeah. And so sometimes we say in scripture, you know, God made heaven and earth, right? It's not making in the way we make, of course. Or we have to have some material like wood to make a table or wood to make a chair. Wood and chair, right, huh? But God, you know, creates without any, what? Matter. Matter, yeah. Yeah. So whatever he created must have been able to be, so it wasn't nothing then, was it? So God's just like us, you know? You know, you do some carpentry, I guess, right? I mean, this, yeah. Yeah. So, what you needed is something that was able to be a table or a chair, right? And wood is able to be, right? These things. So God must have, you know? He's going to pile it up. Yeah. We're mixing up two different senses of ability, right? Because when you say that God couldn't make something that was not able to be, able to be means what? It doesn't involve a contradiction. Could God make a square circle? Because that's not able to be. It involves a contradiction, right? So whatever God created must have been able to be. Not that it had some kind of matter that was able to be created into something, right? You're mixing up two different senses of ability. It's very hard to see that distinction of those two senses of ability. But you're mixing up those two senses. The sense in which matter, you'd say wood, is able to be a wooden table or a wooden chair, right? Where it is really something. Or he had a little bit of being, right? See? But when he said God is omnipotent, right? Well, that doesn't mean that he can make something that involves, what? A contradiction. So he can't make an even number that is odd. Parallel line. Yeah. It's the model that's in there, right? Not in any age. Yeah, I'm going to get it. But they're not really parallel lines, right? Yeah. A few years ago, I heard some of these arguments about certain limitations on God or certain things that God couldn't do. And it was just a very sort of a very shallow surface sort of thing. I didn't hear too much about it. But is it true to say that the way the Lord made creation, that certain things just aren't possible because it's his will? As far as it's possible for there to be a square circle or... No. But there's an opposition between that and being, right? A square can't be a circle. Right. But as far as... It's not that God is limited. It's just that God... That's not something. That's not something. That's not something, right? It's nothing. A square circle is nothing. Right. It is. And nothing. But often Thomas would say, somebody can't say distinction, right? You know? I was reading the beautiful chapter there, 16 of the first book of the Sumacan Gentiles, right? And this is the chapter where Thomas brings out, first, forcibly, right, that God is pure act, right? Well, then, in the second part of the chapter, he talks about the mistake of David Inan, who said that God is, what, the first matter there, see? And they can't differ by, what, anything, right? Because then they would be, what, imposed, right? So, an odd number differs from an even number, not by being a number, but the one is, what, physical and theoretical parts, and the other is not, right, huh? So, there would have to be some difference to separate God from, what, first matter, right? And Thomas says, well, David doesn't know the difference between, what, a difference and a, what, diversity, right? And because God is pure act, and the first matter is pure passivability, right, they have nothing in common, so they're not the same thing. It's not that they have something, but when you have a difference, though, you have something in common, right, they come together in some way, and then there's some difference that separates them, right? And the word difference in Greek is, what, diaphora, which means to, what, carry a part, right, so you carry apart things that are together in some way, right? So, if you put me and the dog together, because we're both animals, right, what carries us apart? I'm two-footed, and he's four-footed, right, huh? Simple way, right? He's a four-footed animal, I'm a two-footed animal. Well, you prefer wine, he likes just wine. Yeah, yeah. You're a philosopher, he's just a one-of-the-philosophers. Yeah, yeah. But Aristotle usually defines man in metaphysics as two-footed animal, you know? Yeah. So, you have to ask him to carry us apart, because they're both animals, being the dog. I got a little distracted today, I had to do some lawnmower and so on, sitting down, sitting on a turret. There was a magnificent squirrel up in the tree there in the backyard, you know? And we got pretty tall trees there in the backyard, huh? And I was watching, you know, just looking at the window there, because I was kind of resting there between my jaws. You know, the squirrel's coming down to the tree like that, you know? And I said, you know, a cat can't do that, you know? They're not going to do that with their claws, you know? And, uh, but then I was watching him come down, and there's kind of these, like, oh, these split trees, you know? And there's distance between like this. He jumps from here over to there. I said, yeah, well, hi! I mean, he's got to get squashed if he falls down, but, is he, is he, is he, is he, you know? So sure. Yeah. I said, even in the squirrels, I used to, you know, kind of dislike squirrels because they look, kind of reminded me of a mouse or a rat or something, you know? And I said, you know, even in the squirrels, I have something to admire, you know? So, you know, we have to have something in common before we can have the diaphora. Or difference in the Latin same, same, uh, etymology, right? Sphero, you know, phora, which means carry, right? And, uh, and then, uh, what? Apart, diaphora, right? You know? Metaphora means, what, carry over, right? But this means carry apart, diaphora. So one of the five predicables, right? Is, what, diaphora, right? Yeah. There's nothing that carries apart man, I mean, God, rather, and first matter. They're, they're other by themselves, right? Because the one is pure act and the other is pure ability. So nothing about it. Yeah. And, uh, seriously, you didn't see that, right? Well, you know, if you talk about, you know, um, the difference between, say, an odd number is a hundred even number, right? Well, because the even number is divisible to two equal parts, and the odd number is not divisible to two equal parts, and the odd number is not divisible to two equal parts. That carries them apart, right? Separates them, right? And now if you say, what separates divisible to two equal parts and not divisible to two equal parts? Is there some further difference that separates them? Do they have a difference that separates them, carries them apart? No. What, what, what? They're, they're what? Separate by themselves, because the one, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So because David did not put in, see this distinction between difference and diversity, right? Between things that are carried apart by some difference from, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Because you wouldn't carry things apart unless they were in some way together, right? And then things that are no way together, right? See, you couldn't see that distinction, right? Well, people have a hard time seeing the distinction between the Pharisee and the Procetism sometimes, right? Notice what Thomas says now, right? They're saying that thing about science. He said, sola sophistica. He's busy about this, right? And for deceiving he uses what is paracidans as if it were paracidans. People can't see that, right? Whence there comes about the fallacy of the accident, right? Which is the first one outside of the speech. Which is saying the same thing like Albert, huh? Efficacissima, most efficacious, to deceiving even the wise men. That's what Aristotle says, right? Even the wise men is deceived by this, I guess. But the rest of us, huh? As is said in the first book of the Helen Coram, huh? Now, take this example at the bottom of the page here, right? The singular is understood. I understand. I understand. what you are there over there you're a man so the singular is understood and what is understood is universal therefore the singular is universal mistake by the accident right for the material singular as such is not what understood strange thing i'll take the example here after the second text from albert the great he's talking about there being a defect of the middle term right huh socrates is a man true enough right and man is a species true enough therefore socrates is a species what that's pretty glad soldiers isn't it yeah yeah you say a is b and b is c then he must be c right what's wrong with that it's just perfect soldiers as far as i can see right what's wrong with that take another one example of this um is a cat an animal yes or no you admit that cat is an animal you're not going to go back to that now are you okay now animals said a dog yes or no yes okay so you said a cat is an animal and now you mean that animal said a dog so therefore cat is what said a dog said a dog you just proved that a dog is a cat it's necessary that the cat is what that's there's nothing actually i don't know about that is there the cat is an animal that is altogether firm right and you also admit that animals said a dog but cat is an animal an animal said a dog then cat must be said a dog you've just proven beyond a doubt that the dog is a cat like propositions necessary right now it's my own invention or discovery or thought or maybe it isn't but it's kind of known i don't remember seeing it so explicitly but i think the fowls of the accident right most of all deceives us right when it's there necessarily see necessarily the cat is an animal that statement is not contingent right like the cat is brown or something right that'd be contingent right the cat can be brown like this mother color too right but a cat must be a fern right an animal must be said a dog that's also the series isn't it therefore a cat must be said a dog you're not even watchable you see you can't do that's that's how we we do it right i mean aristotle himself said in the categories right if if substance is said of animal and animal is said a dog then substance must be said a dog right the dog is an animal an animal is a substance then a dog must be right if three is a odd number an odd number is a number then three must be at what yeah you can't deny reason okay so um marin is a man and man is said of michael must be said of michael michael's marin so you've got some guy just learned all about the soldiers and writing you know c is b and b is a therefore c is a right this is perfect it's a perfect argument right you know it's very hard to what yeah what's what's the felt in this argument why isn't uh michael marin or vice versa some change around there exactly how he expressed in words you see this is the most efficacious for deceiving you why is animal said of cat because animals said of dog that's why it said a cat but is animal said of cat because animals said of dog that's kind of accidental isn't it well is said of cat because the cat is a living body with sensation right that's what an animal is it's a living body without sensation right so it's a cat an animal because animals said of dog that's accidental right what else is said of right so it's being said of cat it's not said of cat because it's said of dog it's said of cat because the cat is a living body with sensation we're not saying animal of cat so we can say instead of dog a cat right we use those necessarily said of dog right and cat is necessarily also an animal that's a very subtle thing right and see how people can be taken into that sort of thing you know what square is is a square definition a square is a square definition i'm gonna make you eat your words now i'm kind of hungry a square is a equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral you look at that i'm not gonna go back right now okay now it's equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral square i mean definition rather can you say the square is that and that is a definition so now you're just going to be forced to admit that a square is a what definition no you are well you see um isn't it necessarily true the square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral quadrilateral is a definition right so if the square is that and that is a definition then the square is a definition obviously right but if i said to you you know a square is a um quadrilateral right and the quadrilateral is a plane rectilineal plane figure right then wouldn't you admit that the square is a definition because you say it's this which is the definition and therefore it is a definition don't you admit that the square is the equilateral right-handed quadrilateral and don't you admit that equilateral right-handed quadrilateral is a definition yeah therefore the square must be definition yeah but it's kind of hard to see what it is what's wrong with that it seems to me to be a real syllogism doesn't it it has a likeness or so yeah yeah yeah Socrates and species and that there's the singular and the universal and there's an element of that not saying this is the solution but that the definition is a universal definition could be speaking of a universal square or this is not the way that this is not the answer I think you're looking for and it may not even be valid. But it would be hard to say what's wrong with this argument right because it does seem to have the form of a sojism right you know but is equilateral and right angled quadrilateral set of square because it is a definition or because it expresses the nature yeah expresses what it is right but not because it's a definition it's hard to get a hold of right so it's kind of accidental to the reason why it's said it right you know it seems you know to be necessarily so right very very hard to avoid that Do you think there's a lot of this fallacy in public discourse Oh yeah oh yeah oh yeah oh yeah oh yeah especially you know we get into these more universal things right now okay now take a take um take another kind of example here did you become a monk now if you become a monk then you are a monk right so So if you put the soft butter into the refrigerator it becomes what you admit that something becomes something it isn't right so now you are admitting that the soft has become hard and therefore the soft must be hard so you are admitting that the soft can be hard What is the kind of addiction you are really mixed up Yeah you are really mixed up The soft can be Yeah Where can it come from Well I have reasoning when it is becoming right you admit that when you put the butter in the refrigerator the soft becomes hard right Right Or if you take the butter out of the refrigerator it will be soft right so sometimes the soft becomes hard and sometimes the hard becomes soft right Right And what does the word becomes mean Right Yeah so it comes to be So if the soft comes to be hard then the soft is hard You have to admit that then it comes you came to be a monk so you now are a monk aren't you Well then if the butter the soft became hard then the soft now is hard Same thing as you right just because you are you know you think it is better to be a monk than to be hard you know He's trying to butter me up But I think that is the fact that it is said the butter is not the softness of the butter Yeah it is the butter as such that became hard And it became soft Not the softness Yeah but it takes one example I say if you put the butter in the ice box to the refrigerator I call it ice box It is a horrible fight we have about this all the time Yeah I always call it the ice box to the refrigerator all the time East to the east and west is west Yeah But when the soft becomes hard it is accidental right It is the butter as such that becomes hard right And but soft belongs to the butter before it becomes hard right So what happens to the butter before it is hard is said to be what becomes hard right So you are kind of putting the soft which is accidental It is not the soft that really becomes hard the soft is lost The softness is lost when it becomes hard And if you think of the soft is what becomes hard It seems that the soft now has come to be hard Just like he is going to be you know I came to be married so I am married So if the soft became hard the soft must now be hard right But you are confusing the But Heracardi speaks as if one opposite is the other right Because change is always between opposites And in change one opposite becomes the other right But you are speaking what? Heracardi is right So in the first book of natural hearing The first book of the so called physics of Aristotle right He is distinguishing between what really becomes the opposite right Which is the subject underlying the other opposite right But not the other opposite as such right But since the butter was soft before it became hard It seems like the soft has become hard right And we would speak that way wouldn't we? The soft becomes hard right The cold becomes hot right The young become old Yeah, yeah, yeah So the healthy sometimes are sick right And the sick become healthy So the sick are healthy and the healthy are sick That is kind of an argument from the accidental right And yet it seems there is some kind of necessity there though is it right Because the only thing that could become hard is something that is what? Soft If you are already hard you can't become hard right But you have to be soft to become hard right So it seems what? Per se because it seems to be what? Necessary right? And if I say you know Four is necessarily a number right? It seems to be per se doesn't it? Four is necessarily what? Yeah Yeah Four is necessarily double of two Four is necessarily half What seems to be necessary seems to be per se right now? Aristotle talks about this right? In the post-no-litics he talks about demonstration right? If you are trying to show that something is necessarily so right? It is going to have to be per se right now? Well what becomes hard must necessarily be soft What becomes hot must necessarily be cold or lukewarm or something like that right? And so it seems to be what? Per se right? It seems to me that the accidental deceives people most of all When it is what? Some kind of necessity there right? Just like in those other examples now where we say Michael is a man Man is said of you right? Bernardo Bernardo yeah And therefore Michael is said of Bernardo right? Yeah Well Michael is necessarily a man And man is necessarily said of Bernardo Therefore Michael is necessarily said of Why not? Seems like a pretty valid soldier right? Can't you follow the argument? What's the matter with you? You're sweet? See how this can get very I was rereading the Veritati there Thomas was talking about the justification of the impious right huh? And what comes first you know? What's the matter with you? What's the matter with you? What's the matter with you? What's the matter with you? What's the matter with you?