Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 35: The Principle of Three in Physics and Theology

Transcript
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Atomic theory, and this is from the volume Across the Frontiers, which is also published by Harper and Row. Something's on paperback, I don't think, but anyway. Following recognition of the basic significance of the two universal constants of nature, Planck's quantum of action, right, and the velocity of light, right, it was natural to ask how many such independent constants of nature there can actually be. Three, it's like the question at the beginning of this reading, right, how many? The answer is, there must be at least three such universal constants, but that probably all other constants of nature can be traced back to these three by way of mathematical relations that are still in part unknown. That three such independent natural units of measure must exist is something most simply made clear to the physicist or technician by considering how the customary physical or technical systems of measurement all contain three such units of measure. The centimeter for length, right, the second for time, and the gram for mass. If we wish to replace these three conventionally established units by natural ones, Planck's quantum of action and the velocity of light must be supplemented by yet another concept. The atomic structure of matter makes it natural to choose as our third unit a length of an atomic order of magnitude. For example, a length of the order of the diameter of simple atomic nuclei. But a precise formulation of this unit of length can be given only if we are able to express mathematically the natural laws in which it figures as an essential quantity. Quantum theory and relativity theory obviously cannot be combined without difficulties. After what has emerged in recent years, we have every reason to suppose that success in combined the two theories can be achieved only if we also take into account the field of consideration, the third basic structure, which is bound up to the existence of a universal length of the order of 10 to the minus 13 centimeters. So, I mean, that's interesting, right? You know, the role that he sees for three there in what? Physics, right? Now, if you go to theology, of course, you can see how theology is dominated by three, right? Starting with the, what? Trinity, which is the most famous example of this, right? But the second mystery of the Trinity is the Incarnation, right? And there are the three, or that Christ as man is what? King, priest, and what? Prophet or teacher, right? And if you study the Second Vatican Council, there are documents, you know, pastoral documents directing bishops and so on, or about the bishop. There are pastoral documents about the priest, right? There are pastoral documents about the laity, right? But you'll notice, in talking about the bishop, or in talking about the priest, or in talking about the layman, Vatican II will try to bring out how each of them, in a different way, right, shares in the three offices of Christ, right? And so they talk about the bishop, and what way he shares in the, you know, prophetic or teaching role of Christ, right? What way is king, ruler, and so on, and his priest, right? And then they'll take up the same thing for the priest, right? And then they'll talk even about the priesthood of the laity, which is a different thing, but you know, he has a sin share, right, in those three. So that's another very important three, right? And the third three that always comes to mind in theology is the three faith, hope, and what? Charity, which is the way that St. Augustine and Thomas divide what the catechetical instructions are, going to faith, hope, and what? Charity, right? So three is a very dominant thing there, huh? But in the theological works, Thomas will sometimes take up this objection, you know. Thomas will say that the Trinity is known only by faith, not by natural reason. One of these objections is taken from Aristotle's book on the universe, which they call Latin De Celu in Mundo, where Aristotle says, and by this number, namely three, we praise God, right? And so on, right? He said, well, Aristotle knows something about this, right? And Thomas, in reply to this objection, he says, according to the exposition of the commentator that Severo was, right, Aristotle did not intend to place a trinity of persons in God, right? Even though he saw three as a number to praise God with, right? But in account of this, that in all creatures there appears perfection in three, as in a beginning, middle, and what? In, right? And therefore, the ancients honored God in threefold sacrifices and prayers, okay? Sort of interesting, huh? Now, that's taken from the sentences here. Now, another passage in the sentences where he's explaining what they call the vestige of the Trinity, you know, the distinction between the image of the Trinity and the vestige of the Trinity. But in the image of the Trinity, you always have three, of course, because here. But now, this particular article is entitled, Whether the parts of the vestige, the footprint of the Trinity, are three only or two, right? Okay? And he says, vestigium, which is like footprint, huh? Is found in the creature insofar as it imitates the divine perfection. The perfection, however, of the creature is not had at once in its principles, in its beginnings, right? Which are perfect, as is clear in matter and form, of which neither has by itself for perfect being. But in the joining of the creature to its end. But nature does not join things that are a distance without something in the middle. And therefore, in creatures there is found a beginning, a middle, and an end, according to which three things Pythagoras laid down the perfection of each creature. And according to this reason of these three things, there is represented in creatures the distinction of the divine, what? Persons. In which the Son is the middle person, right? And the Holy Spirit is the one in which the procession of persons is terminated, right? Okay? Okay? And now as you apply it to an objection, you're in on the same part. That's where you find it's three, right? In that body article, but this is the objection. A footprint is set in the creature according as it represents the Creator. But they're represented in creatures many attributes of God, huh? Which are partaken of by the creatures, as is clear, through Dionysius in the Divine Names, Chapter 9. Once it seems that there are more parts than just, what? Three, right? To the third, Thomas says, it should be said, that the properties of the creature from which we are led to the divine attributes, although they are many, they have nevertheless the order to each other of beginning, middle, and end, under which notions they lead us to the three persons, no matter how they are diversified, right? Okay? And then another little passage here, another distinction there in the senses. He's talking about something kind of funnier about the sins there. And because perfection of every quantity is comprehended by three, on account of the beginning, middle, and end, therefore a three-fold difference is laid down. Okay? But you also do that when you talk about the, what, the three stages of charity, you know, the beginners, and the middle, and the perfect, right? That corresponds to the three parts of the Psalms. When Augustine and Thomas divided the Psalms into three fifties. And the first fifty, you know, according to the correct number now, not this more contemporary number, the first fifty into this. psalm of what? Asking for forgiveness, right? The second 50 end with a psalm dealing with what? Good action, right? And the third 50 end with a psalm of praise, right? That's characteristic of each group, huh? Because the first stage is where you're mainly, what, fighting against your vices and sins and repenting. Second one, you're trying to go forward in the virtues from virtue to virtue. The third, you're resting in God, you know. So, some people see, you know, three as being so prevalent in creatures, right, in things we study, because, you know, we're like a trinity in some way, right? Now, if you read, you know, fairy tales, like, you know, if you get the famous fairy tales, you can get them still in Dover books, you know, the blue book of fairy tales and the green book and, you know, all different colors. But all these stories, they always got, what, people in them. But just to end on a little lighter note here, I have three here. This is taken from Henry Shelley's book, which is The Inns and Taverns of Old London. He says, No one can glance even casually over a list of tavern signs without observing how frequently the numeral three is used. Various explanations have been offered for the propensity of mankind to use that number. One deriving the habit from the fact that primitive man divided the universe into three regions, heaven, earth, and water. Pythagoras, it will be remembered, called three the perfect number. Jove is depicted with three-forked lightning. Neptune bears a trident. Pluto has its three-headed dog. Again, there are three fates, three furies, three graces, and three abuses. Of course, you might mention that there are, what, three hierarchies of angels, right? And each hierarchy has, what, three orders, right? Like, the highest hierarchy has the, what, the seraphim, the cherubim, and the thrones, right? And in the middle one has the, what, the lords, and the virtues, and the powers. The lowest one, the princes, the accents, and the angels, right? And as Dionysius tells us, within each one of those orders, there's a beginning, middle, and end, too. So you have three hierarchies. In each hierarchy, three orders, right? In each order, you have a beginning, middle, and end, too. So it's just dominated by three, huh? The angels, huh? It is natural, then, to find the numeral so often employed in the signs of inns and taverns. Thus, we have the three angels, the three crowns, the three compasses, the three cups, the three horseshoes, the three tons, the three nuns, and many more, huh? And he says, in the city of London proper, the three cups was a favorite sign, and the three tons was highly less popular. There were also several three nuns, the most famous of which was situated in Elder Gate High Street, where its modern representative still stands. In the bygone years, it was a noted coaching end and enjoyed an enviable reputation for the rare quality of its punch. I'll just hit a little light-letter note there in three, you know? It's not a complete, you know, how to feel just a few interesting, you know, ones you can have that you want to get to wisdom, you'll find out that wisdom is about three things, huh? Well, let's get there to get to wisdom. Now, let's give you the next group of readings here, okay? Okay. I'll just kind of give you a little prologue to it, but I'll pass them around here. Okay, I think I've got ten there. You see, Aristotle's working his way from reasonable guesses and probability, to some extent, towards necessity, right? But he's gradually approaching this up. Now, in the twelfth and thirteenth reading, which are the first two readings in this group here, Aristotle is going to do something like he did in 10 and 11, okay? What's he going to do like what he did in 10 and 11? He's going to find a common basis, thought, if you wish, right? And he's going to become strong in it, okay? He's going to follow the advice of the central thinker of human thought a second time. Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all, okay? So Heraclitus said, or he said, therefore, we have to follow what is common, huh? Okay? So you have to find what is common, and you have to, what? Become strong in it. Actually, here, and in 10 and 11, too, he finds something that is common in two ways. He found what was common to all change, right? What is found in all change, and what is common to, what? The thinking of all the Greek natural philosophers, and even the Chinese, and the moderns, when they think about change, huh? Okay? Okay? And he became strong in that, right? Okay? So many steps he took, even the tenth reading, and then the greatest step here in the eleventh reading, huh? So he's going to do something like that here again, right? But there's going to be some differences here, right? And I might mention, first of all, he's going to find a common basis about becoming. In 10 and 11, I said he's found a common basis about what? Change. Change in general, huh? He's going to find it among all men, and not just among the natural philosophers. And third, he's going to become strong in it with complete necessity. There's three differences there that I'm touching upon, right? It's going to be very similar, in a way, you'll see, to what he did in 10 and 11. But he's going to come to three things, right? Found in every becoming, right? Okay? Like he found three things in every change, right? Okay? It's going to be very similar. And it's going to be a truth that is widely shared, right? Except here he's going to argue that this truth is in some way seen by all men. Right there he showed in a way this was seen by all being what? An actual what? Philosopher's, huh? Okay? But the word becoming here will be more the prominent word than the word change, huh? And as you'll see, when you get to the 13th reading, he's going to determine the truth now with complete necessity. And he's going to correct something in, what, 10 and 11, right? It's not being, what, altogether necessary, right? Okay? We'll see what that is when you get there, okay? See? So, um, sometimes I have to spare, you know, the students' minds being up to see the difference between these two, you know? Okay. Peace. Peace. Peace. You know, they see things at a distance, so to speak, you know. And at a distance it might look like he's doing almost the same thing again, right? And there certainly is a continuity there, right? But there will be these three differences, huh? There the key thing was finding what is found in all change, right? Here it's what is found in all becoming, right? There it was seen by all the natural philosophers, and we got it by the Chinese thinkers who wrote the I Ching, right? And by the modern physicists when we talk about change. And finally you're going to do so as complete necessity, right? You're moving from the inside as you go along. It's kind of marvelous the way he follows the advice of Frank Lawrence too, right? Wisely and slow, right? They stumble and run fast, right? He's very careful in these fundamental things. to absorb them slowly and carefully, right? As Humphreys' name said, Edmund Paul, right? The dumb ox. I spoke about that before, right? Now, let me first of all touch you upon the word becoming, right? Now, are the words change and becoming a different reality? Well, notice, huh? Notice. If you speak of the change from being sick to being healthy, right? Isn't that the same as the sick becoming healthy? Aren't you talking about the same reality? Take the butter out of the refrigerator, right? It changes from what? Hard to soft eventually, right? Okay? The hard becomes soft, right? Are you talking about two different things when you talk about the change from hard to soft and the hard becoming soft? Are the butter becoming soft? Now, are there synonyms in the full sense of the word? Synonyms. Do they mean the same thing with exactly the same meaning, right? Ask them sometimes. Three feet and 36 inches. Are they the same length? So, is three feet and 36 inches synonymous? Do they mean the same thing? Not completely. It seems a little difference, right? Because 36 and three are not the same, right? And a foot and an inch are not the same, right? We actually seem to be giving the same length, don't you? You see? Now, sometimes I approach this with something easier to see for the students. I say to them, are you going home for Thanksgiving or Christmas vacation? And the student says, yeah, I'm going home, right? Okay? So, you're going home. Meanwhile, your mother in a conversation is saying that you're coming home for Thanksgiving or coming home for Christmas, right? Now, are you and your mother talking about a different trip? No. Now, what you call going home, your mother calls coming home, right? And I say to them, now, is this because you and your mother speak a slightly different language? Do you have a different word for the same reality? It's the perspective of wherever you're in. Yeah. Yeah. Because your mother might use the word, what? She's going to Assumption College, let's say, right? And you'd say she's coming to Assumption College, huh? Check up again. Okay. So, why do you say you're going home, and why does your mother say she's, you're coming home, huh? Well, the trip is from Assumption College, let's say, to your home, right? And you are at the point of departure, right? At the beginning of where this journey is going to start from, right? And so, that's why you say you're going home, right? Your mother is at the, what? Point of destination, the end, right? And so she says you're coming home, right? Okay. So, in a way, you're naming the same trip, but from the point of view, you might say, or the point of departure, right? And from the point of arrival, right, huh? She might say, I'm going from Assumption College to my home, right? Okay. But you say, you're coming home from Assumption College, right? Okay. So, there's a little difference in the word. It's not just a synonym, because it's a synonym. You, your mother, would say, going as much as you, or vice versa, right? So, I see, it's important to know where they're coming or going, right? But, I mean, it's cool. It's easy to know what the difference is. Okay. Now, given that distinction there, right? Becoming seems to be like coming, at least the word points to that, right? Okay. Then, when you speak of coming to be, you're looking at it from the point of view of what comes to be, which is at the end. The end of the becoming, right? See? So, you can see in the word becoming, that you can change the coming to be if you wanted to, but you can see the connection with what's like coming. Now, you don't see that in the word change with the word going, do you? But, is change different from becoming? Something like going differs from coming. When you speak of change, are you, in a sense, looking at it from the point of view, of the point of view of the point of departure? I think there's some truth to that. You can see it in this way. If I haven't seen somebody for some time, right? And I say, my, he's changed, right? What am I thinking of? Yeah, he's departed from the way he was, the way I remember him. Do you see? So, in a way, I'm looking at it from the point of view of what? Departure, right? See? Do you see that? So, it seems to me in 10 or 11, at least when I teach it, I don't know, if I'm seeing myself, when I teach 10 or 11, the key word to me seems to be more change, although it's not limited to that. I do use the word becoming too, right? Okay? Especially in terms of the contradiction. I think you use the word change there more, right? Changes by contraries, changes between contraries, and one contrary to the other, right? Okay? But here, the word will be very much becoming, huh? Okay? So, I don't know if I understand the full significance of that, but there's a little difference there, right? Okay? But notice, huh? In both cases, you arrive at there being three things. But maybe you'll see them a little bit differently, the three things you can't from the point of view of coming, huh? Rather than going, right? But in a sense, you'll leave it straight from the mind to see it, right? It's like you'll see the same thing in going and coming, right? Now, the second thing there, the second difference, huh? As I say, he's looking for some common thought. What's common, though, to all men about becoming, right? But before, he's finding what was common to all the natural philosophers about change, right? Okay. Now, that's going to be reflected in the way he proceeds, right? But how can he find what's common to the thinking of all men about becoming? He can't open up everybody's head, right, and look inside and say, oh yeah, he's got it, he's got it, he's got it, right? He can't read them like he could have read all the great philosophers before him. What he's going to do, and you'll see that in the very second paragraph of the 12th reading, he says, we say, he says, we say, that's not the editorial we. Meaning, we Aristotle, like we sometimes call the editorial we. It's not we, as we, the Greek natural philosophers, which he sometimes says, right? But we, meaning all of us, right? Okay. He's going to begin from the way we all speak about becoming. And why does he do that? Because the way we all speak about becoming is going to reflect a common understanding we all have of becoming, okay? And then he's going to come down to the things themselves, okay? That's kind of unique what he does here, right? He says, at the beginning, anybody would say, of natural philosophy, and there's something that all men, to some extent, in a confused way, that is to say, right? That they all see about becoming, huh? And he's going to bring that out, the very way that all men speak about becoming, okay? But it's in the 13th reading that you'll see him correcting something, right? It was very fundamental in reading 10, huh? Namely, the changes between contraries. That isn't altogether necessary. And when he determines the truth with complete necessity in the 13th reading, he will correct that. And we'll see that, okay? Let's just kind of look at this little prologue, right? As you will do this the next time, okay? But as you start to read it, you'll see, as I say, something like 10 and 11. He does find what is common to all in two senses, right? What is common to all becoming in the thinking of all men, right? Okay? And he does become strong in it, but there'll be those differences, right? Would there be something to the connection that all men would see it from the point of view of becoming, and all the philosophers from the point of departure? I don't think so, at least in my reading of it, huh? You know? But maybe it's more reflected in their speech about becoming, right? Okay. Okay? But sometimes I come back to change, and I illustrate what he's brought out here, right? Is there a different Greek word for the two? Yeah. Metabolism, that's the word for change, right? Can I see this motion? So, notice at the very first paragraph, huh? He recalls what we learned in the beginning of the book. Let us speak, therefore, in this way, first considering about every becoming, for it is according to nature, and this is the natural road, to state first the general, and then to consider what is proper about each thing or particular. Okay? He recalls what we learned in the first reading, right? The general to the particular, right? Okay? But we saw that illustrated in 10 and 11, when he saw that they all agreed in general that change is by contraries, but they had some disagreement as to which pair of contraries was the fundamental one, right? Okay? So, I'll stop on that note, but let me, again, I've noticed in teaching even other parts of philosophy, the problems people get into because they don't understand the general before the particular, huh? They don't understand good in general. They don't understand better in general, right? I ask the students after, you know, we give a kind of a tonic dialogue on good, right? And Socrates asks, you know, the little boy, what is good? And the boy says, candy, pizza, vacation, bicycles, baseball. And Socrates would say, like he says, to Mino and to Yuthyfro, well, now these are all examples of good things, right? What do these things all have in common that makes you call them good? The little boy would have a hard time coming up with what's common to pizza and vacation, bicycle, except these are all things that he wants. So the first definition he would come, when he tries to say what they all have in common, all the things that he wants is called good by him, right? So this is the first definition of good, huh? The good is what all want, what all desire. The good is what is wanted, okay? And then, imitating Socrates in the Yuthyfro, right, we'd say, now, is it good because we want it, or do we want it because it is, what, good, right? They say, well, did you ever want something which not other people, but you yourself recognize later on was bad for you? My stockings, yeah, one class is, you're at the party, and the host or hostess says, you want another drink? And you say, yes. And as you drink this thing, you tend to feel kind of lousy, and you have to excuse yourself, call for a walk or something. So even you yourself might admit that last drink was not, what, good for you, but yet you wanted it, right? Or the kid who wanted to drive his car a hundred miles an hour down the street, right, and ends up in a tree, you know? And his car is roomed and totaled, and he's in traction and so on. Even he might admit to himself, right, that it was not good for him to drive his car, what, a hundred miles an hour, right? But he wanted to do it, and nobody was forcing him to do it, right? So we all have some non-controversial examples, right? Where we wanted something that, in fact, we saw later on was bad for us, right? And not because other people say that's bad to do or something, right? But we yourself saw it was bad for us, right? So that would be on the side to say, well, it's not good because you want it, right? But now if you take the other side and say we want it because it is good, right, then someone might say, well, why is it that the good is not always wanted, right? And why is it that sometimes, as these examples show, what we want, in fact, is not good at all? It's bad, right? If good was the cause of wanting something, then since contrary causes of contrary effects, the bad should be the cause of aversion, you're turning away from something. But people sometimes want bad things, huh? So I kind of, we see a doubt it to be in both sides, right? And then I say, well, which side do you think has more truth to it? You know, I think the arguments against saying it's good because we want it are stronger, than the difficulties of saying we want it because it is good, right? But before I try to then answer the arguments on the side that I think is true, right, the arguments against that, I give them a very simple induction, huh? And I say, let's make it a little table of fundamental goods and the desires corresponding to them. And I put down food and hunger and water and thirst and reproduction, desire to reproduce, and knowledge and desire to know, and basic goods, huh? And I say, no, it's food. good for a dog or a man because of hunger? Does hunger make food good for them? Or can you see a reason why food is good for a dog or a man apart from their hunger? Everybody can see that, yeah. In the same way, can you see a reason why water is good for the animal apart from their thirst? So you can see in each particular example, right, that there's a reason why food or water is good for the animal apart from their desire for it. And it comes to reproduction, they say. Can you see a good reproduction apart from the desire we have to reproduce? Yeah. That's the only way the species can stay in existence, right? And you see a good in getting your sleep, apart from your desire to sleep, you see? So you can see inductively, right, that these goods like food and water and reproduction and sleep, you can see that they're good for the animal apart from the fact that he desires them. Therefore, nature didn't give the dog hunger to make food good for it, but because food is good and in fact necessary for the animal, nature has given the animal hunger so to pursue what in fact is good for it. The same with thirst and water and desire to reproduce and to reproduce and desire to sleep, right? So inductively I show, which is an army kind of proportion to them, that something is not good because you want it, but it's wanted because it's good. Then we come back to dejection, son, and we say, well, if then the truth is not that something is good because we want it, but the reverse, we want it because it's good, why is it that the good is not always wanted, and why is it that sometimes the bad is wanted, right? Those are the two objections, right? You say, well, you've got to use your reason now, right? And I've already given them what reason is. You've got to look before and after, I say, right? Is there something that comes after the good but before desire? And I say, take the example of Romeo and Juliet, right? In the beginning of the play, Romeo's in love with what? Rosalind, right? Now, Juliet was beautiful at that time, right? But he had no desire for Juliet at all. It was all for Rosalind. What happened? He went to the party at the capitalists to see Rosalind, and he saw what? Juliet, right? So something comes after the good but before desire. And what is that? In this case, it was his eyes, right? And there might be reason, right? You see, the philosopher is a lover of wisdom, right? What comes after wisdom but before loving it? Knowing what it is, right? So the good is the cause of desire insofar as it's what? Known, either by the senses or by reason, right? So the good as known is the cause of love, okay? And that explains why Romeo didn't love Juliet in the beginning of the play. He didn't know her, right? But still, it's her beauty that aroused his desire for her, right? Now, that also explains why the bad is sometimes desired. Because the bad can, what? Appear to be good, right? And so the eyes or the reason can be deceived by likeness, like the Italians who ate the poisonous mushrooms, right? Because they couldn't tell them apart from the good ones, huh? And also the knowledge of the senses or reason can be incomplete. I can know a drink is delicious and not know it's poisonous, right? So I drink the delicious poison because it's delicious, not because it's poisonous, right? I eat the poisonous mushrooms because they appear to be good mushrooms. I know people this happen to, right? I know people who've drunk the wrong alcohol, got blind, them. Okay? So it's the good as such that is what? Desired, right? Okay? It's got to be known somehow. Okay. But if people don't stop and understand the good in general, they're not going to be, what? Able to think about these more particular things. Okay, now we go on to the word better, right? And we say, is something better for me because I want it more? Well, if it's not good because you want it, it's not good-er. More good, better, because you want it more. The ball game's over. You can't play that game anymore. You can't say this is better for me because I want it more. And that's better for you because you want it more, right? Once you see that it's not good because you want it, right? You know, sometimes you have to elaborate upon the force of the reasoning there, right? I say, um, shurder is white and sweet. Now, is something sweet because it's white? No. Everybody can see that, right? So if something is not sweet because it's white, is it sweeter because it's whiter? Right? But if you say it's sweeter because it's whiter, you're going to be forced to say it's sweet because it's white, but it isn't. Right? So if something is not good because you want it, it's not more good because you want it more. Now you've got to give me a reason, I say, for saying this is better than that. You can't just say I wanted more. That escape is closed now. That door is closed. So what is better in general? What's better? What is better? The most fundamental statement about what is better in general is that the end is better than the what means, okay? And you develop that inductively at first, right? Health is better than taking medicine, right? Knowing is better than studying, and so on, right? And you can even syllogize to it, too, if you know how to write. What about asking why was Juliet better than Russell? It's more beautiful, yeah. What I kind of say is when you're looking for a general proposition at first, the most fundamental one, or you could say, if you wanted, the perfect is better than the imperfect, okay? The one meaning of perfect is whole, and the other meaning of perfect is what has reached its end, okay? But it's a little more concrete to say that the whole is better than the part, right? And the end is better than the means, huh? So you develop those, and then later on you can reason from them, okay? And so eventually we reason out the, what, the end or purpose of man, right? And then we use that to reason that the goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body, and so on, right? You see, a person who's never understood good in general can't understand better in general, right? And then they can't understand what's better for a man in particular, see? But once they see that the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, then when you reason out the end of man, you know, that's what's best, right? And what's closer to the end is better, and you can reason in that way, huh? See, when you get to the Apology, right? In the Apology you find out that Socrates has been examining the Athenians about all the goods of human life, and examining their life which seems to be based on the thought that the goods of the body and the outside goods are better than the goods of the soul. And I say, now you can't say that the goods of the soul are better for Socrates because he wants them more, and the goods of the body and the outside goods are better for the Athenians because they want those goods more, because we already admitted something's not good because you want it. Therefore you can't say it's better for the Athenians that they want it more. So now you've got to give a reason for saying it's better. And then what I usually do is go back to the division into two, right? The goods of the soul and the goods of the body are inside goods, and like that as opposed to the outside goods. And I say, now those two which are better, well then you proceed inductively to show that the outside goods are for the sake of the inside goods. See, are your feet for the sake of your shoes? Are your shoes for the sake of your feet? Are my glasses and nose the sake of my, I mean are my glasses the sake of my eye? Are your shoes for the sake of your shoes? Are your shoes for the sake of your shoes? Are your shoes for the sake of your shoes? Are your shoes for the sake of your shoes? It's a book for the sake of my mind, and my mind for the sake of the book. It's your note for the sake of, you know, is my car for the sake of transporting me to school, or am I for the sake of getting my car to school? You see? Are you for the sake of your clothes, or are you for the sake of clothes for the sake of you? See, if you're for the sake of your clothes, you'd go in those mannequins in the department store downtown, right? They're there to display the clothes. See? So you can show inductively that the outside is for the sake of the what? Inside. Are you for the sake of holding this chair down so nobody steals it? Or is the chair for the sake of holding you up? You know, are you there for the sake of holding the mattress down, or the mattress there to help you sleep? You know? So you can show inductively that the outside is for the sake of the inside. And since you've already shown that the end is better than what is for the sake of the end, then you have to say necessarily the inside goods are better than the outside goods. So as they say, we reward to the outside goods and the bronze pedal, I say. Okay? And then we start to ask about the goods of the body and the soul. Of course, if they knew the body was for the sake of the soul, you could syllogize the same way, right? But they don't know enough about the soul and the body. But then we'll say, you know, a reason for the goods of the soul being more, what, godlike, right? Than the goods of the body. See? So if you admit that god is better, right, then you have to say that the goods of the soul are better, right? Or the goods of the body, we share with the beast. They already know man is more than the beast. So the goods man has and the beast doesn't have are the better goods. Okay? Not the goods he has in common with the beast. But if we've also reasoned out the end of man, then we can reason that the goods of the soul are closer to that. But people don't understand what is better in general. They don't have none of the premises to, you know. But then, you know, when Aristotle reasons out, or we reason out the end of man, the act with reason, you know, done well throughout life and so on, and then we sometimes substitute for done well by virtue, right? Oh, what's virtue, you know? I say, well, you know, people start off with too narrow an idea of what virtue is. And actually, virtue should be understood in general first. And virtue is as broad as, what, a thing's own act. Anything that has its own act, the act that it alone can do or can do better than other things, can have its own, what, virtue or vice. And so what's the virtue of a knife? Yeah. Virtue is what makes its however good and its own act good, right? Well, what's the knife's own act? To cut. What enables a knife to cut well? Sharpness. So sharpness is the virtue of the knife. What's the vice of the knife? Dullness, right? See? So obviously, if man's end is to do his own act well, it's got to be according to human virtue. And you want to, that's what human virtue is, but you know kind of in general what a virtue is, right? And then you say, what enables man to do his own act well? And that's when you start to get into understanding the virtues. Even ethics, which is, you know, in human action there, I mean, you have to enter into details eventually and so on. In order to act, you've got to take into account circumstances and so on. But the ignorance of these things in general, these general things, makes it impossible for them to think well about the particular things. There's some truth even there. You have to know the general before the particular. It's kind of interesting the way Aristotle began in Nicomarckian Ethics, because he first does teach you what the good is, and he does teach you what the better is, right? Before he even gets in. It's in the very premium to Nicomarckian Ethics. You know, you have to have a teacher that unfolds it, what's all there. So Aristotle's going to do the same thing here, right? He's going to, you know, or it's according to nature to state first the general and then consider what's proper about each thing, right? And even Euclid does that to some extent, right? He'll define triangle before isosceles, triangle, quadrilateral before square, right? Rectilineal, plain figure before quadrilateral, right? Can't really understand the particular without understanding the general. You can understand the general without understanding the particular, right? You can see how that before and after in our knowledge resembles the before and after in being, right? You know, this can be without that, but not vice versa. This can be understood without that, but not vice versa. If you don't understand better, how can I understand what's better for man? If you don't understand what virtue is, how can I understand what human virtue is? Aristotle in the rhetoric says, wealth is the virtue of money. How's that? Wealth is the virtue of money. Not the virtue of the man now. What's the money's own act? To buy. If you have wealth, you can buy wealth. Poverty is the vice of money, not of the man. You have to buy poorly, right? My friend Warren Murray has a little plaque in his kitchen. It says, much virtue in herbs, little in men. But Lord makes that comparison. He compares the apostles to salt, right? Notice, the herb has its virtue when it seasons well, right? And sometimes, you know, if you leave the, you know, I have herbs in the kitchen there and you don't use it for a long time, they lose their, what, vigor, you know? So they become vicious, right? That's why you will, like, fresh herbs, you know, because they have a piquancy to them, right? But Lord compares the apostles to salt. He says, the salt loses its flavor, you know? Cast it out and trample it under. Tough words, right? I mean, it's kind of reflected in this plaque on the Warren Murray's wall there. Much virtue in herbs, little in men. You know, kitchen there. The herb is doing what it's supposed to do, but the man is not doing what he's supposed to do. Because the man doesn't have the virtue of man. But the herb had the virtue of an herb, right? Made the food tastiest. Part of the problem, I suppose. You know? Yeah. So. Okay. When can you come next time, then? I can't come next week, you know. I can come the 18th. The 18th is the Tuesday after next week, huh? Yeah. I'm going to be coming the 25th, obviously. Oh, yeah. Yeah. I'll go to the 1,000 back today. But is the 18th okay or not? You'd be like, sir. Oh, I'm not going to be able to do that. That's okay. It comes back to you. If you were. That's okay. I mean, I'll catch you. I'm not going to be able to do that. You want to be able to come the 18th or what? Okay. He'll listen to them. Yeah, he's got those. Yeah. Okay. Okay. You must have to see your business time, too. Some of the relatives come around here or not. Not too much. No. Parents can't visit her at all. Or whatever. Maybe if somebody has them nearby, please. Yeah, yeah. I see. Okay. Far away. Yeah. Yeah. There's some things. You know, in this one lecture here, the development of philosophical ideas since Descartes. This is the different lectures of Eisenberg. But he's talking about Descartes, right, and his distinction between the res cogitans and the res extensa. And he sees difficulties in Descartes' way of thinking, right? On the other hand, the difficulties of the separation could be clearly seen in the beginning. In the distinction, for instance, between the res cogitans and the res extensa, Descartes was forced to put the animals entirely on the side of the res extensa. Therefore, the animals and the plants were not essentially different from machines. Their behavior was completely determined by material causes. But it has always seemed difficult to deny completely the existence of some kind of soul in animals. He said, I actually didn't say that, huh? And it seems to us that the older concept of soul, for instance, in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, was more natural and less forced than the Cartesian concept of the res cogitans, even if we are convinced that the laws of physics and chemistry should be valid and of the organisms. One of the later consequences of this view of Descartes was that if animals were considered simply as machines, it was difficult not to think the same of all men. That's amazing. You should get that with a token.