Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 72: Reason, Causes, and the Perfection of Reasoning

Transcript
================================================================================

Are those angles equal? And they'll say yes. Okay, nice to know. What's your reason for saying they're equal? Well, they look equal. But is that the best reason you could give, right? Because I might say, you know, they look unequal. Right? That's probably not the best reason you could give for saying that they're equal. So I might say, well, if you measure them and you find them equal, well, would that tell you it's so always? You could say that they're so. They're equal or is equal. That's a reason, right? Saying they're equal, but is that the best reason you could give? You could say so. Does the geometry say so? Well, in this case, I'd go and I'd say, because this is the right angle, excuse me, because this is the right line, and this is the right angle, these two angles have to be equal to what? Two right angles, right? Okay. And because this is the right line meeting a straight line, straight line meeting a straight line, e plus x must be equal to the right angles. And quads equal to the same must be equal to what? Each other, right? And equals to subtraction equals to be solved to equal. But notice, the reason why these must be equal is that these lines are straight, right? Because these lines are straight, a plus x must be equal to what angles and b plus x must be equal. That's a consequence of that, right? And because they're equal to the same, they must be equal to each other, and if equals to subtraction equals to be equal. Just the axioms. But the basic reason why in this case is what? The straightness of the line, right? The intersection of the line is the cause of there being angles there, right? But the straightness of the lines is the cause of the line angles to be equal, right? Okay? So that's the best reason you can give. The reason why it must be so, right? But then not every reason is the reason why it must be so, right? But, maybe there is a way that you could put cause in the definition of every reason, but not cause in the sense of the reason why something is so, right? I thought it's a statement through which you know or accept another statement. Through which you come to know. Yeah, yeah. Now, myself, I've heard the explanation. Maybe you could use statement, because it probably is statement in the form of a statement, right? But I would probably want to put first that it's a thought, right? Okay? It's a thought of why, right? A thought of why someone thinks, right? A statement is true or false. Maybe that thought would take the form of a statement, but I don't know if it's necessary to spot out at this moment, right? It's a thought of why someone thinks the statement is true or false. So the reason why someone thinks the statement is true or false may not be the reason why it is true, right? There are some theorems in geometry that I might not know the proof of, but I have this respect for Euclid, right? And other people who have studied geometry, right? So, if I didn't know the proof of the Pythagorean theorem, I do know that at least. But if I didn't know the proof of the Pythagorean theorem, I might think that it's true nevertheless, right? Because all the geometrists say it is so. Or because Euclid says it is so, right? So my reason for thinking that that statement is true would not be the cause of this being true, right? But in the most perfect, like in this example I gave here, the reason why I think this is true is also the reason why it is true. You see? And you can see the perfection of that reason, right? For someone who's reason for thinking these are true is that a couple that he measured they were, right? And that's why he thinks it's always true, right? That's not really such a good reason, is it? But me, who knows that their straightness makes them have to be equal, right? For me, the reason why I think they are equal is the reason why they are equal, right? In this case, right? Don't you have two different senses of reasoning that point of view is the same? Well, in either case, it's a thought of why someone thinks the statement is true or false, right? Why do I think that these angles will be equal? Well, because those lines are straight, right? And that's why all this follows, right? Someone else might have a weaker reason for thinking they are so, right? Doesn't Thomas say there you know that the argument from authority is what? The weakest in, say, philosophy, right? It's in theology, right? So doesn't this person have a reason for thinking this? You know, if you ask me, you know, there's two Chinese restaurants in town, right? A and B. Which one should I go to? And I say, well, I went to A and I had a wonderful meal there a month ago. Went to B two weeks ago and had a lousy meal. And your reason for going to A I assume you better go to A unless you find the price of all this. What's your reason for going to A rather than B? In your experience. Yeah. It's because I went to A and I couldn't be, though, right? And went to B and had a lousy meal, right? Okay. So that's an argument by example, right? But is that, you know, the best reason? It may be the best thing I can have in this case, right? But it's not a reason why I must get a better meal there, right? You see? I might have changed quotes to the, who knows what, the Solomon Cook's mind when he poisoned the, made a bad meal, right? Who knows? It might have been the problem in the raw materials too, right? Who can buy in the grocery store or, you know, a piece of meat or something that's defective, right? Not Noah. Used to be at a restaurant I'd stop in on the way up to Quebec, you know, it was kind of a handy place there. And I thought they used to look all the steak I was put there. The steak sort of had kind of a fishy smell. They were the same compartment of fish or something. Did you ever tell what happened at the restaurant? Did I tell you a funny story that happened there? Huh? Not sure. Well, one day I goes in there, right, and I sit down and then I start I go to the bathroom, right, went to the bathroom, right, and the sink was up like this. Oh. And you can kind of see, they must have, you know, lowered the floor or something, you know, some kind of construction, right, and rather change all the pipes, right, they left the sink where it was, so it's kind of usually, I mean, you can do, you can wash it, it's kind of usually like that, right, you see, afterwards, right? Okay. I've never been in a public restroom like that where that happened to be so, right, but it's kind of, okay, so anyway, I go back and I sit down in my booth there and I'm ordering my meal, right? When comes a man and his wife, see? See? And they sit down at the next booth, and the man is complaining about some place they've been, and all he does is complain. One complaint, act for another. And I can kind of watch his wife, they're like, she must be a long-suffering woman. She's having things with everything, you know, and so on, see. And she must hear her complain all the time. But finally, waitress comes over to take their order, see. And you know how you watch your steak done, and so on, right? And he says, and if it isn't done exactly this way, he says, I will send it back. You know, why get so excited if it doesn't get half of you? He didn't send him out, you know. And, you know, he's kind of, you know, he has to put up with this man, and he didn't wait to do that matter, right, and so on. So, I mean, he's pulling you out ahead of time, right? But he's very pounced, and he thinks it isn't exactly what he wants. So I'm kind of, you know, I'm just saying by myself, I'm hearing this kind of speech. And then finding the man, he says, I'm going to go to the bathroom. I knew, and he went in there. But, you know, the question of woof, woof, he complains about everything, right? And he comes out, I knew, and I could just see it coming, you know. I can never believe it the way that it's simple as he says. It was like this, he says. And I'm sure she didn't believe him, you know. She thought he must be exaggerating. I don't think it's most kind of ridiculous. It's just so funny to see. So anyway, the best reason, you know, for going there may not be the best reason, you know, in all reasons that I can give for things, right? We have to use those reasons as all we've got to go on, right? I can't give you a reason why you must have a better meal at A than B, right? And as you know, I mean, it's possible you get a better meal at A one week and a better meal at B the next week, right? See? But if all I'd known is the two times, the one time I'd been in each one, and I had a good meal at one place and the other one was, so I got to go on, you're going to guess you're going to get a better meal, right? But you're really guessing, right? But it's a reasonable guess, isn't it? Huh? Wouldn't it be reasonable to go to the restaurant that, you know, someone you know had a wonderful meal at it, and rather than the one he had a lousy meal at, right? So you have a reason, but it's not a reason of the caliber of that, it's not a reason that makes me say, you must necessarily then, right? See? I'd probably say, well, I guess I'll go to A then, you know? I would say, well, then I must have a better meal at A than B, right? That would be attributing more power to the reason than I actually should have for it. You see? So, the noise, nevertheless, that's the thought of why I think, right, that I should go to A, right, huh? Maybe that thought is stated in the form of a statement, right, you know? I don't want to use a statement here again, I don't like that, because twice I don't have to, you know? It's a little bit like the question, though, when you define a statement itself, right, you know? It's a genius of statement. Speech. Speech, yeah, speech signifying the true of the false. It could be one of those states, a sentence signifying the true of the false, right? But not necessarily, really, you know? It's a sentence, yeah. So there we have the other reason defined. So I put statement into its definition, I put cause into its definition, but not exactly the way you guys are. So this is the last paragraph now. But it is impossible that any other kind of thing be between points and nows. For if there were, it would be clearly divisible or indivisible. And if divisible, either into indivisibles or into what is always divisible. So this, however, is the continuous, huh? It is clear that everything continuous is divisible into things which are always divisible. Why? For if into indivisibles, the indivisible would be what? Touching the indivisible, right? For continuous things have one edge and touch, huh? So let's see, is the form of the argument there good? You divide a line into two points, and the two points would be what? Touching, right? But two points cannot touch, right? Without coinciding. You may too, huh? So you're negating the consequent, right? Then you have to negate the antecedent, right? Okay. I think I mentioned that before, like in the Mino, right? Where Socrates reasons from if-then statements, right? But he reasons from the affirmation of the antecedent to the affirmation of the consequent. And then he reasons from the denial of the consequent to the denial of the antecedent. He argues that virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught. Virtue is knowledge, therefore it can be taught. And then he reasons if virtue can be taught, there are teachers of it, but there are no teachers of it, therefore it cannot be taught. You see? But, you know, he doesn't, you know, teach formally or universally the form of the if-then syllogism, but he exemplifies, right? The two forms that are in fact syllogisms, right? But he doesn't reason from the denial of the antecedent to the denial of the consequent, or from the affirmation of the consequent to the affirmation of the antecedent, huh? I know from experience, when I talk to you, you put the forms on the board, if A is so, B is so, right? And A is so, or A is not so, and B is so, or B is not so. And, you know, when I teach logic, I just get four students at random of the board, and they say, if anything follows necessarily right, you know, write under the line what follows necessarily, if nothing does, write, you know, invalid. And somebody always gets one of them wrong, at least. And sometimes, one time it was perfect, I mean, they got all four wrong. In other words, where something followed, they thought nothing followed, and where something didn't follow, they thought something did follow. I say that now. If that isn't a clear enough example of the need for logic, right? I mean, just imagine, you know, your mind's in the state of thinking that when a conclusion does follow, it doesn't follow. And when it doesn't follow, but it does follow. What harm is it going to do to the whole life of your mind, huh? You see? You know, they're not struck by the significance of their mind being in that situation, huh? You're going to miss out on an awful lot of truth because you're not going to see what follows from what you do know. And you're going to run into a lot of mistakes and errors in your life because you think something follows when it doesn't. You are in serious trouble. It's your doctor. Your mind's not functioning as it should, right? Yeah. Now, over there in the second reading here, right? Now, Aristotle has kind of hinted that this reason is common to all of them, huh? He says, there is the same reason for composing magnitude, like a line, huh? Time and motion, indivisibles. And dividing them into indivisibles or none of them, right? Now, he's going to go try to manifest this a bit more for motion in this particular reading, right? And then in the third reading, he's going to be manifesting it again for time in particular, right? Okay, yeah, okay? And, uh... But... Let's just stop on something maybe that also could be manifested and not done it yet. But is there also the same reason in the sense that we're saying that a point is not composed of, I mean, a line is not composed of points, and a surface is not composed of what? Lines of them. And a body is not composed of surfaces. I don't know if he explicitly says it here, but I mean, wouldn't it be like a similar reason, huh? If they were, if the surface was, the lines would have to touch. If you imagine a square or something like that to be made out of, you know, all these lines lined up, then the lines would have to, what, come in touch with the area? And the two straight lines, and they touch, the touch of their edge should not coincide, because they have no what? Breath there. Breath there. No bit. Because then you give it some width, you'd make it a little bit of a what? Pestle stick, isn't it? So you can't really make a, what, surface out of, what, lines, huh? Now, the same thing we true about a body being a layer, being a pancake and surfaces up, so to speak, a pile of surfaces like a pile of pancakes. Mm-hmm. Because the surfaces have no depth. So you can't get any depth by adding what has no depth to what has no depth, right? Mm-hmm. Kind of getting something out of nothing, almost. Mm-hmm. I should put some this way and a few that way. Mm-hmm. I mentioned, I think, before, but to come back to it not in this context here, you know, the marketuses, it's in the, I think it's in the low edition of Greek mathematics there, right? The little Greek, the one of the marketuses, reading this about the cone, and he's saying, suppose you had a cone here, right? And you bisected it parallel to the base, right? And you took it apart. Well, you have a circle at the bottom of this pile of circles, and a circle at the top of this pile, right? Mm-hmm. Okay, now it says, if you look at those two circles, are they equal or unequal? But he says, if they're equal, the same as you see, the circle above and one below would be equal, right? Then this pile of pancakes, of circles, is a pile of what? It's a pile of what? Pancakes. Pancakes that all have the same what? Size, right? Mm-hmm. So then this whole thing should be not a cone, but a what? But a cylinder, right? Okay? Okay? You see? That's a problem that comes if you say that one above and one below is equal. Well, now other torrents say they're unequal, right? But if they're unequal, would this be straight? Isn't a cone, right? In fact, you generate a cone, right? Is this the way to do it? You know, kind of like Euclid says, with a circle, you know, you take the diameter, you rotate the circle around the diameter, you get a sphere, right? But don't you take a triangle and kind of rotate it around? And then you get a what? A cone, right? Okay. Okay? So, this should be a straight line, because the way it's been better than that. It's straight and all around, right? So, if the one below is a little bit bigger, it's going to be... And that's straight, right? So, it's got to be equal or unequal. So, either way, you've got a what? A prediction, right? That's what we have in the framing of the market, right? See? But isn't that a problem because you're what? A circle doesn't have depth. Compose it? Yeah. You're thinking of this, of this, of the thing here, as being layered, right? Ah. See? Now, if we have the cone parallel to the base, right? What would we say is there? You have two circles there, right? Okay? The one above and the one below. Are they equal or unequal? What would you say? Equal. Equal, yeah. Yeah. Now, why don't you get into the problem, therefore, saying that this is a cylinder instead of a cone? Unless the cone's high. Unless the other. Yeah. But then if you cut, you know, and you've got along there, they're going to be the same. You say, So why is this a cylinder then? Because I'm not piling along the top, I'm not composing. It won't be the... The... The... The... The... The... The... The top cut won't be the... The circle won't be the same as the bottom cut circle. Yeah. If you cut it here, and the circle bottom and the one below would be equal, right? Right. Cut it here, and the one above and below would be equal. Right. But these two wouldn't be equal to those two, right? Right. Okay. But how close can you bring those unequal circles? Some might say, Well, let's take the one right below this, right? Right? Okay. Let's take the next one, right? The next cut. Is that equal or unequal, right? Well, there you'd seem to be back from this problem, because if you make it an equal or unequal, the next one is equal, then the next one to that is equal, and all the way down, they're equal, right? You say the next one is unequal, then it's jagged all the way down, right? Okay. And you seem to have an insoluble problem, like cock has its antinomies, you know, or that terrible thing. What's the solution to this, then? There's a, seems to be a contradiction with whatever you say, right? What's the solution to it? There's no next. Yeah, see? Remember that? Just as there's no next point in the line. So, I mean, I think you could talk about bisecting, I mean, you know, cutting the cone, can't you? Carol the beast, I mean, do the beast or the beast. Cutting it, what? That's where they get kind of sections, don't they? They say, I'm going to cut these things, okay? You can cut it, right? And then, you'd have to say that, I mean, this side, you have a circle, right? And you have to say they're equal, right? Okay. Well, it depends on the material, though, too. Right. If it's wood, you actually lose that space. Yeah. I don't even know why you blade it. Yeah, that's true. But in geometry, you don't have that problem. But it wasn't really actually there, those two circles, until you cut it, see? Okay. So, I think, in Euclidean geometry, you'd have to, in Euclidean geometry, you'd have to say that the circles are equal. So, if in fact, there was the next one below, the next one above, then you'd get a problem, right? That's it. But there is no next one, right? Mm-hmm. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha But the same, you know, if you just, you know, take it, make this, you know, just a triangle now, right? Okay. And forget about the three-dimensional edge. It's always easier to set two dimensions. Now, let's say I have a, you know, sausage trangler. Now, I cut it. I draw a line through there, parallel to the base, right? Okay. Now, I lift this up. So the bottom line here and the top line here, would they be equal or unequal? Equal, yeah. Now, what about the next cut? See? There isn't an ex cut. No, no, see? But if someone admits, falsely, right, that there is an ex cut, right? Then, he said, it's got a problem, right? Because if you cut, take the next cut above that, and they are both equal, right? Well, then, the same thing went above that and all the way up and all the way down, right? So now, you've got an A flat. Not a cone, but an A flat. Rectangle. A rectangle, rather than a triangle, right? See? So, you know, so every little bit of the truth there is important. So, it's interesting, you know, that Democritus presents that difficulty, right? Now, where you've got the solution to that difficulty, another question, right? But the way he has it, I mean, you're inside the difficulty, unless you understand the continuous, the Aristotle understands it, right? You get this difficulty because you're thinking that the divisible is composed of the indivisible, right? In some way. Or because you're thinking that there's a mixed. Well, it's kind of marvelous, that thing, I think, of Democritus. I mean, for, especially for people who are thinking that way, right? Because then you're putting them in that difficulty. And there's no way out. They think there's a mixed one. Because they're imagining, like, a pile of pancakes. There is a mixed pancake, right? There's a mixed one above that, above that, right? If you want your pile of pancakes, do some of a cylinder or a cone. Okay? And I do the same thing with the word, what? Before, right, huh? That first sense of before, which Aristotle gives in the categories before in time, before in the, what, motion that takes time, and before in the, what, magnitude over which the motion goes, huh? So, he says, it is clear from these things, for if a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, the motion over it will be from equal indivisible motions. As if the magnitude ABC were composed from the indivisibles ABC, the motion DEF, over it, according to which O is moved over ABC, has each part indivisible, right? Now, if motion being present, something necessarily moves, and if something is moved, motion is present. To be moved will be from indivisibles, right? In that case, huh? For O has moved on A, being moved by the motion D, and on B by that of E, and on C, likewise, by Yatva. Okay? And if it is necessary that the thing move from one place to another, not at once move and have moved to where it is moved. As if someone walks to Thebes, it is impossible at once to walk and to have walked to Thebes. O is then moved on the partless A, as the motion D is present, so that if it has come later than it comes, it will be divisible. For when it came, it neither rested nor had come, but was in, but was between. But if the one walking, when he walks, goes and has gone at once, he will have walked and moved to where he moves. If then something has moved the whole ABC, and the motion according to which it moves is DF, and in the partless A is not moved, but has moved, motion will not be from motions, but from having been moved. What does that mean? In Latin, they use the word momentum there, you know. Momentum is to motion, what the now is to time, what the point is to the line, right? Okay? But can you make a distinction between my moving to A and my having moved to A? If it's only just divisible, right? You see? Okay? So, I can't be moving into A, right? Before I have moved into A, can I? If A is indivisible? No. So, I have moved without moving, right? In the same way for the next indivisible B, right? Can I be moving from A into B before I have moved into B? And B would be divisible, right? See? I can be coming into this room before I have come into this room, because part of me is in the room and part of me is outside the room, right? Okay? But can I come into a point, coming into a point, before I have come into the point? See? So, in every part of the magnitude, I'm not moving, but I have moved, right? So, motion is composed not of what? Motions, but having moved. Without every beginning motion. So, what are the Latin, these momentums? Yeah, I don't translate myself by momentum, by having been moved. You see? Because momentum in English now refers to something in physics, right? Okay? And that's not the meaning of the momentum here, right? Okay? And something will have moved, he says in the next paragraph, and something will have moved without moving, right? For it will have gone through A without going through it. So, something will have walked without ever walking. It has walked the same without ever walking it. If then it's necessary that everything move or be at rest, and it rests according to each of A, B, and C, so that something continuously resting will at the same time be moved. For it moves the whole A, B, C, and it rests in each part and hence in the whole. I'll teach you a good story. There's an article there that's called Motionless Motion. But you have a motion that is composed of what? So, no motion would you have rest, right? You've got really a kind of a contradiction there, right? Can I move from one room to another room? I do that often. But I'm moving from this room to the next room. I'm partly what? In this room and I'm partly in the next room, right? I move one to the other. But if instead of rooms you had points, right? Can I move from one point to the next point? No. I couldn't be partly in the point and partly not, right? Because the point for one thing doesn't have any parts, right? So I'm either wholly in the point or wholly in the what? Next point, right? In other words, going back now here, it might be wholly in this room and now I'm wholly in that room. When did I move from this room to that room? Was I moving from this room to that room when I was wholly in this room? Am I moving from this room to that room when I'm wholly in that room? That's the way you would be if the panthe was composed of points and therefore the motion corresponding to that, right? Would be composed of what? Indivisibles, right? Interesting to think about, right? Right? Yeah. Yeah. There's no motion, you just have a... That's kind of the way the moderns envision these things, right? Schrodinger, the physicist guy, perfected the mathematics of wave mechanics, you know, and so on. But after quantum theory, you know, they came back and they were thinking again about this instantaneous velocity. See, in Newtonian physics there, you kind of try to unite motion in a circle with motion in a straight line, right? And they try to speak of what? The motion at that point where the line touches the circle. when you have really any motion in the indivisible. So, isn't this a fiction, right? You speak of instantaneous velocity, the velocity you have at that point or in that instant, right? The velocity implies motion and there's no motion to that, right? And he says, it should have struck us, right? There's something fictional about this, huh? It's kind of strange about science in a way because, you know, sometimes I've read scientists or even Catholic scientists and they think they know, well, they'll deny the proposition maybe that whatever's in motion is moved by another, right? And they kind of think of the law of inertia, right? That a body in the absence of external forces, right? to be of the of the of the state of the of the state of motion, or continuous state of motion, right? But they're speaking of motion as if it were a state, which means standing, right? So they are conceiving of what is in fact in motion as if it were not in motion. Now, is that a reason to deny that what is in motion depends upon whoever? So they say, you know, a body, in the absence of external forces, remains either at rest, right, or in a more uniform motion in a straight line. And then they see, you know, speeding up or slowing down, that's a change, right? You see? Otherwise your state, status, your standing is the same, right? But once they talk about change as change, we're really talking about acceleration as if they don't know what change was, then it depends upon something else, right? The body speeds up or slows down, right? It's because of some other thing, right? So when they conceive of change as change, they agree. You know what Aristotle was saying, right? See? And when they conceive of uniform motion in a straight line, right? It's not motion at all. Then they, what? Deny it, right? See? We're not thinking about change as change, right? We're thinking about if uniform motion in a straight line would remain the same, wouldn't be a change, would it? And they're calling that remain the same as if it were not a change, right? Now, in a sense, that is a, what? A fiction, right? It's a little bit like, you know, if we say, you know, by health you are healthy, right? And then we say by blindness you are what? Blind, right? As if blindness were something, right? Like a form, right? By which you are blind. Just as a clay by its shape is a sphere. The shape is something, what? Real, right? The blindness is really the none being of something, right? So, reason sometimes takes what is not and speaks of it as if it were like something, right? Sometimes Aristotle speaks, you know, of metaphorical sense, you know, when someone says my car is total, right? You know, I'm a complete wreck, my car is a complete wreck. Completely gone, right? You know? You're calling what is a lack of something, you know? Right? It's completely empty. You know, I mean, you don't realize how much fiction is involved there. I mean, it's not a question why this particular fiction might be, what, useful, right, huh? You see? But you have to realize that it's, what, nevertheless, a, what, a fiction, huh? You know, the, um, now it's first an assumption there, you know, I was introduced by a friend there in the history department to William McNeil's there, The Rise of the West. Have you ever seen that? Yeah, we have it here. Yeah, yeah. And it's probably, you know, from a secular point of view, anyway, the best, uh, world history we have, huh? But in particular, um, the historian was really the best historian at the time, that assumption. Um, this is a gift that his thesis director had given him as kind of a personal gift, right, you know, this kind of a thing. I use that book a lot because there's a lot of good things in it, huh? But one thing I, I like is, you know, when you divide historical periods as you must do in a history book, right? Mm-hmm. Um, and he used the phrase, fictional sharpness. Oh, yeah. Of all historical, you know, dating of periods, right? Yeah. See? So if you want to talk about, you know, the industrial revolution as a family historian does, right? Sure. And, well, when, what years are the years of the industrial revolution, right? See? Maybe the first one is 1760 to 1820 there in England. But, um, we're talking about the age of the automobile, right? You know? You give, you know, certain boundaries, right? But isn't there a fictional sharpness to that, huh? Mm-hmm. The modern world begins, when, 1500 AD, right? Mm-hmm. See? There's all kinds of things, you know, that, uh, old things are living on, side by side, new things, right? See? So when we went from, from horses to driving cars, that was a gradual thing, right? So when did the horse and buggy age end and the age of the car begin, right? Mm-hmm. See? And so to some extent there's something kind of arbitrary, but, but maybe it's better to call it fictional, right? Mm-hmm. And to some extent you have to, what? In writing the history of a country you have to divide into periods, right? Otherwise it's just a blur. Right? You see, it's just, it's all continuous, right? You see? In a way, it's something like the continuous, right? Mm-hmm. Well, that was the end of that age and then the next age began, right? You know, 1500, you know, it's the end of the medieval world and all some, you know, and, uh, so, um, but can the historian avoid those fictions? I understand. See? So, in some way those, those, uh, fictions are useful, right? So maybe we'll start here with the, uh, the reading here, right? Well, it's a little more like the second one again, but, okay? Maybe some copies of this, Maybe. Okay, so. I can give you two when you're going on. Yeah, or else just next time, you know, because I, you know, I'd look at the paraphrase, the Latin and Greek a little bit, okay. So, I will be done, huh? What does that mean? On earth as it is in heaven. I don't know, but I will do it. You wonder, like, I need to enjoy the Lord of the Rings. you know? Well, you know, Austerly, huh? His thing, towards an evaluation of music, right? He was talking about the fine arts, right, and so on. And I think a good remark, he says, they're, the fine arts, right, music and fiction, so on, they're too high for the beast and too low for the angels. I just find that fascinating, though. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, you know, what's interesting about fiction is, he had another statement that was kind of good, you know, the fiction and things of that sort of music and fine arts are what are most pleasingly proportionate to man. Yeah. See? And I often use that when I'm discussing Mill, right? You know, Mill, of course, has a kind of defective understanding of ethics, right? And he's kind of in the epicurean tradition in a way, right? Utilitarian, so on. So pleasure and pain is the measure of everything, right? Okay? And then, but Mill tries to, you know, nuance this a bit, right? And he says, some people are objected to this saying, well, this is ethics for beasts, right? Because they live pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, right? And he says, he tries to turn the table on them and say, well, you know, they're accusing us, our philosophy is being bestical, right? And he says, you are the beast, he says, because you're assuming that man has no pleasures that the beast doesn't have, right? Okay? And he says that, he tries to argue, you know, that those who have experienced, right, these pleasures that man has that the beast doesn't have, right? They all say that those pleasures are greater than the pleasures that he has in common with the beast, right? It's only those who have not experienced. experienced, right? Okay. So, you see, for Mill, in a sense, there's no reason to say one pleasure is greater than another except the person who's experienced both, right? Just like with pain, if I say that a broken leg is more painful than giving birth, why can't he say that? But a woman who's had a broken leg and given birth, she can say something maybe about this, right? Right, okay? And so someone who has experienced the pleasures that man has and the beast doesn't have, right, can maybe make some changes which ones are greater, right? Okay, but anyway, so he has a little distinction there. But what I do is I divide the pleasures, you know, to prove a little upon them, into three, right? There are the pleasures that man shares with the beast, like the pleasures of eating and so on and sleeping, but there are also the pleasures that man shares with the, what, angels of God. And those are the pleasures of understanding, like in the sciences, right? Okay? And then there are the pleasures that are human in a narrow sense, but in some of the ones that are broad sense, right? The pleasures, which, like Ostley says, are too low for the angels, but too high for the beasts. But these are the pleasures of the fine arts, and, you know, fiction and music, but they involve both the reason and the, what, the body, right? You see? And that's why they're so proportioned to man, right? Oh, but I guess when I glorify the body, then we're back to where we were. Yeah, yeah, we'll have those pleasures, yeah. Oh, great. Thomas says explicitly there'll be a laus vocalist in heaven, right? Yeah. You know, there'll be, you know, a palestrian there and music there, right? But, um, the point is, um, it's kind of interesting about these things, see, that the pleasures that we share with the beasts, right? Um, like the pleasure of eating, uh, drinking, but we have them in a more refined way than the beasts does, see, so we cook our food and we drink wine and so on. Uh, but nevertheless, it's substantially the same, you know, category of pleasures, right? Okay? The pleasures that we share with the angels, it's reversed. We have them in an inferior way. We don't understand much compared to what they understand, right? See? But these other pleasures, so far as they involve the body and the soul, the reason and the senses, or the reason and the imagination, right? They kind of involve the whole man, and therefore they're more, it is a compression of what they're more pleasingly proportionate to us, right? See? Okay? Because one pleasure is almost, you know. Now, I think what's interesting about that, kind of a sign of this, being proportioned to us, is the fact that we can more continuously enjoy the pleasures of literature or music or the fine arts than we can of eating or of philosophizing, right? See? Because as we philosophize, we get kind of tired, or, you know? And, um, and life is a pleasure of eating, like you don't eat so much, and then it becomes, you know, I mean, people on Thanksgiving there, you know, they, you know, in an hour, they've exhausted the pleasure of the table and they're actually sitting uncomfortable, you know? See? But you could go and listen to an opera, say, in two or three hours, or a play, two or three hours, or, you know, even a movie, right? You could, you know, you could spend two or three hours in a museum looking at paintings and so on, right? See? In a way, you can more continuously enjoy music or fiction or that than you can philosophy or you can eating, right? For Brother Mark, he would say, you know, the first beer tastes better than the second beer and the first swallow tastes better than the rest of the beer. I call it the law of diminishing returns, right? In these sense places, you know, I mean, you see? You can be a little bit hungry, you know, to enjoy these things and, and the other way, you get satiated with food and it becomes kind of revolting in a sense, right? Or some kind of forced to eat more, you know, you don't eat more. But, but, you know, people can sit and, you know, read a novel or something like that, right? You know, for, you know, two or three hours in the evening or more, right? In a way, they can't sit down maybe and philosophize most of the money, right? And the only reason I'm going to drop in, especially in a good novel, is your body comes out before your, uh, Yeah, yeah, your imagination that's riding along with it. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, but it's something, I guess, between that point of the receiving of your glorified body, you know, it's just that idea that you don't imagine things. It's just, Imagine that. Yeah, it's just, what I have a hard time, you know, trying to understand, you know, is that my soul is already in my body, it's not going to be in place, right? Yeah. Where's it going to be? Yeah. It's not going to be in place. You know, it's very hard for us to understand that things are, what, you know, quite distinct, without one being here and one being there, right? Yeah. See, we can't understand that very well, right? It's interesting, you know, even logic, you know, the word difference that we talked about, species making difference, and the Greek word is diophora, right? But difference and diophora mean literally carried apart, right? See? As Thomas says, you know, when you place one thing in, one thing there, then it's clear they're different, right? And you know, even the way we speak sometimes, on the one hand, on the other hand, if I have one thing in this hand, one thing in that hand, they're obviously two different things, right? But then we tend to, what, talk about things that aren't in one hand and the other hand, but we use the expression, right? The one hand and the other hand, right? One here, one's there, right? But you can't say Gabriel's here and Michael's there and, you know, you see? Well, I'll be points coinciding. But not that either, see, because then we'd all be in the same place. We're not in different places and we're not in the same place. We're not in place at all. You see how hard that is for us to transcend the imagination, right? Reasoning heaven means we wouldn't, we'd be above reasoning in heaven too, wouldn't we? wouldn't we think like the angels? Be more like, no? Well, you're talking about the vision now? Yeah. Yeah, there's no reasoning in there, that's all at once. We'd partake of eternal life, right? There's no before and after in that vision, right? Oh, yeah. Yeah. But we'd still be wanting to reason, I don't know why we do it, but, you know, we could still reason, you know, outside the vision, right? Oh, okay. We would have that ability. It would be there in virtual. Yeah, yeah. Treason to do it. Because we're going to see the vision, not only God, but everything else that we naturally want to know. We're going to see it. We see God. Hi, Orange. Is that your name? Yeah. It's kind of funny, you know. We might find one on the, we have a kind of split-level house, right? So you come in the front door and there's like four or five steps coming up the living room, right? And then four or five steps going down to the lower level. And she wanted to have, you know, carpet put in like the center thing. But, you know, you leave the wood on the side, right? Okay. So we always talk about it. You're going to take your shoes off and you come to the house, right? And I was saying to her, I said, now, you know, it's when you get that in. That cat's going to see, that's a good place to, you know, you know. And I'm sure she won't want the cat doing that, right? So the first dude put it in there and the cow's upstairs, so time her going downstairs at nighttime. Funny, she went down on the wood, you know, right down on the wood and explained the whole wood like she heard me, you know. Funny, the day she went down the cloud and down down the center part, but the first, you know, deer to, you know, she was going down the little wooden part that was left, you know, the rug is down the center and the big little, you know, little thing and she was like she heard us, you know, what the heck is this, you know. I'll lay down. I'm sure to discover, you know, the idea that it's nice to, you know, some people they got like a post and they put a whole piece of rug around their cat, you know, that's the thing, but basically, it's like, you know, I'm sure she could do it one these days and we'll be chopping up, you know, and she'll be. Can I ask you a question that we listen to? In the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, to open the lights of our minds, order and look at images and rouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, and help us to understand what you've written. In the name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, thing.