Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 94: The First Way: Motion and the Unmoved Mover

Transcript
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No, but what is not obvious is obvious, right? Those who are trying to prove the existence of nature, make a reverse mistake, of thinking that what is obvious is what? Not obvious, right? Aristotle says that's laughable, because if you try to prove the obvious, they're going to prove it by it. But what is not obvious, that's obviously putting the less known or the unknown before the known. So that's one extreme you might say, right? Now the other, this is saying it's so well known, in other words, you don't have to prove it at all. Now the other error is to say, it's so unknown, that you can't even what? Prove it, right? It's not what? Demonstrable. You see how those two are two kind of extreme mistakes, right? And the truth lies in the middle, between those two, right? It's neither obvious, nor what? Unknowable, right? But it's knowable by what? Demonstration, right? But by the demonstration that we call, what? The lack of demonstration, quia, as opposed to the demonstration, popular quid. Not the demonstration that goes in cause to effect, right? It does reverse from effect to cause, huh? And this is taught in the Postal Analytics, both kinds of demonstration, huh? So Thomas, we refer back to logic, right, huh? So, I say, both sumas then, he rejects these two mistakes, and then he proceeds to demonstrate that God is, right? Okay? Now, the Catholic Church there, in the First Vatican Council, right, said that it can be demonstrated, right? This is of God, right? And they quote St. Paul to that effect, right? Okay? But also authoritatively defined the text of Paul, right? From Romans, chapter 1, verse 20, huh? The invisible things of God, right? He's talking about the philosophers, right? We're made known through the visible things, and so on. So, that's a key text, you know, the chapter 1, verse 20 there, St. Paul. So, I mention that because you have some people running around, even Catholic colleges, who will deny if you can demonstrate that God is, right? So, they're always making their own mistakes, right? Okay. Vita, you know, the German poet I quoted to before, you know, he compared the wise man, you know, to a man swimming up the river or lake, you know, separating what? The two from the falls? You know, the two from the falls separated the two. And as he goes on, they what? Come back together. Come back together. Beautiful. Beautiful description of history, right? So, Thomas goes up, you know, separating the true from the falls, right? Right. You know? And some, and the truth, and separate from the falsehoods, but then, you know, everybody comes back, and back together again. Same mistakes. How would you distinguish that first view from what you were saying before about everyone, you know, the full kid? What? How would you distinguish that first position about the existence of God as obvious from what you were saying that in some ways it's naturally known? Yeah. Well, that's a hard thing to do. Um, that's why I used the word think there, you know? You know? You know? Because it's not altogether clear what you mean by God, right? Okay? That's why I say the Greek philosophers, you know, thought there was a God, right, who had providence, you know? They might have had some, some, uh, very hazy notions about what God is, right? Okay? So it's the kind of imperfect knowledge of God, huh? That they have, huh? You know? Except my mother had, she's a little girl. God can hold you with this little finger. Oh, he just got you, you know? You know? You know? You don't know who those are being worried. Faith, right? He's the notion of God, huh? Okay? Let's see. I just mentioned that a little bit because it comes up before this, huh? But it's interesting the way men will go to these opposite, what? Extremes, huh? And, you know, if the whole truth was here, why would anybody think this, huh? If it's obvious, why would somebody think it's unknowable? Right? If that was really true. And vice versa, if something was really unknowable, why would someone think it's obvious? Yeah. Doesn't make any sense, does it? Huh. You know? You know, a lot of times when you're talking about the two central mysteries of the Catholic faith, huh? This is very clear. The truth is in between two extremes, huh? And the first central mystery is to that, the Trinity, right? And the truth about the Trinity is that there's one nature with three persons, right? And there are two heresies, right? One that says there's, as there's one nature, there's one person. And that was what? Sebelius. Sebelius, yeah. Okay. The other heresy would be to say that as there are three persons, there are three natures, like Arius would say, huh? Now, if the truth is that there's one person and one nature, why should anybody think there's three persons and three natures? Uh-huh. You know? There'd be no basis of truth in the truth. See? There'd be no part of truth in the biblical law. On the other hand, if it's true that there are three natures and three persons, right, then no unity either. Why should anybody think there's just one nature and one person? You know? You can't explain why they should have thought that, right? But if the truth is, as it is, that there's one nature, but three persons, then this has an element of truth. There is one nature. This is an element of truth. There are three persons, right? See? And you can see how they can be misled, right? The one, because they realize there's one nature, and they want to hold on to that, but that makes them think they must just own one person. And then the other, thinking there's three persons, they must keep three natures in. You know? You see? So you can explain, in a sense, the two errors by the truth. Because men err, because they see some part of the truth, but not the whole truth, huh? I think folks, if I haven't seen the whole list, the great philosopher Empedicty says, right, huh? Okay. Now, it's the same thing with Incarnation, except that they're just reversed, right? In Incarnation, you have unity of person now, but a multiplicity of nature, but two natures. Okay? So you have, you know, the monophysites, you say there's what? There's one person, so there's one, what? Nature, right? Nature. And then you have Nestorius, right? She shouldn't be called the mother of God, he said, right? Okay? And so there's two persons, and two, what? Nature's, right? Well, neither of those positions explains how that one could arise. But if the truth is, as it is, that there's one person with two natures, right? And there's an element of truth here, and there's an element of truth here. There are two natures. There is one person, right? Okay? But the two false positions each have a part of the truth, right? Okay? Okay. So in a way, these two positions, one is saying, it's so noble, it doesn't have to be demonstrated. Yeah. The other is, it's not noble anyway, right? It's just a matter of belief, right? It's not a matter of... The truth is, it can be known by a demonstration, right? So it's a moment of truth if it's known in some way, right? It's a moment of truth here that's not what, obvious, right? It's not fully or perfectly known, right? So, truth often lies in the middle, right? I don't know, it seems sometimes it's said that St. Thomas is not presenting demonstrations, but like converging probabilities, or even the way the Catechism put it was kind of, kind of, she had the text with me, but it sounded kind of curious how it was put, sort of like, I don't know if I anything remembers, but it, I don't know if you're familiar with that one. I thought it was a text again to see what you're referring to. Because the fundamental text is the one in the First Vatican Council, right? Sure, yeah. That's the same expression of that. Because that's referred back to again in the Catechism, I'm sure. Oh, yeah. I just remember they made a reference to these proofs, and then it said something like, I expressed it. But, you know, there does seem to be, I've heard it in other places, it was sort of a misunderstanding or a lack of clarity of exactly demonstration. Well, it's just like we were saying when we were showing that nature acts for an end. Remember that? You know? And you take Aristotle's first two arguments, which I sometimes take together, right? But the one says, you know, that nature produces the good in the parts of animals and plants, in the order of parts that's good, almost all the time, right? And if it was producing that good in order, by chance, it would happen very, what? Rarely. Rarely, right? Okay. But that's an argument all by itself. It can stand by itself, right? Then you have the second argument that says nature produces the good in animals and plants, starting with the definite beginning, a seed or a fertilized egg, something like that, and going through an ordered number of steps, such as to result in that good plant or animal, right? And that, again, is contrary to its producing the good by chance. When you go through a definite series of steps, such as to lead to that, because that's by chance, right? Aristotle compares it to what you do in art there, where, you know, if I follow the recipe for lemmerang pie, and I say, guess what I got? Lemmerang pie! It wasn't a chocolate cream pie, it was a lemmerang pie! What do you expect? You're following the recipe, right? But notice, the two of them together are even, what, stronger, right, huh? You know? So, I mean, those aren't opposed to say that they're separate arguments, but get together, right? It's even more convincing, right? Okay. So, he says, Having shown that it is not vain to attempt to demonstrate God to be, let us proceed now to laying down the reasons by which both the philosophers, right, as well as the Catholic teachers prove God to be, right? Okay. And first, let us lay down the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to proving God to be, right? Who intends to prove this from the part of, on the part of motion, in two ways, huh? Do all these ways, right? Okay. So, they call these the five ways, the five, what? Five roads, right? All roads lead to Rome, huh? All these roads lead to God, right, huh? Okay. I've always thought the number five was my number, you know, I don't know why I've been attached to that number all my life, number five. I don't know whether Duane has five letters, and that's all I got as a kid. I don't know why, but, you know, that's my Pythagorean number, right? Okay. Now he's going to give the first of these two ways, right? Of which the first is such. Everything that is moved or is in motion is moved by, what? Another, right? But it is clear by the senses, right, that something is moved. As, for example, the, what? Sun, huh? Or something moves, maybe the sun. Therefore, it is moved by, what? Another moving it, right? Okay. Now, either that mover itself is moved or not, right? Okay. And you've got to understand this in a very precise way. He means either it moves, the sun, by being moved itself, right? Or in so far as it's being moved itself by something else, or not, right? Okay? It's got to be one or the other. Could you also read that as saying either the moving thing, the mover, is moving, or it's not? Well, it's involved, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But he's understanding the fact that, he's not talking about, my father generated me, right? I generated my son, right? My son generates his son, right? And this goes down. He's not talking about that kind of a order of movers and makers, right? Yes. Right? Because I didn't generate my son being generated at the same time by my father, right? See? Okay. He's thinking of, you know, like, now, say, where I'm using this glass to push that paper, right? So that this glass is, what? Moving the paper insofar as it's being moved itself. It's that kind of a thing he's talking about, right? Okay? Where you're moving another insofar as you're being moved your, what? Yourself by another, right? Okay? Do you see that? A lot of people must understand that. He's not attempting to exclude the idea of, what? Of a series where I had a father, and he had a father, and that goes back forever. He's not rejecting that, huh? Okay? Now, if you say that the mover here is not moved by another, then you're saying there's an unmoved mover, right? And this is what we call God. If ever it is moved, therefore by another moving it is moved, huh? Either this goes on forever, he says, or else one comes to some, what? Unmoved mover. But one cannot go on forever, he says. Now, sometimes, you know, people take that out of context, right? And say, you know, Thomas or Aristotle or something like that, is rejecting the idea of an infant series to not. Because they say that, hey, what? We just saw that the line is divisible, what? Unmoved mover. Yeah, yeah. See, that's the fullest thing go on forever. If you take that, you know, in the, what? Out of context here, right? Okay? Particular series, he's saying that doesn't go on forever, right? Okay. Okay? I would say, you know, when you divide the continuous, you get a larger number, don't you? So, if it continues to be divisible forever, the numbers can, what? Go on forever, right? So, you start with one, which is, we initiated, no, it's not a number. Then you divide the line, and then you get the first number, two, right? Okay. Now, you divide the half, and you get the number, three, right? Well, since this is divisible forever, mathematical line at least, then the number of lines can increase forever, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, is he denying that proceeding forever? No. No. See? So, some people, you know, quote Thomas out of context there. Uh-huh. You know, what kind of infant, right? Series, huh? Yeah. But he and Aristotle, they both talk about this, infinity, and they admit it, right? That potential infinity, right? Okay. But it's this series now, right? Where, um, you're saying that, what, every mover is a moved mover. So, before every moved mover, there's another mover, right? And so on forever, right? Mm-hmm. All at the same time, right, huh? Okay. Quite a violation of the principle of simplicity, right? Right? Right? infinity of movers to move anything tell that to the uh the movers right you might say living you know moving they call movers right you know transporting furniture right but to move anything you're going to have to have infinity of movers right and he's going to deny that right okay now it says here um movements immobile um which i would have translated as unmoved mover but um unmoving mover yeah but a mover that moves without being moved itself is what you mean at first right okay but as he was saying in a sense that's going to be developed more fully later on that you have a mover that's completely what free of any kind of what motion or change right not only in exercising this one particular thing right in that sense it's made more explicit as you go on later on right it's unable and it's immobile yeah unable to be moved yeah yeah yeah yeah but you see that more fully later on right see what you're seeing at first is that there's a mover that is what moving other things not through being moved itself right okay but as you see later on he takes up as part of the substance of god it's more explicit as i see in the summa there that the first that mover is completely what immobile right yeah okay but your first coming to it is the idea that that he's moving other things not being being being moved himself right okay okay just that word it means the movator you know could mean moved yeah or moving in latin right they don't have yeah yeah different word yeah if i say well i'll try to say it you don't i don't think you have to uh come to a full understanding of the immobility of the first mover right at this point yet right okay okay therefore it's necessary to lay down to posit that there is some first mover that is itself but immobile right huh maybe anymore right about it then now notice that's the main argument right huh if you accept that there are things in motion right which is clear to our senses on contrary to permenities right okay and uh it's not to prove that right that's obvious to our senses but you accept the premise that whatever is in motion is being moved by another right and that other either is what not being moved itself right or if it is eventually it depends upon something that moves without being moved itself right it can't go on forever then you're forced to conclusion right that there's an unmoved mover right which would be the first mover okay but now he says there are two premises there that need to be what backed up right okay the argument i was trying to figure out the form of the syllogism i found it a little bit hard sometimes this is basically an either or well that the one part there is yeah yeah but the main one would be the main well if you take that part there's probably more than one syllogism there right now he's saying either the mover is unmoved right or it's moved right and if you admit the first possibility you've already admitted it's an unmoved mover right if you make the second one either it what goes on forever or you come to an unmoved mover right yeah yeah and he excludes that possibility that goes on forever right therefore you must come to an unmoved mover eventually okay but in a sense that that second part is set up from the first part that's probably the order right you have to first of all see that what is in motion is moved by something right okay now you got a mover right now is that mover an unmoved mover or is it a mood mover i guess one or the other exhaust the possibility so if you take one makes life easy for me it's a move unmoved mover with your eye right okay and take the more difficult case right that itself is a is what be moved right in order to move you then we say well okay can that go on forever right no therefore in any other case you're going to come eventually to play what yeah sooner or later what is in motion what is in motion is in motion because of a what unmoved mover okay okay okay now notice huh um you know formal logic as we called sometimes it's not the chief difficulty in reasoning right i mean some people don't understand the form of an argument right and uh like we're saying in the in the either argument right i mean excuse me the is the argument some people don't realize that you can reason from a if-then statement by affirming the antecedent right and therefore affirming the consequent or by denying the consequent and therefore denying the antecedent but you can't reason formally from denying the antecedent to denying the consequent or from affirming the consequent to affirming okay okay but that can be learned you know without too much difficulty right the chief difficulty is in the matter right right you know when the statements are true or false or this is very probable and so on right huh okay and um again you set up an argument right where is the the chief glory right huh you know you may not be in what we call the chief syllogism right you know you take this um this uh theorem six here which i like because in logic i would take this theorem you know number uh six here in book one where he's arguing kind of a verse of five he's saying if these two angles are equal then these two what things are equal yeah yeah okay now what's the main syllogism to prove that they must be equal okay well it's not where the where the main difficulty is right or or the main discovery you might say is right or the great subtlety is right right right the main argument is a what yeah yeah yeah he says either they are equal those two lines when these two angles are equal right or they are unequal okay or they are unequal okay or they are unequal and then he's going to show but they can't be unequal it's going back to five now but they cannot be unequal now formally this is very simple right there's really only two possibilities they're either equal to these straight lines or they're unequal any other possibility and you got to see the truth of that right okay now if you can show that they cannot be unequal then obviously they are what equal yeah therefore they're equal and all that is very simple right but the real art or reach you might say the proof is how do you show that they can't be what unequal right okay then there the thing is that involves the construction of other things right that if one of these lines is longer than the other which you have to be if they're unequal you could by the the earlier theorem and say this it makes a difference if one is longer let's say this left one is longer you can always cut off the longer one a line equal to the what and shorter and so now they've done it right then you draw a line from there to there okay then you could argue what you've got that that whole angle uh that's cut this whole is equal to the other side and also the smaller angle is equal to the other side yeah first because of uh your premises and six second because of five well what's what you've got here is is the idea that if you have two triangles with equal angles right and equal sides see this side this side right here is equal to that side by construction and this side is common so this triangle here this triangle excuse me this triangle here they have equal angles right contained by equal sides right therefore by number four um they are equal triangles right okay now there you have a regular syllogism right whatever it's called a syllogism period right yeah these two triangles are triangles having an equal angle contained equal sides triangles having an equal angle contained equal sides are equal therefore these two triangles equal okay um but notice huh that's absurd isn't it okay but that follows from saying what the two sides could be unequal yeah yeah so if they are unequal then it follows ultimately that the part is equal to the whole the lesser to the greater is you can say right okay but that can't be okay but the social disobedience is in a sense to back up the if then statement right if they are unequal then it's going to follow that the part is equal to the whole it can make it make them a couple steps you want it to right you know if they are unequal you could cut off the longer one etc right if you're going to get two triangles therefore you're going to get equal to triangles therefore you're going to get the parking equal to the whole obviously greater right so it uses all three ones right but this is not the great this first main syllogism is not for the great difficulty is right okay but still formally speaking that's more fundamental or closer to your your ultimate conclusion right then then the if-then syllogism right right okay so here in a sense you're saying what either the mover is unmoved or the mover is moved right and if you take the first one then you're you're granting me but the conclusion is right see so only if you want to avoid the conclusion you have to take the other one right but then the question is does this go on forever or become eventually to an unmoved mover right and he's going to argue well if um eventually comes on that's what i wanted to prove right if it doesn't it goes on forever but can that be so no right okay so really you have to back up a couple of premises here right and so the third or next i get them broken down my text here he says in this proof there are two propositions to be proved one is that everything moved everything in motion is moved by another right okay and that was towards the beginning of the argument and that in movers and moved one cannot go on forever right okay okay now he gets the same proof in the summa theologiae he's going to give in the summa theologiae a reason for both of them right right but here he's going to give what three ways of proving what both of them right okay so he says of which the first the philosopher proves in what three ways huh now who's the philosopher star star star student yeah yeah i know she called him aristotle up above and he's going through that aristotle's proof right but rather than say aristotle again he calls him the what philosopher right and i suppose in english because we have the article we can make it more explicit right call him the philosopher but they capitalize it because this is an example of what figure of speech then what antona messiah yeah antona messiah means you're giving the what yeah the universal the name of the universal to the particular or vice versa right they call them both antona messiah so if i say he's a romeo or he's a don juan uh then i'm what that's considered antona messiah too okay but i usually contrast because they're very close together antona messiah and synecdoche right and antona messiah is based upon um the universal whole in its part and synecdoche is based on what composed whole in its part right so in saint john says and the word was made flesh right flesh there is a synecdoche for man human okay but our very word incarnation you know it's taken almost like from the very words of saint john right but some people misunderstood that synecdoche right and so arius i guess it was said that the word was in place of the soul he didn't take out a human soul but he had you know flesh and in place of the soul he had the logos right you know yeah but that's a synecdoche but that's dealing with a a what composed whole right so science scripture referred to us as is you know souls sometimes it's what bodies to you all flesh must come right speaking to god right and it's for some reason you want to emphasize that part you know he's a brain right oh no he's a human being not a brain which one emphasized that part right see he's all heart and she's all heart right you know one emphasized the heart you know um for some reason that part stands out right now okay brother mark is going to get married he says he's turning to me he said i was driving up here there there's a case there was somebody shot the priest you know we've been abused by the priest that's on the radio on the way up so i suppose i'll be over the spikes or the paper tomorrow you know but uh it goes on what i didn't forget you're far away i know where it was but uh it was good news on the way up or the bad news so it goes on on on yeah um so i told me see you know sometimes you want to indicate the excellence of that particular among those who have the what come under the general right so we speak of the the white house right that's uh being the house of the president that's stands out among all white houses in this country right um christ is named by antonio messiah the bible is named by antonio messiah right okay but sometimes somebody you know who hesitates to act we call him a hamlet right say or the lover we call but a romeo or don juan or casanova or some other famous one right okay saint thomas notes how how saint paul and saint peter are called the apostles by antonio messiah any other apostles don't call themselves so much an apostle there when they sign their epistles but but thomas will usually refer to saint paul a lot of times by antonio messiah as the apostle as the apostle says you'll see that a lot yeah we're referring to as we're studying the sacred page would that then be by synecdoche no no that would be the whole of a composed whole no they're not going to call sacra scriptura right sacred scripture right and in a way you know the writings of the saints are sacred too aren't they in some way but not the sacred page yeah oh oh yeah okay that would be synecdoche yeah if you call a page of the book yeah yeah yeah yeah So these figures of speech, we use them in daily life all the time. We don't know the name for them, but it's a fairly common thing to do this all the time. You're always running into an example. You don't even have to talk and think about it, right? But Peter and Paul, you see that in Rome, especially the importance of Peter and Paul, sometimes some churches that come in, like St. Paul's downtown, Peter and Paul, right? In Rome, Peter and Paul kind of emphasize there, right? The church has kind of, what, a couple of them, right? I was married on the Feast of Peter and Paul there on June 29th, huh? You know, very orthodox, you see. You notice the Gospels are named by Antonia Messiah, right? You mean the good news, right, huh? Oh, yeah. Yeah, well, there's a lot of good news besides the Gospels, but this is the good news, right? This is really good news, you see? So, it's very common, very common. What's the apocalypse, huh? That really seems to be a revelation, right? The last things, huh? Things that are hidden from us, huh? Names that Christ has given by Isaiah's wonderful, is that one of the names? Oh, yeah. Miracle might be part of Antonia Messiah, too, a miracle. It's filled with wonder, right? Of which the first of these propositions, the philosopher now, proves in three ways, huh? Now, the first is thus. Now, this one is going to be based on the, what, sixth book, right? If something moves itself, right, it is necessary that it have in itself the beginning or source of its own, what, motion, right? Otherwise, manifestly, it's moved by another, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? That's very obvious. The second part is a more difficult thing to understand, huh? It is also necessary that it be the, what? First. First moved, right? Now, why is that necessary, huh? See, if something is the cause for itself of something, right, if something is responsible for something belonging to it, right, why must that belong to it, what, first? If it wasn't first, it would be because of a part of it. Yeah, or because of something else, right? Right? Does it belong to the emotions to be reasonable first? No. Okay? To it, he says, that it be moved by reason of itself and not by reason of its part, huh? Just as the animal is moved by the motion of the foot, right? For thus, he says, the whole would not be moved by itself, but its part, right? And one part by another. Okay? Now, the third thing, huh? It is necessary also that the thing in motion be, what, divisible, right, and have parts, because everything that is moved is, what, divisible, right, as is proved in the sixth book of the physics, huh? Sixth book of natural here. Okay? So here he's explicitly basing himself in the sixth book of the physics, huh? It's in the beginning of book seven that Aristotle starts to develop this argument, right? But it's based directly upon the book six that's come before, and later on he goes back to book three and argues from the definition of motion, right? Okay? So it's motion in a strict sense, as St. Thompson said, that it does not change, like the mind changes. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So these things being supposed, he argues thus, what is posited or laid down to be moved by itself, right, is what is first moved, huh? So he's saying, now, if the part is at rest, right, of this divisible thing, which it must be divisible, right? If the part is at rest, he says, then the whole is what? Yeah. The whole is not in motion, right? For if one part being at rest, another part of it is moved, then the whole itself would not be what is first, what, in motion, but the part which is moved, the other one, what, being at rest, huh? But nothing that is at rest, when something else is at rest, is moved by itself, right? For that whose rest follows upon the rest of another, it is necessary that its motion, what, follows upon the motion of another, huh? And thus it is not moved by itself. Therefore, what is laid down to be moved by itself is then not being moved by itself, huh? It is necessary, therefore, that everything that is moved be moved by another, huh? Now, he's going to give an objection that comes in here from Avicenna, but before we look at that, huh, if I remember rightly in the seventh book, huh, when Thomas is taking this up, right, he's pointing out in a way that in many ways motion can never be the sort of thing that belongs first to the thing in motion, not only because the thing in motion is divisible, right, and therefore the motion of the whole depends upon the motion of the part, okay? So it depends upon something other than the whole, right? But also motion is the sort of thing that can never, what, first belong to you. Why? When are you first in motion? Is this when you're becoming, when you're changing, so you'd be both agent and patient? Well, no, see, that's going to come up later on, but when you, when something, when does motion first belong to a thing, right, see? Well, we saw that before some motion is, you have moved some distance already, remember that? Oh, and before you have moved, right, okay, so when is something first in motion, see? You know, like taking the most obvious kind of motion in place, you know, where is it first in motion? There isn't. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So motion is not the sort of thing that can belong first to a thing, is it? I don't know whether that's something, you know, in addition to this, right?