Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 66: Time, Motion, and the Numbering Soul

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not as a number of the same point, that is, a beginning and an end, but rather as extremities of a line, because they're, what, before and after, and not as parts in account of what has been said. It would use the middle point as two, so that rest could take place. And further it is clear that the now is no part of time, nor is the division of motion as near the point of the line. Again, those things will come out more fully in the sixth book, right? But two lines are parts of one. As a limit, the now is not time, but happens to it as it numbers. As it numbers, a number. For limits are only of that of which they are limits, but the number of these horses, ten, is also elsewhere. Now, this is further than the transition I had, but maybe next time we'll talk about a few more things that Aristotle talks about in the time. And then we'll talk about what? Eternity. Eternity, yeah. Okay. Okay. We want to talk about, in particular, what does it mean to be in time, right? To be measured by time, right? You have to see that that's important to see in itself, but also to see when you talk about eternity, right? Why we are in time, but God is not in time, right? But you have to see what it means to be in time, right? And what does it mean to say my life is measured by time, right? But God's life is not measured by time, yeah? Our discussion on eternity will be two weeks hence. No, next week we'll do it. Sorry, next week. Yeah, but we'll say a few more things about time, right? Okay? And one thing is, as I said, what it is to be in time, right? To be measured by time. But another thing is, something we leave really to experimental science, but what motion do we take as the, what, standard for time, right? Okay? And then the other thing is, going back to the original difficulty, right, about this time exists, right? Right, you see? And Aristotle, you know, raises later on the question, would time exist without the numbering soul, right? Okay? Without the soul that numbers. And he's going to answer, time would barely exist without, see? But it doesn't fully exist without the numbering what? But he's going to make a distinction there between, he would say, you know, is there a number of trees in the forest out there without the numbering soul? Well, you can say more that there's a number of trees out there, even though we haven't numbered them yet. And you can say that there's a number of days that we didn't number them. Because all those trees out there, there's ten trees out there, they all exist together, right? There's ten trees out there. But are there ten days in the world around us? No, because one day is before or after another day. So where do you get ten days then, right? See? Unless they had the numbering soul, right? This is very important when you study the Dhyanima, too. And Aristotle talks about how man is the animal that has the sense of time. And he lives in time in a way that animals don't. But when a man is in passion or something like that, he's, like, living in the here and now. He's now looking before and after. And that's a text. I, you know, defend Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? The first time you see the use of reason when a person starts looking before and after in, what, time, right? My stock example of students is that it seems to be, I haven't gotten any sociological survey, but it seems to be that freshmen, right, get sick drinking alcohol more than seniors get sick drinking alcohol. Okay? Now, without, you know, a very elevated idea of what virtue is, right? You know? Or what the good is. If you just think of the good as pleasure and the bad as pain, right, huh? You know? And so you have, like with the English utilitarians, the calculus of pleasure and pain, right? Then the secret to life is how to maximize your pleasures and minimize your pains, right? Well, if a person drinks to excess, right, and he's sick to his stomach all night long and feels loud as the next day and so on, right? He's not really maximizing his pleasures and minimizing his pains, right? For a little extra drinking for an hour, he has ten hours of misery, right? So if he stops, you know, at a point before he's sick, right, then he can get a good night's sleep and he can enjoy some more tomorrow, see? So this is not a very, you know, elevated use of reason or very elevated understanding, but it's kind of an opening beginning, right? And what you're looking at before and after in time, huh? The thing I used to notice about the little babies, you know, and especially when we had little babies in the house there, my wife would always, you know, you wait till the baby, you know, really gets a good cry up at night time, you know, to make sure they really want their milk and so on, right? And, but the order was that you would put the baby on the changing table, right, and change the diaper, and then the baby would be fed milk, right? Okay. Now, you'd see the baby would be put on the changing table and they'd continue to cry and they'd cry until they get the milk, right? And then after, I don't know, how many weeks or whatever it is, once the baby was laid on the changing table, they'd stop crying and they'd not yet receive the milk. Well, what's, what's looking before and after now, right? You realize that changing table is the problem to the milk, right? And relief is definitely on the way now, and, you see? Well, I mean, that's a very simple example, but it always struck me. I was always struck by the fact that at first they would continue to scream and cry while they were being changed, but then as time went on, they started to, you know, the ones that got on the changing table, then they started to calm down, like the process was started, right? The process of meeting all their little needs and so on, huh? And that's, say, what? The before and after, right? Mm-hmm. And, you know, as a child, you kind of see that, too, you know? Think about time. That's kind of the first sign of the use of reason. As long as a person's living the here and now, they seem to be very little different from the beast, huh? And what's good here and now, or bad here and now? It's the same thing with pain there, you know? See, so the guy, you know, you've got the dental coward and that sort of people, right? And they put off these things, right? And then all of a sudden, they're in a very, what, much more serious condition and maybe even more, going to undergo more pain, you know, because of this delaying the treatment or whatever it was, huh? You see? So in a sense, when a person says, well, no, the idea is, let's go get that tooth or whatever it is, fixed right away before it gets abscessed or whatever it is, right? You see what I mean? It was kind of calculus there of pain, too, right? And you're looking before and after in time, huh? So there's a real connection there between time and the, what, and the numbering soul, huh? And that's kind of the difference between man and the other animals, too, that they don't seem to go around numbering things so much, huh? Okay. So we'll talk a little bit more time and then eternity next time, huh? If I have it in my computer, I'll get the thing on the sixth book, you know, I'll give it to you next time. Produce it or something, okay? So, you've been a little bit distracted, your attention. You know, what is virtue? Mino doesn't define virtue. He gives examples of virtue, right? And Socrates has to explain the difference between giving examples of a thing and defining it, huh? Likewise, when he asks Yuthyphro what is piety, Yuthyphro gives examples of piety, and Socrates has to explain the difference between giving examples of a thing and defining it, right? Okay. Mm-hmm. Now, that's a, you know, in the theotators, right? When Socrates asks the theotators what is epistemia, right? He gives science, he gives examples of it, right? That's natural because examples are closest to our senses and that's where our knowledge begins. So if you ask a little boy, you know, what is a nose? He wouldn't give you a definition of nose. He'd say, that's a nose, that's a nose, that's a nose. Okay? So it's natural to give examples of a thing before defining it, huh? But there's also a road, huh? From examples of a thing to its, what? Definition. Which road is to compare the examples, separate out what they have in common, leaving aside their differences, right? And that's one way to arrive at a definition, huh? Okay? But now after you have the definition, you might give examples to, what? Illustrate the definition. Because a definition is something that the reason grasps, but the reason doesn't think without an image, an image to consider what it's thinking. So that you need an example, right? In a sense, to illustrate, right? The definition. So even after we've arrived at the definition, say, of motion, as the act of what it's able to be, in so far as it's able to be, in order to understand the definition, you have to exemplify it, right? And so I was taking the simple example of a man coming into a room, right? Walking into a room, huh? Okay? Yeah. And you can say, the man who is out in the hall is able to be in the room, right? Okay? And when he's walking into the room, his ability to be in the room is in a way being actualized, isn't it? Yeah. Because as he's coming into the room, as he's coming through the doorway, he's already in part in the room, right? He speaks of the, he's tropas, huh? You know, tropas. And then, we're going to throw out again, for going forward, right? Okay? In Latin, they translate that modus, the word she didn't, you know? But the Greek word is the same, you know, tropas, you know, going forward, huh? But now, in English, we translate that, sometimes we, partly translate, we say, way of proceeding, right? We take our Latin word, a proceeding, a very common way, when I was coming up, because I mean, the philosophy was common. But finally, you know, fully translated in English, you say, the way of going, what? Forward. Now, the second word is, you know, the Greek word is progain, but it's the same, etymologically, it's this. They're very close, right? Okay? But here, the words are somewhat different, huh? Okay? Now, the Greek word tropas, it can be translated as way, huh? It has some good sense, tropas, but it also has a sense of, what? Turn, or turning, right? Okay? But maybe this context, in more than actually, it translates as the way, right? Okay? But the etymology of Godus is a little bit different, huh? Thomas is always quoting Augustine, Godus is, what, mensura prefigite? It's type of the idea of what? Right. Of measure, right? You see? But then, it gets broadened. I think it's word way. The word way is a little closer to the word road, isn't it, huh? But sometimes you use the word way and kind of, the way of doing something, right? You know, it's a little more in terms of the activity rather than the road itself, right? But I think it's something to be learned in all of these words. It's like you get the ethics, right? And as Shakespeare tells us, that part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. And, you know, I first read Aristotle's Nicomagno Ethics, I read it in the English translation, of course, you have the word happiness, right? Then you get Thomas's thing and the word is what? Felicitas. Then you look at the Greek and the word is what? Your daimonia. Okay? And the etymology of the three words is all different, huh? Happiness comes from half, which means luck. Happy go lucky. See? But Felicitas comes from Felix meaning fruitful. Oh, Felicitas. That's right. Yeah, Felix means fruitful. Okay? And then, uh, Eudaimonia means what? You got, you're well-demoned. So I say, the three names kind of have a different etymology, right? And happiness suggests that this happens by good luck, right? Mm-hmm. Felicitas, that happens by, well, it's a natural result of your good actions, right? Like in a bad tree, you don't bear good food. No. Mm-hmm. Um, Eudaimonia, that depends upon an upper, or a higher being in some way, right? Mm-hmm. And I say, and there's all kind of, you know, seems to see an element of truth in all three things, all right? Oh. Because, um, our happiness seems to depend upon, uh, what we do or don't do, right? Mm-hmm. And, uh, in that sense it seems to be the natural result of what we've done or not done, right? Our sense is responsible, in that sense, right? For our happiness or our misery. Mm-hmm. Depends to see some truth, you know, the thing that happens in life to people, right? You get hit by a car and you're maimed or, you know, you, you know, uh, your house burns down and you're poor now or something, right? So luck seems to have something to do with things, right? Mm-hmm. But then the idea that, you know, even the common man will say, you know, when something nice happens, somebody upstairs likes me, you know. And so, uh, but you see, the emphasis of Nicomachean ethics is, is upon, what? What you should do or not do in order to be, what? See? But Aristotle's not deflecting the fact that there's things either by luck or by some higher power, right? You know, but these kind of, we don't have the same control with him, right? Now, But, uh, now, you go to Latin and you see that they also have the term Buena Fortuna, which etymologically is similar to, what, happiness. And you go to Aristotle's, uh, book on the poetic art, he didn't use the word eudaimonia there, he used the word eutukia, which means good luck. you know, and so you're talking about the, the, the fortune or misfortune of these characters in tragedy, you know, eutukia, you know, and, so of course, you know, Shakespeare's always saying, you know, you know, Othello says, I'm fortune's fool, right? You know, I mean, Romeo says, I'm fortune's fool, right? And who can control his fate, you know, says, Othello and so on. Okay, I just mentioned that because, because you have to be kind of sensitive to the fact that sometimes the words we use to translate at least have a different, what, etymology, right? And it's a suggestive about it, right? See? So the English word, you know, we translate nous in Latin by intellectus, which Thomas takes as intus legere, but in English you translate it by understanding, which comes to stand under. So there's a little difference in there, right? And maybe something to be understood by each of these words, huh? I was wishing how sapiensia means sapida asiensia, Thomas said savory knowledge, right? And how Shakespeare touches upon that, huh? In the In Roman Julia. Well, here we have something similar, right? Because the modus portu identity identity. I I to fit the matter, right? So in a sense, it's measured by the matter. So the word modus fits it very well, doesn't it? Okay? And you measure it to make things fit, right? Make them fit. So the modus purge identity has to fit the matter. Tropos doesn't have that sense of measure or fit, right? Tropos has the idea of turn, right? Okay? I was reading my favorite author there, Washington Irving, right? And I don't know if you've ever read Mount Shore, one of these little stories you read, right? It's a marvelous story for me. It's about a guy who has kind of a poetic turn of mind, right? And he gets a teacher who also has a poetic turn of mind, right? And so he just loves this teacher, but he doesn't realize that he's confusing this beautiful poetry for wisdom, right? And of course, he's kind of romantic, too, you know, and of course his father's always making fun of him, he says. And you have to follow the story, oh, I think it happened to Mount Shore, yeah. But anyway, you know, Irving speaks of this, what? Yeah, this poetic turn of mind, right? Well, you can see what Aristotle's sense is talking about there, but something that fits this, right? that when you go to different subjects, you need a different, what? Turn of mind, right? See? And as Thomas explains in the commentary there, in the second book of the physics, men have, sometimes by birth, right? a different, a different, a different. Okay, shall we say a little prayer? In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order the luminary images, and allow us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. We have the reading in Mass today from Daniel there, where the three are in the furnace there. We put three in there, and there's a fourth one in there. He looks like the Son of God. He's an angel, you know, protecting them there in the fire. So, handy ones to have around, those angels, huh? Before we come back to time here, I was going to give a little bit of the Pope's address here. To representatives from the world of culture, art, and science at the Palace of Congresses in Astana, Kazakhstan. And during his pastoral visit, that was in September, this September 24th. He's quoting one of their writers, or thinkers, huh? One of your country's great thinkers, the teacher Abai Kunanbai, whom I've never heard of, but put it this way. And he quotes him, huh? This is in quotes. A man cannot be a man unless he perceives the evident and the hidden mysteries of the universe, unless he seeks an explanation for everything. Anyone who fails to do this is no different from the animals. God distinguished man from the animals by giving him a soul. It is absolutely necessary that we constantly extend our interests, increasing the knowledge which nourishes our souls. It is important to realize that the goods of the soul are incomparably superior to the benefits of the body, and that carnal needs should be subordinated to the imperatives of the soul. Nice thing, fits in very nicely with Socrates there in the Apology there, where he's always examining the Athenians about the preferring the goods of the body, and exterior goods to the goods of the soul, huh? But also this difference between man and the other, what, animals in terms of reason, huh? Now, there's some other quotes in which I'm going to give him just a second, but, you know, one thing here about the next part where he compares it to something in the Gospels, huh? You don't know in these translations, you know, that people think what language was given in and so on. And a lot of times I think when they stick in the translation, they just take the current one that they're using in the church today, right? In America, you know? Well, it's kind of inappropriate when you go back and see the text here, right? Because in the quote from him, he's talking about the soul, right? So, the Holy Father says, How can we not appreciate the profound wisdom of these words, he says, which seem like a commentary on the disturbing question asked by Jesus in the Gospel? And he quotes Mark 8, verse 36. What does it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his life? But in the Greek there, of course, you had the word, what? Soul. Yeah, yeah. And so you hear that other quote, What's it profit a man to gain the whole world and suffer the loss of himself? But the Greek is, what? Soul, right? So, I mean, you know, obviously he's making a connection between that text and this one. And I don't know what version he used or what the translation that he did was, but certainly the translation you have here, which is the one that is, must be common now in the readings at, you know, in the parishes and so on, the word soul has become a nun person, right? A nun word. And that's unfortunate, huh? Maybe we'll do some things in the philosophy of the soul, right? From the three books about the soul after we get through with natural philosophy. Now, the next quote that he has from Kronvai. If, this is a quote again, If the heart no longer aspires to anything, who can unveil its thought? If reason abandons itself to desire, it loses all its depth. According to somebody coming to the house there, you know, and I was comparing it to this fragment that we have from Heraclitus, you know, he speaks of, you would not come to the end of the soul no matter which direction you traveled. So deep is its reason, right? So if reason abandons itself to desire, maybe it means emotion here especially, huh? It loses all its depth, huh? Interesting, huh? Can a pupil worthy of this name do without reason? That's the end of that second quote he has from him, huh? And then later on he has a third quote from this. Abai Kunanbai. All people, whatever their religion, attribute to God love and justice. Love and justice are the origin of humanity. Those in whom sentiments of love and justice prevail are the truly wise. I don't know if this guy may be, you know, Islamic, you know, because he's, you know, speaking, you know, well, you don't actually have to give the church respect for authentic Islam, right? But, let me just, you know, address there. No clue if he's ancient or modern or anything like that. It doesn't identify when exactly he was. I don't think so, yeah. How do you spell his name, doctor? Well, the first name, the first name is Abai, A-B-A-I, and the second one is K-U-N-A-N-B-A-I. The first quote is from the sayings of Abaiya. The second one is from his so-called poems. And the third one, again, is from the sayings of Abaiya. This is in Kazakhstan, where the Holy Father is? Yeah, yeah. You know, if the Pope speaks, this is like the, what, March, April of this year edition, but it's always, what, giving you a sample from three or four months or so back, you know, so these ones are from, well, that one's from September 24th, you know. Okay, so I wanted to say a few more things about time, and then we'll go to eternity, right? Now, three things perhaps we could talk about a bit in regard to time. And one is, what motion do you take for measuring time? Another question is what it is to be in time, right? And then a third thing that Aristotle would come back to in some of the other readings we didn't see is what we saw in the problem in the beginning about the existence of time. And he raises the question, would time be without the numbering soul, without the rational soul, the soul that numbers them? What does it mean to be in time, right? Well, it means to be what? To be measured by time, huh? So what is it for your life, for my life, to be in time, right? Well, it's measured by time, right? It has a beginning and a what? End in time, huh? And that's important to remember when we talk later on the definition of eternity, huh? Because God's life is not in time, right? It's not measured by time, huh? It doesn't have a beginning and an end in time, huh? Some people's life is longer and some is shorter, right? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. In my lifetime, I was able to go to the Bicentennial, the birth of Mozart. And they had, you know, in Minneapolis there, they had two concerts devoted entirely to Mozart. But then I was also around for the Bicentennial of the what? Nation. Death of Mozart. Where they, you know, in New York, they performed every piece of Mozart that they have. Okay. And my oldest was at West Point at the time, and they had, in the fall, they had, you know, the marriage of Figaro, and they spring the magic flute, right? Uh-huh. Yeah. They're brought there from the New York City Opera and so on. So Mozart's life, right, much shorter than my life, huh? But his life was what? Measured by time, right? Oh. Okay. It had a beginning and an end in time, huh? Okay. Now, because time is a measure, the other question that we asked, huh? Time was defined as what? The number, huh? Of the before and after in motion. Or the number of motion according to the before and after in motion. But you take just any motion in order to measure time? Well, in general, when you look for a measure, what do you look for in a measure? You want something that is kind of invariable, right? Yeah. And perhaps simple, too, huh? So would you measure distance by using a rubber binder or something? It's longer and shorter as it's being used, huh? If you stretch it around various things, it becomes longer or shorter. You try to take something that, what, seemed inelastic, at least compared to other things, right? Yeah. Not getting longer or, what, shorter, huh? Clothing stretches sometimes in time, right? Especially if you eat too much or something. Okay. Stockings, you know, they get, you know, longer and shorter, huh? Sometimes an old shoe is more comfortable than a new one because it got stretched, right? So you don't want something like that, huh? So, in ancient times, and for most of man's life, what did they take as the motion to use for this? Sun. Yeah. The motion of the sun around the earth, or at least the apparent motion of the sun around the earth, right? That seemed to be very regular, right? Okay. And that's going faster or slower, like when I walk or you walk, right? Or if you take a stone falling to the ground, you know, it seems to go faster as it falls, right? Okay. So this motion or apparent motion of the sun around the earth seems to be very, what, regular, right? Okay. And also, you know, it's swift, right? But also, what's the third thing that it has, huh? What seems to be continuous, huh? So that you can, what, you know, just go and then come back again, you know? Maybe you stop there at the end a little bit, you know? But it can be, what, continuous, huh? Now, you know, the question of whether the motion or the apparent motion of the sun around the earth is the best standard to use, right, for time, is really a question more for experimental science, huh, than for the philosophy of nature based on our common experience. It's quite possible, huh, that they might find something that would be a better, what, measure, right? But in ancient times, there seemed to be an additional reason to take the motion of the sky around us because that seemed to be in some way a cause of the changes down here. And so in terms of the weather and so on, right? And in terms of generation and, you know, plants, right, and growing and so on. Sun seemed to have a lot to do with this, huh? So it seemed to be a motion also that it was a cause in some way of other motions. So that was maybe an additional reason, huh? So, now the most interesting question is the third question that I raised and that is the question of, and Aristotle asks it later on in the same treatise on friendship, not friendship, on time, and that is, would there be time without the numbering soul? Because time defines a number, right? Now, Aristotle sees a distinction between time and numbers like, say, the number of chairs in this room, right? If none of us were in this room and none of us had counted the, what, chairs in this room, it would still make some sense to say there's a number of chairs in this room, right? Okay? Because all the chairs in this room exist in this room, right? But now, this number that is time, whether you take, say, three years, right? Or three days, right? Or even three minutes, right? But any number like that, that is time, is a number of things that are before and after and therefore don't really, what? Exist together, right? I mean, take a strange example. I mean, not exactly the same thing here, but suppose one of us came into this room by himself and then he left by the door over here and someone else came into this room by himself, right? And then left by the door over there, right? And each one of us, huh? Well, could you say that there was eight of us in this room today? Or was there ever eight of us in this room? Because you left before he came in. Right. And he left before you came in. And so on. There really never was eight people in this room, was there? When was there eight people in this room? But it's not even one day or one hour or one minute of time that's ever here. Because time always has a before and after. And the before and after don't exist, what? Together, right? Thomas has an interesting thing to say there in the beginning of the Summa Theologiae. That first question of the Summa, where he raises one among the questions about how one speaks and thinks in theology, sacred doctrine. And he has an article there on whether sacred scripture should use metaphors. Have you seen that sometime? And as you know, in the Summa Theologiae, you have kind of a contraction there of the question disputata. So you have usually maybe three or four objections, right? Usually against what he's going to be determining in the body of the article. And one of the objections against their sacred scripture using metaphors is drawn from the common saying in the medieval times that the poetry is what? Infima doctrina. Okay? Infima doctrina. Meaning that it's what? The lowest of teaching, right? In the Greek said Homer was the teacher of all the Greeks, right? Okay? But then, sacra doctrina is the what? Highest, huh? Of course, it especially fits poetry down here, fiction, to use the what? Metaphor, right? So the objection is, it seems inappropriate for the highest teaching, right, to use what the very lowest teaching uses, when all these things in between, like geometry doesn't use metaphors, natural philosophy doesn't use metaphors, right? When Aristotle talks about defining, he says you can't define by metaphors, right? He says you can't define by metaphors, right? He says you can't define by metaphors, right? He says you can't define by metaphors, right? He says you can't define by metaphors, right?