Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 59: Definition of Motion and the Categories of Being

Transcript
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When you study the great dialogue there, Plato the Mino, and Mino wants to know whether virtue can be taught, right? And Socrates says, well, I don't know. Furthermore, I don't know what virtue is. Furthermore, I never met a man who knew what virtue is. And Mino says, well, I know. And Socrates says, well, what is it? And Mino gives a bunch of examples, and Socrates has to point out that examples are not a definition. And then finally he tries to come out with a definition, but it doesn't seem to separate the good man from the bad man, and so on and so forth. Mino can't define virtue. Then later on in the dialogue, Mino wants to know whether virtue can be taught. But this is before it's been defined, right? Socrates says, well, I told you. I mean, you can't really know well whether virtue can be taught. Before you know what virtue is. Yeah, but I don't want to know that. I want to know where virtue can be taught. So Socrates reasons, right, that virtue can be taught and that virtue cannot be taught in the last part of the dialogue. But obviously that's an imperfect reasoning because it doesn't decide which it is, right? See? So you can, what, reason imperfectly before defining a thing. You can reason about a thing imperfectly, but you can't reason perfectly about a thing before you've defined it, huh? That's what happens to the modern sound. There's a, there's a, um, almost universal failure to define the things they're talking about. And you can, as I say, reason about things you haven't defined, but if they can be defined, you can reason perfectly about them after you define them, huh? And of course, you can, to some extent, reason your way towards a definition, too, huh? Maybe you can reason out a definition to some extent, huh? Okay, but, so Aristotle is trying to define motion here. So in the next paragraph he says, there's something in act and something in ability, huh? Now, where does act in ability first become known to us, huh? What first makes us, in fact, distinguish in some way between act and ability, huh? When we see someone or something do something, and then it's, we know it, we're able to do it. Yeah. Or when you see something change, right, huh? See? Um, I'm actually in this room now, aren't I? Okay. When I was out in the parking lot, there, was I, what? In this room? But I was able to be in this room, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Yeah. Now, if I have a piece of clay in the shape of a sphere, and I mold it into a cube and other different shapes, right, and I begin to see that the clay is able to, what, take on many different shapes, right? Mm-hmm. And so I start to make that distinction between ability and act there, huh? Through motion, right, and through doing, as you say, huh? Okay. He says, there's something in act and something in ability. And now he seems to be subdividing, and of that in act, one is a this something. Another so much, another such, and likewise in the other categories of what is. Now, what the hell does that mean, huh? Hmm? I say that somebody's in class to surprise the students and try to, you know, speak in their persona, you know? See? Yeah? Well, he's referring, you know, back to the book called The Categories, where the first meet these in the study of philosophy, but a man in this room, huh, and a cat, let's say, right, and a tree in this room, right, and he said, what is this? Or what is that, right? Ho Kali put, huh? What is this? What is that, right? Okay. This is a man, huh? That is a cat, huh? That is a what? What is that? That is a what? Tree, right? Okay. So that first category corresponds to the question, what? But this phrase, this something, huh, which they translated in Latin as ho Kali put, huh, or a Kali put, huh, is something, it's referring to an individual substance, huh, like a man, or a dog, or a tree, right, something like that, huh, so it's individual substance, one you could point out, huh, what is this? This is a man, right? What is this? This is a cat. What is this? This is a tree. What is that? It's a stone, and so on, right? So this is the basic kind of thing, a substance, huh, corresponding to the question, what is it? Then, we might say, how big is it, right? How large is it, right? Okay. And then we're asking, how much, how big, how tall, so then we're asking about, what, the size of the thing, right? It's quantity, right? We might ask, how many men are in this room, right? Okay. This again referred to, what, quantity, right? Very close to that. And then you might say, how are you today? Still sick? Or are you, do you feel pretty good? How are you? Right? And there you're asking about, what, quality, right? Okay. Where are you? Right? Okay. So, in a way, you could see different questions corresponding to these different kinds of things, right, huh? Okay. And of course, there's ten of them if you study them in the categories, so, so you don't go back, maybe, and rehash the categories here, but, this something refers to, say, to an individual substance, right? Like a man would be the best example of that, right? Or a dog, or a cat, or a horse, right? Or a tree, and so on. Another so much that refers to the quantity, right? Another such, as Aristotle says, such as a man is, so does the end appear to him, right? It refers to the quality, okay? And likewise, in the other categories of what is, huh? Of being, huh? And then he singles out something about towards another, because there's a special connection between this and motion, huh? Now, sometimes we use the abstract word, what? Relation, right? But what Aristotle, when he names this in Greek, he'll say, what? Prosti, huh? And when they translate that very literally, in Latin, they'll say, ad, ali, right? Okay? And if you wanted to translate it in English, you'd say, what? Towards something, right? Okay? Now, this word how is very interesting, huh? If you just say how, period, you're thinking of the quality of the person, right? Usually we're thinking of health, but that's because we're such materialists, right? How are you today, you know? I mean, healthy, sick, you know? But, um, I'm sad today, or I'm angry today, right? Or, or how are the men in this country, you know? Well, they're all villains or something, right? Or they're all vicious, right? Or something, you know? If you ask how much, you're not asking about a quality, but about a quantity, right? Here, if you want to put in a question, I'd say, how am I towards you? I'm towards you, a teacher, let's say, okay? Or a friend or something, right? How am I towards my wife? Well, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you, I'm towards you I'm a husband, right? How am I towards my children when I'm a father, right? And some of these towards something are based on what? Quantity, right? Like four is double of what? Two. Four is a half of eight, right? Others are tied up with acting upon and what? Undergoing, right? So I'm a father because I generated somebody, right? I'm a son because I was generated by my father and so on, huh? And she touches upon that in particular because of the connection between this and motion, the mover and the what? Moveable, right, huh? So if you take the motion of this glass now, right, the glass is able to what? Move, right? To undergo motion and I'm able to what? Act upon it, right? Okay, so that's connected with motion, huh? And it generally says the mover and the movable. For the mover is the mover and the movable. And the movable is movable by the mover, okay? And these are just some distinctions that he's going to what? Have in mind when he's going to try to define motion, huh? It's going to be defined basically by ability and act as we'll see, right? But the different kinds of motion or change are tied up with different, what, categories, huh? So it might be a change of place, and that would be the category of wear. It might be growth, and that would be a change of, what, size or quantity, right? It might be a change of quality, right? Becoming hot or something of this sort, right? Okay. Now what does he mean here when he says, and motion is not beside things, huh? What does that mean, huh? What does he say that for? Is it in the sense of beside, in the sense of motion is not beyond things, in the sense that things are an integral part of motion, or that you need to think? Well, in a way, in a way you could say, here, you have four kinds of things, okay? And this is a little bit like, this distinction is a little bit like, we were talking earlier about the four kinds of causes, where I pointed out that there are four kinds of causes, but these four kinds of causes are also four meanings of the word cause, okay? That's a very subtle thing, you see that. Why, if I divided, let's say, the parallelogram into the square, the oblong, the rhombus, and the rhomboid, they'd be four kinds of parallelogram, right? But would they be four meanings of parallelogram? Or is the meaning of parallelogram exactly the same instead of each of them? So the logician would say that parallelogram is said univocally of square, oblong, rhombus, and rhomboid. What does that mean? It's said with exactly the same meaning in mind. If I say number of odd number and even number, right? Odd number and even number are two kinds of number, right? But are they two meanings of the word number? So you have exactly the same meaning in mind when you call an odd number a number, an even number because an odd number, right, is a multitude composed of units in the same way, and for the same reason exactly. An even number is a number because it's a multitude composed of units. You see that? I think it's very subtle. You see that difference, huh? And sometimes, you know, students, I know in class, they're kind of mixed up, right? You say to them, you know, is dog and cat different meanings of animal? What would you say? No. Dog and cat are two kinds of animals, right? Two different kinds of animals, but when you call a dog an animal and when you call a cat an animal, you have exactly the same meaning in mind in both cases. Or if you say quadruped, right? When I say a dog is a quadruped, and when I say a, what, dog, I mean a cat is a quadruped, they have exactly the same meaning in mind, a four-footed animal, right? And one is not more a four-footed animal than the other. But if I say this is a square and this is a square, square number, right? Does the word square really mean the same thing? Now, perhaps not by chance that we call four a square number or what? The next square number would be what? But we wouldn't call six a square number, would we? Isn't there some connection between what a square is here and why we call these square numbers and not that? I mentioned how, but we call the factors, I guess, of a number, you know? Greeks sometimes, like Euclid, would call the sides a number, right? So, if nine is three times three, you can speak of three as the sides of what? Nine, right? Yeah. And two are the sides of four, but what are the sides of six? Three. Yeah, so it's not a square number, but it's not a square in the same sense as that, right? It's a rectangular number, I guess. Yeah, yeah. I'd love a number, yeah. Yeah, okay. And, or if I say square of this, and then I say, you know, the card you will, you know, the square in the city, right? Well, it's not the same thing exactly, is it? But there's this connection between them, right? Okay? Quadrangle, they call it sometimes. This is a quadrangle in a different sense than the quadrangle on the campus or something like that. Now, suppose I said seeing of the act of the eye, and seeing of picturing you here, and seeing of understanding, right? Or maybe you could say those are three kinds of seeing, right? But it's also three meanings of the word to see, isn't it? There's some connection between the two, right? Okay? That's a very subtle thing, huh? Now, our substance, and quantity, and quality, and sometimes we say relation, therefore I'll include it. There are four different kinds of things, aren't they? Is what a thing is the same as its size, or its quality, its health, right? You could say that what we have here is four kinds of things, or four kinds of beings, if you want it to, right? Because they all are in some way, aren't they? I am a man, I am five foot ten, I am healthy, I think. I am a father, I am a son, I am a teacher, I'm shorter than Jordan, and so on, you see? I am, these are all different kinds of being, right? Different kinds. But are they also four different meanings of being, or four different meanings of thing? 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Okay. What is a man and his health, two things? What would you say? It's the same subject. Would you say that Socrates and the health of Socrates are the same thing? You guys were sick. They're separable. Yeah. So you might, last week, you had the flu, if I can believe you, right? You were just playing hooky, right? Okay. So you weren't healthy last week, right? It wasn't safe for me to come up here, right? It was a plague. So you were there, you were here last week, right? You see? But your health wasn't there. So you and your health are not the same thing, are they? Okay. Okay? But are you and your health two things in the way that you and, orange is it, an apple? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Are two things. Oh. Okay. You and apple, or you and orange, are two things in this first sense of thing, right? See? But you and your health are not two things in that same sense, are you? And sometimes a person might hesitate to say that the shape of the nose is a thing, like the nose is a thing, right? And sometimes, you know, we say it's not a thing, but it's something of a thing, right? But it's something, and therefore, in some way, it's a thing, right? Because something means something, huh? And the same with the word being, you know, instead of these things, huh? And a sign of this is that when I walked into this room, did I come to be? No. And when I walk out of this room, I assume I will. Well, I cease to be? I wouldn't speak of it, would you? Mm-hmm. See? But nevertheless, when I came into this room, I came to be in this room, in that qualified sense, right? When I leave this room, I will cease to be in this room. I have to add that, right? Mm-hmm. And I say, you know, an example I always give in class, I say, if I say to the student, right, you know, if you leave this room, you will cease to be. Mm-hmm. And he takes me to court. Mm-hmm. And I've been threatening my students, right? Mm-hmm. And I say, well, your honor, huh? When I said that he would cease to be if he left the room, all I meant your honor is that he would cease to be in the room. Mm-hmm. And so, do you think the judge let me go? Mm-hmm. Huh? Huh? Now, nobody understands that by those words, right, huh? Mm-hmm. You see the idea? So, there you can start to see it. The word to be, the primary meaning here is, what? Life and death, being of a substance, right? Okay? So, this guy comes on the stage in this famous play, what does he say? To be or not to be, that is the question. As you're thinking about, you know, to be married or not to be married to Ophelia? Mm-hmm. Or to be in Denmark or not to be in Denmark? Mm-hmm. Or to be a student or not to be a student? Huh? I was thinking of what? Suicide, you know it, right? I was thinking of life and death, right? Mm-hmm. See? So, he doesn't qualify it. And he just says to be or not to be, that is the question. We understand the question to be, that is the very substance, right? Mm-hmm. A question of life and death. So, the word being is not said equally of these, huh? This is the primary sense here. And even quantity and quality seem to be being in a fuller sense than, what? Being towards another, right? Mm-hmm. So, you can see how if my son grows and gets taller than me, I become, what? I was taller than him and now I'm shorter than him. Happens a lot of times with immigrants, right? Where the son towers over the father. He better die to whoever it is, right? So, by being taller or shorter than my son, that change from being taller than him to being shorter than him seemed to have taken place without any real change in me. I haven't shrunk. If I shrunk, that would be one thing, right? But I stayed the same height, you see? Five foot ten, but now he's six feet or something, right? Do you see that? So, it doesn't seem to be as much in me as my size, does it? Right? It's towards him I'm shorter, right? So, you have many senses there of, you have many kinds of beings or many kinds of things, but there are also different meanings of the word thing, different meanings of the word being, huh? Now, it's not a word that is equivocal by chance, huh? Because all these meanings are, what? Connected, right? Right. And the substance has a certain size, right? And the qualities exist in the body and colors on the surface, you know, and so on. And some relations are based on, what? Quantities like taller and shorter than, right? And some are type of qualities like teacher and student, right? And so on. So, they're all connected, right? So, it's equivocal, they say, by reason, right? So, here you have four kinds of things, but also four meanings of the word thing. Okay? See the difference then, huh? Kind of a subtle thing to see, huh? Okay? So, sometimes you have many kinds of something, and those many kinds are also many meanings of the same. Other times you have many, what? Kinds of something, but they're not many meanings of the common word, right? It's very important to see. Hristal saw that very clearly, huh? Amazing that he saw that. Can you repeat those two? Saying sometimes, right, when you distinguish many kinds of something, right, we are at the same time distinguishing many meanings of the same. But other times, when you distinguish many kinds of something, we're not distinguishing many meanings of that something, but only many kinds of it. Yeah. And in the latter case, the name of what is being divided into many kinds, that name is being said with exactly the same meaning of those many things. It's being said univocally, the logician says, huh? Okay? But in the other case, the name of what is being divided is being said equivocally. Maybe by reason, maybe by chance, but it's being said with more than one meaning, huh? Not exactly the same meaning, anyway. Again, these ones, huh? You see that, you know, you talk about the four kinds of causes. You know, you have a student in class who wants to just call the maker a cause and not the matter, right? See? What's the cause of the chair? Which seems kind of funny to call wood the cause of the chair. It's a carpenter's the cause of the chair, they'll say, right? You see? You see? But that hesitation is because they're thinking of what? One meaning of the word cause, and wood doesn't mean a cause in the way that the carpenter has, huh? Right. See? And, uh, that's why they hesitate, right? Yeah. Okay? See? And somebody, you know, you see, somebody, you know, in the bar, you know, is my nose and my ear the same thing? They say, no, of course not. And they say, now, is my nose and the shape of my nose the same thing? It'd be a little bit uneasy to answer, wouldn't they? See? Because the nose and the ear seem to be able to exist independently of each other, right? I could lose an ear and keep my nose, or vice versa, right? But I can't put my nose here and the shape of my nose there, right? See? But then if the guy says, well, then the shape of my nose is not something, well, then I say, well, that's not going to be able to flatten your nose and start to fight the way. But the point is, it is something to him, right? It is something in some way, huh? Right? Okay? Now, um. Because if you ask the man in the street, the average person, is growing or walking or something, is that a thing? What would they say? They probably hesitate to say it's a thing, right? I would admit maybe the size of something is something, right? Now, take it with the word being, but it's even more puzzling, right? Remember when we were studying change there in Aristotle? I think we did study change in me. And in the 12th and 13th, as opposed to the 10th and 11th reading, change was sort of the word up front, right? And we got the 12th and 13th, we started to use the word becoming more, right? And Socrates, or Plato, whoever it is, in the dialogues, he's very fond of distinguishing between what? Becoming and being, huh? If you read those dialogues, it's a very important distinction, huh? Between being and becoming, and sometimes non-being, right? And just to give you one example where this is famous, in a dialogue called the Protagoras, right? Protagoras is a sophist, right? In fact, as he says one point, you know, Socrates, he says, if I had always fought with the weapons of my opponent, never would I have always won, right? Never would the name of Protagoras have spread throughout the world. So anyway, he's trying to catch Socrates in a contradiction, right? And Socrates, at one point, is saying that it's what? Difficult to become good. And then later on, Socrates is saying, it's not difficult to be good. And there's an apparent contradiction, right? But is Socrates really contradicting himself? And kind of the example that we give is, it's difficult to get to the top of the mountain, right? Was it difficult to stand on top of the mountain? No. So it's not the same thing, becoming and being. You know, it's like, you might say, it's difficult to be in heaven? Well, that would be very, very delightful. But it's difficult to come to be in heaven, huh? I say, well, it's the same thing, right? Okay. And sometimes I ask students, I say, do you depend upon your parents for being? Well, we probably say, you know, Mother, I wouldn't be without you. Okay. But do we actually depend upon our parents for being? Because my parents are dead, huh? Mm-hmm. And if I depend upon them for being, I should be dead now too, right? Right. Does that wooden table over there depend upon the carpenter for being? No. He might be dead for all we know, right? I don't know what it is. But as I say, you know, you heard me joke about that. If you have a poor carpenter whose chairs depend upon him for being, right? You'd have to be holding it together, you know? If he walked away, the thing would fall apart, right? So, maybe strictly speaking, I depend upon my parents for becoming and not for being, huh? Mm-hmm. But I depend upon God for being, as you find out when you study God's causality and theology, right? Mm-hmm. But I don't depend upon my parents for being, but for becoming. Mm-hmm. See? And the table might depend upon God too. In fact, it does for being, right? But that's kind of hidden to us, that dependence, huh? Like St. Francis, you know, he sees God everywhere, right? Okay. You'd be very much aware of that in heaven, that everything here depends upon God for being, huh? Okay. But as far as what we see, the carpenter, the chair depends upon the carpenter for becoming and not for being, huh? And that's why in the definition of cause, he says, it's what is responsible for the being or the becoming of another double thing, right? Mm-hmm. It could be dependent upon it for both, huh? Now, why am I doing that, right? Well, obviously, becoming is not being. But then there can't be any becoming in the world, can there? Mm-hmm. Never thought of that, did you? Mm-hmm. There can't be any becoming. Because whatever can be said to be is a being. Mm-hmm. And so if becoming could be said to be, it would be a being. And then, gone's our distinction between being and becoming. Amazing. Now, if you want to stretch and say that becoming is, in some sense of the word, being, it's going to be much less than the sense even which quantity and quality and relation were a being, huh? It doesn't have much of a problem in saying that quantity or my knowledge as being, right? But instead of saying becoming as being, that's really, what, kind of strange, isn't it, huh? Mm-hmm. You're really, what, stretching the meaning of the word being, right? Okay. But normally we would distinguish between these two because this is such a, what, diminished sense of becoming, huh? Do you see that? In case that isn't bad enough, right? Can you be blind, huh? Does the hole in the donut, is there a hole in the donut? Well, it is there. You see? You know, to be blind, is that to be in some way? Really? To be ignorant, is that to be or not to be? To be one or the other, Shakespeare said, right? Huh? Isn't being blind not to be? And yet, you'll find sometimes we say that he is blind, right? He is ignorant, right? In fact, we can even say that nothing is nothing, right? That's true, right? You can't deny that nothing is nothing, right? So it is something, maybe nothing, right? See? Well, this is the last sentence. Where even non-being is said to be. But it's only in our mind, huh? Our mind speaks of what is, in reality, a non-being as if it were, what? Being something, right? Okay. See how strange it is? See? Now, when they say being and thing, or something, right, are equally universal, right? You have a similar thing, but it's easy to see the problem here with the word being and becoming, the distinguishing difference. Now, in Aristotle here, he uses the word things. And motion, or becoming, you could say, is not beside things. What does that mean? See? Well, he's thinking here of being or thing. Okay. Okay. Okay. According to the ten categories, we just talked about the fundamental ones, substance, quantity, quality, and relational, these are the words that mean the four kinds of things, which are also four meanings of the word thing or being, right? He's thinking of those, right? And becoming is not like, okay, what? Another thing in the way these are different things, right? But becoming is the coming to be of one of these, huh? Do you see that? So birth or better generation is the coming to be of a substance, right? Growing is the coming to be of what? A certain quantity or size, right? Becoming hot, right? Is the coming to be of what? A quality, right? Strictly speaking, relation, you don't really change there. Something else is changing, right? There's something outside of you. So I'm changing from being taller to being shorter than my son, but it's really because he's been, what? Growing, right? The change is really in quantity, right? Okay. So he says, that's what he means. And motion, or we can use the word becoming there, is not beside things. It's not something like what? Another thing, right? For the changing always changes, either according to substance, or according to quantity, or according to quality, or according to place. Those are the four that Aristotle distinguishes, and more explicitly in the fifth book, right? Okay. Change of change of change of quality, change of quality, change of quantity, or growth. Sometimes change of quality is called, what? Alteration, right? Sometimes change of place is called locomotion, or sometimes use the word motion just for change of place. Okay? And then generation would be change according to substance, or even the opposite of generation, right? Corruption of a thing. But nothing common to these can be taken. What does he mean by that? We saw the word being or thing was common to them, but there's nothing, what? Univocal, really, common to them, right? As we say, which is neither this, meaning, what? Substance, right? Nor so much quantity, nor such quality, nor any other of the categories, right? Okay? Thus there will be neither motion or change besides the aforesaid, there will be nothing besides the aforesaid. Okay? What he's seeing here is that motion or change is coming to be of something in one of these categories, right? Of course, he's not going to say that there's change in all of these categories, right? Okay? And to take up this question, you know, which ones that really are, you know, change as such in book five, right? But basically he sees it as being in what? Substance, second generation, quantity as in growth, alteration and sensible quality, right? And then locomotion or change of place in the category of where, okay? But not in the other categories, right? Okay? We're going to have to determine here now, I mean explicitly, in which categories there are, right? He just mentioned the ones that he's going to show more explicitly in book five, right? Okay? But the point he wants to make here is that becoming is not like entirely distinct other kind of thing apart from these ones we've met so far, right? It's in one of these, what? Ten. In one or more of these ten, right? Okay? If you go back to the categories, the book called The Categories, he distinguishes the ten, right? And then in Latin they call it the predicaments, when he distinguishes the ten and goes through the ten. Mainly the first four that he spends time on. But then there's the anti-predicaments to help you understand what's going to come up. And then the post-predicaments, right? And the post-predicaments among them are motion, right? And these four kinds of motion, right? But they're not like something, what? Of an entirely different kind of thing, right? See? I mean, growing, in other words, is not distinct from quantity in the way that quality is distinct from quantity, right? And being so big and being somewhere are different kinds of being, right? But coming to be somewhere is not another kind of thing, like being somewhere is different from being five foot ten or something, right? Or being wise or being healthy or something, right? Okay? Okay, so maybe the word becoming is helpful there, right? Then each of these kinds of motion, you are really talking about the, what, coming to be or the ceasing to be of something in one of the, what, categories, right? One of these other things, right? Okay? And that's, again, the reason why this, or how becoming, is in a way a sense of being, right? Because it's the coming to be of some being, right? So it has some relation to being, huh? So you can relate it to it in some way, right? Okay? Just as logic is called a philosophy, why? Because it's a tool for acquiring philosophy, right? It's not philosophy in the fundamental meaning of philosophy. But it's connected with that because it's a tool for acquiring philosophy. Right? Okay? So motion is connected with these kinds of beings, right? Or becoming, if you wish, right? It's connected with being because becoming is the coming to be of one of these, right? Do you see that? Yeah. What about the categories of doing and suffering or undergoing? Okay, that's a special problem that Thomas, you know, takes up in the commentary, but do you want to take it up yet? Okay. You could take it up, you know. Very difficult thing, huh? To understand. Okay. So, each belongs in two ways to all. What is he talking about in this last paragraph? As in this, for one is form and the other lack. And according to such, for the one is white and the other black. And according to how much, for the one is perfect and the other imperfect. And likewise, according to change of place. What is he talking about there? Going back to things we met in the first books of natural hearing, right? The distinction between form and lack of form, right? And the fact that even of contraries, one seems to be lacking in comparison to the other. Like black seems to be lacking, right? And black almost seems to be the absence of color, right? And so the idea of the perfect and the imperfect, right? And it's going to be related to motion because motion is going to be an imperfect act in one of these categories, right? And it can be reduced to that in a way, like the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, right? But it's not the same thing, but you might connect it with that. Yeah, each means each of the categories here that we're talking about. Each belongs in two ways tall. What is the each here? Well, he's thinking, I guess, of how in each category you have something more perfect and something imperfect, right? Yeah, okay. Okay. Or in each pair of contraries especially, right? Yeah. You know, you go back to the, what, 10th reading there in the first book where he's talking about how they all use contraries, right? Mm-hmm. But when you look at the pair of contraries, one seems to be lacking something. So the full and the empty, obviously. The empty is lacking something compared to the full. But even the, what, the dense and the rare, right? So I'm going to give you a glass of yellow beer and him a glass of beer foam. And charge you the same price. He can rightly complain, right? That he's not getting, what? It's all your glass, you know. But the rare has less matter in the same volume, right? So the dense is to the rare something like, what, form to lack. There's something lacking there. And then the mixed and the, what, segregated, right? You mix things together and you get something that, new kind of, right? So something in the mixed that is not found in the, what, segregated, right? Okay. So if you divide genera, as you often do, by contraries and one is lacking something, right? This is kind of a background for understanding that motion is going to be something not the same as lack, but it's going to involve, what, an imperfect act, right, huh? Okay. So when I'm coming into the room, I'm, what, imperfectly in the room, right? Now, in the beginning of the second reading now, he's going to work out the definition, right? Now, having divided act and ability according to each genus, huh? Now, when you, if you ever study wisdom, right, and you talk about being, which is the subject of wisdom, we divide being, not only as we did here, substance, quantity, quality, relation, et cetera, but we also divide it into act and ability, right? But you could kind of crisscross these, huh? Because in every genus, you can speak of what? Act and ability, right? What is able to be five foot ten was actually five foot ten, right? What is able to be a man was actually a man, right? What is able to be healthy was actually healthy, right? So you wouldn't tack on act and ability here, but it would, what, crisscross that, right? So you divide every genus, in a sense. And the fact that act and ability here according to each genus means that you can bring out something, right, common to all these motions, right? And now he does it. The act of the able to be as such is motion. Now, what the hell does that mean? Okay? Such is alteration is the act of the alterable as such. Growing of the growable, decreasing the decresable, and so on, right? Okay? Now, let's just again stop on that definition one. The act of the able to be as such, huh? Now, there are three parts to the definition, right? The able to be, or you can say the act of what is able to be. And you can say, as he does say there, as such, right? Or you could make it more explicit if you want to. Insofar as it's able to be, right? Okay? Spelled out, insofar as it is able to be. Now, you see, in every genus there is ability and act, right? And motion is the act of what is able to be. And then he adds this third part, huh? And what is that third part bringing out, huh? Well, Aristotle's not always as explicit as he could be, you know, Thomas, huh? And, but in various places, there's really three things they point out about that third part of the definition. Now, take the first thing here, right? When I'm out in the hall there, right? Standing out there. Okay? I am actually a man, well, I'm actually a philosopher, right? I'm many things actually, right? And, but I'm also able to be in this room, right? Okay? So, what does it mean to say that my coming into the room is the act of me? Was it the act of me insofar as I'm actually a man? Is it the act of me or why I'm actually a philosopher? No. It's the act of me insofar as I'm able to be in the room. Right? Okay? It's not the act I already have. Right? It's what it's able to be, could have some act, right? What it's able to be in the room could actually be a man and a philosopher and a father and the other things, right? Okay? So, it's not the act that I have insofar as I'm an act, but the act that I have insofar as I am what? Able to be, right? In this case, able to be in the room, right? Likewise, if I put the water on the stove in the morning to make my tea, the water is able to be hot, right? But the water is actually water, right? And the becoming hot is the act of the water insofar as it's actually water. It's the act of the water insofar as it's able to be hot, right? Okay? And that makes that necessary to say. It's necessary to say in a sense, right? Because what is able to be can have many acts, right? That don't belong to it insofar as it's able to be. My motion is the act that belongs to it precisely insofar as it's able to be something, right? Okay, do you see that? Okay. And that's the first reason. Sometimes Thomas gives that and doesn't go on explicitly to give the other meanings, right? Okay? How would you kind of put that in a nutshell? Well, I'm saying what is able to be could have some act, right? Okay? But the act that it has, in a way, is accidental to the act which is motion, right? The act which it already has is not really motion, right? Okay? Where motion is an act that belongs to it, not insofar as it's an act, but insofar as it's able to be, right? An act. Okay? You've got to see the meaning of that, right? I'll take a very simple example of what I say. Say, I'm standing out in the hall there, and I'm able to be in the room, but I'm actually a man, I'm actually a philosopher, I'm actually a father, et cetera, et cetera, right? But it's not those acts that is my motion of coming into the room, is it? Those are acts that I have insofar as I'm actual, right? See? But motion is an act that I have insofar as I'm able to be, right? Insofar, it's an act that comes to me insofar as I'm able to be in the room, right? Or becoming hot is an act that belongs to the water, not insofar as it's actually water, right? But insofar as it's able to be what? Hot, right? Okay? That's kind of obvious in some ways, but you can say that third part is making that explicit, right? You're not talking about any act, right, of what it's able to be, right? Because it might have many acts, right? You're talking about an act that it has insofar as it's able to be, not insofar as it's already actually something. You see that? Okay? Now, that's one meaning, huh? Okay? And one reason why you add that part. But now, there's a second reason, right? Because you want to bring out that that ability to be is not perfectly or completely or fully actualized by the motion. Okay? So when I'm coming into the room, let's say from this room here, I'm coming into the room, my ability to be in the room is somewhat actualized, right? In fact, I'm partly in the room, as you can see. But it's not fully realized, right? Once I'm fully in the room, I can walk around the room, but can I come into the room? No. The only way I can come into the room now is to...