Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 18: Empedocles: Elements, Love, Hate, and Order

Transcript
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But that's certainly what's more known to us. Without understanding ability or potency, one doesn't really see how any other kind of change is possible. There's something that can really change inwardly. There's something that can really come into existence, or go out of existence. All you can do is shift around, mix and separate things that always were and always will be. That's kind of the thinking of the early Greeks and of the early modern scientists. So you see why I take those five fragments together. Now the next two fragments. Nor does anything of the whole become empty or overfull. Nothing of the whole is empty. So whence could anything come, anything additional come? Now here you have a position about the empty. And you might contrast it just for a second here with Democritus on the last page there. Or in the first fragment from Democritus, DK9, he's saying that what truly exists are the atoms and the what? Empty. On page nine there. Last page there. The first fragment from Democritus. Where he's denying that the sense qualities exist, like a modern philosopher. But what truly exists, he says, are the atoms and the what? Empty, huh? Why, in the fragments before us of Empedocles, he's denying that the empty exists. So this is, again, a famous question. Does the empty exist? And a lot of questions, there's two answers. Answering no. And Democritus, as we'll see later on, is answering yes, and Empedocles, as you can see, a bit of his fragment, is answering no. Now, presumably the reason why Empedocles denies the existence of the empty would be because the empty is really nothing. And to say the empty exists, then, is to say that nothing does exist. Nothing is something. In modern science, there, sometimes they talk about empty, what, space. Nothing there. Okay? Now, you might ask about empty space. Does it have length and width and depth? Well, now, if you say it has length and width and depth, is there something there that has length and width and depth? Well, if you say there's something there that has length and width and depth, then it's not really empty, is it? If there's really nothing there, then nothing has length and width and depth. How can nothing have length and width and what? Depth is absurd. He's saying, in a sense, that nothing is, what, something. So, you can see why Empedocles would deny it that this is the empty in a way it involves a contradiction. He's saying that nothing is something. But Democritus, a little bit like Heraclitus, is getting into the position of apparently admitting a contradiction in order to save the reality of change. Apparently, the argument of Democritus was that if the empty didn't exist, then the universe is packed, what, completely tight. You know how in your suitcase, if you keep on putting things in there, you have to sit in the suitcase to close it, huh? And the more tightly things are packed in the suitcase, the less they can move around. Well, if there's no empty in the world at all, how tightly would things be packed? Completely tight, huh? So, it seems you couldn't, what, you could, like, fish in ice or something, huh? You couldn't move at all. So, like Heraclitus, seeing the reality of change and wanting to defend that, he thinks, in order to hold on to the reality of change, you've got to admit that the empty exists, that nothing really is. which is saying nothing is, but what is not. But, At least he's saying that what is not is. That seems like a contradiction. Now, in ancient times, Aristotle follows Empedocles and says that the empty does not exist. And the answer he gives to Democritus is that motion in some kind of circular way could be without the empty. If I had my beer can filled with beer, the beer could still, what, rotate them, because as one is coming in, the other is leaving at the same time, right? Now, in modern times, the early modern scientists followed Democritus. In fact, that's why they borrowed the word Adam from Democritus. And they also followed Democritus in talking about empty space between the planets, maybe, or between galaxies, or even the atom sometimes, right? But with Einstein in the 20th century, there's a tendency to go back and say the empty doesn't exist. There are fields everywhere, magnetic fields and gravitational fields, and these fields are not simply, what, the mathematical ice, there's something real. So Einstein would seem to be going back to the position of Empedocles and Aristotle that the empty does not exist. But the early modern scientists were following Democritus and holding on to the existence of atoms and the empty, right? And because they thought motion required this. Now, the next more expansive fragments that we have here, DK17 and DK21 and DK23, besides kind of expanding on the idea of the mixture and separation of things, they also introduce something new, and that is a third kind of cause. And that is the cause now in the sense of the movers, huh? Now, notice, huh? Empedocles, it said that everything is made out of earth, air, fire, and water in different ratios. And you have earth, air, fire, and water coming together, and then earth, air, fire, and water are what? Separated, huh? So you have these contrary effects, huh? In the world. The coming together of earth, air, fire, and water, and the separation of earth, air, fire, and water. So you have contrary effects. Now, what brings earth, air, fire, and water together, and what separates them? Well, first of all, if you have contrary effects, like coming together and separating, would you look for the same cause? Or would you look for contrary causes? Do you think that contrary effects have the same cause? Or would you think that contrary effects have contrary causes? Which, do you guess? Yeah. Contrary effects have contrary causes. And this is a highly probable statement, huh? So, Empedocles is going to look for a different cause of earth, air, fire, and water coming together, and another cause for their being, what? Separated, right? And just as coming together and separating are contrary, so he's going to look for contrary, what? The causes of these two, huh? Just like if you and I, for example, we saw that sometimes the butter becomes hard, and sometimes butter becomes soft, and that's, I guess, a part of our experience, isn't it? Yeah. Now, if all you knew, to begin with, right, is that sometimes butter becomes hard, sometimes it becomes soft, you say, hey, those are contraries, hard and soft, aren't they? Would you look for the same cause of the butter becoming hard and of the butter becoming soft? Or would you look for contrary causes of it's becoming hard and becoming soft? Yeah. And you might eventually figure out, hey, if you put the butter in the refrigerator where it's cold, you put it out in the backyard, in this time of weather, maybe, it gets a little bit cold, it's going to get, what, hard, right? But you put it in the warm room or on the stove or something, then it becomes soft, huh? And so you might eventually come to not only contrary causes, but in particular, in this case, it's the hot and the, what, cold that are the contrary causes, huh? Okay. Now, there's another famous proposition, and that is that like effects have what kind of causes? Yeah. Now, is it true that human beings sometimes come together and sometimes they distance themselves from each other, right? Okay? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? And what is it that brings people together? It's the fact that they like each other or love each other, right? Okay. What is it that separates them, huh? Well, they dislike each other. They hate each other, right? Okay. So, in human society, it's love that brings us together and hate that, what? Separates us, huh? Okay. Now, there's something like that, isn't there, in the natural world, huh? Earth, air, fire, and water come together, and then they are, what? Separate, right? So, if like effects of like causes, there must be something in the natural world, like love and hate, that bring together and separate them. Okay? Now, you can give whatever name you want to, but a kind of cosmic love and a kind of cosmic hate, huh? Now, his God, right, he'll use the names, maybe, of gods or goddesses. He might call love, Aphrodite or something, right? Or hate, you know, he'll use the name of God or hate or something like that. Okay? Now, we're not quite as poetic. We might say, you know, if the pieces of metal sometimes come together and sometimes they separate, there must be contrary causes. And we'll call one the force of attraction, another one the force of repulsion, right? That's basically the same idea, huh? Okay? There are contrary causes of contrary effects. So, he reasonably guesses, huh? That there's something like love and hate in the natural world, because it brings together and it separates. And he's in the name of the gods or goddesses, huh? So, he's talking here, apart from that, it's kind of a cycle where love brings them together and hate separates them, and this goes on forever, huh? I shall tell something double. At one time, it grew from the many to be one only. At another time, on the other hand, it grew apart from the one to be many. There is a double birth of mortals, a double death. He's speaking, you know, like us, right? The coming together of all things, and so on. The other, on the contrary, nourished as things grow apart. And in no place do these things stop taking turns forever. At one time, all things come together by, what? Love, huh? Another time, again, everything is carried away by the hate, the strife, huh? Okay? So, he's teaching us, huh? In the next paragraph, he says, But come, listen to my words, for truly learning causes the mind to grow, huh? Does that have any kind of change, besides changing the place for the mind to grow? Yeah, I was just thinking of it. But again, he's just describing again the same thing here, right? He's talking about how things came together and they're separated. But look at her with your mind and not sit with your eyes in amazement. She is recognized to be unborn in the limbs of mortals, by whom they think friendly things and achieve concord, calling her by the name of Joy or Aphrodite, the goddess of love, huh? So that's what's really new in these fragments on the bottom of page 4 and top of page 5. He's talking about all these different mixtures and segregations, right? But he's introducing now a third kind of cause to bring the things together, love, and another one to separate them, hate them. So now you have, in Empedocles, at least three kinds of causes. You have the kind of cause that the Greeks began with, namely matter, right? And he thinks that that's basically four in a kind, earth, air, fire, and water, but that's the matter. Then he brings in the form, the ratio, that Pythagoras had talked about. And then what maybe Hercules was trying to get at when he said war is the father of all things, and when he chose fire rather than a more passive matter, he was thinking of the mover, right? But he brings out now the mover, or the movers, are love and what? Hate, huh? Okay. So he has three kinds of cause, matter, form, and then the mover, love and hate. But both Aristotle and Thomas Fowling, Aristotle note that he's in a way, what? A little bit along the Manichean line, right? There's a good and a bad principle, love and what? Hate, huh? Okay. But there is an interesting fragment of Empedocles that Aristotle will use for a number of reasons, but he says there's no hate in God, see? That's interesting, huh? There's love in God, but no hate in God. But because of his other positions, as we'll see in the last part here on page 6, there are some contradictions there, so I'll get some into. Now, what are the next three fragments here in the top of page 6, these strange fragments? Well, we have a fuller account of Empedocles' thinking than these fragments would give you. And here we have, again, another famous dichotomy. As we study animals and plants, especially, we see that animals and plants have a variety of parts, right? And we notice that these parts are well arranged. They're where they should be in the body. So my biting teeth are in front and my chewing teeth in back. That's where they should be, right? And my stomach and all my holes and so on and trunks, they're in the right places. My arms and legs. I'm well arranged. And the cat's parts are well arranged. Even the tree's parts are well arranged. And the question is, what is the cause of this? How did you get this good order of parts in animals and plants? Okay? And the fundamental they've caught in me in thinking here will be between Empedocles and Anaxiagris. And Anaxiagris is the philosopher who brought philosophy to Athens. And he became the friend of the Athenian statesman, Pericles. But he had to leave Athens on the charge of Empedocles, which may have been partly a way of getting at a pair of keys. But anyway, Anaxiagris, in looking at the good order of parts in animals and plants, he saw, Anaxiagris, the likeness between this and the good order in the parts of a chair, or the good order in the parts of a building, a good order in the things made by what? Man. Man, huh? Okay? The artificial things. So you saw the likeness, huh? Between the order in the parts of animals and plants, and the order in the parts of artificial things, huh? And then, using the probable statement we saw earlier, like effects have what? Like causes, right? Okay. And then, what was the cause of the order in artificial things? The order in the parts of a chair, or the order in the parts of a book, or the order in the parts of a house or something, huh? Well, it's the human reason, huh? The human mind, huh? That's responsible for that order. It's the human mind that knows and directs us in that order. Well, if like effects have like causes, and the order in natural things is like the order in artificial things, and the cause of the order in artificial things is the human mind, then you could guess reasonably that there's a like, what? Cause of the order in natural things. Another mind, huh? A greater mind, huh? And we'll see in the great fragment of Anaxagoras, towards the end of the great fragment, DK-12, which we'll be looking at later on, that all minds are what? Similar, huh? The lesser and the greater, huh? Like in the bottom of page 8, the very last sentence. Every mind is similar, both the greater and the lesser, huh? So Anaxagoras reasonably guess that there's another mind, and it's greater than ours, because it's responsible for much more order than our mind is, and more intricate and amazing order, right? But there's a greater mind that is responsible for the order in animals and plants, which our mind is somewhat like, right? That is responsible and known to be responsible for the order in the parts of artificial things, huh? So... Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. So notice the marvelous reasoning there of Antiochus, he sees the lightness of order in artificial things and in natural things, he knows the cause of the order in artificial things, right, but he has to investigate the cause of the order in natural things, but he also has the probable thought that like effects have like causes, right? So he recently guesses that there's a greater mind, and we'll be studying that, and this is what really caught the attention of Socrates, to read the dialogue called The Phaedo, Socrates was very impressed with this thought of Anaxagoras, he thought he could have developed more of the consequence of it, but he was very much caught up with that. Now, Empedocles is trying to explain the good order without a mind, with only mindless causes. So he has to explain the good order as being readied by, by chance, okay? Now, if a mindless love is bringing things together, and then the mindless hate separates them and so on, right, and this goes on and on, what would you expect, then? Well, they might come together in any old crazy combination, and these particular fragments are describing some of the crazy things that happened as the mindless love is bringing things together. On it many sides of foreheads without necks burst forth, and bare arms wandered bereft of shoulders, and eyes wandered in need of foreheads, right? Okay? But yet when God was more mixed with God, now see, he means earth, air, fire, and water, which he's giving the names of gods and goddesses. But yet, when God was more mixed with God, these things fell together in whatever way everyone happened to me. Okay? So my eyes might come out in my stomach, right? Or they might come down the bottom of my feet, or some other place that would be, make it miserable for me to... Okay? And many other things besides them continue to came to be. You know, these crazy combinations. Many things were born with two faces and two breasts, offspring of cattle with faces of men. Others, the reverse, born of men with the heads of oxen, mixed in part from men and in part female by nature, adorned with dark limbs, and so on, huh? So you might have had a mermaid, or a centaur, or any crazy combination. Now, this is only part of his thinking, huh? But what Aristotle says, and Pedocles said, in addition to this, he was that all these crazy combinations can't survive, huh? So if you had a mermaid, let's say, a mermaid, she had, up here she has human lungs, and down here she's a fish-like thing, but she can't really survive in the ocean because she's got lungs, and she can't survive on the shore because she doesn't have any legs to walk around and hunt and so on, huh? So the mermaids are going to, what, perish, huh? Even though in Columbus's voyage there's a report of having seen mermaids, huh? Because nobody knows exactly what they meant when they saw mermaids. So Aristotle supplies the rest of the thinking then in his account of this, that Pedocles said, all these crazy combinations that he's describing in the fragments, they all perished because they couldn't survive. But since love keeps on bringing these things together, eventually it happened to put them together in the, what, good way, right? And that good combination, what, survived, and all the bad ones, what, perished, huh? Well, notice, huh, that's kind of a remarkable imagination because you're saying that what we actually see in the natural world today, everywhere we see good order, huh? And all the animals and plants. But he's saying that's not basically the way nature is at all. He's imagining, right, that originally nature produced what? You know? All these crazy combinations, right? But they've all perished, right? And the one in a million or one in a billion or whatever it took, right? That one survived and that's why we have the good ones around now. Now, my friend Warren Murray that was describing this to a modern biologist, he said, Oh, that's my theory. It basically is, right? You see? Okay? By chance, huh? But anxiety, which makes a lot more sense when he introduces the greater mind as being responsible for the order. And as the great Heraclitus said, huh? Thinking of this mindless fire of his, and so on, and the other mindless causes that the think is a... I think it's a... that time had, he said the earth, the cosmos is, what, a heap of powder but random, right? It should be like the, you know, the remains there of the World Trade Center there, right? That's fire roaring through the thing, right? What's it got? A heap there, right? All the orders go on, it's just a mess, right? Now you see pictures of that about nausea there on TV and so on. Incidentally, I saw a bumper sticker for the first time today. It says, Surgeon General, warning, television may be dangerous to your literacy. There's criteria, obviously, you've got to keep televisions away from them, especially little kids, but even adults get wasted in time with them. So, Inc. Saber's much more reasonable, I think, but we'll come back to that and talk about this again. This is kind of a great dichotomy between Inc. Saber's. But, as I say, Socrates was tremendously impressed with this idea of Anaxagoras. And Aristotle, who was still so full of admiration, he said, Anaxagoras seemed like a sober man among drunk men. We need to do this to the greater body, huh? That's quite a couple of them. Would you say so bad? Aristotle. Yeah, it seemed like a sober man, Anaxagoras, among drunk men. Now, these last two fragments are touching upon Empedocles thinking about how we know. And the first fragment is saying, By earth we see earth, by water, water, godlike air by air, destroying fire by fire, love by love, and hate by hate. It's because we have these in us that we, what, know them, right? Now, is this true that the thing known, the thing known must be in the knower before it can be known? That's what he's saying, right? The thing known must be in the knower before it can be known. So, he's saying that, huh? That we know earth, air, fire, water, and so on, and love and hate because we have all these things in us. Now, is that true? In other words, if I can remember you people, does that mean that I have your shape and your color and so on, in some sense, inside of me? Could I remember you if I didn't have your color and shape inside of me? Can I? Couldn't, would you? See? So, it seems to be truth in what Empedocles is saying, huh? That the thing known must be in the knower before it can be known. And Aristotle gets in a little difficulty with God there because he recognized that there's no hate in God because he thought of God as something, what, eternal. And if there's hate in God, then hate is a cause of corruption. And God would not be eternal if there's hate in him. So, that's a good insight into God, that there's love in God, like, you know, St. John says, God is love, right? No hate in God, huh? But then if there's no hate in God, God wouldn't know what hate is according to this fragment, huh? And, uh, therefore we'd know something God doesn't know. And of course, that's laughable to all the Greeks. That's one of the problems, huh? But, no, it's a more basic problem here, huh? There's metal inside the chair. Well, why doesn't the chair then know metal? Well, in the wooden chair there's wood, so why doesn't the wooden chair know wood? In what way is the thing known in the knower? Granted, in some way, the thing known must be in the knower. But now, if you open up my head here, would you find a little bone statue, let's say, or a little flesh statue or something, of everybody that I know and remember and I've known in my life? I've got rows of little statues up here, huh? Find those things up there? In other words, is the shape and the color of everybody that I remember in my head like the shape of somebody might be in the statue, to make a statue of that person? Have I taken in your shape in the way that if we made a wooden statue of you or a marble statue of you, we had Michelangelo here and he took away, or some other artist and he made a statue and he put your shape into the wood or the marble? Is that the way that I have your shape inside my head? My eye starts to, you know, change of shape and take on your shape? Well, as the later thinkers, and especially Aristotle would see, there's truth in what he's saying here, but he doesn't understand the way it's in there. It's not in there in a material way. It's in there in a what? In a material way. That I receive the shapes and the colors of other things without losing the shape or color that I have. I don't take on the colors and shapes of other things as my own shape now, like the wood would or the marble would, right? It remains the shape of another, right? So sometimes they speak of knowing as receiving the form of another as other, right? Or retaining the one that you have. So there's a kind of immaterial reception, an immaterial way that the thing known is in the knower. And the higher you go in knowing, the more immaterial it becomes. When you get to find it to the means of the self, it's completely immaterial. So Empedocles is seeing some of the truth there, that the thing known must be in the knower before it can be known, but he's not quite able to understand the way it's in there. If you understand it as being there in a material way, then the Pietas or some other statue, right, would know the person of whom, what? It is the statue, right? Because it has now received the shape of that person, right? But I must have received your shape in a different way than the Pietas or the marble received the shape, huh? Because the statue doesn't know the person of whom it is a statue. But I know, right, somehow you, right, by having your shape in me. So I haven't received your shape in the material way that marble or wood would receive a shape, huh? I'm receiving it in an immaterial way. So this is kind of a beginning of thinking of how we know, but he's seeing some truth there that somehow the thing known is in the knower, but he can't really, what, understand the way it's in there. He's thinking of it as being in there in a kind of material way. And then he'd have problems of why the chair doesn't know metal, because it's got metal in it, huh? It's got to be in there in a way other than something is in matter. So this is something that we bring out when we study the soul, right? The kind of receiving, huh? That takes place even in sensing, but even more so in reason. But it's an immaterial reception. Now, Empedocles is still thinking even of thought as being something, what, material. Well, it's really Anaxagius that we mentioned before who's first going to start to think of the mind as something immaterial. And Plato and Aristotle will follow Anaxagius in that regard. But Empedocles, like most modern scientists, they think of, what, thought as something material. Now, if you're still thinking of thought as something material, and you think that the matter which we're made is basically bone, flesh, and blood, right? Which would be the most reasonable guess as to what thought is? Is it bone, or is it flesh, or is it blood? Yeah, blood, huh? Now, one reason for guessing blood is that thought seems to be a kind of, what, movement, huh? Yeah. As Shakespeare says, it's what? You know, it... Discourse, right? And discourse comes in the word for running, so it's like emotion. So blood circulates, so that's one reason to think it's blood rather than flesh or bone. They're more stationary, huh? But another thing that we'll see more clearly in Anaxagris, thought seems to be something very, what, subtle, doesn't it, compared to other things. It can penetrate things. And we speak of a good mind as having insight into things. We speak of a good mind as penetrating. And which is more penetrating, bone or flesh or blood? Well, if I take out my handkerchief, huh? It seems like beating this morning, isn't it? But if I put a bone, dry thing, a piece of bone in here, would it go through? No, if I put even a piece of dry flesh here on it, would it go through? No, if I put blood, it would probably go right through, huh? So if blood is the most, what, penetrating, the most subtle thing, huh? It has insight, can get into things, right? Then it must be what? Blood rather than flesh or bone, huh? Okay? There's a couple of reasons at least, right? If you're just, you know, limited to those, right? Blood is either bone, I mean, thought is either bone or flesh or blood. But the best guess would be what? Blood, huh? Okay? And even, you know, Aang Seger's will speak of thought as being the, or mind as being the thinnest of all things. Okay? So he says, nourished in the sea of blood which goes in two directions. Here especially is what men call thought. For the blood around the heart in men is thought. Now, it's the same thinking you find in the modern biologists often. It's, oh, maybe identify thought with the brain ways or something like that, right? Well, they'll take the finest and the thinnest material thing they can think of. There might be electrons going up and down these things or something, right? That's your thought. Same thinking, really, as him. But the idea that whatever is the finest matter you can think of, that's what thought is. But bone would be a very bad guess, huh? My biology professor when I was a sophomore in high school, he was a real tough guy, the biology guy. And he'd come in, he'd, um, didn't know the answer, you know, he'd stand on the desk and say, boneheads! I don't know how many times he called boneheads. Of course, we're all scared of Mr. Gatto. And all kinds of stories, you know, his brutality, you know. The story of, like, one of the windows there, and one of these windows had one of these latches like that. It was locked, but he didn't notice it. And he's trying to open up the window. And, of course, the latch flies off, you know, the lock, you know. Another story about throwing a kid down the stairs, I don't know, I never saw him do that. But, uh, I'd be up, you know, to 1, 2 a.m. in the morning studying for one of these exams. I studied more for his exam than for biology in college. And I was at a pre-med one time, biology course, and college didn't say as much as I did for this guy. And, uh, that's where I met Warren Murray. We were both in a biology class, you know, and, uh, and, uh, kind of competing there. But, uh, but Warren knew a lot of science, you know, and he'd always call upon Warren, nobody else knew the answer, and Warren knew the answer. Uh-huh. But one time Warren didn't know the answer, then he really, he, he, he, he, blew up on him. But anyway, you know, I just mentioned that because, you know, that was his, his name for us, we didn't know the answer, boneheads. So, that'd be the worst thing, that's not a compliment, we'd call him bonehead. So he took something much more subtle than a Bowman, right? Something, you need blood, huh? That's what God is, huh? There must not have been a lot of blood-loading among these guys. Well, maybe so, I don't know. Yeah, yeah. So that's the, uh, the great Empedocles, huh? Great philosopher, kind of, he used to say. But not the greatest, huh? Not the greatest Anaxagris. Now, Anaxagris, we'll see first his position on matter, and then later on his position on the, what, mover, huh? All in that order. And sometimes Aristotle, you know, is hard in Anaxagris as regards what he says about matter, and sometimes he even says, you know, that in some ways Empedocles is better, right? And what he says about matter. Other times he'll say, if you listen to what Anaxagris is trying to say. But anyway, we'll see you later on when you go back to Aristotle. 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