Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 32: The Three Principles of Change: Substance and Contraries

Transcript
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So I don't know if we can meet next week, you know, but do you want to meet the Tuesday following that? Would that be the, um, is that too close to Christmas? I don't know if it is, the Tuesday. I probably won't make it because I'm putting together in a newsletter. Yeah. It includes a lot of hard work. Yeah. I could come up this week on Thursday this week, too, but, you know, before the exams hit me, you know. But usually, you know, I try to be there kind of for students who are, you know, afraid of their exam on Saturday. They might come see me, you know, but I could come up on Thursday afternoon. But next week, I'd say it's kind of bad because I'd say, actually, Tuesday, I'm giving an exam on Tuesday afternoon. And then, uh, I don't know on Thursday, I'm on Friday, so it's Saturday. So either we could meet Thursday this week, if you want to, that's too soon or not, you know. Okay, okay. But next week is not really good, you know. Okay? Sure. Okay? You can make it on Thursday or what? I'd rather do it this week because I have to get pressure to finish other things. Yeah, I mean Thursday this week, yeah. Yeah. We had to track up on Thursday at the same time, regular week. Okay, then we'll, we'll, uh, finish this eleventh reading, right, and we'll do the next reading. But I don't know where I'll get, you know. Okay. I think Thomas there, was it the Ephesians that they're called the pullers of the church? It's kind of unusual because usually you find the apostles called the pullers of the church, right? But, but the Ephesians, I just got through the, read the order of the epistles, they're Galatians, you know. Thomas is always criticizing them for their, their, uh, defects and so on. But the Ephesians, he's more praising them. He wants to confirm them. They're, they're much better Christians, apparently, than the Galatians are, right? You know, the Latin, oh, insensate Galatia, you know, you senseless Galatians, you know, and so on. He's really, really upgrading them a lot, you know. So, I think there's the Ephesians there. He's praising them, the, the, the, the pillars of the church, right? Mm-hmm. And, uh, Thomas says, uh, by this he means, by faith, hope, and charity, right? But then he, he speaks of three pillars in the Old Testament. And there was the, the pillar that, uh, was like a cloud, right? Right. And then there's the pillar, uh, which was of smoke, and there's another one of the, the prophetic books there. And then there's a pillar of fire, right? Mm-hmm. And the, the pillar called the cloud, right, he represents, uh, faith, right? Because we see God in the mirror as we're darkly, as St. Paul says. You know, the cloud of a knowing, like in, in, in, in the, in the mystic. And so that's, that's, that's our faith, right? They're a pillar because they're a pillar of, what, cloud, because they have the faith, right, where we see God, but that darkly is in the mirror. Mm-hmm. And, uh, then, uh, then, of course, the, the, uh, the fire, of course, is what, the charity, right, uh, you see? But the one of smoke, he ties it up with hope. And, uh, it's because, uh, fire, uh, is rise to smoke, right? Mm-hmm. And so charity is what really, you know, perfects our hope, right? And, uh, so that's for the, the, the, the pillars of the church, right? But it's kind of interesting the way he brings out those, those to me. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, how can the good is what all desire be a definition if the bad is sometimes desired, right, and therefore it doesn't separate the good from the bad, see? Well, the solution to that is that there's the good as such that is desired, and the bad as such is not desired. We desire the bad because it appears to be good or because of the good in it and we don't see the bad in it, right? And even that crazy guy in Crime and Punishment, right, who he's going to, you know, kill the woman, he's got a reason to kill her, doesn't have anything in for her, right? But it's the false appearance of good, right, that he wants to show that he's above the law, right, and not similar to the law. Well, if the rest of you guys are under the law and I'm above the law, I'm above all the rest of you, I think they have a certain superiority, you know? But it's obviously a crazy, you know, a distorted idea of what excellence is, right? He's really becoming worse than all the rest by committing this senseless murder, right, huh? But what's attractive to him is the idea of what? Freedom, right, you know, and being above the law, right? It's a false appearance of the good, huh? Are there some exercises that you go to, because this is really like a real art, to do this, to be able to see, you know, or come up with contradictions as you begin to, I mean, reflecting on things, but to have a play to that, you know, that ability, but I wonder how many years it takes to really develop that good art. Even these puns that you have, you know, Shakespeare is always, you know, because I saw all the puns, right? But the puns, in a way, produce a kind of paradox, right? You know, even my mother would say, you know, I see through the blind man, but he couldn't see at all. But there's a parent contradiction there, right? You know, kind of paradox, not a big deep one, right? But it does make you stop. and examine the meaning of the, what, the word right now, you know? Oh, humor, I guess, involves contradiction. Yeah, yeah. Not at all. Yeah. Well, the Catholic faith seems to be steeped, so I guess contradiction would be... Yeah, but what you have an example of the Gospel of St. Matthew is that one passage of Scripture can appear to contradict another one, right? Mm-hmm. And our Lord is showing you. So it constantly, throughout the Scripture, sees this, even though, you know, you know it's not contradict and truthfully. But it makes you, you know, stop, you know, and think what's hidden there they didn't understand, right? Mm-hmm. Because Augustine says there's more things they didn't understand in Scripture than they didn't understand, right? But each of these things, you know, leads to light. Mm-hmm. How many students do you have in these classes where you'll be having to correct? Oh, maybe. It could be anywhere from 20 to 30, you know? Mm-hmm. You know, it might be kind of bored, you know, with that, you know? You can feel it before. I was correcting these papers, you know, for the introduction of philosophy, you know, and so I managed to get through them. I put it on Zaid by Mozart, you know, and then putting it on the introduction of the Suralio, you know, just letting it distract you a little bit, you know? For years I used to always play harpsichord music, which is kind of monotonous, correcting exam, you know, because it wouldn't distract me too much from the correcting of it, you know? It was always a joke between my wife and I, you know, that he's putting on the harpsichord music, you know? But now I was putting the operas on later, you know, and you know, the rest of your teeth so you don't pay too much of that stuff, you know? And then, you know, and you get a little more crutching down, and then they start coming in, you kind of, you know? Have you ever listened to Gorecki? What? Gorecki? No. A modern composer, Polish. Uh-huh. He's had this one, this one, this one, this Miserere, Great Amen, it's like 15 minutes long, and it's just an amen being sung over by a choir. Yeah, and if you don't want to fall asleep, you listen to that, because it'll lull you, and then the voices will, I mean, it's just the most amazing piece I've ever heard. You know, just tremendous humor. I mean, I don't know, maybe, let's see, I might not be the best expert. We'd never get out of the choir here if we sung our own event. As many events as we do there. So, Mozart's Masses, you know, you had a bishop there who liked short Masses, and what Thomas did, I mean, what Mozart would do with some of them, right? He'd make it very short, you get to the amen, it's like that, you'd go on and on and on, because the bishop would think, you know, that's a nice short piece, you know, it's just about over, you know? And all of a sudden it goes on and on and on and on, and I think he doesn't purpose to annoy him. I heard that St. Thomas once said he was sorry that they'd burned the books of the heretics so long, because they could have learned so much more. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If your mind is free, right? Otherwise you'll end up in despair, and that's not too absurd. I hope it's beautiful in life. So, we'll see you on Tuesday then, right? Okay, same time, same station as they say. Thank you very much. You're welcome. Can you visit me or you're... I'm an observer for Christmas month, and I was given the option of coming in, and I'm pretty glad. You're welcome, you're welcome. Somewhere down the line, studying philosophy. I was reading it here. The tempest of the day, you know, and, you know, the souls frotting the ship there, you know, on the water, right, are arousing the compassion of Miranda, right? You know, that's a beautiful example of Shakespeare using that one. Synecdoche, right? He's caught, caught the men out on the ship there, right? The souls, right? You know? Because you have that scripture, you see. You know, sometimes, you know, man is called a soul, and sometimes flesh. But in either case, it's a Synecdoche, right? Giving the name of the pipe to the old. Yeah. Do you want these, or can I keep these? Yeah. If you want, you can keep those. Okay, because I don't know if you, I know you didn't expect me to come. Okay, if you, yeah, if you don't mind. You've got all, all faith. Come to the camp, and then come back. There's one difficulty I can't untie with this answer that there had to be a God that had to become man to make a preparation and had to be infinite. Yeah. Because the sin was infinite because it defended God. Yeah. Now, why can't you say that, well, then, it's infinite because it was toward God who was infinite. So if I make reparation to God, it can be infinite in the same respect. Because humanity is an instrument of its divinity, right? But just man himself. Yeah. So if I've offended God, well, if I do something to make it up, it's infinite in the same respect that the offense was. They're both to God who's infinite. It seems like the answer is taking infinite in a different sense, as if I have to be infinite. But I wasn't infinite when I made the infinite offense. But it was God who was infinite. But that's like the old thing we said there, you know, before, that God is chiefly responsible for the good you do, right? But you're chiefly responsible for the evil you do. And it seems quite unfair, right? You know, you should get credit for the good I do, mainly. Not me, but I get credit, I just want to say credit, responsibility for the evil I've done, mainly. But wasn't the infinite sin was the original sin? That's what you were talking about, right? Well, it's an immortal sin that has a kind of affinity to it, too, you see, because you're rejecting an infinite good there, right? I see. But that's not surprising, right? I mean, I could murder you, right? And that would be a rather bad thing to do, right? But could I do something good as much as that is bad? Well, that would be more of them. Well, if I, no, maybe. It would be a good thing. Yeah, yeah. I mean, if I have a murder for you, I mean, what can I do? I can't bring you back. Right? I can do more harm to you than I can do good to you, right? And take away your life, but I couldn't restore your life. Well, once I've done that, I can't make reparation as far as you're concerned, anyway. Except because of Morrison, I'm the one who's died. Spiritually, huh? I killed myself, you know, I separated myself from God, huh? Life of my soul. Because there's that nice proportion, right, huh? The soul is the body, right? The body dies, huh? God leads the soul, the soul is dead. It's kind of a proportion there, right? The soul. God is the life of the soul in a way that the soul is the life of the body. It's not, you know, to be identified exactly, but there's a likeness there, huh? Would it have something to do with that? We rejected the infinite? Yeah. I mean, we had the grace, and then we rejected it, so we can't get it back? Yeah, we did. You're saying that, oh, we're talking about murder right now. Yeah, yeah. To commit a murder, the murderer is more dead, in a sense, than the one who was killed, as long as the one who was killed was in a state of grace. Because the one who did the murder committed a mortal sin. Yeah. Is that what you're saying, that because of the mortal sin, God is not there? I mean, if we captured Ben Laden over there, right? Right. You bring him back and have him reconstruct the thing and put him back in there to get killed and so on, right? You can't really do it, right? If you had to change your heart, right? No, but that's, I mean, we're saying that those people, and assuming that they're innocent, well... No, but what I'm saying is, my rejection of God is worse, really, than my rejection of you when I killed you. right you see that's okay that's how that involved a subjection of god too right i mean there's something irreparable about certain certain uh evils right you know i mean this you know read this tragedy by shakespeare you know what's it called othello right i think you know i remember first reading othello one of the first tragedies i read by myself you know it wasn't spoiled in class it's cool you know i mean imagine you know a fellow when he realizes that his wife is really innocent right and he's killed his wife right and you know that's when he kills himself right eventually but i mean you know he's sticking you know he's asking what the devil is to roast him and so on right you know like he can't be forgiven for what he's done right huh you know and uh how can you ever be forgiven with this right well of course you know he can be forgiven for anything but in this life but uh i mean it seems to him like you know there's no way you could possibly what you know he's lost his happiness is there's the happiness right anyway didn't put punishment for what he's done you know it's really extremely pitiful right so there are some things you know that we can't really overcome right that's the old thing you know they say if you want to be angry at somebody you know tell them off verbally don't don't write a note there's something primitive about writing a note right and and and you're going to have much higher time you're reconciling you know if you say some hot words i mean that that can be harmful too you know but you take the taxi down write a note and they want to see you again there's no excuse that it was just my temper yeah yeah yeah yeah you have a little time to think about it presumably yeah you brought that out yeah it's premeditated exactly yeah yeah yeah but there's something that you just kept you burying them i'm having a problem misunderstanding the sense of the word i think i have to show my experience to explain it uh okay this uh sense of the words i mean i was reading over my notes just how important that is i mean it's really the most common mistake in thinking yeah that's all i've been doing when i'm thinking about that and one of the things i was thinking about was nature you know knowing it by the effects yeah and that's all we can see is the effects in that yeah yeah i kept coming up with the words properties characteristics attributes and that and then i would look them up and they all seem to point to quality attribute being more inherent characteristics being more distinguishing quality and um uh property being more of an essential quality yeah and then i went back to the notion of quality and that i got from a class and that was like the senses of passions ability or inability disposition habit and the last one is the one that it said shape or form and and then when i think of shape or form i think isn't that quantity i can't get past that what quality about quantity yeah oh of course species yeah it is it is it is it's just quality about quantity though the shape of the object right okay so maybe i'm not misunderstanding yeah shape or figures is the fourth species of quality in the categories yeah yeah that's tied up with the determination of quantity oh determination okay so i i wasn't making this understanding right determination how do you define what's contained by limit or limits right you know the figure right what's the limits of quantity right it's kind of quality about quantity okay so it's the limits of quantity is what we're talking about yeah i see you see when when uh uh uh you could will show that student what different shaped figures right can be what equal right when you're first out in geometry you know you have to kind of place one figure upon the other and they coincide therefore you know they're equal right then later on he gets to what show equality figures that don't have the same shape and you have to show that in a different way than what by placing one upon the other right so they have the same quantity but but they're what shape is different huh yeah so like that like you know they you know between parallel lines right you have transient parallel lines and the triangle is half of the what parallelogram the same one right but then you can figure out a way of making it a parallelogram equal to a what to a to triangle right just take take a half the face right and you get the rectangle which we'll see which is equal to the triangle then right it's a triangle half of them the theorem maybe i don't know if you got that far in there but the theorem is where you have triangles and uh parallelograms between parallel lines right and you know you could show us that all triangles on the same base right and the same parallels are what equal and see with parallelograms but then later on you can you can see that what a parallelogram on the same base would be twice as big as a triangle on the same base so if you you divide in half the the base of the triangle and make a parallelogram on the half one then it must be what equal to the triangle but you don't know that by direct of those two figures anyway if they went on top of the other right yeah we've got proposition 47 then the one yeah yeah yeah yeah so the difference in quality of the quantity is the same how much would be the same right but the shape would not be the same so the quality is different so you're arguing there about about pasta in the house see because my wife likes the spaghetti and and uh my son martin actually eat the ziti right it's a little more you know but i don't know whether to see some of these things is i mean it's partly shaped you know the ziti gets a little more chewy than the spaghetti but i mean basically i mean you go in the in the supermarket all these different shapes pastas you know and uh you know and they're really basically the same uh matter but a different uh form right and it's funny how sometimes things it would taste better in one shape than another i don't know why they said it my son marcus went down to uh help my son paul his brother there you know move he's he's uh the station how possible paul's the captain of the army there but he's going to go down to florida and teach uh rtc i guess at the florida institute technology or something like that so they're going across you know quite a few long drives there but uh marcus will be going down in one flight coming down a different way right so you buy one-way ticket right one of the suspicions now people buying one-way tickets so my mother and my wife had made a big box of presents for the grandchildren there for paul and for paul elizabeth and so on on the big box so he made him open up that thing he went through everything you know but happened about two or three times because he had you know a couple of changes and every time they checked him again so i said that doesn't pay to buy a one-way ticket you know i mean it just makes you a bum so strict you know i don't know i mean i mean some people don't see them any problem at all but people you know they they go after for some reason but you remember you go out of the month oh i went to my wedding anniversary they checked me twice i mean they check me every time it involves you know i need to go online for about an hour and then you can say play for ourselves in purgatory now this is always just a question kind of like that i recommend you you save a little money and invest on those what's the uh the gregorian promise there you know how many masses oh 30 30 yeah just just i i i'd do that sort of thing you know or else i just was wondering because you know outside of it yeah we're talking about time briefly in beginning of the last year there's the history down through history right that they would um uh endow right these wealthy men endow or church right champion they call it i guess yeah and you have someone who would you know kind of like get his wages from the dows or something and uh and would say yes for you you know and make a deal okay Let's say I will pray. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Praise God. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're on the bottom paragraph from page 4, reading 11 here. And in that bottom paragraph, you have the second argument for there being a third thing in change besides the two contraries. Now, as we saw last time, I emphasized the first argument because of two things. One, I think it has more strength, right, or more necessity than the second and third arguments. And secondly, because it illustrates the role of contradiction, right, in development of our knowledge, and that seems to be important according to the great minds of philosophy and of science and of theology. Now, the second and the third arguments depend upon the distinction between substance and accident, among other things. So, you recall that from logic a bit, huh? Let's just recall it a bit. Substance here means a thing that exists not in another, not in another subject. And Ernst always gives us his first example, a man. The second example would be an animal like a dog, huh? Because the unity of a man or a dog is more clear than, say, the unity of a plant. Like, when you say a rock, a rock of substance, well, you might think it to be a substance, but maybe it's actually a combination of what substances kind of fuse together, right? So, that's what a substance is. Now, an accident has many words, but accident here, as it seems from substance, is a thing that exists in another subject and cannot exist apart from it. So, if I take, as an example, the health of a man or a dog, right, that exists in the man or the dog, and you can't put the man in one room and his health in the next room, because his health can't exist without the man. You can put a man in one room and the dog in the next room, or he's got the cat in another place at nighttime, so she won't do her business. But I can't put my, what, health in one room and me in another room, right? Or, let's say, the shape of a man, right? Or the knowledge, right? I'll have to take my knowledge with when I go home today. Can't leave it up here. But these are examples of accidents, huh? Now, the word substance, of course, is the black and derived word and comes from to stand under, right? And it gets its name because, in a way, it's the first subject underlying all the accidents, huh? So, it's well-named, in a sense. So, it stands, huh? And what's interesting, too, in terms of our, what my language is, anyway, English, that the English word understanding has the same etymology as the word substance, huh? And that's not simply by chance, huh? Because the senses know only accidents, but it's reason, or the mind, or the understanding, if you call it sometimes, which knows what substance, huh? So, it's a word, huh? That's the Latin etymology, and the Greek word, of course, is usia, right? It doesn't have quite the same. Now, the second thing that these two arguments are based on is the idea that contraries are accidents, huh? Rather than substances, huh? And once you see that contraries are accidents, we say, well, isn't substance more fundamental than what? Accidents? Yeah, yeah. And so, if the two contraries, as you've been in the previous reading, right? The two contrary accidents are beginnings or causes, even more so should, what? The substance underlying them be a beginning. Okay? In addition to these things, Aristotle says, then, someone might have doubts if no one placed another nature on the contraries. For we see that no substance is, what? Contrary, huh? So, man or dog, what's a contrary to? Or horse or plant, right? But it seems that the contrary is accidents, like health and sickness, huh? Virtue and vice, and so on. But the beginning, meaning the cause, ought not to be said of any subject, for there would be a beginning of the beginning. Substance seems more fundamental. For the subject is a beginning, and seems to be before that which is said of it, like healthy or colored, or whatever it might be, right? Okay? That's an interesting reason, right? To think that there's going to be now a third thing, right? You know, unless you accept what was said in the tenth reading, that the beginnings are contraries, and everybody's saying that, right? And then you add to that the contrary is accidents, and you realize that accidents and substances are, but doesn't the underlying substance have to be a beginning just as much, if not more so. It seems more fundamental, right? Than the accidents, and so those contraries are in some sense beginnings, even more so as a substance, huh? Okay? And then again, in the top of page five, he gives another argument, and again, it's based upon the idea that one substance is not contrary to another, but it's accident to accident. And so, how then would substance be from what is not substance? If you said everything comes to be from the contraries, and the contraries are accidents, you'd have the body coming to be from health, or sickness. Doesn't seem to make any sense, would it? Or the butter coming to be from hardness, or from softness, right? Okay? Or how could none substance be before substance, right? Doing this none substance, besides substance, accidents. How could accidents be the origin of substance? So, the second and third arguments, you see the need for a third thing, right? Okay? Now, in the next two paragraphs here, Aristotle's going to kind of conclude now that there are three things, right? The contraries, and the subject underlying the contraries. And in the second paragraph here on page five, and in the third paragraph there, he's going to say that his predecessors, in a way, saw this too, right? Whence is someone should hold the former reason, meaning the reason that there are, what? Contraries, right? The changes by contraries, changes between contraries, changes from one contrary to another, right? We even say that in change, one contrary becomes another, right? And then this to be true, the three arguments you just given, is necessary if both of them are to be saved at some third thing unto I. Water or fire is something in between these, huh? It seems more the in-between, huh? He says in-between because something that would be more, what? Unlimited as far as qualities are concerned, huh? For fire and earth and air and water are twined together with contrarieties, like hot and cold and dry and wet. Hence those making the underlying other than these do not act unmeasinably. Of the others, those saying air, for air has the least sensible differences of the other. Then water is better, right? Than, say, fire, which is very definitely right. But now, in the next paragraph, he's indicating that in a way his predecessors saw that. But it all shaped this one thing by contraries. So besides density and rareness, they had something that was made dense or made rare, like water or air or Mother Earth or something else, and by them more or less. Now, in the rest of this paragraph, he's kind of alluding there to a difference between Plato and the natural philosophers, huh? Because Plato would speak of contraries to, in a way, excess and defect, but he puts them on the side of matter. Sounds kind of strange, huh? Well, the other guys would see unity on the side of matter more, and then the contraries, the two, what, opposite forms that the matter can, what, assume, huh? Okay? But you've got to realize that Plato, in a way, is, what, a logician and a metaphysician, and he's, what, thinking of forms separated from matter, right? Which matter is partaking of, right? And when you look at it that way, then you see the, what, multiplicity in the side of matter, yeah. So, the form man could be shared in by many pieces of matter, right? In the same way if a woman's making Christmas cookies, right, huh? And she got the idea of a Christmas tree, right? That's something one, right, that one shape, huh? But then she realized that one shape, and this piece of dough, this piece of dough, this piece of dough, right? And you see multiplicity on the side of what? Matter, right, huh? Okay? But then you're kind of looking at it from the point of view of the, what, extrinsic cause, right, huh? Okay, rather than the matter itself, in the way the matter is what formed, huh? Because if you look at, you start with a piece of clay like that, and say, okay, this clay can be molded into a sphere, or molded into a, you know, a square, or something else, right? And then you see the matter as being something one, the clay, and the form, like the spherical shape, or the cubicle shape, or the cylindrical shape, or the pyramid shape, and so on. You see multiplicity in the side of what? Form and unity in the side of matter, right? Okay? Because then you're looking at it from the point of view of matter and the transformation of matter, right? And the same matter can take on many different forms. Just like you look at my body, right? My body can be healthy one day, and be sick the next day, and be healthy again another day, right? You see? So there, when you look at it from the point of view of matter and the transformation of matter, matter seems to be something one in which different, what, forms can succeed each other, right? So matter is one, but the forms are many. But if you look at it from the point of view of a maker, it's kind of an extrinsic clause, right? You know? I'm going to make, what, many classes that same shape, right? So you've got this matter down there, and I've got one form I'm going to realize in, what, many classes, like all those window panes, right? The same shape has been put into this matter, this matter, this matter, and this matter, right? And so the multiplicity seems to come, in that case, from the, what, matter, right? So, how many cookies can I make? It's like I've got a little, you know, Christmas tree-shaped thing, you know? And we roll the dough out there, and jump, jump, jump, jump, jump, jump. All of a sudden I run out of dough, right? But the multiplicity of cookies comes from the shape that I'm trying to impose upon them? No. Because there's many pieces, many separate pieces of matter, that can all receive one in the same what? Yeah. So then I think of the form as something one, and the matter as something what? Molten. Yeah, yeah. That's what Ted's looking at, right? Yeah. Yeah, you said Plato's view is the one that shape, form was one. Yeah, he thought of the forms, especially, you know, what a man is, what a dog is, is existing in a world by themselves, right? So, spirit, anything of a spherical shared that one form. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. As if there was a part for matter, right? Mm-hmm. One form of this kind, another form of that kind, and many pieces of matter could share in the same form, right? That must be an interesting world, because everything would be absolutely unique. Yeah. You could only have one spirit. Well, yeah, but you could be many different pieces of matter partaking of it, right? But I'm... So you partake of the form of man, and you do two, and you do two, right? Mm-hmm. So what a man is, is something one, but individual men who share that nature, they are many, right? So the multiplicity is in the sight of matter, you see? And there's some truth in that way of speaking, too, right? But it's more appropriate to the natural philosopher who's talking about things that change, as we saw in the definition of nature, right? To look at it from the point of view of the matter that's being changed or transformed, right? And then we see the matter as something one, and the forms as something, what? Many, right? Okay. In a sense, Plato's coming in from the outside, so to speak, right? Because he was shook up by his teacher, Cratchelism. And Cratchelism says, everything in the world around us is changing. Well, how can you understand something that is always changing, see? And that led to kind of, you know, almost despairing Plato's part, right? So you have to find something somewhere that aren't changing, right? So we can understand. And he thought that the definitions of Socrates, right? Which are definitions of the universal, right? He thought that they were, what? Giving us a true knowledge, right? And a knowledge of something that's unchanging. So he thought of, what a man is, is existing apart from the material world. That's partly because of what we saw in that reading from Aristotle earlier, where he touched upon the central question. Plato thought that truth required that the way you know things, what, be the way they are, right? So, if the mind truly knows the universal, in separation from the singulars, we don't put Socrates or Plato or you or me in the definition of man, do we? So if we truly know man, apart from you and me, and Socrates and Plato, then man must truly exist apart from you and me. And that's that world of forms. They call it falsely translated in English, ideas. Greek word is aidos, which means, what, form in Greek, and so the world of forms, I don't know, is, in large part, Plato comes to this because he's convinced that we get truth through definitions, and he's answered yes to the central question, or he's thinking yes to the central question anyway. So that must be the way things are. It's a little bit like, you know, when you got to Pythagoras, remember? Pythagoras came into natural philosophy from mathematics, and therefore he started talking about things he was accustomed to in mathematics, like ratios and things of that sort. Well, the natural place to begin, if you start from natural things, is with matter, you see? And natural philosophers and even modern natural scientists, they tend to be materialists, or at least to start out what they are, you see? Because that's what stands out in matter. They're, you know, it's a matter of the changes, huh? It's like, so, but I think it's coming even more from outside, should I say, than Pythagoras and it looks at it that way, huh? And notice Aristotle's modesty in the fourth paragraph. To say, then, that the elements are three would seem to have some reason. But a lot of reason, of course, I think it's all right. For those considering from these and other such things as we have said, huh? So notice what he's doing now. Let's recall the context here, which is developed, which is developed here. He asked how many beginnings there were at the beginning of this chapter, right? And he eliminated there being just one because of the previous reading, which said they were context. Contraries and contraries and general opposites have to be two. Then you're eliminated by those four brief arguments that there's an unlimited, or if you want to speak Latin, infinite multitude of them, right? Now it can't be just one because the beginnings are contraries and so there has to be two of them. Now if something forced us to say, or if there's some reason to think, there must be a third thing. But we just got through with three reasons, right? Why there must be a third thing, huh? So we've gone up to three. Now, does anything force you to say there's more than three, right? But now again here, the principle of fewness is what we're looking to apply here, right? And that principle is not that fewer are better, period, because two is fewer than three, but fewer are better if they're enough, right? But two was not enough to explain change. It'd be in a contradiction change without that third thing. Plus there's other arguments he gave from substance and accident, right? Okay. But now he's going to stop and say three is enough, that's all you need, right? Okay. And he's going to get a couple arguments. Three is enough. Three is all, huh? Okay. Now, the first argument is apart from contrariety in a sense. But to say more than three would seem no longer to have a reason, for one is enough to undergo. If you have two contraries, right, and an underlying subject, then change is what? Possible, right? Okay. So that's, as we're, enough to explain change, right? Okay. If our fourth thing exists, there will be two contrarieties, and it's necessary that another in-between nature exists separately for each. Then you end up with, what, six things, right? But that isn't, what? Necessary, right? See? Aristotle is looking for something that in a way forces you to say that there's more than three, right? Like there was something that forced us to say there's more than two. But in this case, there's nothing that, what, seems to force us to say there's more than three. Once you have three, then you can have change. So the hard butter can become soft, right? Not because hard is soft, or because hardness becomes softness, but because the butter can lose the hardness and acquire the opposite, what? Softness, right? Okay. So there you see he's kind of applying the principle of fewness, huh? And then he gives another argument based upon contrarieties, and it goes back to the thing we saw in the arguments against the unlimited. At the same time, it is impossible for there to be many first contrarieties, for what? For substance is one genus of being, okay? Now, in saying substance is one genus of being, it's also the genus of being that un-belies all the rest, right? And in one genus, you have only one, what? A pair of contrarieties, right? Okay? Now, most of what that argument is based upon, right? It's based upon substance being before all the genre of accidents, right? So at the beginnings, we'll have to be in substance rather than elsewhere, right? And then, that in one genus, or one kind of thing, you have only one contrariety, because they are the species that are, what? Furthest apart, right? Okay? Okay? Now, that's why he says three is enough. He stops, right? Okay? But now, if you use your reason, which I guess means you look before and after, right? If you look at the three arguments whereby he, especially the second and the third arguments, where he argued that there must be a third thing besides the contrary, right? If you look at that, and then you look before at the arguments against what? An unlimited multitude, and now after, at the argument, and especially the second argument here, for saying three is enough, right? You'll notice an apparent contradiction. Something he says both before and after, or in the arguments before and after those middle arguments, right? Something he says in the arguments against there being an unlimited multitude, and something he says here in the arguments to say three is enough, right? Contradicts something he, apparently, used in his second and third arguments to say there must be a third thing besides the two contraries. There's no contraries in substance. Yeah, yeah. In the second and third arguments in the middle, right, he reasoned that contraries are accidents. There's no contrariate in substance. And if the contraries are accidents, and accidents are not his fundamental substance, only if they're beginning, substance even more so has to be a beginning, right? Okay? But in the arguments, one of the arguments against you being unlimited principles, he argued, like he did right now in his last argument, that substance is more fundamental, right? It's a fundamental kind of thing, the fundamental genus. And in one genus, there's only one contrariate, so in substance there's only one contrariate. He's arguing that there is contrariate in substance, right? Or from there being only one contrariate in substance, right? In the second argument here, you see there's no more than what? Three, right? And in the argument, one of the arguments for there being, against there being unlimited multitude, right? In fact, it was the second argument against the unlimited, right? And there's one contrariate in one genus back in page four, and substance is one genus, right? Okay? Does he mean, though, when he says, as there's always one contrariate in one genus, is he referring to the particular accident that would be put in the chain? Now he's saying substance is one genus, right? And there's always one contrariate to one genus. He's arguing that there being one contrariate to the onion substance. Well, in the second, third arguments for a third thing, besides the contrariate, right? He reasoned from only accidents are contrariate, right? Now how can he have his cake and eat it, right? You see? I don't understand what he means by this contrariate in genus, though. Well, no, we're showing you. We're showing you. Remember the other day? We took examples of accidents, right? I took color, and I took habit, okay? Oh, that's where it's now. Oh, okay, so this is an equivocation, then. No, no, it's not an equivocation. Is it? No, it's in, because it's not an equivocation. Okay? We have white and black, which are the contrariate in color, right? I have many other colors in there. I just took, for example, yellow, right, which is, and say, blue, right? Now, blue is closer to black than yellow, and yellow is closer to white than blue. Yeah. But yellow and blue are not as far apart as are what? White and black. Yeah. So contrariate are the species furthest apart in the same genus. So white and black are the species that are furthest apart, right? Okay, but I was thinking of color as an accent. Yeah, I know it is an accent. But, I mean, for genus, though. Yeah, it's exemplifying the fact that in one genus, there's only one contrariate, because there's only one pair that are furthest apart, right? Okay? Now the genus of habit, let's say, we have virtue, and we have continence, and incontinence, and then vice, right? Okay? Now, in the virtuous man, the vicious man, his will and his emotions are going in the same direction, right? Okay? But in the case of the virtuous man, his will is going in the right direction towards the good, right? His emotions are obeying him without any real trouble, right? The vicious man, right? His will now has chosen what is bad, right? And his emotions are perfectly degreed with the choice of the will, right? See? Well, in these cases, there's a, what, conflict, right? His reason and his will are urging him towards one thing, and his emotions are in a terribly moving in the other direction, right? And the kind of man, he continues, he controls himself, right? But we're definitely like an alcoholic, right? Who's got a real urge to drink, right? But he holds on, right? See? Okay? Because it's...