Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 6: Experience in Science and the Concept of Nature

Transcript
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And Bohr being the head of the institute would sometimes go down like you kind of do and encourage the boys downstairs, right? And, you know, help them a little bit with their tubes and so on, you know, and then he'd break something, you know, and then he'd be his way out of there, see? Because it does take a lot of expertise just to do these things properly. And I remember one of the biologists' assumption there was going away to get a degree. And the first course he had to take, you know, in reference to preparing for his degree, was a course just in how to use the instrument he was going to use in his research. The course is to learn the instrument, huh? And you can even see, you know, if you read the literature enough, you can see the jokes about this difference between the theoretical and empirical physicists. The one that already sticks in my mind was in one of the German cities, in one of the labs, the equipment blew up. And, you know, I don't know why it blew up and something went wrong. Things just blew up. And then they found out that at the time the equipment blew up, Wolfgang Pauly, the great theoretical physicist, was in the train depot. And so that's why it blew up. Well, it's obviously just a joke, you know. But it reflects the fact that there's this division of labor. So actually, you know, in a general chemistry book or a general biology book that a chemistry or, you know, biologist might be teaching, there are statements that are based upon experience that he simply could not have. And that's why I say, you know, strange as it may seem to some people, in that respect, belief is more necessary for experimental science, human belief, than it is for philosophy. Because the theoretical physicist is believing the empirical what physicists have done. When Louis de Broglie proposed the theory of wave mechanics and so on, and it's so different from the current ideas that they started to make fun of it, you know, the comedy française, the French national comedy. But Einstein was still, you know, had a lot of authority at the time, and he said, no, just a minute, there might be something to this. So they tested the theory in the Bell-Telephone laboratories in New York. They tested the French physicist's idea in the Bell-Telephone laboratories in New York, and exactly what he predicted showed up. See? So, then of course they repeated the experiments in Europe, but notice that first one there, you know, Louis de Broglie wasn't conducting it, you know, the French weren't even conducting it. So there's a real division of labor there. And as this goes on, it becomes more and more a true one, that there's some kind of a division of labor there. But you don't have that in the philosophy of nature, because everybody has the experience, huh? Now the second one here is from these very important lectures of Heisenberg, the Gifford lectures, and they've been, you can buy them in the form, they give the title Physics and Philosophy, but it's basically the Gifford lectures that he gave Scotland. It's a very interesting readings there. We had a little passage on that, the other thing I gave, remember? And Heisenberg sees the importance of the knowledge, more general knowledge, for theology a little bit. But anyway, notice what he says here. Since the time of Galileo, the fundamental method of natural science had been the experiment, huh? This method made it possible to pass from general experience to specific experience, huh? To single out characteristic events in nature in which its laws could be stated more directly from general experience. He's making a somewhat similar distinction to the one I've made between common and private experience. Because general experience is specific experience, something like what I call common and private experience. He's thinking of something like that anyway, huh? Now I may be exaggerating a bit there when he says that the experiment enables you to do that. Because, you know, if a biologist went out in the woods and observed a bird in its natural habitat, you know, for days after days after days, right, he would acquire an experience that not everybody has too, huh? Which would be a specific experience, huh? What especially is characteristic of the physical sciences is the experiment as a way of getting an experience that not everybody has. An experiment is, what, you know, kind of subjecting nature to something you don't find in nature, and something is revealed then by that, huh? Just like we do sometimes with people that find out their character, huh? You know, I remember seeing a movie years ago. where these people were trying out for the CIA or something like that. And they're all invited to this countryside estate where they're going to be tested, you know, as to whether they're going to be admitted as CIA. And they've all arrived at this kind of really nice place. And then they're informed shortly after arrival that the testers and so on have been delayed, you know, because of this or that in Washington or where it was. So just relax for a week or two and then we'll be there, see. Well, unbeknownst to them, that's when the testing is going on. And they're seeing, like, which guys are susceptible to the charms of women, you know, and have other, you know, weaknesses that could make you a bad candidate for spy school. And so, I mean, the point is you're artificially arranging a situation to test people's, what, character. You know, they say you may have this price or something like that or somebody. You see, you're creating artificially the thing, yeah. There's kind of one kind of somewhat little older joke, but I think it's kind of interesting for the point. It's at a party, see, a man, woman, at the party. And this one man proposes a hypothetical question to the woman. Would you sleep with a man, you know, that you're not, you know, ready to, for a million dollars for one night? Well, for a million dollars, one of the ghosts are saying, I don't know, maybe I would, see. And it's kind of a hypothetical question, right? But it's the sort of thing where you're not going to be really offered that, right? See? And then the kind of punchline is later on in the evening, this guy offers $20 to this girl who said yes to the million dollar hypothetical question. She says, who do you think I am? And he says, we know what you are. We're just telling you about the price. It's a very, very funny story. But I mean, the point is, you see, you put somebody in unusual circumstances, huh? What is the Shakespeare play where that takes place? Who cannot be betrayed with a plot? Yeah, yeah. In Oswald, it ends well, right? Where this man is always bragging about how the brave soldier is and so on. And so one day he's out on guard duty, they dress up like the enemy soldiers and they grab him, right? And take him in and pretend that they've captured him. And then they, you know, threaten him and he reveals all the fun of the troops and so on. And then they take out their masks and he's completely disgraced. His name is Paroles, huh? You know, which means, I guess, words in French, huh? He's just words, no real words. But he says, who cannot be betrayed with a plot? You see? So, you could design artificially, right, circumstances to test somebody's character, huh? And you might, you know, in the normal course of events, you know, not ever have this kind of test, huh? So the experiment enables you to get an experience that you would not normally have, right? That would not come up in the ordinary course of events, huh? So there, Heisenberg is making somewhat the distinction we've made, huh? I noticed the second statement, which is very interesting. Some statements of ancient philosophy are rather near to those of modern science. Now, when he says this, he doesn't mean that they are, they've arrived at what modern science has, right? But he says they're near in some way. This simply shows how far one can get by combining the ordinary experience that we have without doing experiments. That ordinary experience is something more like, what, common experience, huh? But this is another, you know, way of speaking, with the untiring effort to get some logical order into this experience to understand it from general principles. So I think you see in Heisenberg here words that are different from the ones that I used up there, but they're expressing somewhat the same, what, distinction or distinctions like the one that I made, huh? What he calls general as opposed to specific experience. Sometimes I hear people speak of common experience and special experience, right? If I use the term common and private experience myself, he sees that, huh? But at the same time, he sees it and Bore sees it, as you remarked, that this is a private experience, an experience that requires, you know, some sophistication even to get, huh? And some effort, huh? Maybe some special tools, huh? And these experiments only do require this special training. Now, the third reading is from... Pope Paul VI, and his encyclical letter on the Holy Eucharist, which is a very important encyclical letter, Mysterium Fide. And in the course of this letter, he's talking about why the definitions of the Articles of the Faith and so on that are made by the Consuls can be good for all time. Why they're not subject, in a way, to the variation of time. And the basic thing he's saying is, is because the thoughts that are used in expressing those Articles of Faith are thoughts that come to us from what he calls a universal and necessary experience. I think that's really the same thing as what I call common experience. When he says universal, I think he means an experience that everyone has. It's common to all. And when he says necessary, it means the same thing as I mean, you can't avoid it. For by these formulas, by the rest which the Church uses to express the dogmas of faith, concepts are expressed which are not tied to one specific form of human civilization, nor a definite period of scientific progress, nor one school of theological thought. But they present what the human mind, by universal and necessary experience, grasps as realities. For this reason, these formulae are adapted to men of all times. Well, here he's talking in particular about the importance of common experience and the thoughts that are tied to common experience for the, what, dogmas of faith. But you could speak more generally of the importance of the books of natural hearing and the three books about the soul, which are tied to our common experience. The importance of those books for, what, theology as a whole. Now, what's the reason for that? Well, when you study theology, you find out that we know more what God is not than what he is. We don't see in theology God as he is. As St. John explains in his epistle there, 3-2, something like that. 1st epistle, 3rd chapter, 2nd verse. We shall see him as he is. They take those words over in the math sometimes. There you're talking about the Vedic vision, right? Seeing God as he is, which St. Paul describes more metaphorically as seeing God face to face. But theology is seeing God more, what, negatively. So, when we say God is the unmoved mover, there's a negation there, unmoved. When we say God is unchanging, there's a negation of change, right? When we say God is immaterial, even when we say God is simple, although grammatically that doesn't seem negative, we show that he's not composed in any way. If you look at Thomas' question on the simplicity of God, it shows that God is not composed in this way, or this way, or this way, or this way, or this way, and then finding the rest that he's not composed anyway. When you take up, God is infinite, right? That's a negation again, huh? He's not limited, huh? When you say God is one, he's indivisible, right? He would be divided and so on, huh? So, we know God by what they call the via negativa, or the via negazione, you see, the way he's writing for him. The negative way, or the way of negation, huh? Even though we can see some likeness of the creature to God, and know God, to some extent, by the likeness of the creature to God, as John Paul the, I mean, not John Paul, as Paul VI pointed out one time when he starts quoting the Fourth Lateran Consul, you know, where it's correcting the errors of Joel Kimmaphores, get a little carried away, extending the likeness more than it should. And it's a very precise text, huh? Where it says, one can never note a likeness of the creature to God without at the same time noticing a greater, what, unlikeness, huh? Okay? There's always that infinite distance, huh, between God and the creature. And that's why you have these things in the scripture, like in one of the psalms, you know, who's like God, huh? Right? That's what Michael means, I guess, too, huh? Who's like God, huh? Because it's more of a different... than a likeness. Like I mentioned at the time when I was teaching the Shakespeare's Exhortation to use reason there, and introduction to philosophy a number of years ago, and of course he speaks of reason as godlike. I happened to have a student from Saudi Arabia in my class, and so after class he talked to me, he objected, you know, to Shakespeare called him reason godlike, because that was, you know, and so I thought, you know, I should explain to him what the Church says about it, right, so I was showing him this text in the Fourth Lateran Council, you know, but there has to be some kind of likeness between the creature and God, because every agent makes something like itself, but we see, you know, an infinite distance too between the creature and God, and that's a very famous text, that Paul VI happened to bring my attention first to one of his talks, right, but you can see in the Fourth Lateran Council, and that you can never know the likeness of the creature to God without at the same time observing a greater unlikeness, huh? So even the knowledge of the likeness of the creature to God is perfected by, what, negations, huh? Now, once you see that, then it's a very important thing you have to see. The difference between knowing something by the via negativa and knowing something by the via affirmativa. Now, I know something by affirmation. I'm closer to it when I can affirm the particular than the general. So, for example, if I say you're a body, okay, that's not as close to you as if I say you're a living body. You're a body that's alive. Do you know that? Okay? You're a living body. I'm going to be a little closer to you, but you are. Now, if I say you're an animal, that's getting even closer to you. You're not a plant. And then when I say you're a man, I'm even closer to you, right? So as I descend from the general to the particular, affirmatively knowing you, I'm getting to know you better and better and better. I'm getting closer and closer to you. You see that? Okay? But now suppose I was knowing you negatively, okay? And let's say, I say, you're not, you're not an oak tree. Okay? That's true, right? You're not an oak tree. Now, if I'm as close to you and I say you're not an oak tree as I would be if I said you are not a tree, which is getting closer to you. Yeah. When I say you're not an oak tree, I separate you from oak trees. Okay? That's true, right? When I say you're not a tree, I separate you from all the trees. And what if I say you are not a plant? That's even closer to you, isn't it? But notice in the via negativa, I'm knowing you better when I can negate the general than when I negate the what? Particular. In affirmative now, just reverse. When I can affirm the particular, I'm closer to you. You see that? Take a little, just an example. Let's take a math example. Suppose I'm knowing number affirmatively. Okay? Well, I say seven is a number. Okay? Let me take seven as an example. Okay? It's a what? Odd number, right? It's a prime odd number. Okay? Notice that my reason is going from the general to the particular. Odd number is more particular than number, and prime odd number is even more particular than odd number, right? So I'm getting closer to seven as I go from number to odd number to prime line numbers. I can affirm the particular and closer to it now. Now, suppose I was knowing 7 negatively. What should be closer to 7? Not even or not, let's say, 4? It's true that 7 is not 4, right? So, I have a kind of negative knowledge of 7. I don't know what it is, but I know it's not 4. Am I closer to it when I say it's not 4? When I say it's not even? Yeah, I'm starting to narrow it down. Do you see that? So, again, the same thing we saw taking you. I'm closer and have a better negative knowledge when I can negate the general than when I can only negate the particular, right? So, in theology, if I say that God doesn't have 2 atoms of hydrogen and 1 of oxygen, like a molecule of water has. That's true, right? But am I as close to God when I say he doesn't have 2 atoms of hydrogen and 1 of oxygen or when I say he has no parts? So, if I can negate, if I have a reason to negate to God that he has parts, am I going to bother to say he doesn't have 2 atoms of hydrogen and 1 of oxygen? It's going to be useful for me to know that a molecule of water has 2 atoms of hydrogen and 1 of oxygen. It's really kind of uselessly via negativa if I can give a good reason for saying that God has no parts like him. So, in theology, we want to negate the general more than negate the particular. Now, to understand the negation, you have to know what it is you are negating. So, it's more important for me to understand the general distinctly than to understand the particular in theology because I'm going to negate the general, I'm not going to bother to negate the particular. I'm not going to show that God doesn't melt, he doesn't freeze, he doesn't fall, he doesn't run, he doesn't grow. I'm going to say he doesn't change. So, if I understand change in general, I'll understand what it is I'm negating. And my understanding of change in general, as we'll see later on, enables me to syllogize to God being unchanging. So, Paul VI is seeing the importance here for the Articles of Faith and consequently for theology as a whole, the importance of those thoughts that are tied to a universal necessary experience. And that's what we call common experience. And I'd like to remark how interesting the example of Divine Providence, which extends all the way down to chance events. Thomas Aquinas was in the only place in Europe where he could get Aristotle's eight books of natural hearing at that time. I mean, Aristotle's works are gradually coming back into the Latin world, to the Arabs and so on, and sometimes through the, you know, more directly to the Greeks. And he was at the University of Naples, which at that time was the only place in Europe where he could get the, what, the physics, so-called Aristotle, the eight books of natural hearing, huh? And he could not have written the Summa Theologiae, as we have it today, without knowing the eight books of natural hearing. For example, when you look at Thomas' explanation of the eternity of God, which is, the definition of eternity is taken from Waitis' work, The Consolation of Philosophy. But when you explain the definition of eternity, there's several negations of what is found in Aristotle's definition of time, and also what is found in our understanding of the now of time. So when you look later on at the definition of time and talk a little bit about the now of time, as kind of a footnote, we'll look at the definition of eternity in theology, and you'll see that it's negating, huh, things in our general understanding of time and the now of time. The Consolation of Philosophy The Consolation of Philosophy The Consolation of Philosophy The Consolation of Philosophy The Consolation of Philosophy So if Thomas didn't understand time in general and the now of time, he wouldn't be able to explain the knowledge of the eternity of God we have in theology, which is according to via negativa, which involves negating, those things that you have to understand distinctly about time in general in order to do this. Do you see that? So this distinction between common experience and private experience I bring up on this page because I want to bring out that what we're going to be studying in this course, some things from the books of natural hearing, is based upon experience. It's not just a game of thoughts or something. It's based on the common experience of the natural world. But in order to explain that, I have to point out the distinction between common and private experience, and it helps you understand what experimental science is. It's based upon a private experience of the natural world, and that's why you have that division of labor and the two parts there, right? But it's also important, that distinction for understanding theology. Now sometimes theology makes use of what, you know, private experience, and you get to something very, what, particular, right? Like, for example, when you get into moral theology, right? You're talking about a pill, whether this or that pill is, what, moral or not, right? Then you have to know exactly what the pill is doing, right? Is it aborting, you know, the baby? Or is it just regularizing the woman's period? Or what is it doing, right? And there you might depend upon very particular knowledge for those things, right? But for the most part, theology makes much more use of knowledge based on common experience, because you're talking mainly in theology about God. And, and, um, there you use mainly the via negativa, and therefore you have to negate the, what, general. And the general is what you know and the basis of common experience. And even you talk a bit about creatures, you know, about the soul and so on, you base yourself upon that knowledge of the soul that comes from our common inward experience of being alive. Now, see, Aristotle doesn't, himself, stop with the knowledge based on common experience, you know, he goes all the way down to, you know, anatomy, huh? Aristotle, you know, cut open animals and plants, you read the history of animals and the parts of animals, he talks about his anatomy and what he found. And when Alexander the Great conquered the Near East and so on, he had men who would send specimens of animals and plants that were, you know, unique to those areas that were not found in Eastern Greece, have them send, you know, specimens back to Aristotle so he could get a more complete knowledge of the, what, animals and plant kingdoms and so on. So Aristotle went into this private experience, but I mean, he first of all perfected this knowledge based on common experience. He's really kind of an unusual man, the way Aristotle can go from these very general and sometimes very abstract things like logic and all the way down to these very concrete things like anatomy, huh? In the same way, you know, in politics he can talk about very general things like man is by nature a social animal or a political animal, as he says. But he can, you know, examine 150 Greek city-states and talk about the revolutions and why they took place, the revolutions, you know. And there is a requirement of private experience, right? And so he writes the famous fifth book of the politics and revolution and how governments are overthrown and how they're preserved and so on, right? He has all this private experience that he's gotten from his historical research, huh? So, I mean, he's the most balanced mind in history, huh? You know, it's kind of an amazing thing, huh? And we see that in Plato and you don't see them on scientists, right? Either in the general or in the particular Aristotle goes, you know, all the way down to the particular. Okay? There's some of these, there was one of the scientists talking about how this descending to the particular, in a way, kind of goes on and on, but we've never, you know, completed. Now, on the level of the common experience, would you say, does it have that same characteristic or would it be able to say, well, Aristotle kind of completed that? Well, you've got to be careful about saying that, but somebody said you could say that, yeah, yeah. Warren Murray has an interesting hypothesis there as to why Aristotle, when he got to the end there, he trusted the school to Theophrastus, right? Theophrastus was not, in fact, the greatest philosopher there is, but he was a very good, what we call experimental scientist. And Aristotle saw that, you know, the substantial work had been done, and now in this other part, right, based on common experience, but there's still more work to be done in private experience, huh? That's kind of interesting, I think, observation on Warren Murray's parts, just like, you know, when Albert the Great talks about Aristotle, he doesn't do anything in geometry, but geometry was already considerably developed by the time Aristotle came along, see? But natural philosophy and ethics and so on, and political philosophy, they were in logic especially, and so on, and wisdom, they still needed to be developed a lot, huh? So, you might have thought that the school now has a lot of the knowledge based on common experience, huh? And then, if we need, you know, some people who can do this other kind of research, huh? Okay? It seems like there's... Kind of a common error, even in the church. Some people will say things as if all theology is private. There's only... Now what Paul VI says there, right? Of course, you know, the very word heretic means what? Chooser, yeah. You're picking and choosing which you want to believe. I'll believe this, I'll believe that. Choose to believe this, I'll choose not to believe that. That's giving up the faith, right? So let's look here now at the, page three here. And this first reading, which is the very beginning of the second book, is the reading now where Aristotle is going to what? Define nature, but define it now not in the sense of a perfect or complete definition, but draw a line around this cause called nature. I think I mentioned before how the great Heraclitus said that nature allows to hide, huh? But you have to at least draw a line around nature if you're going to talk about what natural philosophy is about. It's about natural things, huh? It's about things whose cause is nature. What do you mean by nature, huh? Now, before we look at this reading one, let's look a little bit at the word nature, huh? Like the Greek word phousis, it's more familiar to us, so. And on the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle takes up, I think I mentioned before, the word beginning, cause, element, and then he takes up the word nature, right? And it might seem strange if he does so in wisdom, because this isn't more appropriate to hear. But there is a meaning of nature that's very universal, that is important for the wise man. Now, the word nature is a word that is equivocal by reason, huh? And you have to go back to what the first meaning of the word is, and then follow up the meanings from there. I'm going to give you some, at least, of what he does in book five, here. Now, what's the fundamental root of the word nature, huh? What does that N-A-T basically refer to, huh? Birth, yeah. And you can see that in many words in English derived from that same root. Prenatal, postnatal. We use this very often, huh? Prenatal means before birth, huh? Postnatal, after right. The prenatal care, or the postnatal care of the woman, huh? The word nativity, huh? Really means, what? Birth, day. My home parish in St. Paul, Minnesota was the nativity of our Lord. It was called Nativity Parish. And so we usually don't hear the word nativity used except maybe in that context. Actually, it could be referred to anybody's birth date. My nativity is January 18th, right? My birthday, huh? What would it mean, as I say to my students, is anybody here a native of Worcester? What would it mean to be a native of Worcester, huh? What would it mean you were born here, huh? The Europeans call the Indians, those who are already here, the nativism. What would that mean? It means those who were born here as opposed to those who came from abroad. So, prenatal, postnatal, nativity, native, huh? You see the original root of the word nature. Now, you don't see that in the word nature in English, huh? But you kind of guess, you know, going back to these other words that come from the same root in Latin, prenatal, postnatal, native, nativity, huh? And the Greek word phusis is where they get the word physics. There's that first sense, too, of birth. Now, it's not strange we should have a name for birth. We name things as we know them. And we name first of all things that are sensible and that strike our senses. And birth, Sonny's going to start. Now notice too, in birth, that the baby comes from within, and this idea of within is going to be kept somehow in all the meanings of nature. If you don't understand that, you'll understand nothing about the word nature. And that's the reason why, the fundamental reason why Heraclitus says nature loves to hide. Now, what is within is hidden, this is the first meaning of birth. And so sometimes, like in that first reading, I think I translated it, instead of translating it as the natural road, right, the road from the more known and more certain to us is the more certain and more known by nature, is inborn, I translate it, right, inborn, trying to get a little bit of the, what, concrete character of the word in Greek or in Latin. To say something as natural as to say it's inborn. There you see the word birth right in there. Now the second meaning of birth is connected with the first one, refers back to it. It's now the source of birth within the, what, woman, right? The source of birth, or the source of the baby, you might say, within the mother. But notice that also is something within, something that is therefore hidden to us in the beginning. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, the second meaning refers back to the first meaning, right? It's the principle or the source of that. Now, the third meaning generalizes the second meaning. And it's the third meaning which will be the one he's going to be concerned with here. So, he's going to take any source, not just of birth, but any source of any change within. Okay? Any source within of any change. Now, I'm not going to go through all the other meanings, but I'm going to mention just one of the other meanings. Eventually, the word nature comes to mean what a thing is. The nature of a thing is what it is. Okay? And in this last sense, this is the reason why we sometimes, well, we talk about nature there in wisdom, right? Because what a thing is, is something that the wise one wants to talk about, because that's altogether universal. But in this sense, we can speak of the nature of a poem, the nature of God, the nature even of grace, as Thomas says, and so on, the nature of government, right? Et cetera, et cetera, right? Now, this sense of nature is obviously too general to characterize natural philosophy. You'd find that in any science, though, because every science defines, every science asks what something is, right? Okay? The first two meanings are appropriate to natural philosophy, but they are too, what, particular to characterize the study of natural things as a whole. So these first two meanings, although they are the first two meanings, they're too particular. Eventually, you get a meaning that's too general. When I say too particular, too general means too particular, too general to characterize or to define natural philosophy. Although the natural philosopher or the natural scientist would, in fact, talk about birth and the source of the baby and birth within the mother, he doesn't just talk about that, right? Okay? So it's this middle sense, this number three here, that is going to be the important sense here that he's talking about. Okay? Do we use that second one in English for the word nature? No, no, see? Now this is, again, an example of what I mentioned before, that we tend to borrow words from Greek or Latin in their, what, later meanings. In English, we tend to use word nature in this fourth sense right away, don't we? And therefore, we're out of order in our mind right away when we use words. And you can do one of two things. You can take the English word, birth, and try to extend it, but then that's, you're going to get doing that, right? Or you can go back and learn the earlier meanings of the Greek or Latin word. But we tend to, what, take go of our later meaning without realizing the order that we have to go through to get there, or we don't extend the English word, huh? And you can see the master of the English language, in a way, extending the word birth, huh? I was mentioning my friend there, Friar Lawrence, huh? And in Roman Juliet, when Friar Lawrence is out in the garden there, and he's talking about the natural world. And he says, For not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give. Nor aught so good, he said, but strained from that fair use. Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. Do you remember those words in Roman Juliet? He's talking about something departing from its nature, right? And that's really like a revolution, huh? Who's what you should be? But notice that line there. Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. Not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give. Nor aught so good, but strained from that fair use, right? Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. And you notice how very important that is for understanding ethics, right? Because we generally go wrong by misusing our parts, right? It's not using them for what they should be used for. So people are always misusing their sexual organs, as you know, in our society. But they also misusing their mind to consider unimportant things rather than think about God or something worth what? Strained, huh? Remove that fair use, the beautiful use of these things. So all of our parts are in themselves beautiful, and if they're used as they should be used, right? That's the fair use. But strained and drawn away from that fair use, right? Then they, what? Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. What does he mean by true birth there? Yeah, the true nature, yeah. It's contrary, right? In general, you could say, why should man be reasonable? Well, basically, because he's an animal with reason, that's why. And so when he's unreasonable, he's what? He's an evoke from his own, what, true nature. He knows what the great Shakespeare's done. He's extended the word birth right down to here. You see how wise he is? Now, when I talk about the first road in our knowledge, well, you know, in any field, it might speak of method or something, right? But method comes from the Greek word odas, meaning road. So I would prefer to take the English word road, that we walk and drive on, and then carry it over, and eventually apply it to the road in our knowledge. Imitating what the Greeks did with the word odas, and what the Latins do with the word via. The word road here, in the first reading there, in Greek it would be hodas, huh? It's hodas, but ah. So, forget the word odometer, you've heard that word? Bicycle, that is a little thing you can use to measure how far you've gone. Odometer. Ado, it measures the road, huh? And that's where you get the word method. See, method means, in Greek it comes from metta, with, and hodas, what, road, huh? But when you see the English word method, you don't see the idea of road, do you? When Christ says in the Gospel of St. John, I am the way, the truth, and the life, as we usually translate it, huh? But the word way there is, I am the hodas. Very striking, huh? Is that fourth sense, is that synonymous with essence, then? Yeah, yeah, essence, that's what a thing is. You know, essence is a very abstract word, huh? Especially in English, huh? Dick kind of used to make fun of the use of the word essence. Of course, in French, essence is used for, yeah, so he used to use it. Dick kind of used to like to make fun of that, so. But even in this fourth sense, nature is something within. What a thing is, is within it. 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Or we can use the expression in English to think out what a thing is. But before you think it out, it's inside, right? So the idea of being within is something that is kept in all the meanings of nature. De Connick gave a famous talk, he actually gave an assumption, way back in the 50s, but it was titled Sadio Ergo Sum, I sit, therefore I am. And he's talking about the importance of the sense of touch in philosophy. And in regard to natural philosophy, the sense of touch is the sense of the inside, huh? The eye is what is the sense of the surface of things, huh? But what's going on inside you, right? You know through your, what? Sense of touch, huh? The sense of the interior, it's a sense of substance, huh? It's a sense of sympathy, and so on. So it's very important. So I ask my colleagues, why does Heraclitus say nature allows to hide? And they're looking for some abstruse explanation of this. And it seems to make sense, sounds interesting. He says that nature allows to hide. But the basic reason why nature allows to hide is that what is within things is hidden. And that's why, you know, Shakespeare has Iago, you know, he talks about how the native act and figure of his heart is, you know, is hidden from Othello and so on, but eventually be revealed by what he does. But why does he call, you know, his inward disposition of his heart, and what he wills really, why does he call it the native? Why does he say the word native, huh? That's kind of a metaphor. Because this is a matter of choice, what he is, not a matter of nature, to this extent. But it's something within that is hidden. You know, God scrutinizes our hearts, as we say. Hidden even somewhat to ourself, right? What our heart really is. But even more so, it's hidden from others, maybe what our heart really is, and where our heart really is. The native act and figure of my heart, and compliment extern, eventually, acts, and eventually, we find out what he is, even Othello does. Too late then, though. Now, Hersthal's going to define nature in that third sense, because that's the sense of nature that we should have in mind when we say that natural philosophy is about things that are by nature. So let's look now at the first paragraph here, of the first reading from the second book of natural hearing. Of the things that are. Now, when Aristotle says of the things that are, at this point in philosophy, he's thinking of the things that all of us are aware of in the beginning, the things that are around us in the sensible world. He says of the things that are, some are by nature, while some are by their causes. Now, the only other cause we hear of in this reading is art, human art. But in other places, he'd talk about luck and chance, and whether there is such a thing as luck and chance, and so on. And you might sometimes talk about God, right? But, as I look around this room here, it seems like everything I see is either by nature or by art. Most of what I see around this room is by art. It's only your nose and your head and your hands that are by nature. Now, if I went for a walk in the woods, most of what I see would be by nature, except for some beard can. Somebody left there or something. So, for the most part, in the world around us, some things are by nature and some are by art. The natural things and the artificial things. So he wants to separate the natural things from the artificial things. And he's going to do so by separating the cause called nature from the cause called art. So he says, of the things that are, some are by nature while some are by their causes. He's hinting that there are other causes besides nature and even art that he mentions later on. But he's not concerned with talking about luck or chance or God or choice or anything like that. Now he begins to exemplify the things that are by nature. By nature are the animals and their parts. And we'd all say the animals and their parts are by nature, even the childhood. And the plants. And the simple bodies are what the Greeks thought were simple. such as earth and fire and air and water. Now, notice. Notice the order in which he gives those examples. He gives the animals and their parts first. Then the plants. And you could say their parts too. And then finally he goes to the non-living things like earth, fire, air, water. Do you see any reason why he gives them in that order, the examples? Well, if he's going to distinguish from art, animals are living and sensitive. And more different. Yeah, yeah. The word nature, although it's going to be applied to non-living things, right, and to their natures, it comes from living things, and especially from animals. Iconic, you know, sometimes would stop. When Aristotle gives examples, or when Thomas points his examples, he'd ask about the order of the examples. It's not so easy. If I was being a modern Thomist, I wouldn't bother to ask why the order of the examples are just at random, huh? But with Aristotle and Thomas, there's very often a reason why the examples are given and the order they are. Like those three kinds of examples in the first chapter. And he started with the one most known to us, the sensible, composed whole, then the one that is like that, right? And ended up with the one that's closest to what he actually wanted to see. It's very well ordered. And he says, We say that these and things like them are by nature. Now, when Aristotle says we, I often say, is that the editorial we, meaning we, Aristotle? Or is it we, the Greek natural philosophers? Or is it we, men in general? And what is it here? Yeah, men in general. And even if you ask a little boy or girl there on the streets, you know, what things are natural, what are artificial, they will identify the animals and the plants and the stones as natural and the cars and the houses as artificial. Okay? Now, what do these seem to have in common? Well, he says, All of these seem to differ from the things not put together by nature. For each of these has in itself a cause of motion and rest. Now, the Greek word that I translate by motion, kinesisa, sometimes in English you might hesitate and translate by change because it's a little broader than the English word motion. You usually think of just change of place. He goes on to talk about other kinds of change besides change of place. So, you might understand motion there somewhat more broadly than we usually do in English. Some according to place. Some. So, for example, if I give go of a stone, it's going to what? Naturally fall to the earth, huh? Hot air would naturally rise. Some according to growth and wasting away. And that's the animals and even the plants. These things grow and sometimes they shrink. They say we shrink, I say, no, yeah, I'm probably shrinking now. Until I really shrink away. But you see these eating old ladies there, these pious old ladies at the church there, they're really shrinking as the years go by, but I think we're all shrinking after a certain age. And some according to alteration. So some things freeze, other things melt, right? Different temperatures and so on. So he's saying that the natural things have within themselves, right, a cause of their change, as we'll see later on, it could be an active or a passive cause, but also they have within themselves a cause of their own, what, stopping to change, huh? It's due to something within different animals and plants and so on. Not only that they grow, but that they grow to different heights and they'll continue to grow forever. So the tree grows to a greater height than, say, a man, but the trees here grow to a lesser height than, let's say, the redwood trees or the sequoia or something in California. But bed and clothing and any other such genus there may be. Now, obviously, when he says bed and clothing and any other such genus there may be, he's thinking of different kinds of, what, artificial things, right? So he's contrasting the natural things with the artificial things. Insofar as they have each of these set of them, and to the extent they are from art, do not have any inborn source of change. Now, let's exemplify that a bit. Suppose I have one of these stone benches that you have in gardens sometimes, and you have, let's say, a wooden chair that you have in here. Now, if I put the stone bench in the fire, and I put the wooden chair in the fire, the wooden chair would tend to burn. But maybe the stone bench would, what, resist changing in this way. So they're both in the same fire, but the one is consumed and it is not. Now, does the wooden chair burn because it's a chair, and the stone bench resists burning up in the fire, resist changing, because it's a bench. It's not as bench or as chair that the one, what, burns in there doesn't. It's due to the natural material out of which they are made. Now, notice, huh? If you put a piece of wood in the fire, and you put a stone in the fire, and the wood burned up and the stone didn't, and the little boy asked his mother, Mommy, why did the wood burn up? Why didn't the stone burn up? And the poor harassed mother, and I see mothers being harassed by very inquisitive little boys, and she'd probably say something like, well, it's not the nature of stone, of a stone to burn in fire, but it is the nature of wood to burn in fire. We could say that. Now, you might say, well, is she really answering the little boy's question? Certainly not in any complete way, is she? But does she mean something by saying it's the nature of wood to burn, but not of a stone to burn in ordinary fire? Isn't she have in mind that it's due to something within the wood, and something else within the stone that the one resists being burnt by the fire, and the other is consumed by the fire? Because the same fire, the same flames, are licking both of them, but the one changes in a way the other doesn't. So it's not due simply to the outside that the one burns another. So it's not due to the other. So it's not due to the other. So it's not due to the other.