Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 86: Motion, Continuity, and the Paradox of First

Transcript
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So when I go from Worcester to Boston, when I've gone from Worcester to Boston, I'm in Boston, right? Now, when I'm first in Boston, how long is that when I'm first in Boston? It was 12. What? Zero. See? If you say, I'm first in Boston during this hour, right? Then you say, well, what about the first half hour of that hour? Was I in Boston or not? See? If I was already in Boston during the first half hour, I was in Boston. Then that hour is not when I was first in Boston, was it? So he's going to be bringing this out, right? So in this way, there's going to be a first, we'll see, in change, right? And something indivisible. But then he's going to go look at the other end, right? When I set off from Worcester to Boston, right? Is there a first distance that I go? Is there a first part of my motion? Well, now, in terms of the understanding of the continuous being divisible forever, you're going to have a hard time having a, what? First distance, huh? Do I first go a mile? I have to go a half mile before I go a mile. So do I first go a half a mile? Okay? Well, no, I have to go, you know, a quarter of a mile before I go a half a mile. And this thing's going to be divisible forever, right? Okay? So it's not going to be a first distance I go, see? Or a first time in which I, what? My motion starts, right? See? This is going to set the stage, then, that you now, the first year, it's going to set the stage for seeing this before and after in change, that before you've gone some distance, you're going some distance, right? And before you're going this distance, you have gone some distance. And before you've gone some distance, you're going some distance. And this goes on forever, right? You see? Okay? And again, they say, this is going to be a starting point, that it will be no first year, for saying that nothing moves itself. We'll see that when we look at the arguments from the 7th and 8th books, but we'll look at Thomas' summary of those arguments there in the first book, the Summa Gentiles, right? Where he does it much more at length than he does in the Summa Theologiae, right? It's going to be kind of like a summary of the important things in the 7th and 8th books, huh? But in the 7th and 8th books, you know, you want to get to the idea of the dependence of motion upon a mover, right? And eventually the dependence of move-movers upon an unmoved mover, huh? And, you know, reasoning to the dependence of motion upon a mover, partly from the definition of motion, and partly from what's being seen in this book, right? This is the most manifest, as Thomas says, argument for this isn't so God. But, you know, with Descartes, they gave up the attempt to even define motion. Descartes thought you couldn't define motion. And John Locke, you know, follows them in that respect, huh? And they don't do the 6th book either, huh? So, the consequence of that is you can't know that God is, by reason, the first argument. So, very serious, huh? It's kind of interesting. Now, De Connick said one time, you know, the philosopher doesn't really ask, does God exist? The theologian asked that question, right? The philosopher is studying motion, and all of a sudden, as he understands motion better, he realizes that motion depends upon a what? Depends upon a mover, yeah. And then he figures out later on that a move-mover is going to depend upon an unmoved mover, right? And all of a sudden, there's God, right, staring him in the face, so to speak, right? Not face-to-face, but somebody staring him in the face, huh? Okay. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas. Thank you, God, our blessings. And help us to understand what you've written. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. Okay, I think we're on page 10 of the reading. We're in the middle of that seventh reading. Okay? Now, just to recall for a moment here a little bit where we are and what's going on here. In these three readings here, six, seven, and eight, you're dealing with the distinction or division of motion. And the order of the parts of motion, right? Okay. And if I remember rightly, in the sixth reading, we were talking about a couple ways of dividing motion, huh? And now, in the seventh and eighth readings, we're concerned with the order, right? And what is the distinction and order of distinction and order? What's the distinction and order of distinction and order? Let the state questions like that make them hard to... Yeah. I don't think it's the distinction and order of the senses of before. Well, what's the distinction between distinction and order? The distinction and order presupposes distinction. Distinction is before order and before knowledge. Okay, and also in being, too, right? Things can be distinct without having an order among them, right? Like a cat and a baseball bat, I don't see if they could order among them, right? But they're distinct, right? But they can't have a before and after if they're not distinct, according to the axiom of before and after. Nothing is before or after itself, right? So what does distinction mean in general? When are two things distinct? Let's put it that way a little more concretely. When are two things distinct? Yeah, when one is not the other. That's the safest answer, right? Okay. And when are things in order? Before the other. Okay. One is before or after the other, right? Okay. Now, that's the distinction, right? Between distinction and order. Now, what's the order of distinction and order? You're saying what? Yeah. Distinction is before order in what sense of before? Second sense. Second sense, yeah. Distinction can be without order, but not vice versa, right? And then in our knowledge, right? Okay. So if I saw no distinction between today and yesterday, I couldn't say today was after yesterday, right? If I saw no distinction between wine and water, I couldn't say. Wine is better than water, right? Well, water can be without wine, but not vice versa. Okay. I couldn't say the before and after. It's just called distinction. Which is before in the fourth sense. Yeah. Yeah. Because order would seem to be more like the end, right? So God has made creatures distinct in order to have a, what? An order in the universe, right? And the order of the universe is the greatest good of the universe after God himself, right? But it's the greatest good, you might say, within the universe, right? But the whole universe is order to God, so he's the chief good, right? Okay. Okay. So, he talked about the distinction, then, of the parts of motion in the, what? Sixth reading, right? Now in seven and eight, he's going to be talking about the order. So it's pretty clear what he's doing here, right? In six, seven, and eight. But what's the difference between seven and eight, huh? See? Well, in seven, the concentration is upon... on first, right? And in eight, the concentration is on before, right? Okay? And, but they still pertain to order, because first is defined by what? Before and after, right? Okay. Now, in I think the part we saw already last time, he's shown in what way there is a first in motion, and I was going to show, starting in the second part here, in what way there's not a first in motion. In what way is there a first in motion, huh? There's a first, there's a first, first in which it has changed. Yeah, yeah. You talk about the complete change now, right, huh? Okay. So what is not a sphere is becoming a sphere, right, huh? There is a first when it has, what, become a sphere, right? Okay. And he points out, when it's changing, huh, from A to B, right? When the change is completed, it's where? Yeah, yeah. Okay? Now, he goes on to point out a second thing that, what does he conclude about that, where it first is in the term to which it's changing? That's indivisible. Yeah, yeah. The Greek word would be ottoman, huh? You know? Forget the word Adam, right? It's indivisible, right? So when I was becoming a man, right? I won't try to say when exactly I did become a man, but when I was becoming a man, huh? When I first became a man, or when I first had become a man, right? I was at any period of time? Why can't you say there was some period of time when I first became a man, huh? I was born on January 18th, let's say, right? I mean, I became a man before that, but let's just take that which is more known to us, huh? When I was first born, let's say, was that any period of time? Why not? Both unborn and born at the same time. Yeah, yeah. Especially clearly you have contradictories there, right, huh? Okay. So if you said I was born on January 18th the whole day, I was not first born, well, have you been born in the morning already, or was it in the afternoon when I was born? If I was born already in the morning, that wasn't first born in the whole day, was I? The same you could say about any period of time, right? So I'm going to be born at the end of that time, and the end of that time being a limit is what? No time at all, right? Something indivisible, right? Now, in the middle paragraph on page 10, he's now going to go over to the second consideration, that there's nothing, there's no first distance you travel, right? There's no first distance you have traveled, right, huh? He's looking at it now from the beginning rather than the end of the change. So he first wants to distinguish these two, so in the middle paragraph on page 10, if you have your reading there, that into which something has changed is said in two ways. The one in which first the change is perfected, right? And we talked about there being a first when the change has perfected, and that that change is, that first is invisible, right? The other in which it first begins to change, huh? Okay? Now he says, the one called first according to the end of the change is possible, right? Okay? And exists, for the change can be perfected. And there is an end of the change, which has been shown to be, what? Indivisible, right? Because it is the, what? Limit, huh? Okay? That's interesting, huh? Even looking at it in terms of limits of quantities, right? The limit is always, what? Not a quantity of the sort of which it is a limit, right? So the point is the end of a, what? Line, limit of a line. The line is extension, but the point is no extension, right? The line is the end of the, what? Triangle or something like that, or the square, right? It's the end of a surface that has length and width, but the end has no, what? Width, right? A surface, like a square, I'd say, is the end of a cube, right? And has length and width, but unlike the cube, the body, it doesn't have any, what? Depth, right? Okay? But now he's going to contrast that. He says, the one according to the beginning, though, right? Is not at all, for there is neither a beginning of change, nor a first time which was changing. Okay? It's kind of strange, isn't it, huh? That there's no, what? First, huh? Okay? So he says, let A.D. be the first in which, huh? I suppose he's thinking of time here, right? This is not indivisible, for it would come about that nows were next to each other, right? Okay? Now, if you said that the time which I begin to move is something indivisible, then there'd be a first time in which I am in, what? Motion, right? Namely, that first indivisible, right? If the continuous was composed of, what? Indivisibles, right? Okay? A, B, C, D, right? So I'm at rest in A, and then B would be when I'm first in, what? Motion, right? Okay? So he says, this is not indivisible, for it would come about that nows were next to each other. And this goes back to the general consideration of the continuous, that no continuous thing is composed of what? Of indivisibles, and no continuous thing is indivisible either, right? Okay? So everything continuous is divisible forever, huh? I think it's kind of a second one that if you take that there is motion in that indivisible. Further, if it rests in the whole time C, A, before it starts to move, it will rest in the A at the end there. Thus, if A, D is partless, it at once rests and will have changed, huh? It rests in A while in D it has changed, huh? That's kind of assuming, you know, what the opposition is saying, huh? Now, since it is not without parts, it is necessarily divisible, and it has changed in any of this. Now, dividing A, D, the time which is first changed, if it has changed in neither, it has not changed in the whole. It's kind of obvious, right? If it changes in both, it also changes in the whole. If it has changed in one of them, it has not changed in the whole. Thus, it is necessarily changed in each. It is clear, then, that there is nothing in which it has first changed, for the divisions are, what? Unlimited, right? Okay? So did I begin to move today? Hmm? What did you say? I first began to move today. Or was it this morning? I first began to move, huh? Huh? So I wasn't moving this morning. I didn't begin to move today, did I? It wasn't until this afternoon that I got up. That was not true, but you see my point, right? Huh? Okay? So if I was already moving this morning, when did I first begin to move? At six, between six and seven? That first hour? Hmm? Well, time is divisible forever, right? Is there any time when I first began to move? No. Because any time you say is the first time you get to move, if I'm moving during that whole time, you'd have to say, right? Then in half of that time, I'm already, what? Moving, right? So that is not the first time, right? So only if you make time something indivisible, or composed of indivisibles, which we've excluded from our study of continuous, would it be possible to have a first time which I'm in movement. Aristotle's going to come back to this when he argues that nothing moves itself. Let's see that. Look at Thomas' statement of those arguments there in the beginning of the Summa Cana Gentiles. You're not looking at that from the point of view of time, right? Neither is there anything first of what has changed that has changed, huh? Let DF be the first of the DE that has changed. Now, how are you thinking about this in this second way of proceeding here at the bottom of page 10, huh? Is it as if the body DE is changing? Of course. It's like I'm shoving something through the doorway here, right? Okay. And how much of the thing I'm shoving through the doorway comes in first? You have the same problem there, right? Do I first shove it in the first foot, you might say, of the piano, wherever it is? No, because half of that foot is going to get in the door before the whole foot gets in, right? Well, is it half a foot then that first gets in the door? Because a quarter of a foot is going to get in the door before the, what? Half a foot gets in, right? And because the body itself is divisible forever, what's the first amount or length of the body that has come through the doorway? No, no. It's very strange, right? Nothing is first. Nothing is first, but there is a time when something is moving. Yeah, but is there a first time when it's moving? No. No? No. There is a time when it's moving. Yeah, yeah. There's no time when it's first moving. That's the point he's making, right? And there's no part of the body that has first gone through the door. It shows what a strange reality is, what? Emotion. Change, right? Right? And it's from this, huh? That he will reason later on, right? That the body cannot be in motion to itself, right? Because that has to be in motion to itself, what? First, but not because of anything else. And notice, this is based upon what he showed earlier. Everything that changes has been shown to be divisible, right? Let HI be the time in which DF has changed, huh? If then DF has changed in the whole, let's say the whole length DF has gone through the doorway in each time, and half of that time, something less will have gone through, and before DF will have changed. And again, another before this, right? Because the time it is of wherever. First there will be, whence there will be nothing first of the changing that is changed. So from the thing said so far, it is clear that nothing is first, neither of the changing as he's just shown, right? Nor of the time in which it changes, huh? Now it comes to a third way of looking at this, which is that according to which there is change, right? But the thing itself which is changed, or according to which it is changed, does not have itself likewise. I make a distinction here because sometimes the change is in terms of something which is as such a quantity, like when you change your place, right? And the place is like a continuous quantity, right? Or when you have growth, where there's a change of quantity, a continuous quantity, something continuous, as opposed to what? A change of quality, right? Where you don't have this continuity as such, although you have a certain continuity insofar as it takes time, right? But the thing itself which is changed, or according to which it is changed, does not have itself likewise. For three things are said to be in change, the changing, which is talked about in the second argument, and that in which there is change, which is one way of referring to the time in which the change is taking place, like in the first argument, and that to which, or according to which it changes. And he gives the example, as the man might be the thing changing, right? In some time, and he's changing to white, huh? Now the man and the time are divisible, but there's another account about the white, except that all are divisible, at least by, what? Accident, right? Insofar as the time is divided, huh? For that to which white, or equality happens, is divisible. But there will not be a first in whatever things are divisible by themselves, and not by accident, as in magnitude. So let the magnitude be A, B, and let something be moved from B to C first. If then B, C is divisible, there will be something before C to which it has changed. Again, another before that, and always thus, in account of the division never coming to an end, huh? Thus there will not be a first which is changed, huh? So what he's saying there is, I'm going to run, let's say, a mile today. Is there a first distance that I run? No. No. No first distance I run. I have to run half a mile before I can run a whole mile, right? And a quarter of a mile if I can run a half a mile, right? And because the distance is continuous, it's divisible forever, right? So there's no first distance I run. Strange, right? Likewise in the change of quantities, thinking now of growth, right? Okay. When I'm growing between five feet and six feet, right? Is there a first amount that I grow? See? Not if it takes time, right? Okay. It is clear then that only in the change according to quality can there be the indivisible through itself. But even that can be divisible but accidentally, right? Insofar as it's in time, huh? Okay. Now, from what he's shown here in the second part of this reading that there's no first, huh? In the beginning of motion, he's going to argue about the before and after now in the eighth reading, right? He's going to say, does moving come before having moved? Or more generally here, changing before having changed, huh? Does moving take place before you have moved some distance? Or have you moved some distance before you're moving a certain distance that's completed? Both. He's going to argue both, right? He's going to argue each in turn, huh? Okay. So before having moved any distance, you were moving some distance, right? And while you're moving some distance, you'd already have moved some distance. That's a very strange before and what? After, right? Very strange. Very strange reality, huh? Mm-hmm. Wonderful and strange. Shakespeare's always coupling those two, right? Like in Hamlet, you know, he says, strange and wonderful. Then it's a strange you give it welcome, the old saying going back to Homer and so on. So, he begins in the eighth reading. Since everything changing, it changes in time, and something is said And something is said to change in time. Thank you. Thank you. time, as in first and as by another, as in the year, because it changes in the day, then necessarily the changing changes in each part of the first time which is changing. This is clear from the definition for the first has been spoken of thus, but it's also clear from these things. Let XR be that in which first is moved, that which is moved, and let it be, that's XR apparently stands for a time there, right? And let it be divided by K for all times divisible. Hence it either is or is not moved in the time XK and likewise again in KR. If then it is moved in either, it would rest in the whole, for it is impossible that the move move in none of this. If it moves in either only, it will not move in XR first for the motion is by another. Necessarily then it is moved in each part of XR. Having shown this, it is clear that everything moving has been moved before. For if it has been moved to the magnitude KL in the time XR first, in the half, what moves equally fast and starts together will have moved the half. If the equally fast has moved some distance in the same time, the other will necessarily have moved this distance so that what moves will have moved. Now Thomas says he's using two bodies there, right? He says you have two bodies that are starting off and this one body is going to go this distance, right? And the other body going equally fast starts off and stops right here, right? Okay? So the other body has obviously has moved this distance, right? But the equally fast body is going to continue moving, right? In that time that the other body that stops here has gone this distance, it will have gone what? This distance, right? So before it goes through this whole distance, it will have gone this far, right? Okay? So you manifest that, Thomas says, because this is more actual than it has gone that distance, right? Okay, just stop and you're going to rest, huh? But this is also has gone that distance, right? So before it goes this distance, it has gone this distance. See? So before going this other distance, it has gone some distance that is like what? Part of that distance is going, right? Okay? Somewhere during the time it's going this distance, it has gone this distance already. So before it is, the going this distance has been completed, right? It has gone already some shorter distance, right? Okay? Now it shows a little bit differently in the next argument here. Now notice that first argument is taking two different bodies, right? To make it more manifest, huh? As Thomas says, act is more known than ability, huh? Further, if we say that it has been moved in the whole time XR, or in general in any time and taking the ultimate now, the same. For this is the determining, and time is always between nows. So likewise in the others, it will be said to have moved, huh? For always together with the division, there will be a time determined by the nows. If then every time is divisible, and time is what is between nows, everything changes will have changed without, what? Limit, huh? So at this time, you look in one body, is divisible forever, right? Each of these divisions is a now, and it has moved a certain distance, right? And before this moving any distance is completed, it already has moved some distance, right? Okay? Mark by those nows there, huh? Okay? Another slightly different way of showing it here, in the second paragraph. Further, if what continuously changes, and neither ceases nor rests from change, necessarily moves or has moved anything, and one cannot be changing in the now, okay? It necessarily has changed according to each now. Thus if nows are limited, everything changing will have changed the infinity of times. Okay? So he's saying that, what? This is divisible forever, right? Each division is a now, right? And in that now, there's no what? Motion, or rest for that matter, right? So, it either has to be moving, or has moved in any of those parts of the time, or in the time. So in the nows, it can't be moving, so in every now, it must have what? Have moved a certain distance, right? Okay? So before moving any distance, it has already moved some distance. Okay? So that's what he's shown, as he mentions here in the beginning of the third paragraph. Not only is it necessary that changing has changed, right? That what will also reverse. But also what has changed necessarily was changing before. For everything that has changed from something to something has changed in time. For let it have changed in the now from A to B. It has not changed in the same now which it is in A, for it would be at once in A and in B. And it has been shown before that what has changed when there's change not in this, where it started from. If in another, there will be a time between, for nows are not next to each other, huh? So, if each of these nows, it has moved some distance, right? Well, there's always a time between any now and any now you want to take before that, right? So, before any now in which it has moved, there was some time in which it was, what? Moving, right? So, before every has moved, there's a moving. Okay? Now, this is not the same as the question which came first, the chicken or the egg, right? But, and that may actually have an answer to it, that question, by the way. The ninth book of wisdom is answered, in a way. But, in here, there's no, what? Saying which came first, right? Which came first, moving some distance, or could it have moved some distance? Well, if you take the same distance, but... Yeah. Yeah. So, when you're moving some distance, you've already moved some distance, and before you move some distance, you're moving some distance. And so, neither one comes, what? First, first, huh? Very strange reality, isn't it? Emotional? Neither one being the having moved and the moving. Neither one is first. Yeah. And the two being moving and having moved. Yeah. Or changing and has changed, huh? Now, is that true about thinking? No. Thinking is going to be more like numbers, right? Okay. Okay. You can see that even in numbers, right? That there's a next number after two, right? Which is three, huh? There's nothing between two and three. Contrary to modern mathematicians. There's nothing between two and three, huh? Okay. Because the one is even simpler than the point, right? So, just as there's nothing between two and three points, huh? Even more so, there's nothing between two and three points. So, there's nothing between two and three points. So, there's nothing between two and three points. So, there's nothing between two and three points. So, there's nothing between two and three points. So, there's nothing between two and three points. So there's a next one, right? And if you're going up, as it were, the numbers, right? There's a next number, right? There's a first number you come to after two, which is three. And the first number you come to after three, which is four, right? But because it continues to be divisible forever, there's never a first but length, right? Okay? And if you wanted to, you know, you could put lines like numbers in order of the links, right? You know, you could say, okay, something like that, right? But there's another line in between these two, right? Okay? So what is the next longest line? So after this, huh? What if you could add a point to this, and that's the next longest line, but the point, what, adds them, right? What was it, see, I guess one of those guys who said that the point is nothing, right? Because you add a point to a line, the line is no longer, right? Therefore, a point can't be anything, right? And, but that's kind of assuming that what is, is something, what, continuous, right? Oh, yeah. Exactly. A point is in some way, huh? But it's not continuous, huh? Yeah. That's why Thomas, and I told you how Thomas uses that when he's speaking of the goodness of the creature, the goodness of God, huh? He's saying, you know, that the, the goodness of God is to the goodness creature, something like a line is to a, what, point, huh? So the point adds to the line is no more than the point at all. So the goodness of the creature added to God is no more than, what, the goodness of God. That's kind of going to help our mind to understand, right? Because if the goodness of the creature added to the goodness of God was something, made of something better, right? Then there'd be something better than God, right? And he'd be like a, and a part of this whole goodness, right? And that's things I understand, huh? So the goodness of God, and you can argue what, you know, God is kind of morally obligated to create us because it was better that the creature be in addition to himself, right? See? Once you realize that the creature added to God, if you can speak of it, added to God, right? There's no more than God alone, right? Then you realize that God would know even more obligation, you might say, you know, to create us in order to make something better than himself alone, right? See? And then you realize how gratuitous, huh? God's creating us is, right? Thomas would quote, you know, he had a senator there, a philosopher, you know, he says, God alone is liberal, right? He gets nothing out of what? He's so generous, right? You know? You know, it's pretty gratuitous in God's part, huh? Absolutely gratuitous, huh? It's amazing things in Havana. I think I mentioned the other way Thomas shows that, huh? Where he says that the creature partakes of the divine goodness, right? And just as Socrates and the arm of Socrates are no more than Socrates. So God partakes of God is no more than God alone, right? Okay. Well, let's say, even in heaven there is, what, kind of awe of God, right, huh? Kind of a filial fear, I suppose, of God, right, huh? So you realize how, how, what, utterly gratuitous it was that he created us, huh? Kind of an amazing thing to think of that. How superfluous we are. Not from our point of view, exactly, you know. But from the true point of view, right? You know? This whole thing with the moving and the changing and so having moved, you would have already moved, this all seems to be a property of the continuous and infinity. Because if it were possible that that weren't so, then you wouldn't have something continuous. Right, right. Continuous is something which is divisible forever, right? Something that is not indivisible, something that is not composed of indivisibles, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? The same way if you start, you know, on a line, you see the hell you have a line there, right? If you start there, what's the first length on the line? No. So before every length, there's another length, right? And since the end of a length is a point, before every length, there's a point. But since that point can't be linked to the original point, before every point, there's a length. So that's the analogous to what you have in motion, right? See? Because motion is like length, there's something continuous, and has moved is like a, what, point, right? It's the end of a motion, and it's a, it's indivisible, right? It's a limit, yeah? Now, you, when you say that there is no first length of something moved, but there is a first position from which it moved. There's no length, but there's a point. It goes, there's a length. You can say that, I suppose, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But now we're in time of motion, right? There's no first distance it goes, huh? Correct. And, uh... But there is a first point from where it begins. Yeah. So what's the mystery of that? I mean, why do, it's like the human mind creates this... Not creating it, but that's the way the thing is. That's the way the thing is. That's it. And, uh... Uh... This is not the way thought is, right? Right, huh? Mm-hmm. But, again, this is important to understand because later on we contrast it, right? With thinking, but also later on we reason from this to a thing that's not moving itself, huh? The thing... The motion can't belong to a thing first through itself. There's no motion that belongs to it first. Yeah. See? So it's always kind of from the outside that it has motion. It's kind of a strange reality, huh? We'll look at the arguments there. Thomas will... You know, we'll look maybe at the Summa Concentilis where he summarizes, you know, the arguments for the unmoved mover in books 7 and 8, right? But basing itself upon both the definition of motion in book 3 and on book 6, right? Both ways he'll do that, huh? In the Summa Concentilis it's more complete there. The Summa Theologiae is much more contracted there about the argument for motion, right? The Summa Concentilis has two different arguments in many ways of showing the different premises, you know? So it's kind of a summary of books 7 and 8 but based on 6 and 3. But it's even more contracted you might say in the later work the Summa Theologiae, huh? Now, one thing in reading Thomas is you go through the works of Thomas. I don't think there's really that much of a, what, development of the teaching in the sense that he's teaching something new that hasn't taught before so much. but sometimes something is more explicit in earlier work than in the later work although something else may be made more explicit in the later work because he takes up certain questions that he didn't take up in the earlier work, huh? But I've kind of discovered that, huh? In reading Thomas, huh? So, you've been really taught that one example, you know, when I was first thinking about order, right? And I had come to the conclusion that order means, what, before and after, right, in general, huh? And then I was reading Thomas, I think it was in the Questionis Disputate where he takes up the Trinity and so on, right? Okay? And Augustine says in there that there is a, what? In the Trinity, Augustine says, There is an order of nature in which this is from that, but not an order in which this is before that. But not an order in which this is before that. Now, if you look at the collection of the creeds, you know what they have in the Enchiridians and so on, you'll see in what's called the Creed of Athanasius, the Athanasian Creed, which is a great authority, it's very explicitly said there's no before and after in God. Now, when I first saw this text in the De Potencia, which is a fairly legal work of times, I said, oh gee, maybe I misunderstood. Maybe before and after is not the definition of order in general, but it is one kind of order, right? Okay, see? So, looking at this text of Thomas, you know, you could think that, right? Yeah. You see? It's not this kind of order, but it's that kind of order, right? And I didn't have a copy, you know, in fact, you couldn't get the sentences out of print, right? That Thomas was commenting on the sentences at that time, right? Uh-huh. And years later, I got the third and fourth volumes, you know, and finally, you know, one of these outfits that, you know, collects old books from seminaries and other places, you know, all of a sudden, it appeared and I quickly got it, you know, okay? But before that, you know, I was up at the wall there, my friend had a copy of the sentences, so I was reading these things, you know, on the Trinity from the sentences. And there, Thomas is much more explicit, right? Oh, I see. And there he says that the genus, you get it by saying the first thing involved in order is distinction, right? And then he said, well, distinction is not really the definition of order, it's presupposed to order, right? Okay? So, that's the first thing he points out, distinction is presupposed to order. Then he says the genus of order is what? Before and after, see? But then you have, what, differences, right? Okay? One of which would be if I, what, generate my son, right? I am what? Before him, right, huh? Okay? In one way, right, huh? See? So, we have particular differences there, right, huh? Okay? And then he said, when we apply the word order to God, we keep one of the differences and drop the what? Genius, right? Okay? Now, I was prepared to understand this text because of, you know, Father Belay among other people, right? And Father Belay was often pointing out, not in the back of this particular text, but how Thomas will sometimes say, when a word like, say, scientia, is carried over from the creature to God, you drop the genus, but keep the, what? Difference, right? Okay? So, for example, you might say that science is a habit of demonstrating, right? Okay? Now, in God, you have no habits, you have to demonstrate, right? Okay? But demonstration is a syllogism making us know the cause, and that it is the cause, and it cannot be otherwise, right? Well, God has no need of a syllogism to make known something, right, to him? Okay? So, all that generic idea, right, that's a habit, or demonstration, making known, now, that's all. But the last part, knowing the cause, and that it is the cause, like otherwise, yes. You see? Okay? And, of course, as Aristotle teaches us, genus is taken from matter, right, and difference from form, right? Okay? That the genus, in a way, is to be difference in the things we know, as matter is to form, very clearly. So, just as the matter can be, what, form in various ways, right? So, the genus, by the differences, can be determined in various ways, huh? So, the genus of man is animal, which is taken away as more material than man, and the difference would be rational, or has reason, right? Okay? Well, of course, matter is to form, I'll put this more clearly there now. You say that the genus comes to the differences, as matter is to form. Well, matter is to form, as what? Ability is to act, right? Well, God, of course, is what? Pure act. So, anything that pertains to matter, or to even the ability to be actualized in some way, has to be denied of God, right? Okay? But what is more formal or actual, if you understand it, without this imperfection, then, can be carried over and applied to God by a certain likeness, huh? Okay? So, I was very familiar with that thing. It comes up a lot in other texts of Thomas, huh? So, for example, you apply the various virtues to God, and you say, you know, that God is just, right? Well, you drop the genus, which is habit. Everything is purely actual, God's. It's in there in the form of an act, rather than in terms of a habit, huh? And that's one way they understand the Psalms, when it says God doesn't sleep, right? Because sleep is analogous to a habit, right, rather than to the act. So, I was quite familiar with that teaching there, especially the ways that turn into our heads all the time. So, when Thomas explains more fully the doctrine here about order, right, he explains that you're dropping the genus, right? There's no before and after of God, but you're keeping, what, the difference, or one of the differences, right? Okay, and that's, if you look at this text, without having this full explanation of it, you might think that there are two, what, kinds of order, right? Right, right. You see? You know, one order is before and after, and the other is this from that, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah? The order of one thing from another, right? No, no. See, but Thomas is not as explicit there. Even though in other things, the De Potentia, right, that he hasn't explained before, he's more explicit about them. Like, for example, in one of the questions there of the De Potentia, he had the most complete explanation of the kinds of relation that there's in, for Thomas, apparently. You see? So, though he's talked about relations before, he never talked as explicitly about relations as he has in this question of the De Potentia, right? But something else he's very explicit about, he's, what, more contracted in, later on, see? And I find that myself, even as a teacher, but even more so as one who's writing or speaking about something, you know? If I've gone into something, you know, at some length before, right, then later on I kind of, what, assume that in a kind of a summary form, right? And maybe develop something new that I hadn't seen before, I worked on before, right, you see? Which is fine for me, but for the student who hasn't maybe seen the earlier, more explicit treatment of something, right? It could be, what, stultifying or even, you know, they could misunderstand a bit what I'm doing, you know? Okay? But I think that's a common thing in Thomas, maybe other authors too to some extent, but I mean, I think you have to take that into account, huh? Can I ask again, then, in the first definition, when we say order of nature in which this is from that, then what is that? So we've dropped the genus because we're talking about this in reference to the Trinity. So the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy, you know, God from God, light from light, true God and true God, right? And the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, that's from one beginning, huh? Okay. And now, is this, this is a difference, then, that which is from... No. No.