Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 48: Generalizing the Four Causes and Their Divisions

Transcript
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But he's showing you how you can understand these kinds of causes in a very, what, broad way, right? Where not just wood is the cause of the chair, right? But any parts can be said to be the matter of something that's made, right? I could say that a definition, the matter of a definition is the genus and, what, differences that compose it, huh? All parts are like, what, matter in a way, huh? You see that? Incidentally here, the middle term B is not a part of the conclusion, is it? And B is what actually, what, in a way unites C and A. So B is more like the mover or maker, huh? But, so sometimes you speak of the premises as having something like the maker or mover and something like the matter or the parts on it which it is made, huh? But the minor and the major terms, C and the A, are more like the parts of the conclusion, right? B is not so much like a part of the conclusion but as what unites those parts, huh? That's why we're comparing that earlier to energy, right, huh? And here it classes fire a bit, huh? Which is both the matter and the mover, right? So this is the difference you can see here, right, when he talks about the cause called matter, right? He's showing how you can kind of generalize this, right? So we could speak, for example, of the soldiers as being the matter of the army, right? Because they are the parts of the army, right? You see that? And we could speak maybe of the nine, what, orders of angels as the parts of the angels, right? Or you see, the first hierarchy has got the, what, the seraphim, the cherubim, and the thrones, right, huh? They are the parts. They are the matter, the first. But no, she used the word matter in a very broad and loose sense, huh? But they have something of matter because they are that from which something comes to be in it, right? Or if they don't come to be from it, I mean, they were created all of it that way, right? They're like parts nevertheless, right? And parts seem to be like the matter, okay? So he said some of these are as the underlying subject, huh? That's the matter, such as the parts. And then, relative to that, you can speak of whatever pertains to the whole as being like the, what, second kind of cause, the mover, I mean, the form. While others are as what was to be, huh? The whole, huh? And the putting together in the form, right? Okay? So sometimes we speak of the order of the universe as the, what, form of the universe, right? Then he comes to the mover, huh? Now notice the examples here and the significance of them. Instead of saying father, he now says the seed, right? But that's also an example from, what, nature, right? The seed produces a plant. And he gives two examples from reason, the medical doctor and the advisor, right? Now they correspond to the difference between making and, what, doing, huh? Correspond to the distinction between the two virtues of practical reason, art, which is right reason about making, like the medical art or the art of carpentry, and then prudence or foresight, huh? Which is right reason about doing, right? And the advisor is concerned with your doing, your actions, right? So it's significant that he says the doctor and the, what, advisor, right? Making and doing art and foresight, huh? He gives the doctor first, perhaps, because the doctor in some ways is more like, what, nature. That's why he calls it doctor physician, right? Comes the Greek word for nature, okay? And generally the one making are all whence the beginning of change or rest or motion. I'm making this a little footnote, huh? When we say God is the creator, right, what kind of a cause is that? Yeah, we induce it to the mover or maker, but if you go back to the original definition there of the mover, as whence first there is a beginning of motion, well, creation is not really a motion. And that started with some matter and transformed it, right? But in the broader sense, right, of the mover or maker, God could be said we're a maker when he, what, creates, right? Even though he's not making the world out of some kind of matter that pre-exists, right? Like we make, huh? Which are kind of generalizing the sense of mover or maker to include even the, what, creator, right? And finally comes down to the fourth kind of cause, further as the end and the good of others. And now he points out the connection between the end and the, what, good. And that's extremely important for the whole of philosophy, for the whole of our thinking. Let's look at end and good here. The definition of end is that for the sake of which. As I say, if you want, you can add that for the sake of which something is or is done, right? The definition of good, which you find in the beginning of the Nicomachian Ethics there, that good is what all desire, what all want. So the definition of end and good is not the same. But you'll see in the beginning of Nicomachian Ethics, Aristotle identifies the end and the, what, good. And here he's identifying the two. Now, you see a connection between those two, from the definitions. And sometimes we are said to desire the means to some end, right? But we desire the means to some end because we desire the end. So primarily and chiefly we desire the end. And if something is good, people will, what, aim at it, right? And vice versa, if they're aiming at it, that's a sign that it's good, or at least that they think it's good, right? So these two tend to believe the same thing, the end and the, what, good. That's a very important thing to see. And part of the reason why we say that the good is in things, huh? And the good is not something, you know, relative in this wishing-washing modern sense, right? Is that the good is basically the same thing as the end, right? And the end of the thing is tied with what it is. It's tied to what it is, to things themselves. So that's a very important connection, huh, that Aristotle was making there. For that, for the sake of which is best, huh? The means is only good in a secondary way, but with reference to the end. And would be the end of others. Now, when Aristotle says that it makes no difference to call the same a good or an apparent good, he obviously doesn't mean it makes no difference whether you're pursuing a real good or an apparent good. But he means what? One is always pursuing what seems to him to be good, right, huh? It may in some cases be a real good, in other cases it may only be, what, an apparent good, right? As he says later on, huh, the apparent good is desired because it resembles what is truly good, right? So ultimately you desire what is truly good. These, then, and so many in kind, he says, are the, what, causes, huh? So he enumerates the four kinds of causes, you know, naming to some extent, but defining each kind of cause, right, and simplifying them. Then he gives the three corollaries. Then he comes back to the four kinds of causes and shows how you can understand them in a very, what, broad way, right? Okay. Now, let's apply there the rule of two or three. to the four kinds of causes, see? And sometimes when you have more than two or three, it's useful to divide it either into two or three, or at least one of them if you can, right? And sometimes you can divide it into two in more than one way, right? So if we had, for example, in the room here, men and women and boys and girls, right? You'd have four groups, right? But you might divide them into two twos, right? And you could probably divide it here into two twos in two ways. You could divide the men and the boys against the women and the girls, and that would be on the basis of sex. But you could also divide the men and the women against the boys and the girls on the basis of mature and immature, or something of that sort, right? Okay? So, let's go back to the four kinds of causes, right? And divide them into two, which I think makes the most sense. There's perhaps seven ways you can divide them, right? Three ways you can divide them into two and two, and four ways you can divide them into one and three. And no one of these divisions is the correct division, right? Each one kind of reveals something by the likeness and the difference of things that are put together or what separate, right? Okay? Now, sometimes you'll see matter and form divided against mover and him. And what is the basis for that distinction, huh? Putting matter and form on one side and the mover and the end on the other side. What is the basis for that division? The matter and the form are in the thing. Yeah, yeah. The matter and the form are inside causes, right? The matter and the mover and the end are outside. We're thinking the form now as opposed to the model, of course. Okay? You know, qualify that a bit, right? But basically we're thinking the form and matter's inside causes and the mover and the end as outside causes. It's an important distinction, right? Now, sometimes we put the matter and the mover and we divide them against the form and the end, huh? Now, what's the reason we're putting the matter and the mover together and then the form and the end together? Oh, oh, well, mover would be like shaping the form and the end would determine the form. Okay. But perhaps we usually think of the matter and the mover as being at the beginning of something, right? Oh. Or the form is definitely what it was to be, right? And obviously the end is at the end of things, right? So if you study in, let's say, the fifth book of wisdom, if you study the meanings of the word beginning, right, you get something like matter, let's say in the third meaning of beginning, and something like the mover in the fourth meaning of beginning, right? When you study the word limit or end, then the fifth book of wisdom, you can translate the Greek word, you write the word in the end, forming in the moment, huh? So matter and mover seem to be in time at the beginning, right? So you have a carpenter and wood at the beginning, and then at the end you have, what, the form and the sitting. And that's why when you look at the Greek natural philosophers, with that odd bird Pythagoras, all these things to talk about is matter, or matter and the what? Mover for the most part. They're kind of up front, right? Because you think of a cause as a beginning, and form and end don't seem to be a beginning, but more a what? An end, huh? Okay? Although in some, you know, there's a sense of beginning that can be considered beginning too, but, okay? Now, sometimes you see the form and the mover or maker put together, that makes more sense than putting the matter and the end together. In fact, you might say, you've got a question mark, right? Well, in what way do the form and the mover or maker come together? The form. Yeah. And the mover makes something like itself, right? So dogs produce dogs, cats produce cats, human beings produce human beings, right? So sometimes we say that the maker and the form, they're not the same numerically, but they're the same in what? Kind, huh? Okay? The mover or maker through its form produces a similar form in the effect, right? Now, matter and end, in the context of that, they seem to have nothing in common, right? They seem to be entirely, what? Disparate, right? Okay? But there's a way in which we bring matter and end together, and when Ernst Gauss talks about definition by different causes and demonstration, and he points out that a definition can be the beginning of a demonstration, or the end of a demonstration, or a demonstration, in a way, in a different position. What does this mean? Well, sometimes we define something by its end. So I might say that a knife is a tool for cutting. Sometimes we define something by its matter, meaning its parts. A knife is a tool composed of a, what? Blade and a handle, right? Or a blade inserted in a handle, right? So you speak of a definition by parts, by matter, in a broad sense, a definition by end. And you could demonstrate one from the other. You could say that a knife is a tool for cutting, and a tool for cutting needs a blade and a handle to be held. Therefore, a knife is a tool composed of a blade and a handle, right? Okay? And when Aristotle defines demonstration in the first book of the Posture Analytics, he first gives a definition from an end, huh? It's a syllogism making us know the cause, and that which is the cause, it cannot be otherwise, right? And then he gives a definition of it from the, what, kind of premises that it's from, right? And he calls the first a definition from the end, the second a definition from the matter or the parts. And you can reason from one to the, what, other, right? So for the definition from the end, you reason the definition from the matter or parts, huh? Or you can combine the two, like with the knife, you could say, a knife is a tool composed of a blade and a handle for the sake of cutting, right? Or in logic, right? Instead of, like, imitating Aristotle there in the Posture Analytics, and you say, what is the definition? Well, a definition is speech making known distinctly what a species is. That's a definition from the end, right? There's another definition of definition, which is from its parts, huh? It's a speech, right? Composed of the genus and differences of the species, right? Okay? But you can reason from the definition from the end to the definition by the matter or parts. You could say, a definition is a speech making known distinctly what a species is. But speech making known distinctly what a species is has to give you the genus, what that thing is in general, right? And its differences, right? Therefore, a definition is speech composed of a genus. And so Aristotle says the definition can be the beginning, the middle term of a demonstration, or the conclusion, right? Or you can put the two together and make one grand definition, say a definition is speech, right, composed of the genus and difference, making known what the species is of that sort, right? So, in that way, matter and end can enter into these parts of a demonstration, right? We just look at them by themselves, they more seem to have nothing in common, right? Right here, the parent and the child is over each other, right? Or even the artist, he may say, what, form like the form he's already conceived in his mind, right? See? But there's a real likeness between them. Well, here, there seems to be no likeness at all, right? But sometimes these two are coupled together when we talk about the definition from matter or parts and the definition from end. Just like you might say marriage is a society for, what, generating, nourishing, educating children, right? And such a society must be composed of a man and a woman, right? Okay? As long as they can generate. Or you might combine both of those and make a kind of complete definition of what marriage is. So you have these two very clear, very often, these two, but this here, in a way, you can at least see the likeness here between these two, right? Yeah. So those are the three ways you can divide them into two and two. And they all reveal something, right? You may want everything out. Now, sometimes we divide one of the four causes against the other three, right? So sometimes we divide matter against form, mover, and in. And sometimes form against matter, form, and in. And sometimes in against matter, form, and mover, maker. Four possibilities, right? But does each of these reveal something, right? Is there some reason, right? Or you might sometimes distinguish that one cause against all of the other causes, right? Why might we distinguish matter against the other three kinds of causes? Because matter is kind of substantial and other things full of, if you think more of matter is... What is matter, see? Especially the first matter. Yeah. By form, moving in, we're all in terms of what? Yeah. Form is act, right? The mover, you know, the old saying is every agent acts in so far as it's an act, right? And the end is an act, right? Abilities for the saving act, right? And that's very important when you talk about God as a cause, huh? Because God is pure act, right? Therefore, God can in no way be a cause in the sense of what? Matter, right? Now, he's not an intrinsic form of things, but he can be a cause in the sense of the model or the exemplar. Our soul is made to the image and likeness of God, right? God is an exemplar cause, huh? And God is obviously the mover or maker, right? And he's the end of the whole universe, right? But because he's pure act, he can only be one of those kinds of causes. He cannot be a cause in the sense of what? Matter, right? You see that? So matter is essentially something imperfect, right? We were mentioning before, too, you know, when they looked for the first cause, they actually thought of matter as being the first cause, because that's the cause most known, right? And they attributed to matter that it would be one and simple and unlimited in some way, and even eternal or unchanging. But they didn't attribute to the first cause, in that sense, perfection, right? Perfection is tied up with actuality and therefore the other causes. So if God is a cause in these senses over here, he could also be the most perfect thing in the world, which he is. But if he's a cause in the sense of matter, the first cause, he'd be the least perfect of things, right? And I was mentioning before how, when we try to figure out what the end of our reason is, we have reason to say that the end of our reason is to know the first cause, that's the final goal, right? And the end of our reason is to know the best thing there is. Well, if the first cause was matter, then the best thing would not be the first cause. But if the first cause is the end of the whole universe, it's going to be also the best thing in the world. Best thing. So form and over and in there are based on actuality and matter on passive ability, right? That's a very important contrast in between matter and the other three. Because it's very important in understanding what kind of cause God could be, right? You know, it can't be an intrinsic form, because an intrinsic form is in some sense a part, isn't it? And there are some quotes that don't get the idea of matter, right? But the extrinsic form, the exemplar, that's not a part, really. The other things are modeled after. So I tell the students that God is a cause, and how many of these four kinds of causes has God a cause? And the answer is two and a half. He's a cause in a sense of the end, the mover, and the model, but not the intrinsic form, right? And in no way a cause is matter, right? So don't call him a mother, right? Even though in some things he might be like a mother, but he's very misleading. Now, is there any reason to distinguish form from matter, mover, and in? Any context where he might distinguish form against matter, mover, and in? What would be the reason for doing that? Mathematics. Okay. Mathematics. Okay. There's another interesting passage, and if you look at Thomas' commentary on the first, on the second book, rather, on the physics or natural hearing, towards the end there, he gives a kind of reason why there are four kinds of causes. Okay? The picture is in the way he does this, huh? You see in 10 verse out of Thomas, does it? He goes back to that kind of common notion of cause. The cause is that which something depends upon for its being or for its what? Becoming, right? And then, he says it has being through its what? Form. Okay? But in becoming, you need some matter, right? To be formed by the mover for somewhat in. So, taking matter, mover, and end as they're more known to us, right? In that part of the sense, they all seem to be tied up with becoming, right? Matter is that which something comes to be, right? The mover is the cause of becoming, right? The mover. But he moves the matter towards some end, right? So, that's why you have four causes. That's a beautiful thing, right? You know? And sometimes, I see Aristotle and Thomas divide mover against the other three, huh? And what do you think is the reason of putting matter, form, and end sometimes together and leaving out the mover? Those three are totally other than the mover. That's true. What do matter, form, and end, why do they sometimes, we bring in those three and leave out the mover? Because sometimes, like what it is... The chair, you see, it's got all the matter and its form and it's there and the mover could be someplace else. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The mover seems to be responsible for the chair coming into existence, right? When you look at what you've got there, you bring in the matter and the form and the end, okay? And so one might say, you know, that the chair is, you know, it's wood in that shape, it's wood in the shape suitable for sitting. That's what a chair is, right? Why are we going to be a carpenter? He's responsible for coming to be, right? We say, well, what is a chair? You know, it's wood in this shape, wood in a shape suitable for what? Okay. So you'd say extrinsic and intrinsic? Or if I, you know, look at the word cap, my favorite example, cap. Funny, I was at the PMR conference, I was using my example of cap to illustrate one of these things, you know. And then the Dominican there, Lawrence Dewan, you know, him at all, or... Anyway, he was giving me a paper later on, he was using cat to kill the fly selfies, too. So he made reference to my, he said in my talk, he said, he's the same example. So he's, look at us, what is this, right? It's three letters, right? In a certain order, signifying that thing was around him to go. Right? See? You don't have to be the writer, in a sense, when you look at that, too. He seems to be responsible for his coming into existence, right? Okay? But when you see cat there, right? It's just what he is now, there on the board, right? It's letters in a certain order, right? Good. The C before the A and the U for the D. Signifying, right? The animal that be owls, right? You see? So there, these three come together, and that's left out. You kind of see that in Aristotle's biological works, right? Where he'll talk, like in the book of the parts of animals and so on, about what the parts of the five animals are made out of, you know, and then the order of them, right? And then the purpose of them, right? And then in a separate book, in the book on the generation of animals, right? Where the emphasis would be upon the mover, right? The protection of these things, right? When you take existing animals, right? You look at my teeth here, you know. So what are they made out of that? Something hard and so on, right? And the teeth can find a different shape than the teeth in back. And the teeth in front are shapes suitable for biting, and the teeth in back get shapes suitable for chewing, right? And see if I can target the question, how did the teeth come out of my mouth, right? You know? Where did they start from, you know? And so on, right? There's no protection of the tooth, right? But the tooth that's there now, right? Yeah. You talk about what it's made out of, and the shape it has, and its suitability for biting, or for chewing, or whatever it might be, right? Okay. So you see our style science, you know, it's necessary here. Like that, those things are green in. And why in the end sometimes, the body can see on the field? The end and beginning. Yeah. It's because, you know, cause of those arms, they say, it's the cause of all the other causes being causes. It's sitting, it's why the carpenters make chairs, right? And because the carpenter shapes the wood, that's how the wood gets to be the wood of a chair, right? And how the shape gets to be in the wood, right? But the carpenter does what he does for the sake of something you see now. So the end is the cause of all the other causes being causes. That's very important to know in the fifth, in the twelfth book of wisdom, right? When Aristotle was showing that God is the first cause of all things, right? We first arrive at God as the first, what? Mover. And the first maker. If you look at the proofs in both sumas, the first one is from motion, right? In the Summa Thilogiae, the first two are from motion in the Summa Congentitas, right? And then the second, or the third one, is from the maker, right? So you see God is the first mover or maker. But then Aristotle has to go on to show that God is also what? The end of the whole universe. Otherwise, he would not, in fact, be altogether the first cause. He'd be the first mover or maker, but not the first cause because of the end. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And when Augustine says, we are because God is good, right? Well, primarily, good goes back to what cause? The end, right? It's for the sake of what? Sharing in his excellence, right? That he made things right. Okay. That's a very important thing. So those are seven ways, huh? They have no qualification up here, but seven ways you might divide the four pains of causes into what? Two, right? Two and two, there are three ways you can do that. And four ways, one against what? Three. I don't see any way to divide them into three, although maybe someone else can come up with that, you know. But I think these are ways that I commonly see in different places where they're hooked sometimes, though. Now, when you study the word nature, in all of its meanings, it keeps the idea of being within. And eventually, nature takes on a very broad meaning, meaning what a thing is. But nothing is more within a thing than what it is, right? Well, the insight causes are what? Matter and form, right? Now, you see a connection between matter and form and the parts of a definition which expresses what a thing is are genus and what? Differences, right? Genus and differences correspond to what? Matter and form. Not that genus is the same thing as matter or difference in the same thing as form, but genus is taken of what is more material than the thing, right? Like the genus of man is animal, right? And the differences are taken of what is more than the thing. And there's an analogy there, just as the matter can be, what, formed in various ways, right? So the genus can be determined in its potentiality by different, diverse differences, right? Going back to the difficulty there of our friend John Locke, right? The three lines in the definition of triangle in general are neither equal or unequal, but they're able to be the one, right? Just like wood is not, as wood is neither a chair nor a table, but it's able to be these, right? So in a sense, the genus is the differences, a bit like matter is to form, right? The fact that matter and form are the intrinsic causes, right? And the nature of the thing is intrinsic, right? And the definition bringing out the nature, right? And though it has the form, not of matter and form, but of genus and differences, it has a connection with the, what's in the thing, the matter and the form. Well, when we're defining, since we're defining the essence of something, what is in it, when we're making these species making differences, but necessarily found that in Aristotle's categories it would have to be a quantity, a quality, or a relation because those are within, with every species making difference, have to fall because it's an accident. Well, I was thinking of substance first, you know, or a matter and form, right? Make it up, right? Yeah. Yeah. In the case of accident, you've got to be careful because an accident is something of another, really. And therefore, when you define accident, you have to say what it is of what. You have to be in something outside of it, right? So in the seventh book of wisdom, when Aristotle's talking about definition again, he says that either accidents cannot be defined, right? Or they have a definition in another sense, huh? Because the idea of definition, it comes from the word for limit, huh? In Greek or in Latin. Latin, our word for the Latin one. And of course, the limit