Logic (2016)
Lecture 55: The Fallacy of Accident and the Per Se/Per Accidens Distinction

Transcript
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It's a time in which he's, what, turned away from God, right? And then a time in which he's turned towards God, right? The end of the time in which he's turned away from God and the beginning of the time when he's turned towards God, a day of the same. Well, then there's a time in between which he's neither turned away from God but turned towards God. Is that possible? No. Because then he can turn away from his sin without grace, right? He doesn't have grace yet. What's the solution to that, right? But is there a last instant in which he's turned away from God or is there just a first instant in which he's turned towards God, right? But if you think, you know, that's a different, here's a last instant in which he is turned away from God. Either you say that's the same instant in which case he's turned away from God and turned towards God. Yeah, which is a contradiction, right? Or else, not that it can't be the same instant, right? Therefore, there must be some time in between in which case he's, what, no longer turned away from God so he doesn't need grace to turn towards God, to turn away from his sin, right? You see a very different problem. In the fallacy of the accident, I'll listen to page two here now, in the English, yeah? In the fallacy of the accident, the middle term is not connected with one of the extremes in the same way, or insofar as it's connected with the other extreme. For example, Socrates is a man, and man is a species. Therefore, Socrates is a species, huh? Well, Socrates is not a man insofar as man is something universal in reason, huh? Socrates is a man by reason of what man signifies, an animal with what? Reason. Now, to be a species happens to man insofar as man is said of Socrates, right? But nevertheless, it belongs to what? Man as such to be a species, right? It's very hard to avoid that, right? But is man said of Socrates because Socrates is a universal, as man is? Or is man said of Socrates because Socrates is a species, as man is? Or is Socrates a man, is man said of Socrates because it signifies the nature of? So you've got to see the distinction there, right, huh? So if someone says, is man said of Socrates as such? You've got to be very careful there, right? Yeah. Not because of its universality. Because man is. Or because it's a definition. So he has it. Yeah. Michael is a, what, rational animal? Rational animal is a definition. Therefore, you're a definition, right? You belong in the science of logic, right? Smile when you're saying that. Yeah, you belong in the logic, right, huh? It's a logic we find out that Michael's really a definition. Like a defining moment. Yeah. He's a speech signifying what something is. That's what he is, right? No one is? So we say, we admit that Michael is a man, right? And we admit that man is a, what? That man is a, uh, having reason. And we admit that that is a, what? Definition. Definition. Therefore, Michael is a definition, huh? You don't belong in natural science. You belong in logic. It's a very hard thing for people to express, though, right? When you first, first meet it, huh? We admire Aristotle and Porphyry, right, huh? They both do the same thing. You know, Porphyry was asked by a guy named, I guess, Chrysaurus, something like that in the Greek. Chrysaurus is trying to understand what's called the categories of Aristotle. He's went across these words, genus, difference, species, property, accident, right? What the hell do these words mean, right? And so he asks him to explain it, right? How was his name? Porphyry says, Oh, Chrysaurus, it says, to know what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what property and accident is, is not only necessary for understanding categories like you wanted, and that's the way you came to me, but for understanding definition, for understanding division, the definition is, what, of a species by genus and differences, right? And one of the most important kinds of division is the division of a genus into its species by differences, right? So again, understand those five things, right? To understand definition, division, right? And demonstration, because in demonstration you prove a property of a species through an understanding of its nature, right? Because, you know, you're asking something that's so important for, not just to understand the categories of Aristotle, it was very important for that, but for understanding definition, division, demonstration, I mean, wow. But then, I'm struck by the fact that porphyry, right? When he gives those five, he gives them in this order. Genus, difference, species, property, accident. But when he gets into each of the five, right, he takes a genus first, and then what does he take up second? Yeah? And then comes difference, and property and accident, right? So there's one change in the order, right? Is that just, is that just, you know, closiness in this part, right? He puts difference in the premium, right? He puts difference before what? Yeah. But in the tractatus, the drawing out, the thing, he puts what? Does he know what he's doing? I mean, is he looking before and after? I mean, which comes before? In the premium, you've got the difference before the species. In the Swedish, you've got the species before the difference. Which comes first? Difference or species? Well, which comes before? What's this now? It's critical by reason. He had a no. Yeah, yeah. In what sense of before does difference come before a species? The order of being, isn't it? In what sense, though, does species come before difference? Yeah. The order of knowing. Yeah, yeah. That's interesting, because genus and species are like father and son, right? They're kind of correlates, right? So genus is a name said with one meaning of many things, right? Other than species, right? Signifying what it is. So it kind of defines genus in comparison to species, right? And then species is what is placed directly under the genus. You know what the genus has said in answer to the question of what is it, right? Just turn them around, right? Okay? So in the order of knowing, species comes right next to the genus, right? And then when he proceeds to difference, right? He gives, you know, a couple notions of difference. One is a difference is what a species has in addition to a genus. Now he's defining difference by what? Genus and species, right? Okay? Or he gives another notion of difference. A difference is what separates species under the same genus. So you're making known what difference is through genus and species, right? Plus the fact that genus and species are kind of relative to each other, right? Do you see that? But in what way is difference prior to species, right? Well, take the definition of what? Square, right? It's an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. Well, there can't be a, what, square without a quadrilateral. But there can be a quadrilateral without a square. Can there be equilateral without a square? Yeah, you have what's called the rhombus, like jerks. But my mammonic device is rhombus, you know. It's kind of, that's at the end, right? So it's like a square, right? It's equilateral, right? So equilateral, even in the genus of quadrilateral, can be without square. But can square be without equilateral? No. See? And then the other one is what? Right-angle, right? And can there be a square without right angles? All right angles? No. But can there be right angles without a square? Yeah, in the abloh, right? You know? People call rectangles of mine, but the abloh. So, in the order of being, you might say, right? Genius is before, what? Equilateral. It can be without equilateral. And equilateral is before, what? It can be without square, but not face versa. Magnificent, right? He's giving them in the order of being there, right? And then he's, what? Giving them in the order of knowing them. Just one thing is turning around, right? Aristotle does the same thing in the categories, right? Because when he first enumerates the categories in the anti-predicaments, right? He gives substance first, then how much, or quantity, and then how, or quality, and then what? Yeah. But in the order, he takes up what? Quality, yeah. Because of the, what? Of knowing these things, right? The fact that things that are really relations, I mean, really basically qualities, are said to be of or towards something, right? And because Plato's not defined fully, so you have to take up gradation in some way, distinguish, right? Between something whose whole nature is to be towards something, right? And something who is basically something other than gradation, but has some gradation following upon it, right? So it's kind of interesting, right? There's one thing where it's, you know? It's just how subtle these guys are, and how carefully Porphyry is writing, and Aristotle really admire them, you know? They're really looking for an actor, and seeing in different senses, the innocent minds. You don't find a care in the modern philosopher, at least, just, I mean, sloppy, very sloppy. We were talking last night about the, you know, we were talking a little about the distinction between the image and the thought, right? Of course, in English philosophers, like Locke and so on, you know, use the word idea, you know? But sometimes they mean an image, sometimes they mean a thought, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, imagine that. I don't get it. Yeah, the London psalm, yeah, imagine. Well, we had a priest here many years ago, I asked him to translate something from Spanish. Yeah. He had to do a philosophy in it, because I didn't read Spanish. So, now, I never knew in Spanish, but I read, when he translated into English, he used the word something, and I said, I think what you mean there is to conceive what I thought. And he said, no, no, I think it was a man. And so, I said, what does the Spanish say? And he brought it up in whatever it was called severe in Spanish. And, oh, he said, yeah, conceive, imagine, you know, it's all the same. And then, I don't think it's the same. Well, there's an interesting likeness between the imagination and reason, right? Because when you imagine something, you form an image, right? And when you think about something, you form a, what, thought, right? So, it's a little bit different from the exterior senses, right? Right, huh? So, you know, when Thomas comes to talk about the Trinity, right, huh? I don't think it takes it to be a demonstration, right? But it seems that when you think about something, right, there's a thought that proceeds from you, right? So, it's not quite as mystified, right, huh? That there should be a thought in God, right? It's the likeliest that we do the two of you, you know? So, to be a species happens to man insofar as man is said as Socrates, right? Well, even that's kind of hard to see, you know, because you might say, it doesn't happen that man is a species, right? A species, by definition, you know, is going to be able to be said as a signature, right? What belongs to man insofar as man is in reason, where it is universal and more precisely a species, happens to man insofar as man is said as Socrates, not the reason of its being in the mind. Since man signifies in general what Socrates is, an animal with reason, it says Socrates is the reason of what Socrates is, or it signifies this in what? In general, right? It is not said of Socrates the reason of what happens to it in reason. So, can we excuse you from being a definition? Because to be an animal that has reason in your mind or our mind is a definition, right? That's not why we say your animal has reason. That's your definition, right? It happens to you in mind. Hard thing, no? Okay, this work that I mentioned before, the Fallacis, the Quo Stam Nobili Artistis. If you look at these short philosophical works of Thomas, this is one of them, right? It's in the Marietta edition, right? There's some dispute as to whether it's really by Thomas, you know, but a lot of them think that it was written after he was kidnapped. Or something, you know. It's very exciting for his friends there, right? Probably interested in these things, right? It should be said, therefore, first about the Fallacy of the Accident. For it should be known that the Accident here is taken insofar as it's distinguished against, what? Per se, to itself. Per se is said to be in something, something inside something, is in it according to the ratio of its own, what? Per definition. So it could be something that pertains intrinsically to the definition of the thing, right? Or something that falls upon the nature of the thing, right? Expressed in the definition, huh? Now, I don't know. But aside from this, whatever is in something is said to be in it. Per acedemns, huh? For in order that something be inside something, per se, per acedemns. Triptigitari, vi pota se habere, huh? One of these things. For some things are in every way the same according to the, what? And these are words like vestis indumentum, which I guess are kind of what... synonyms right and in these there is only the per se and in no way the paratchit ends right some things there are which one is altogether extraneous from the ratio of the other right as white and man right and in these is only what paratchit ends and no way per se right then so is a white man and a black man different kind different kind of man kind of accidental to being man right in order to be a different kind of maniac they have a different kind of reason maybe a matter of woman i don't know but some things are which one pertains in some way right to the ratio of the other right although they are not altogether the same in definition as has the superior in the more universal right and the inferior right now for the superior is placed in the definition of the inferior right nevertheless it is not altogether the same the definition of the inferior superior command so it's a definition in fear adds over the definition of the superior right and my mother said what i don't know it didn't sound right doing to say that man's an animal well he's not just an animal right and similar he says not only about the more universal the less universal right the genus say in the species or the species in the individual but similar about the property and the species right for the species is placed in the definition of property but nevertheless the species and the property are not altogether the same in definition and in these he says there's in some way the per se and in some way the ratchet ends in so far as they practically according to definition and they differ partly and those things things there which are said in the first way is necessary that whatever is true about one should be true about the what other right and that such things are entirely the same thing of secundum ram right and they differ in the moment so when it's in these it does not happen the fallacy of the accident but in all others it is not necessary that whatever is true of one should also be true of the other it sounds very strange we just got to study the syllogism right and there therefore if from this that something is what true of one is clued to be true of the other there is possible the fallacy the accident it happens sometimes that what is true about one is concluded to be true about the other to it when something's attributed to one according as is the same as the other then what is in one and the other will be in the other one right so he talked about that in the categories right didn't you know he's talking about the the uh predicament order there right so that if animal you know substance is said of what animal it said an animal is said of dog then substance will be said of what dog yeah but if genus is said of animal right huh an animal is said of dog maybe maybe dog is not a genus that's not the best example of course that's a lower genus right then but if you say you say man is a lower species right well then man is an animal right animal substance and man is a substance right but man is an animal animal is a genus therefore man is a genus it seems to be identical though in speech doesn't it man is an animal animal is a genus therefore man is a genus man is an animal animal is a substance therefore man is a substance look just so i like don't think of the words but substance is still signifying what man is right why genus is saying something about animal right that belongs to animal not insofar as it's said of man right now even that's kind of hard to maintain it sometimes what's the genus is instead of you know it's a name so many of many you know very very easily over the great sense this is most of all able to that's going to do wise yeah there was something like that you know he gets in those troubles about the you thought right so you do geometry you understand what you imagine right that's what i thought of that he's trying to tie up you know man's imagination with superior reason right and he just sees even the wise there was a wise i went down and stood up and quotes these guys with approval as well as sometimes i think this is an example here later on of the four-footed right now you can see that it's kind of a fallacy of the middle term so so at the end of that passage there he says as the philosopher says in the first book of the specific refudations the false accident comes about because someone's not able to judge the same in the diverse one in the many right okay you must be careful when saying something's gratitude and it's the same could be said some teacher tear his first philosophy wisdom some peachy tear compared to natural philosophy or political philosophy or compared to the wisdom of god this is going to be the second kind of fallacy and outside of speech there the fallacy is what is pleasant is good would you say adultery is pleasant right remember adultery is good would you say adultery is good In some way, then? Yeah. Would you say simply? You know, without qualification, it's good? You know, I kind of suspect, you know, this is one of the biggest mistakes in thinking, you know, that takes up people. You talk to the materialist, right? What's he saying? He's saying matter is the source of everything, right? And everything comes from matter in some way, right? Is that true, simply? You see, Aristotle, in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, right? A favorite book, by the way, of the 14 books, he says, you know, that the thing that goes from ability to act, right? It's an ability before it's an act, right? So the wood, you could say, right, is able to be a chair or a table or a bookcase before it's actually one, right? So ability comes before act, right? Then Aristotle says, but sotichitere, aplos, in Greek, huh? Act is before ability. Passability. Why? Because something goes from ability to act, because there's something already in act, right? So he's saying that act comes before simply, right? But the man who thinks of matter as being absolutely first is thinking of what? Potency, right? He's thinking of what is before in some, you know, diminished sense, right? Is before simply, right? You know, it's kind of puzzling that we get into the four kinds of causes, right, huh? Because what does Aristotle do when he takes up the four kinds of cause, huh? You know what the order that is? An Aristotle distinguishes. The word cause is equivocal by reason, right, huh? And the basic distinction of the senses of cause is matter, form, mover, and end, right? But in what order does Aristotle distinguish that one? He gives matter first, then form, right? Then mover, and then end, right? Okay. Now, that's why I got in the habit there when I was explaining what kind of causes there would take a blackboard thing, blackboard thing, I'd say, now, if you come into the classroom and the word cat is on the board, right, huh? What does that word cat on the board depend upon for its existence? What is C, A, and T, right? Isn't that what's most obvious dependence? Yeah. I say, now, if someone says it doesn't depend upon C, A, and T to be, right, well, then let's take away the C, where's the word? How can you deny it depends upon C, A, and T, right? That's the most obvious, right, huh? But then I can force you to admit it has another dependence besides upon the letters, right? I take the word ask, right? I say, now, exactly the same letters as that, right? So the word cat, if it depends only upon those letters, this is the word cat, isn't it? Right? Now you're forced to say there's another dependence that you didn't realize, right? What was that? The order, yeah. That's the same second-handed clause, form, the order, right? And what does a wooden table depend upon? It's wood. Yeah. If you take all the wood out of the wooden table, what do you have left? That's a good idea. Yeah. Isn't that what's most known, right? Yeah. Okay. But then if you say, yeah, yeah. If that's all the wooden table depends upon, the wood, then this is a table too, right? So you're forced to say that the wooden table depends upon not only wood, in one way, but also upon its shape or its heart. Yeah. Yeah. So now you've got two kinds of clauses, huh? You've got matter, which is most known, right? You have to do a little thinking around, you have to add some word or something, right? Something that's going to force your mind to realize, so there's what we call form, whatever kind of clause, right? If I ask you, what is this here? This is the word cap here? No. What makes it to be what it is over here, the word cap? It's the form, right? Form is the terms of what the thing is, right? It matters to that from which something comes to be, it's it, right? But the form is what makes it be what it is, right? Now, what's the next kind of clause, huh? Yeah. Now, how do you get from that to this, right? You say, well, do the letters just automatically arrange themselves in this order? Yeah. So you've got the mover, in this case, it would be the, what, the writer, right? Okay. So, the writer put the C before the A here, and after here, he put it after the A, right? And then I'm talking to guys from TAC, Thomas Climes College, but I'm sure I get the same letters again, right? I'd always refer to it for college. TAC, right? Did you see the, the, the, the, the register there? They had an article there about the, who the commencement speakers are, the Catholic, so-called Catholic colleges. Oh, I can see. And some had very good people, you know? With TAC, Thomas Climes College out of California, they had, uh, the most superior, the Sisters of Life, Life, you know? With TAC, they had an order that, uh, the Catholic College, yeah, started, and she's quite a woman there, I guess. She said, the head of the order, she didn't speak there. So they're one of the, the good Catholic colleges, right? And then they had some other ones that, you know, they had some buddies, not, uh, pro-life, or some, some other terrible thing, right? So, but now, going back to our starting point here, if the writer can put them in this order, and that order, why do you put them in this order? Yeah, he wants to talk about the cat, right? So that's the end of your purpose, right? And, uh, so if I want to talk about my favorite animal, I'd like to have a crush of her, right? Okay, if I wanted to teach, you know, acting ability in the ninth book of wisdom, I would put them in this order, right? So it depends upon, is my title, my favorite animal, my favorite book of wisdom, right? So, you're kind of forced, you know, in this order to recognize these four kinds of causes, right? But, assume to which is first, matter in the form, or mover, in those three, because I made the letters C, A, and T, and put them in order, right? So, I made that matter of those three letters, either matter the word cat, than what these other ones, right? And I'm the one who gave them that form or order, right? Why did I do that stuff, right? This is the cause of causara, right? The cause of all the causes. But you might think, you know, that since matter is what most known, right? That therefore, simply speaking, it's life. Life's only what? before in some way right now you can have the letters c-a-n-t without the word cat but not vice versa right i see it that way now you read timid of athens right and timid of athens after he he gets disgusted with human nature right he's mentioned in putak you know timid athens and he's his example of the great foot misanthrope right but why does he turn against all men when the game to play uh he's a very generous man right he's always inviting people over come out and have dinner at my house and so on and then he not only get you a free dinner right but he gets you some little present or something you know and so on well his his servants of course you know who are preparing the meals and so on they're kind of concerned about his his uh his finances you might say right and uh finding ones into a little bit of you know temporary distress well that's no problem he's got all kinds of friends in athens right so he sends to michael and he sends to mars and uh the awesome excuse why they can't lend him any money right so what does he do that's he turns against all mankind right now so one of the later scenes he's he's digging in the ground right to find roots you know to eat right and what does he he addresses the earth right like he really poached it right he says common mother thou whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast right teams and feeds all right so he's seeing mother earth right as being what yeah yeah and as being infinite as thomas points out you know that they thought the beginning of things was infinite but they also the idea that um they say the word matter material let's say it might come from the word mater mother right so it's more known that you came from your what mother and from your what father that's what i always tell that story in a real life story my son paul was very little i told you that story earlier and did i come from mama he said ah but blue he said we're just kind of sitting you know living with some place and uh he said did i come from home he said little boy you know i said i said yes you did come from mama and he said well did maria come that's his sister and uh i said yeah you came from mama and he said did marcus come that's his own brother and i said yeah marcus came from mama then finally he saw the blue you know i didn't he said uh did you come from mama yeah yeah but what the hell i was doing but i could stay i mean this dead meat comes so it's more known that you came from your mother than from your father right it's more known that you came from your father than that you came from god you know and aristotle realized that the soul came immediately from god right the human soul not these souls of the dog or cat or this tree that could come immediately from your parents right from god through your parents right but that the immortal soul came from uh god not to your parents but immediately from god right but that's obviously much more hidden to us right but it's also less known that the matter i mean that the father that you came from your father that you came from your father than from your mother right so um yet they say the father is is maybe more the source of uh the form right because the father determines whether you'd be a male or female and genes the woman right but the man right it's kind of interesting right so he's more in some sense a mover maker right he determines more you could be a man or a woman right god most of all yeah i know it's crazy crazy out there they got it you know i picked up the morning paper there and uh the holy cross you know holy cross the jesuit college there you know but they uh they got some english professor there's got a you know data base you know all about transgender or something or all these things and and uh just collecting all this you know information about them you know so we could study this great uh yeah i i mentioned that you know didn't i about the cardinal was it sophia was the one who sent uh john paul ii to rome at the end of the war there and he wanted him to go to the angelic rather than to the gregorian because that was no more safe right and he didn't want him to stay in the in the polish house because most of these guys are going to the gregorian one to stay at the the belgian house and so on so yeah a little bit of prudence there you know but uh not that's something discreet either but in regards to this sort of transgender stuff and all the myriad of new genders that they've uh dreamed up is there any sign that this this year foolishness of it is going to cause it to fizzle out or is it really just kind of rolling down a hill and gathering you know they're keeping getting more and more outside of nature right so anyway you know you might say that uh simply what comes first is the maker or or maybe the end right meaning comes first is a cause of those arm you call it yeah yeah but if you think that matter comes simply first right and you'd be a materialist you know materialism is whether and most of my science is kind of you know evolutionary because they're they're thinking of matters being simply what comes before right and that's this next kind of fallacy right well you're still in the first one but you see the power of that that one right that the uh evolutionists and so on and the materialists are making the second kind of mistake right now this first one's even more difficult right stop here i guess