Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 16: God's Five Attributes and the Natural Mind's Inclination

Transcript
================================================================================

And this is important when you talk about a locomotive where you have energy and mechanical energy being, what, turned one into the other, right? So it's kind of amazing now with these conservation laws, which you might say, you know, I don't see anything in common between height and speed, you know, they click two different things, huh? But the scientists will, what, have two forms of energy, right? You know? So you stand in his head to keep things from, to be concerned. Now I could add, I haven't done it here, but you could add the idea of the unlimited, huh? Because even Shakespeare talking about Mother Earth says, whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast even feeds all. And they had a tendency to think of the first matter as unlimited. But the equations in modern science, they have a, what, something infinite about them. Because from one equation you can reduce, an infinity of different, what? Yeah. Yeah. Force equals mass time acceleration. But instead of doing numbers for one of these or two of these, you can calculate an infinity of other numbers, huh? Something infinite about that, huh? Mm-hmm. So if you look at these four things here, one simple, unchanging, and infinite, huh? It's very interesting when you look at Thomas' treatise on the substance of God in the Summa Theologiae. It's arranged around five attributes in the Summa Contra Gentiles, huh? God is one, simple, unchanging, unlimited. The one that isn't among those four, of course, is that God is perfect, huh? Now it's not that God is unlimited in the way these other things are unlimited, but it's not purely by equivocal, this sense. It's kind of interesting to think about that. If you study theology long enough, you begin to see that everything you want to say about the substance of God can be put in around those five, huh? So the eternity of God is tied up with his being unchangeable, and his being everywhere with his being infinite, huh? His being the measure of all things with his being one, huh? And his goodness with his being perfect. But four of the five are already kind of anticipated, right, in the natural inclination of our mind, huh? Our mind is naturally moving towards something one, simple, unlimited or infinite, and unchanging. And God is all four of those things, plus he's, what, perfect, right? But they're thinking of the first cause at first in the sense of matter, and of course matter would be something imperfect. So that one would be added, huh? You talk about the higher kinds of cause, but the four of the five, at least in the name, I already see the human mind looking for that, huh? So in terms of natural inclination of our mind, you can see that in the Greek philosophers, even the materialists, and you can see in the modern natural scientists, that our mind is naturally seeking something one, simple, unlimited and unchanging, huh? You can see how kind of, how naturally Thomas, you know... Thinks out God. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If you look at, you know, question two of the Prima Parser, right, the existence of God, right? Then he goes into the substance of God, and that's in questions three through, what, eleven, right? Well, question three is on the simplicity of God, huh? And then four is on the perfection of God, and five and six are on His goodness, right? And then he talks about God being, what, infinite or unlimited, to which he attaches another question on His being everywhere. And then he takes up God being, what, unchanging, and he attaches to that a question on His being eternal. And then finding that God is one, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. But four of the five, at least in name, are already seen in this natural tendency of the mind, huh? Now here's, there's Thomas going to be giving, what, reasons for saying that God is all these things, huh? You see? But our mind is already inclined to think that He would be that way anyway. But He'd be built that into our mind, huh? It's sort of marvelous to see that. So, um, we're going to look at the section. Here are the moderns in the mover until after we looked at Empedocles and Anik Sabres, right? Then we'll look at the section on the mover. Let's see it all together, right? Okay? So next time we'll start looking at Empedocles, huh? That's where it says, Empedocles. What part of the meaning in saying that our mind naturally applies to this is because these things are, you know, our mind itself is more simple. You know what Augustine says, you know, Augustine is for themselves and our heart is restless in joy, rest in thee, right? Our heart is made for God, right? And we'll rest in toads and rest in God. But our mind is made for knowing God. And so the mind, you could say, is naturally inclined towards God without realizing it first, right? It's interesting, you know, I'm kind of struck. We'll see later on when we go back to Aristobel. But interesting phrase that he has when he's talking about the Greeks there. One point where he says that they're forced by the truth itself. It's kind of a famous phrase. And I noticed in the Summa Congentilis when Thomas is taking up the infinity of God and he gives all the reasons, you know, for the infinity of God. Quite a few, about 16 reasons. I'm a crazy number. But then at the end, you know, he goes back to the early Greeks, right? And he uses that phrase again in the first album. They're forced by the truth, that the beginning of all things is infinite, but then when they realize that the beauty is an infinite body, they realize that the infinite thing they're looking for was something other than a body. It's that same phrase, of course, by the truth itself. And you can see it kind of, you know, in Max Bohr and the Unity and Simplicity, the same thing. The genuine physicist, that he knows what the genuine is, he's the real thing. He's known the real physicists, like Einstein and Bohr and Heisenberg, these guys are really something. He says, the genuine physicist believes obstinately in the Unity and Simplicity of nature, despite any appearance of the contrary. That's the natural inclination of the mind, right? The mind, huh? And you saw that Max Planck saying that, huh? So long as physical science exists, right? This will be, huh? Always his goal, huh? You know what he says there about the more general law is, the simpler its form is, huh? It's very much like the more universal cause is, the simpler its, what, is a cause, huh? And, you know, as you go up, you know, among the angels, huh, the angels get simpler and simpler. But more powerful and more universal than a cause of health, you know, until you come to God, right? God is the first cause, the most universal cause, and he's the simplest thing there is. Like St. Teresa of Apollos says, you know, God is altogether simple. And the closer one gets to God, the simpler one becomes. It's kind of amazing, huh, even by the simplicity of saints, huh? It's kind of a reflection there, you know, that we're getting closer to God, right? It's for the mind. You know, when Aristotle was comparing, in the book on the poetic art, he takes a tragedy and epic first, huh? Because there's somewhat similar tragedy and epic. They both represent men, you know, greater than us in some way, and they both arouse pity and fear and so on and so on. But then he raises the question, which is a greater form of tragedy or what? Epic, huh? And although he thinks at home, which is the greatest of the poets, he thinks that, what, tragedy is a higher form than epic, huh? What's the reason he gives, huh? Well, one of the reasons he gives is that tragedy, with less words, right, you know, achieves that effect of, you know, the purgation of pity and fear. It takes epic, this whole long thing, right? And of course, the epic also has less unity than the tragedy, huh? So, he's saying that tragedy achieves the same effect, but with fewer, what, words, with fewer scenes, with fewer, right? So, he sees the power of that, huh? It's like we were saying about computers, you know, computers get smaller and more, what? effective, right? The radius got smaller and better, you know? Even the relation between the, you have mentioned that today, between the simplicity and beauty, usually, even in art, more simple, more beautiful. In music, maybe. I like classical music, but not the modern classical music. I love the baroque styling, classicism, you know? Haydn, also, I wrote before them, Bach, Handel, you know? I was driving up today and they played Haydn's first symphony. WC1? Yeah, yeah, yeah. They played Haydn's first symphony, you know, on tour and whatever. You know, he was playing the first symphony there. I could play a nice little piece. I don't know how old he was, he wrote it, but it was a really nice little piece. It's 101, maybe? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Known, at least, numbered, yeah. Yeah, yeah. So, in simplicity there is beauty, sometimes, right? Yeah, yeah. It's even more obvious that the drama, you know, like Sophocles' plays or Shakespeare's plays, are superior to all the novels, right, huh? The novel is not a very concentrated form. So, even though we're accustomed to… She wants to go back? Yeah. Should I open it? You can let her open it. Yeah, we're accustomed to which one of dinner, which one I go. I just want some left in the middle. So, there. We're accustomed, you know, you used to have to be, you know, the plays are much more concentrated. The pleasure you get from them, right? You know, the presentation of them, huh? Oh, the Gregorian chant is beautiful. Yeah. It's very simple. Sure, sure. Right? Music, huh? Yeah. Yeah, absolutely. Okay. Thank you. We'll see you. See, I felt a lot about these… In fact, I gave a paper one time comparing the two Sumas, you know, where they consider these five attributes, right? But, you know, I've had them in my mind for a long time, you know. And, you know, Thomas didn't really say how he arrived at those five, huh? You know, he said, you know, you mentioned the Sumas of God first, right? And then, what, this is five things to be considered, right? And my number five again that I'm caught up with. But, you know, I was kind of struck by how four of the five, right, are so explicit in the, what, early Greeks and modern scientists and the natural tendency of our mind is reflected in these men and their thinking, huh? And, you know, you kind of… It kind of helps you to see, you know, that these are the basic things, you know, to see, huh? But because they're thinking more of matter, you know, the cosmos known to us, huh? We don't see the idea of perfect, huh? But then, you know, when I got to study wisdom and so on, you realize that there's really two criterion that Aristotle has, two criteria, as we should say, for the end of our mind. Now, the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, right? So, the end of our knowing must be, you know, better, right? Where Aristotle argues in the Dianima, in the beginning of the Dianima, that knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, huh? And therefore, the end of our knowledge would have to be, therefore, the best knowledge, and therefore, the knowledge of the best thing, huh? Okay? But then, in the beginning of metaphysics, he reasons that the end of our knowledge must be a knowledge of the first cause. Because we know the way things are, but not why they are, the mind does not yet reach its end, huh? And if the cause has a cause, right? Okay? The end of our knowledge must be a knowledge of the first cause. Now, if the first cause is also the best thing there is, then everything harmonizes, huh? As Aristotle says, in the Ethics of the Truth, all things harmonize. Well, when you realize that the first cause is God, and God is the best thing, well then you realize that everything fits together, huh? But those who make matter at the beginning of all things... then the first cause is not the best thing, is it? And it's kind of funny, you know, the Marxists say, mind is the highest product of matter, you see? Well, mind is something higher than matter, right? And man's, you know, divinity that, you know, that Marx attributes to man, right? Man is the most, you know, man is, human mind is divinity, right? Well, it's because of his mind that man is, has his appearance of being the divine, right? So the mind, it's not the beginning of all things, it's this matter, this imperfect thing, right? So, you've got what you call schizophrenia, because the mind is, all it's thinking is to get to the first cause, and all it's thinking is to get to the best thing, not the same thing. So you're, you're divided, right? It's, it's raining, see? And so, eventually you realize that, that the natural tendency in the human mind is both to know the best and the most beautiful of all things, like he speaks to the beautiful, right? In those texts, right? And it's to know the first cause. They must really be the same thing, right? And then you bring in the four with, with the idea of perfect then, right? And, obviously, it's talking about perfect, and you attach consideration of the good and the beautiful to that. And the good and the beautiful are basically the same thing, so. So you can see in the very natural tendency of the mind, huh? Wants to know the best thing, the most beautiful thing there is, huh? You know, Plato has interest in there, in the dialogue called the Symposium, right? I don't know if you've read that dialogue, yeah. When Saketis goes to the higher love matters, huh? See? Then you go all the way up to, what, the beautiful itself, huh? And the beautiful itself is really the same as the good itself that he spoke of in the Republic, huh? The really beautiful itself is, what, God. But that's like, you know, Aristotle says, the end is to know the best thing, right? The most beautiful thing, huh? But you can't, you know, just know the first cause, either. To be the first cause must be the most, the best thing, the most beautiful thing, you know? Then you have the fifth attribute, right? The divine substance, huh? It's one simple, unchanging, unlimited, and perfect. You know? Therefore, the good, the beautiful itself. And it doesn't have to begin there, it was in the confessions he begins. Too late have I come to know thee, thou ancient beauty. Isn't that the way he begins? Kind of repenting or kind of regretting this. It's wasted years, so to speak, huh? Too late have I come to know thee, thou ancient beauty. Well, it's interesting, too, you know, when you study the four kinds of causes, you realize that in some way the maker is responsible for the matter and the form, and the end is responsible for the maker. So the wood gets to be the wood of a chair, and the shape of a chair gets to be in the wood, due to the carpenter, right? But the carpenter does that for the sake of sitting, right? So the end is the cause of all the other causes, being causes. So the end is called the cause of the cause of the causes, huh? Of course, the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, right? So when Aristotle shows that God is the first mover or the first maker, he goes on to show he's also the first end, huh? But if he wasn't the first end, he wouldn't be the first cause. But the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, right? So he's the first cause, he must be the first end, and if he's the first end, he must be the best thing there is. Because the end is always better, you know? The end of all these things, you know, fit together in harmony, I guess. And, uh... You might see that the mind is already tended then to those, to something. In a way, perfect, too. It only tends towards the causes within you. It strengthens you, you know, preparing in a way to see the reasons that we give, too, for these things. The reasons why God is simply the reason why he's infinite and so on, right? But it's not like it's pulled out of nowhere, in a sense, like, you know, I never would have thought that he would be like this, right? Right? We can look at the natural theology fragments, maybe I'll give you those sometime, you know. But there's one from Xenophon, which I think is marvelous. He's talking, first of all, nobody really knows God, right? But then he goes on to find to see what he thinks God is like, and he says, the whole of God sees, the whole of God hears. Okay, well, you know, God doesn't mean to have eyes or ears, right? But everything that God has, it's really one and the same thing, huh? So, there's no distinction of parts in God, huh? So it's kind of interesting the way he speaks. The whole of God sees, the whole of God hears. See? Well, in you, this is what part sees, this part hears, and so on, you know. And this part loves, and this part understands, you know, and so on. But in God, the understanding and the will are one and the same thing, right? The whole of God understands, you could say. The whole of God loves, huh? You could say he's, he's understanding itself, but he's love itself too, right? You know what I'm saying? But it says, how does Zenify know? It seems to me that he's thinking that he's naturally inclined that way to think that way, our mind, huh? Just like we, you know, we think about the soul, which is the most God-like part of us, huh? We think of the soul as something finer and thinner and more subtle, right? You know, you know, thinking of the soul as being this air-like substance, right? that penetrates the body. Because in some way, the soul is in all parts of the body, right? But it's not like an airy substance spread to the body. But we actually think of the soul as being something finer and thinner than the body. When you argue that the goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body, you know, we say, well, the soul is better than the body, therefore the goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body. But the soul is better than the body when we say, well, the soul is more godlike. Nobody thinks that the body is more godlike than the soul, do they? Nobody thinks that way. They're not too sure what the soul is, or too sure what God is, you know. The soul is more godlike. It simply jumps into theology, about every natural philosophy or knowing anything even about experimental science, you know. You see, then it's like they're being, you know, out of the blue, right? Talking about God, where he's one, you know. How about this, let's say to God first, then talk about the reflection of God, and we'll talk about the God being infinite, and then we'll talk about God being unchanging, and then we'll talk about, where do we get these five things, you know? But I mean, this kind of naturally occurred to the mind in what you've done through natural philosophy and experimental science to some extent. Well, actually, what else are there going to be talking about? What else did you come to, right? I mean, if you look at the Second Vatican Council when it talks about Thomas there, it's not that Thomas says a great deal about God that it was not said in one way or another by the Church Fathers, but that he, what, unifies it and orders it so well, you see? And even in Church documents, you know, you might find a number of things, you know, said about God that he's eternal and that he's simple and, you know, but, and then he's unchanging and all like that, but they don't see that unchanging and eternal go together, right? So Thomas orders these things, right? And so, when you want to talk about God more deeply, you want to talk about the way Thomas has ordered and divided it, right? You talk about his existence first, and then you talk about his substance, and then you talk about his operations, right? And you talk about the substance, you do it around these five things, huh? That's where Thomas Mastery comes in, right? You know exactly how to divide and order these things, and nobody else seems to know exactly how to do it, right? I mean, even Aristotle, I mean, I think Aristotle sees all these five things about God, you know, but I don't see where he ever brings the five together, like Thomas does in this clear way in the Summa, right? Where Thomas is talking about these things at some length, and he sees, he sees that if you want to talk about the substance of God, you ought to have five parts to your consideration, right? You see? I think you could add something to what Thomas says, like, it might be interesting to have a question on whether God is a measure of all things, huh? Right? In the laws, there's that famous saying, Plato, there in the laws, you know, where he says, was it Brutagos? Yeah, Brutagos said that man is a measure of all things, and he said, no, no, God is a measure of all things, right? You remember that? In the laws? Yeah, but he's got a beautiful text, right? He said, no, no, no, God is a measure of all things, right? So that's a very interesting attribute of God, huh? But if you know the metaphysics there, it's a property of the one to be a measure, huh? You see that, first of all, the one in the number, and then later on in the one, right, that's comparable to the being. So I think if you want to talk about God being the measure of all things, it would be interesting, Thomas has written in an article on that, I mean, it talks about some places, but you could attach that to his being one, right? See, it would fit into that basic division, right? You know? He attaches to his being perfect, that he's good, right? He attaches to his being infinite, that he's everywhere. He attaches to his being unchanging, that he's infinite, right? I mean, excuse me, that he's eternal. He doesn't attach anything to simplicity, I mean, or to his being one, right? But he could attach that. That is a big pressure of all things, see? So he's still fond of that basic way he divided it. And then when you look at the other summa, the summa kind of gentiles, he has the same five. The order's a little bit different. I wrote a paper that one time, a little difference in the order, right? And there's something to be done for both orders, very interesting, you see. But basically it's divided around these five, you see? Thomas knows how to divide things in order the rest. He knows how to do that. You see? I mean, how would he ever have done it without having gone through this? I don't see how he would have. Anybody would have done that. Augustine doesn't really do it that way. I mean, he doesn't order it that way. Well, you know, nobody else I don't think did before Thomas. But since he's following nature, nature's in that direction already. Pick an example on Thursday to the students. Right? Okay. And you don't know anything you don't have in your mind, right? Okay. So therefore, all that you know is what's in your mind. Therefore, you don't know anything outside of your mind. Well, notice, huh? It is true that everything I know is known by me, right? And it's known by me when it's in my mind, right? But does it follow from that, that therefore everything I know is only in my mind? No. No. This is the first kind of mistake outside of words, right? The mistake of the accidental. Notice, when I define square, let's say, as an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, that definition is in my mind. But I don't put in the definition. So they're taking something that is accidental and making it belong as such. And that distinction between the as such and what happens is a distinction that people often overlook. But you have to see that distinction. I was taking a very simple example with the students in class there. Where I said, do carpenters play the violin? And the boy asked Mama, Mama, what do carpenters do? Do they play violins? What would Mama say? Something new, perhaps. Yeah. But that would be something accidental. Something happens, huh? It's not insofar as he's a carpenter that he plays the violin. Sure, some carpenter might happen to play the violin. But you wouldn't say that carpenters play violins because of that, would you? So you're distinguishing between what the carpenter, as such, as carpenter does, and what the carpenter happens to do, huh? Okay? But I think what the accidental deceives us is where it's necessarily found there. We'll just come back to that when we get put it back to Aristotle because, in a way, it's involved in that a little bit, too. And this is the kind of mistake that Aristotle, in the book on mistakes there, this book on search of reputations, he says, this deceives even the wise, he says. And you could hardly be stronger than that. So let's say our little prayer here. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise God. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Take care. So we looked at Thales and Anaximander, Anaximenes, the three citizens of Letus, and Pythagoras, who started on the island of Samos, off the coast of Turkey or Asia Minor, but who migrated to southern Italy, and then Heraclitus, who's back again on the coast of Asia Minor there, the city of Ephesus. I think you went... What was Heraclitus? What? Do you know the date? Oh, it's around 500 B.C. No one knows for sure. I'm sure the dates of these people are around 500 B.C. Okay, same as Thales. Well, a little bit later than Thales, see. Thales is operating around 600 B.C. We did it in the Eclipse of the Sun, the year 585 B.C., so it must have been active around 600 B.C., so that's the age we give. So we went through all the fragments, I think, of Heraclitus, and then we looked at these natural inclination of our mind to unity and simplicity and so on. In the moderns, that you see the same thing. So Heraclitus says, it's wise listening not to me, but to reason, to agree that all things are one. He was touching upon the inclination of reason itself, what's common to all of us, what's natural, therefore, to look for unity and simplicity of the other things. Now, with Empedocles, you have a kind of break here in Greek philosophy. Because Empedocles is going to give up the attempt to find one first matter. And we're going to have to try to see what might have been his reason for giving up that attempt. So even though our reason is naturally inclined to look for one thing, if we can find it, you might have a reason for thinking there's more than one matter. And we'll try to bring that out. Now, Empedocles is over in Sicily. And I was looking at a map of Sicily the other year there, and there's a place called Porto Empedocleo. And there's this legend about Empedocles that he jumped into Mount Etna there, and as if he had claims of being divinity, he wanted his mortal veins to not be around. But you find these crazy poets, like Shelley and so on, running off and writing these fantastic things about Empedocles. But what apparently happened was that Empedocles was studying, among other things, the volcanoes. And what he did was to build a tower near the volcano, so he could look down inside the volcano. And those scientists who study volcanoes to do, today, do the same thing. They build towers so they can observe the volcano from the tower. And the legend in that area was that the tower collapsed, and that's how he ended up in Mount Etna, not by desire for immortality of earthly remains, or the existence and unfinding of them, but the tower collapsed. And the scientists who dug up there, they do see the remains of the tower. So it might be that that's the way it ended, and this other legend is really kind of making him kind of crazy that he was jumping into the mountain to pretend he was a divinity, like Oedipus that disappears at the end of Oedipus at Colonus, you know, the story. Now, Empedocles wrote his philosophy in verse, and he also used poetic language, but that doesn't mean he's a poet. The authority of the poets was so great at the time, that when Aristotle, even in the time of Aristotle, when Aristotle was talking about how men want to proceed, he says there are some who don't want to proceed unless you can quote a poet, and authority for what you have to say. So the poets were seen to be even inspired by the gods, so that the respect for the poet, in a way, is the respect for the gods. And so the poets had a great deal of authority, just like in our time, the scientists have a great deal of authority. So just as we try to be scientific, you know, the social sciences, so-called, they try to be scientific, you know, the sociologists, they have hypotheses and theories, and they have tests and all sorts of stuff, but it's not really that scientific. But they try to put on the air of being scientific. And so you see a book called Scientific Philosophy, that sort of stuff. So he clothed his philosophy in the garment of, what, not science, but of the poets, using not only the verse of poets, but also using names of gods and goddesses. to name things and so on. So this would appeal to people because they're used to the poets and reading them. And you have some other philosophers after that, like Lucretius and so on, who wrote their philosophy in verse. But even No Lesser Man Than Boethius, if you look at the constellation of philosophy, he has poems in there, or we call them poems. They're not really poems in the sense of, he's trying to make a likeness of something. But he put into verse, maybe meter and so on, his teaching about things. And so it's kind of a prosa and then a poem and then a prosa and then a poem. I mean, something in verse anyway. But I think we use the word poem sometimes too lightly for anything in verse. I mean, Thomas's prayer there, the adorote devotee latins deitas. Quesu piece figure, he's very latitas. It's got a meter and it's got a rhyming and so on, but it's still a prayer and not a poem in the sense of a fiction or a likeness. Some people say that they think the Our Father, in the original language, was in a kind of verse. It'll be easier to remember. So there are some prayers that I know that are kind of in verse, kind of in meter, but it's easy to remember. Shakespeare's Exhitation News Reason was in a verse, in a meter. But it's not really so much a poem, it's really an excitation. So, Empedocles gave up the attempt to find one first matter. And instead he said that there were four first matters. And what he took was the four that individually had been taken before. So, Mother Earth and Water and Air and Fire. And so, in this first fragment that you have here, he says, Hear first the four roots of all things. Bright Zeus, that would be fire. He gives the names of God who has this. Life-giving Hera would be what? Would be air. Okay. Air is the soul, as you know. And Hades, so Hades was the god of what? The underworld. So that would be earth. And obviously, Nestus, who moistens with tears, the springs of mortals, she is what? Water. Okay. So this is the first thing that strikes one about Empedocles. They call these thinkers, after starting with Empedocles, the pluralists, because they're saying there's plural, many. By the guys before, they were the monists, they're saying there's one matter. Now, we do have a fragment of Empedocles in the Fragments on Method, where he says, Man doesn't live very long. Man, he says, having seen only a part of life, he says, they boast of having seen the whole. So maybe Empedocles thought that there's some truth in saying water is the beginning of things. But maybe, having seen a part of the truth, that water is a beginning of things, Therese says, what? It's the beginning of all things. You know, all things are explained by water. And someone else said, Mother Earth is the beginning of all things. And someone else said, air, and someone else said, fire. But maybe each of these men had seen part of the truth. But the whole truth is that there are all four of these at the beginning, huh? There's four roots. But before we get down to the details of that, let's do what we did with Therese, because in a way we're making a fresh beginning. We've got a dissent from the general to particular now. Why would he give up the attempt to find one matter? That's the most general thing here.