Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 26: Aristotle's Method: Becoming Strong in Common Truth

Transcript
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everybody's heard this ingenious explanation of why the sun goes around the earth goes around the sun and doesn't fall into the sun or shoot off into space so you don't have a fiery death or a winter death there's a there's a balance there they say of what centrifugal and centripetal forces right okay so it sounds like contraries right fleeing the center seeking the center everybody's heard of newton's three laws one of which says that for every action there's an equal and yeah so he's making use of contraries and einstein went so far as to say that matter is condensed energy and energy is rarefied matter yeah it sounds familiar right and uh down in the in in the atom there they say that there is in the center there are these protons right and the protons having the same electrical charge should be repelling each other right but there are contrary forces there are nuclear forces that operate over a short distance so both the the solar system and the what the existence of matter depends upon the balance of what contraries right then they're even more obscure things like matter and anti-matter that's a lot right but they that means um so it seems east and west huh ancient modern anybody who thinks about change they seem to come up with some kind of what contraries huh so this is the common basis this aristotle has what discovered right and notice huh that they agree about the general because they all use contraries but they disagree about which particular pair of contraries is the key one and that's a confirmation of what we learned and began the book that the general is more known to us than the what particular and men tend to agree more about the more known and disagree about the less known huh so if i bought in you know some dry red wine here and gave you all glass you know we tend to agree more that drinking dry red wine than that we're drinking carboné sauvignon you might agree about that more than we agree about this carboné sauvignon from napa velli huh 1971 okay you see now aristotle's going to start to become strong in this common basis huh see what he's done okay and that'd be like the cornerstone of our knowledge huh he says in the beginning of the second paragraph he starts to become strong by giving a reason for what everybody is saying although without giving a reason and he says in this reasonably okay now the reason of course is in the form of a reason is given in the form of a syllogism a syllogism in the first figure right now what you're looking for here is a reason to unite two things huh and aristotle wants to give here a reason why the first pair of contraries without saying that but in fact is the first pair of contraries but if you take the pair of contraries that comes before all the rest he wants to give a reason why it makes sense right to think that the first pair of contraries are the first beginnings the first causes of all things right okay wants to give a reason for this huh in other words he's looking for a middle term right something that these are which is also the first beginnings huh now what does he take as a middle term well nothing other than a definition of what all of us mean by first beginnings or first causes and so the connection of the middle term with the major term will be obvious huh and therefore it will remain to show the connection of the middle term with the minor term huh okay now by the first beginnings or causes of all things are they from anything else yeah okay so not from anything else okay that's one thing that must be true of the first beginnings huh but not from anything else and if there's more than one of them one cannot be reduced to the other right otherwise that other would be the alone first beginning right okay so one not reduced to the other and three last but not least everything else is from the other okay so this is as it were a definition of what we all mean we stop and think about it about the first beginnings or causes huh they're not from anything else but everything else is from them right and you can't reduce one of them to the other huh you see that okay now if he can show that those three conditions you want to call that of the first beginnings that they belong to the first pair of conquerors he will have given a reason for what everyone says without giving a reason you see that that's one way of becoming strong right and what everybody is saying without giving a reason okay that's the first step he's going to take now this third one was in a way anticipated by his master who was what Plato right Aristotle as you may know spent 20 years in the school of the academy and he left because Plato died huh okay now Plato or Socrates in the Phaedo we don't know where one begins and the other is off right Socrates has a induction in the Phaedo that change is between what contraries huh okay but that was anticipated by the central thinker here Heraclitus huh we saw some of the fragments of Heraclitus where he talks about change being between what contraries huh so as far as this third thing is concerned one way we can show that is by a induction following in the lead of Heraclitus himself and Socrates or Plato in the Phaedo right induction is an argument for many particulars towards the general so who is it that becomes sick someone who's already sick no he might become sicker but he doesn't become sick it's someone who's healthy who becomes sick right and who becomes healthy yeah so change is from healthy to sick or from sick to healthy right okay what is it that dries out yeah and what is it that's moistened yeah you don't moisten the ocean do you can't moisten the water here in the glass because it's already wet huh it's the drier that's moistened right what is it that becomes hard something hard something what and what is softened and what is it that's moistened and what is it that's moistened and what is it that's moistened Something hard, right? And what becomes hot? Something cold. And what cools off? Yeah. They say, well, sometimes it starts from the intermediary, like lukewarm, but lukewarm, the intermediary seems to be a mixture of hot and cold, right? So it all goes back to the contrary, doesn't it, huh? Okay. What is it that's enlightened? Dark. Yeah, what is it that darkened? The light, right? Okay. So inductively, you can see the changes between the contrary, huh? Okay. And in fact, we even say that one contrary becomes the other, huh? The dry becomes wet, the hard becomes soft, the healthy becomes sick, right? And so on, right? So that's one way of showing that. Now, I add a couple of ways to this, huh? And the second way I do is I imitate the way our established shows that time is tied up with motion. Remember how he shows that? That we never perceive time without perceiving motion of some sort? Mm-hmm. Okay. Well, I think a very simple way of showing this, huh? I say we don't really perceive change without perceiving opposites, huh? And I give this very simple way of showing it. I'm going to do a little detective work here. And I say, at 10 o'clock, huh? X is cold. We're told that at 10 o'clock, X is cold, right? We're told that at 11 o'clock, X is soft. Okay? That's all we're told. Now, on the basis of that information alone, that X is cold at 10 o'clock, and at 11 o'clock, X is soft. Can you say that a change is taking place? Why not? Because the same thing will be cold and soft. Like, let's say, ice cream might be cold and soft, right? So it could be cold at 10 o'clock, and soft at 11 o'clock, a lot of change is cold. Okay? And I take the second example. And I say, maybe we're told that X is hard at 10 o'clock, and at 11 o'clock, X is hot. On the basis of that information alone, could Sherlock Holmes say that a change is taking place? Because the same thing could be hard and hot like a hot stone, let's say. Right? But if you're told that at 10 o'clock, X is cold, and at 11 o'clock, X is hot, then you could say that a change is taking place, right? Or if X is hard at 10 o'clock, and at 11 o'clock, X is soft, then you'd say that a change had taken place, right? Why? Because they're contraries, they're opposites, right? And one cannot be the other, right? Therefore, if it's one at one time, and the other at the other time, there must have been a change, right? So this is my second way of showing. I'm just going to add a little bit to our style there, right? The change is between the contraries, huh? You don't really recognize change until you see opposites there, either. Now, the third way I show it is by kind of the definition, in a loose sense, of change, huh? And I say to the students now, is change staying the same or becoming different? What do you think change is? Well, they all say it's becoming different, right? It's not remaining the same, it's becoming other, right? But difference or other implies some kind of opposition or contrariety. Do you see that? That's what otherness means, huh? Now, one not reduced to the other, right? Well, the fact that they are contraries would lend way to that, huh? That was the problem, you remember, before. If you took something that had a definite quality and made that the matter of which all things are made, like if sugar, for example, was the beginning of all things, everything would be sweet, so how could you get the bitter, right? Made out of the sweet, okay? Or if fire was the beginning of all things, how would you get anything cold and wet and so on? So from the fact that the first pair of contraries are contraries, it seems you can't simply reduce one to the other. You see that? Okay? Now, that leaves the first addition there, not for anything else, to be satisfied, right? Okay? And that's the reason why we have to take not just any pair of contraries, but the first pair of contraries, huh? Because we learned in our study of the green and pedocles that one pair of contraries seems to be a cause of another pair of contraries. And so we took the example of how hot and cold seems to be causes of black and white, and causes of, what, hard and soft, right? Or we saw that wet and dry with a sponge, for example, can make it hot or, I mean, hard or soft, right? So since one pair of contraries does give rise to another pair of contraries, you can't take any pair of contraries to satisfy that condition but the very fundamental pair, right? Maybe some discrimination, what is a fundamental pair, but if you do take the most fundamental one, then you will satisfy all three, what, conditions, right? So basically that's what Aristotle is doing, right, on the rest of page two there and the top of page three, huh? Okay, so it's easy to follow from the text of Aristotle, but that's basically the reason he's given there, right? You see in the stadium he's in there in the middle, in the first, in the second paragraph here, right? Okay. For it's necessary that the beginnings be neither from each other nor from other things, and all things from them, right? And these belong to the first contraries, right? Okay. And he goes on to show that, right? Okay. So that's the first step that Aristotle takes in becoming strong, right? Okay. Now, in the second paragraph of page three there, he takes his second step, huh? And he says, almost all the others then have followed as far as up to this as we have said before. For all, although laying it down without a reason, he's just given a reason, right? Nevertheless say that the elements of what are called beginnings by them are contraries, as if being forced by the truth itself, huh? Okay? Now, this is the second thing he's pointing out, right? That this common thought that they have, that change is by contraries, changes from contraries, it doesn't seem to be, what, an hypothesis, right? But it seems to be something forced on their mind by the truth itself. Now, sometimes, I like to contrast this with a phrase of Albert Einstein, huh? Einstein was perhaps the most famous scientist in the 20th century, but in 1905, Einstein published three papers, huh? All three now being considered worthy of the Nobel Prize, huh? Okay? Um, one was the explanation of Browning movement, huh? Another was the explanation of the photoelectric effect, and that's what he received the Nobel Prize for. The third was especially through relativity. It took them so long to absorb it, the scientific world, that it's the same kind of what? Yeah, yeah, it's the law, right? Okay? But notice, huh? Einstein is the only scientist who in one year has come up with three hypotheses, right, worthy of Nobel Prize. It's unusual for a scientist to have an idea worthy of Nobel Prize in Denmark, right? But for one man in one year to come up with three, it's never done before, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So I take that as a sign that I've said must have some... . . . awareness of how these things take place, right? Einstein has a phrase, he says that the hypothesis, the hypothesis, he says, is freely imagined. There's no logical pattern, so it's freely imagined, now that's his phrase. So I'd like to contrast that wonderful phrase of Einstein there, freely imagined, with the phrase here, forced by the truth itself. Aristotle is aware of this kind of thing called an hypothesis, and he talks about it most explicitly in the next book on the universe, right? Where he's getting into what we would call experimental science. And that's the famous text there where Aristotle is criticizing the Pythagoreans who are looking for the same kind of principles as they had in geometry. And where Aristotle says, you know, in geometry, the principles, right, justify the conclusion, right? But here in the book on the universe, the conclusion has to justify the principles. Of course, that's because you're now dealing with what we call a hypothesis. And because an hypothesis is, as Einstein says, is freely imagined, it has to be tested, right? And you test it by its what? Conclusion, right? And would the conclusions of the hypothesis agree with experiment or observation? You see? So Aristotle's aware of that. But the only guy, I think, that's aware of the distinction between this and what he has here, which, besides Aristotle, what I see, is the famous scientist Hugin, huh? And Hugin, if you look at his treatise on light, he's a contemporary, almost a Newton, right? The kind of famous dichotomy, because Newton says light is a shower of particles, and Hugin says it's wave-like. In the 19th century, they seemed to decide in favor of Hugin's. But then when Einstein got to light, before electric effect, sometimes light behaves like particles, so is it a particle wave? That's the famous dichotomy, right? How do you reconcile the wave in the particle? But the Hugin, you know, he compares what he's doing, and he contrasts it with geometry. And he doesn't refer to Aristotle, but he might have seen Aristotle first. But he says, in geometry, the principle justifies the conclusion. By here, it has to be the reverse. The conclusion will justify the principle, right? Because in geometry, the principle is seen to be true. And therefore, whatever you can deduce in that principle will have to be true. You deduce it, you know, rigorously by syllogism, huh? Like Euclid does. But here, in the beginning, it's what? An hypothesis. So it has no justification in itself, right? But you have to deduce the consequences, and then, huh? You accept it if it agrees, huh? So I can contrast this, especially the word free, with the word force, right? Force on the mind by truth itself. It makes a nice... The opposites alongside each other are more clear, so I have to contrast the two, huh? Now, why does it make sense to say that this thought, that change is by contraries, huh? Change is between contraries, right? Why does it make sense to say that that's not an idea freely imagined, but that it's an idea forced, it seems, on the mind by truth itself? Because if it's with our natural inclination, we're inclined to believe that. Yeah, but even more than that, you could say, anybody who thinks about change, and we could say even more broadly than Aristotle, East or West, ancient or modern, they come up with some fair contraries, right? Now, it's something we're freely imagined. As you know, the imagination has rise to diversity, huh? If you imagine my house, and you've never seen my house, well, you might imagine it different than he does, right? And, of course, freedom, as you know, what? It rise to all kinds of diversity, huh? You know, you hear that famous exchange between the American diplomat and the Russian diplomat back in the time he was still in power? Did you ever hear that one? It's one of these cocktail parties, you know, with diplomatic functions, and Americans talking about the variety of goods we have over here, right? But they didn't have it over in Russia, right? And the consumer things. He's kind of putting the Russian on the spot, right? Well, the Russian said, true, he says, we don't have six colors of toilet paper, he says, like you do, he says, but then he says, we have other priorities. That's pretty good reply, you know, by the Russian. But that's what freedom gives rise to, right? Everybody wants a different couple of toilet paper to match their bathroom, you know, and maybe, you know, frivolous, but it does give rise to diversity, right? So the fact that an hypothesis is freely imagined, you wouldn't expect everybody, East and West, ancient and modern, to what? You know, freely imagine the same thing, huh? But everybody, it seems, who turns his attention to change, whether he's a Greek natural philosopher or a Chinese thinker or a modern natural scientist, they seem to come up with some pair of contraries, they can't avoid that. Okay? It seems like the idea, you know, like a whole is more than a part, huh? Everybody, East or West, ancient or modern, it seems to have that idea. And so it's forced on your mind by truth itself, huh? If somebody says, I don't know if the whole is more than a part, well, we'll give you part of your salary this week, huh? We'll give you part of the car you bought, part of the book you bought, et cetera, et cetera, because you don't see any difference. And he's giving me a man, because he really does know this, right? He's just, you know, being a jerk, yeah? Denying that he knows what he does know. Okay? So that's the second step Aristotle takes to become strong, right? Okay? He first gives a reason for what everybody is saying without giving a reason. That's one step, right? Secondly, he realizes the kind of beginning this is, right? But it's, without speaking too precisely, it's more something forced in the mind by truth itself than something freely, what? imagined, huh? Okay? And that, you can see the solidity here, right, of following the advice of Heraclitus here, huh? Which we're beginning with, huh? I might mention that it's a beautiful text there in Huygens, huh? But, you see, if you go back to Aristotle when he first makes the distinction in the third book, I think it is, of the book on the universe, the Pythagoreans are badly influenced by customs, eh? Because they're coming into experimental science from geometry. And so they're accustomed to the kind of beginning that is forced on the mind by truth itself. The kind of beginning, therefore, that justifies whatever you can reduce from it with necessity. And when they get into experimental science, they look for the same kind of beginning as to which they are accustomed. And that's a mistake, huh? Okay? Now, we moderns, huh, are in the reverse situation. We're accustomed to experimental science, right? And therefore, to this kind of beginning that is freely imagined. To this kind of beginning that in no way justifies what follows from it, but this kind of beginning that is tested by what follows from it, huh? And so we tend to, what? come into geometry and into even these first parts of philosophy and think, well, every beginning here must be the same as the beginning we're accustomed to. It must be something, what? Freely imagined, right? Yeah. And that's to, what? Make the same mistake because of custom, huh? Yeah. That's an extremely serious thing, huh? And I think I mentioned before, didn't I mention Claude Bernard? I was talking about him before. Did I doubt what happened in Twinsy? Did I mention Claude Bernard? Yeah, Claude Bernard, yeah. I thought it depends on the way of determinism, right? Yeah. Claude Bernard is a very, you know, very reputable father of modern physiology, right? And has a good understanding of his primal method. When he comes to talk about philosophy and theology, it's ridiculous, right? You know what he, the way he describes the three? The theologian has an idea, but he never, what? He loses anything from it. The philosopher has an idea, and he induces all kinds of things from it, but he never goes out and sees it with it. So or not. The scientist has the idea, he deduces a controversial system, he goes out, you know. So he has the complete better, which involves three things, right? The hypothesis, the deduction from it, and then examining whether what is deduced or predicted, in fact, the so or not, huh? Okay, you take off that last part, you get the philosopher, take off the deduction, you got the theologian. Well, the point is that the beginning in philosophy here, in the beginning of experimental science, and the beginning of theology, all three beginnings are different. The beginning here, the hypothesis is something free to imagine, huh? The beginning here is forced in the mind by truth itself, huh? The beginning in theology is known by what? Faith, right? And as Augustine says, no one, what? Believes in us, he wills to believe, right? Okay? So that's why belief is meritorious, because it's free, huh? Okay? But notice, it's not free to imagine, right? You're freely assenting to the word of God. So the beginning in theology resembles that, insofar as there's freedom there, right? But it resembles this in terms of its, what? Assertitude, right? Or greater assertitude, huh? Okay? So all three beginnings. So it's a mistake to look for the same beginning in theology, and in philosophy here, and in what? Experimental science, huh? So you can see that when you read Claude Bernard, for him, there's only one kind of beginning, right? And, therefore, the philosopher, any fortiori, the theologian, I don't know, they should, but they're beginning. Well, it's a different kind of beginning, huh? So when you have a beginning that's forced in the mind by truth itself, then this beginning tends to justify what you can deduce from it, huh? It's the opposite of what you have in experimental science, where the hypothesis in no way justifies what you deduce from it, but they are used to judge it, okay? But in theology, you have what? Belief seeking understanding, huh? So the understanding you're seeking is not to test the belief, right? But it's to understand so far as we can as a kind of consolation, right? We're not fully understanding it, huh? To me, that's an extremely important thing to see, that the beginning in theology, the beginning in philosophy here, and the beginning in experimental science, there's three different kinds of beginnings. And you see, if you're accustomed to one, then you may try to, what? Seek that kind of a way everywhere. I'm struck by a passage in Albert the Great, huh? In Albert the Great's logical works. When he gets to Angus, he's talking about Porphyry's work or something, but there's a part of logic dealing with these things. And one of the objections to it being such a part of logic is that Aristotle didn't write any book on this, okay? And Albert doesn't take that argument too seriously. He says, Aristotle might have written something that was lost, right? We don't have all his works. Or he might not have got around it. He might, like any man, not get around everything, you know? So there has to be no argument at all for him, right? You see, isn't that kind of a strange argument, right? There can't be any such part of logic because there's no, what? On that, right? In other words, there was a kind of a tendency in the Middle Ages to imitate, you might say, the method of theology, right? And to find some author or authors, right? That were to other disciplines, right? Like the Bible is to what? Theology. So in medicine, you might take Galen or somebody like that, right? Or Avicen or somebody, right? And so we follow Galen even though the corpse doesn't seem to be the way Galen described it, right, huh? See? Okay? And then logic, we, what? Aristotle is the Bible there, huh? You see? Okay? But the point is, there is no book which is to philosophy as the Bible is to theology, really. You see? But I mention that, huh? Because you can see that Albert, the great mind there, is rising above, right? The influence of custom there, huh? Yeah. But most people are swept away with that custom, huh? But we've got different customs, so we, what? Make different mistakes, huh? Yeah. Can you just quickly review again the beginnings for the three experiments of science theology? Okay, there's a beginning here, which is forced in the mind by truth itself. Okay. Then there's this beginning, this pre-diagnostic. Obviously those two are not the same. Right. Because in one case, the mind is forced, right? By the truth itself. In the other case, it's freely imagined. Okay? So, whatever is forced in the mind by truth itself is a foundation that you can build upon. But what is freely imagined is not a foundation you can build on. It's something to subject to a test, right? And to hold on to it so long as the consequences of it still agree with observation or experiment, right? But you never get suititude there, right? Okay. Now, what's the starting point in theology, huh? See? Well, there, what you're doing is freely assenting to the divine truth, huh? You're freely assenting to the word of God. Okay? So you share in the suititude of the word of God. So it's unlike that, right? Which is something freely imagined, yeah? But you're not forced to believe, huh? God doesn't force the mind to believe, huh? See? And so reason can't really doubt that the whole is more than a part, right? But the reason can doubt, right? The things that believes, again, temptations anyway to doubt these things, right? Okay? Because they're not forced in the mind. And that's why believing is considered meritorious, huh? Thinking that a whole is greater than a part, I don't have any merit for that. I can't help but think that. Or my favorite accent there, before and after. Nothing is before or after itself. I can't think otherwise, really, myself. See? But in believing the word of God, right, Augustine is very clear that believing is, what, a free act, huh? Okay? There's an entirely different beginning from either the beginning in philosophy or the beginning in experimental science. But now, I mentioned in the case of Podbinarium, he's an eminent scientist, an eminent biologist, a physiologist. But for him, the kind of beginning that he's experienced as a biologist, as an experimental scientist, is the only kind of beginning there is, right? Well, then the philosophers seem to be, what, just deducing conclusions from whatever they, I mean, it's a good description of modern philosophy. That's not the Greeks, right? They're not simply, you know, freely imagining something and then deducing the consequence of it and then accepting whatever consequences followed from their free-to-imagine thing. I mean, that's not at all what they're doing, right? You see? It's a superficial understanding he has of philosophy in that. But, you know, I contrast it with the Pythagoreans and Aristotle's critique of them because they are coming from geometry and from thoughts and beginnings that are forced on the mind by truth itself into experimental science. So they try to carry the kind of beginning that they're experienced with in geometry into experimental science, and that's a mistake. We're making the reverse mistake because we're accustomed, the modern world is dominated by experimental science, and so we're accustomed to that kind of beginning that's a hypothesis, and then we try to say, well, everything's a hypothesis, right? You know, the whole is more than the part. That's a hypothesis, you know? These are hypothesis, you know? Anything could be, you know? Who knows what's going to show up, you know, in our experiments, right? See? But notice, you know, when they test an hypothesis, they do so by deducing the consequences and then seeing if the consequences are in agreement with experiment observation. If they're contradicted by that, then they, what, either reject or have to modify their hypothesis. But the principle of contradiction there, right, something cannot be or not be, that's presupposed to what they're doing. And they can't possibly test that, like to a hypothesis, because then they'd be, what, assuming the very thing they're trying to test. Let's see if the principle of contradiction is contradicted by anything. If it is, we'll reject it. We'll reject it because we accept it, right? Well, that's obviously absurd, right? So there, method of testing hypothesis presupposes a beginning that is not an hypothesis, which is the axiom of contradiction. As Aristotle points out, that's the natural beginning of all the axioms. To deny that a whole is more than a part is going to be gentle contradiction. You're going to say that the whole, which has parts, doesn't have parts. It's no more than one of its parts, right? That's all it is, one of its parts. You see? So if you want to try to lead a man like Bernard out, the force of custom is stronger than argument with these people. As Aristotle was... When I teach the apology, I always make this point, right? That Socrates is more concerned with his anonymous accusers than with the ones who are trying to prove in court that he's guilty, right? He's more concerned about the influence of what? Custom upon the minds of the jury. They're accustomed to hear that Socrates is a bad man, right? Than any proof that the prosecutors can be sent in court. So I usually stop on that and I say to the students, which is stronger for the most part in our thinking? Custom or argument? Yeah, custom. Yeah. And a sign of that is that people who live in different ages and come from different venues, right? They have a certain common thinking, right? That's obviously explained by custom and not by reason. And when you go back and read people and what they're like in other ages, I always take the example of the paston letters there from the 14th century. The paston wanted to marry one of their daughters off to some rich old money bag, you know, because of the good alliance and she didn't want to marry this rich old money bag. Want to marry that young man. So of course they were beating her every day, right? Until she agreed to marry the rich old money bags. But as the historian explained, you shouldn't think that they're cruel parents. I mean, anybody would do that, obviously. Your dad didn't marry the man you wanted. You know? There's things that we would, you know, be kind of shocked by, you know. They take for granted, right? I mean, what else would you do, right? And so, then you see the force of custom, see? So, and I always quote Max Planck. Max Planck says, we never convince the older generation of physicists of the new ideas, even though there's evidence from them in experiments. But because they're contrary to the ideas they grew up on, they won't accept it. What happens is, he says, they get old and die out. And then the new physicists come in and are taught the new ideas at the beginning of their things and they accept them because they don't have that impediment of custom, right? I say, if even the scientists were supposed to be trained about all the evidence, that's about them. And Max Planck is a pretty darn good, you know, witness to this, right? Then what about the rest of us mortals? Augustine says on that, our entire way of living with respect to marriage, banquet, closing, and out of necessities and customs of human life might seem shameful among other peoples at other times. He goes into a whole big thing on this. Love to buy. Sure, sure, sure. I mean, I read these new Hudson Shakespeare's, you know, which are old now. And they're rich, rich in for the high schools, but they're very good. I don't think very much. But, you know, in their introduction, they'll say, you know, occasionally a lion is left off that they thought was a little too body for the high school thing, you know? But, I mean, they just kind of take it for granted. You know, you want anything like this, you wouldn't think of this. We have plates, obviously, in high school, you know, those lions are left out, right? Of course, they can see the kind of things that the high school kids are exposed to now. I mean, Shakespeare, there's no reason to say it's Shakespeare now. I can't put things on TV or anywhere else. And, you know, like...