De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 9: Emotions, the Passions of the Soul, and Their Bodily Nature

Transcript
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Having existence, not just in the body. That's based upon something kind of obvious that you must be before you can do something, right? And so if you can be without something else, then you can do something without that, right? Or put it the other way around. If you can be not just in another, but you can be what? Yeah. Then you can do something not just in that other, but in yourself. I can think not only in this room. If I could think only in this room, then I'd want to make sure this room doesn't get destroyed because then I couldn't think anymore, right? And there'd be no reason to think that I could exist separately from this room, right? If I can't do anything except in this room. But most of the things that the living thing does clearly seem to involve the what? Body, right? And he goes into the question in particular of what they sometimes call the passions of the soul. Now I think that phrase down through history, which you find carried over directly into Latin, you know, the passion is anime, right? That's kind of misleading in some way because you might think you're talking about a passion that the soul has without the body, right? Okay. And the reason why they call it the passions of the soul is because it's passions that only bodies that have a soul have. Why the passions, passion actually comes from the what? Latin word and the Greek word is similar. It's another word for what? Undergoing, right? So there's some things that non-living bodies undergo as well as living bodies, huh? So you can heat my body, you can cool my body, but you can heat the water, you can cool the water, right? Okay, that's the bodily undergoing, let's say, right? But only a living body can undergo something like anger or fear or desire or something like that. A non-living body can undergo that. So that's what they call passions of the soul, but it's kind of, I think in some ways, misleading, but occasionally, so if you can mislead what you're saying. But it seems that all the passions of the soul are with the body. Anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving and hating. For the body suffers something with these, huh? He's going to start to manifest this a bit, huh? The following indicates this. Sometimes when forceful and manifest sufferings occur, nothing is provoked or feared. But sometimes one is moved by small and faint occurrences. Whenever the body's excited and is in a condition like that, it has when one is angry, huh? People remark about how sometimes people are set off by practically nothing, right? And this one, one of those instances where someone was remarking, he was watching this clerk, you know, who was dealing with the public there, railroad tickets, however it is, and he's being very patient with people coming in, you know, and changing their tickets or asking stupid questions and so on, right? He kind of admires the guy being so patient and calm with these people all this time. And finally, he gets up to the desk, you know, he decides to compliment the man on, you know, how patient he's been. And the man blows up. But, you know, sometimes, you know, you come in, you say something to somebody, you know, that all of a sudden they starve, you know, because their body has been, what, disposed, right, huh, to feel something, huh? And sometimes you feel, you know, sad or depressed or joyful or fearful, and you can't point to anything, right? That seems to be a sign that there's something, what, bodily there, right? Very much, huh? Moreover, this following case is more clear. For nothing fearful occurring, the passions of one being fearful come to be in those suffering. If things are so, it is clear that passions are in matter to count. That's the attempt there to render it to the Greek, right? Count would be logos, right? And it's a logos in matter, huh? Once the terms are such as, if you're going to define anger, anger is some motion of this sort of body or of a part or of a power from this for the sake of this, huh? Let's stop at the business a bit here, huh? What in Greek or in Latinx sometimes called the passions of the soul, in English we have, sometimes we use the word passionate, that maybe sometimes is a little too passionate, to name these. But you see, sometimes the word passion is used. But perhaps it's better in English to use the word emotion, which comes from the word for what? Motion, right? So I'm said to be moved to fear or moved to anger or moved to pity, right? Moved to sadness sometimes. Another word we use sometimes, but it's maybe not as precise, because there's other meanings, the word feelings, right? You've written my feelings here, both of them. Or I'm feeling sad, or I'm feeling, you know, I feel angry, or something like that. Although this word feeling there indicates a kind of connection there between the sense of what? Touch, which feeling can name, right? And the emotions, huh? Maybe because the emotions are in us, and the sense of touch is a sense of the what? Interior, right? Okay. Other senses seem to be kind of more turned out, right? But touch and taste to some extent, too, but especially touch is the sense of the interior, right? And maybe that points out some connection between the emotions and the what? Sensism. And Aristotle will bring this out when we get to the third book about the soul, that the emotions or the feelings follow in some way upon the senses. And that would be, in a sense, the difference between the emotions and what we call the will, right? Where the will follows upon our having reason. Understand that, huh? So the emotions are something that we share with the other what? Animals, huh? Now, the emotions of man can be more elevated in the emotions of the animals, right? But the other animals have anger and fear and hunger and thirst and so on. Okay? Or the will is something that we share with what? The angels and God, right? Strictly speaking, God and the angels don't have emotions, but they have will. So man being an animal with reason, right, animals defined by senses, man has these two groups of desire and powers that he'll talk about. But the emotions are more known to us than the, what, acts of the will. Okay? And what you find is that we take the names of emotions, sometimes, and carry them over and place them upon acts of the will. So... You're going to have to do it. You're going to have to do it. You're going to have to do it. You're going to have to do it. The word love, for example, right, can name an emotion, or it can name a, what, act of the will, huh, okay? And sometimes in Greek or in Latin you might have a somewhat different, what, name, right, for that love, huh? Like in Latin you see sometimes the word direxio, which comes, has the word for choice, huh, it shows in love, right? And here they might use amor, okay, okay, in Greek you have different words, maybe. If you look at C.S. Lewis' book there, the four laws, right, kind of the study of the four different words in Greek, you know. Like eros, which maybe names very much emotion, and agape, which is used to name the love and the will of someone. But, when you carry the names of the emotions over from, to the acts of the will, you're going to be keeping part of the meaning of the emotion, and you're going to be dropping part of the meaning of it. This is what you're pointing out here, emotions involve something bodily, and so it's very true, anger, you know, and fear, you know, that there's a bodily change, right? You ever had little kids in there, you know, and their big dog comes around, you know, and you get to feel a hum, hum, hum, hum, right? Okay? But the will, like the understanding, as we'll learn, because the will falls upon the understanding, the will is also immaterial. And so, the act of the will, that is given the name of emotion, it keeps the, what, formal aspect of emotion, like, for example, in the case of anger, there's a desire for revenge there, right? It keeps that formal aspect, but it drops the, what, bodily meaning, huh? But notice, it's very difficult for most people to distinguish between the love that is an emotion, and the love that is an act of the will, and the two may be present at the same time, and that's right. It's very hard for people to, to, to see a distinction between that, huh? Let's say the love of wisdom, where the philosopher is named, is that love an emotion? Because that wisdom is not something really that the, that the senses know. Of course, sometimes, if the will is moved, right, it can overflow into the emotions, right? And that can get people confused, too, right? Okay? And vice versa, the emotions can sometimes, you know, affect the will, right? You see? So, it's very hard for most people to separate these two, huh? But, the essential difference is that when the name of the emotion is carried over, it's the will. So, you keep the formal aspect, but dramatically, what, bodily aspect, huh? If you ever look at the, towards the end there, the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, when Thomas is talking about God, right? He wants to talk about the love of God and things of this sort, right? And you'll make this distinction that we make here. You point out how certain names of certain emotions are carried over and placed upon the acts of the will. Well, and he points out how you drop the bodily aspect, right? Okay? And then later on, some of these names are carried over and applied to God. But, as he goes through the emotions, he sees that the names of some emotions can never be carried over to God, properly speaking. Metaphorically, it can be said again. But, say, something like fear, right? Can there be any fear in God? See? Well, fear, first of all, it can't be the bodily aspect of fear. Thump, thump, thump, this guy doesn't have a heart to go thump, thump, thump. The other bodily parts, huh? But even the object, the formal aspect of fear, right? Fear is concerned with an evil that is difficult to avoid, huh? Was there any evil that's difficult for God to avoid? Can God and his divine nation out undergo anything bad? No. So there's nothing to fear. So there can't even be fear in its formal aspect, huh? But in the case of our will, there can be fear, right? So in Socrates, you see in Socrates, the fear of being, what? Mistaken, right? The fear of error, right? As my friend Warren Murray said about Monsignor Dion, right? His principal passion is fear. And, but he's thinking, you know, not so much of bodily fear, but of his fear of being, what? Mistaken, right? He used to joke, you know, I mean, if you propose something new, towards you, the honest twist reaction is to reject it. And you've got to be justified, right? So that fear of being mistaken about some universal question of philosophy, which you see in Socrates or Monsignor Dion, that fear is in the what? The will, right? One sabbatical, you know, semester sabbatical, you know, I spent studying the causes of error, right? And I kind of joked that after this semester, right, you know, I was like this friend, my brother Richards, who everyone got a medical degree and anyone got a, you know, psychology degree or something like that. And, of course, you look around at you and I and all those average people, you know, and he sees everybody just on the brink of going into one of these psychological disorders or sicknesses, right? And kind of funny to talk to him, you know, because they studied all the different ones. And, you know, he used to be joking, I was in college, you know, that you should take the course in abnormal psychology, because once you see in abnormal psychology, it's what we all have in a somewhat exaggerated form. And so you can kind of, what, see what these little things that we have are with us, our life, in a sense, huh? You see? But so how something like that, you get through with a special event, actually, you realize how easily the human mind is, what? Deceived. Deceived, right? And how many are the causes of it's being deceived, huh? And how difficult it is to avoid being deceived. As our scholars say later on, you know, this seems to be the usual condition, more or less the state they have. To be in error, right? And as Thomas says, we live longer in error, right? To do the truth, right? And so, we shouldn't fear in the will, right? It's not a bodily thing. But you realize that error is something bad. You know, Thomas says in the Summa Gentiles, when he's showing that perfect happiness is, of course, not found in this world, right? And he says that error is a magna pars miseria. That error is a great part of richness, right? And of course, everybody is, to some extent, what? Mistaken, right? So they can't avoid richness, huh? It's only when you see God face to face, huh? That your mind will be so strong, there's going to be no errors in your mind anymore. But in this life, there's always mistaken about something, rather. So, mistake is something bad. It's a great part of misery. And it's something, what? Difficult to avoid, right? And that's the object of fear. And evil, difficult to avoid, huh? Okay? But in the emotion of fear, in addition to that, there's this bodily thing that started going. It's emotion, right? Bodily change, huh? But you drop out that bodily change part of it, which is part of the definition of what fear really is, huh? As an emotion, when you carry the word fear over and apply it to the will, right? But, when you get to God, fear cannot be carried over properly at all. God, because not only does he not have the bodily aspect of it, but he doesn't have the formal aspect, right? There's nothing bad, difficult for God to avoid. God cannot suffer anything bad in his divine nature, right? So he can't have fear at all, right? Now, sometimes the names of some emotions that cannot be said properly in God, not only because of the bodily aspect, but because of the formal aspect, sometimes it can be said metaphorically in time. And the common example is when God is said to be what? Angry. Angry, right? Okay. But that's by certain what? Metaphorical likeness there, because the angry man, what? Punishes, right? And God, in his just will, right, punishes, right? Okay. But he doesn't really have anger. Anger arises from what? Sadness, right? It arises from you're undergoing something bad, right? That you're trying to get rid of, right? And so God can't really be sad, and therefore he can't be angry. But metaphorically, anger is said of God. But fear could not even be said metaphorically of God. It could be said metaphorically of God, right? There's no sadness in God, right? But the man who pities somebody, he, what? Tries to help that person or to relieve their misery richness, right? So God is said to what? God's will to what? Relieve our misery, right? It's metaphorically called pity. So you have the same word for pity there in the Aristotle's work in the tragedy there, right? Which you have in the curia lisa, lisa lisa. So the difference between the ones that can be said metaphorically and those that cannot? Yeah, you say, the name of no emotion can be said of God, or even our own will, as far as the bodily aspect of the emotion is concerned, right? Right. As regards the formal aspect of the emotion, the names of all the emotions really can be carried over to the acts of our will. Okay? But only some of those names can be carried over finally to God's will. But those that have further obvious something bad can then no way to carry over to God. And those that have ones like desire and hope cannot be properly in God. Because desire and hope, although they're for something good, they're for good not having, right? So God is good as itself. So there can't be desire or hope in God. Basically, when they distinguish the emotions, the Aristotle doesn't have to be considered. There is an emotion, but if you look at the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, or you look at the question on the passions of the soul in the De Veritata, right? Thomas will subdivide them into basically, what, 11 different emotions. Just touch upon it a bit. Plato and Aristotle have already distinguished them into two groups, huh? In Greek, one was epithumia, and the other was thumax, huh? And in Latin, they would translate these two kinds of emotions into the incupiscible emotions and the irascible emotions. But both kinds of emotions are named here from one that stands out, huh? Inrascible from anger and concupiscible from sense desire, right? Like hunger, thirst, and so on, right? Well, the concupiscible emotions arise in regard to what is pleasant or painful to the, what? Senses. And so, if something is pleasant to the senses, or something is painful or disagreeable, if it arises liking or loving, I'm going to just throw out my word, but basically the same thing, you like it, huh? I like licorice, huh? Or I like chocolate or something, right? Okay? Liking or loving. So, if it's painful, disagreeable to the senses, right? These are the words besides pleasure, painful, agreeable, disagreeable, right? Liver, I hate liver. I don't like to taste the liver, okay? And salmon, I don't like to taste the salmon. It doesn't agree with my senses, okay? So, that involves what? Loathing, hating, disliking, right? So, you have these two basic emotions, huh? Liking or disliking. Loving or hating. Okay? So, I love licorice. I hate liver, okay? But now, if I don't have what I like, then I have what? I want some licorice, right? Okay? There arises desire, to use a liking word, or wanting, right? So, desire or wanting is for what I like, but don't have. So, hunger and thirst are examples of desire or wanting, right? Okay? We don't have a common word. And the other one, sometimes use the word aversion, or turning away, right? But it would be the opposite of desire or wanting. So, I go to somebody's house, and they're serving salmon, though. I say, the version for this, I eat the stuff, okay? But now, desire or diversion is before the good is bad, or the bad is forced in, right? Okay? But now that I eat the salmon, it's going to be what? Sadness, right? Right. Okay? If you give me the licorice, which I like, or whatever it is, right? And now you have sensible joy, right? It sounds like I might say pleasure or pain, too. But, okay? So, these are the six emotions that they call the concubiscible emotions. But they arise in regard to the what? What is agreeable or disagreeable with the senses, huh? And the basic, you know, agreement or disagreement of the concubiscible appetite, as they call it, is liking or loving or hating or disliking, right? But they give rise to these two other emotions, each of them, right? One in the absence of the object and the other in the, what? Presence of the object, huh? Okay? Now, why is there this other group of emotions, which they call the irascible? Well, they arise because sometimes there is a difficulty, right? In regard to getting what is pleasant, right? Or holding on to what is pleasant, right? Or there is a difficulty in, what? Avoiding what is disappearable, right? Or in getting rid of what is disappearable, right? So, from desire, there can arise, when a good thing is desired but is difficult to get, right? Either there can arise hope, which is a movement to overcome the difficulties, right? Therefore, you estimate that you can overcome the difficulties, or else there arises, what? Despair. If you think you cannot, what? Overcome the difficulties, huh? Overcome the difficulties, right? Overcome the difficulties, right? Overcome the difficulties, right? Overcome the difficulties, right? Overcome the difficulties, right? Now, in the case of aversion, if you aren't too sure you can overcome or avoid the evil that's threatening you, then you feel something called what? Fear. It's the most natural one. But I think you know, you know, I can handle that guy, you know. Then you have to sit in what? Boldness, right? Confidence, right? It says they call it confidence, too, but sometimes confidence is equivocating. You used to hope, too. So you have two emotions that can arise from desire when the good desire is, what? Difficult, right? To obtain. But either hope or despair, upon whether you estimate you can overcome the difficulties or not, right? And two that arise from aversion for something bad that's difficult, right? Now, if the candy's there in front of me, right? Well, then I don't have difficulty reaching for and taking some, right? Okay. But the man is pursuing the young lady. He's not sure she's going to say yes. He's in hope, right? Or else maybe he's in what? Despair of getting that, right? Like the one who saw grapes, right? The fox desired the grapes, but they're up high and he tried and he tried and he couldn't get there, right? So eventually he, what? Despair, right? Now, there's something like that, you see, in the acts of the will. Because the will loves something that reason presents to it as good, right? But if it doesn't have that good, then it desires it, right? Like you might learn what wisdom is and you start to love what wisdom is, but you don't have wisdom, so you desire wisdom, right? But if that's something difficult to acquire wisdom, then you need something in addition to the desire for wisdom. You need the hope of achieving it, right? But if you get discouraged, you might start to, what? Discourages itself, a kind of despair of it, right? You go into despair, right? So, in that great dialogue with Phaedo, they want to know whether the human soul is immortal or not. But at one point they become, what? Discouraged, huh? And Socrates has to lead them back to hope before they can continue the discussion, huh? And so then I was seeing something the other day there. They're talking about English gardens, right? A lot of interesting gardens in England. One of these gardens has what they call a maze. A maze is, you know, it's like the most little thing you used to do with your pencil, you know? And, but it's said that the monastery started the idea of the mazes. Have you ever heard that before? No. And apparently, the purpose of the maze in the monastery was to give the monks, what? Two things, patience and perseverance, right? So you get down to that thing and you're trying to find your way through it, right? And you have to learn your patience, right? Because it takes a long time. You must have been very involved, huh? And then, and persistence, right? You need those qualities, huh? So, um, you need that, right? But then after he gets them, you know, restores their hope and so on, and then they start to have some initial successes and they get kind of bold and then Socrates says, whoa, whoa, whoa. Not going to be so easy to answer Sides as it was Silius, right? Knocks Silius down, bang, bang, three strikes these out. And so, um, you've got to expect time to balance people from fear. Now, if you're sad, right? Or in pain, right? But you think you can, what? Overcome the thing that's causing you sadness or pain, right? Then there could arise another emotion, anger, right? So you're stepping on my foot, right? I say, hey, you're stepping on my foot. And you say, so what? Well, then I get what? Anger, right, huh? Okay? I think I can, you know, shut you off, right? Okay? So, there are what? Basically, 11 emotions. Love and hate, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. These six emotions are called the concursable emotions. The great big, put them under epithelia. And then you have five emotions called the epithelial emotions. Named from this one here. It's just so manifest, huh? Okay? Two that arise or can arise in desire, right? When the good desire is difficult, right? Two that can arise in reversion. When the evil or bad that you're trying to avoid is somewhat difficult to avoid, huh? And one that arises from sadness, when you think you can overcome possibly what's causing this. But there's no one, of course, find anger with joy, because joy or pleasure, there is no difficult in that at all. So, in a sense, the irascible emotions there are to help, what? You can't make the incubusable objects, huh? So, R. Stavos says that the animals, they get what? They fight over food and sex, he says, right? Okay? You can do that sometimes, too, right? Okay? They fight over the girl, right? But, you know, they fear what's going to hurt their body, right? So, huh? Okay? Now, when you study the virtues and ethics, huh? You'll find out that there are certain virtues that are concerned with sickening emotions, huh? So, temperance, let's say, or moderation is concerned with these kind of emotions here. With hunger and thirst and sexual desire and so on. And mildness is concerned with this emotion here. And courage with these emotions down here. Magnanimity with this here. Okay? So, different things. Now, as I say, each of these emotions has a formal aspect, a logos, as Aristotle would say, right? But also, if it's an emotion, there's a bodily aspect to it, huh? Okay? So, hunger and thirst and sexual desire and anger and fear. There's something bodily going on that's involved in this emotion. But there's a formal aspect, huh? What the object is and whether it's good or bad. Whether you have it or don't have it and so on. Whether it's difficult or not. So, the names of these can be carried over to the will as far as the, what, formal aspect is concerned. But not the, what, bodily aspect, huh? And finally, some of these names can be carried over, as we said, even to God. As Thomas shows at the end of his first book of the Summa. But he'll say, you can't have anything bad in God, right? So, none of these emotions here, none of these names can be carried over to God, even as far as the formal aspect is concerned. Because nothing can really harm God, right? Okay? You can't undergo anything bad in his divine nature, huh? When God became man, then he could have emotions, right? He could have fear and anger and so on. But God couldn't have these, huh? Now, as far as the good is concerned, right? Well, there can be love in God, enjoy in God, but no desire, because desire is for a good you don't have. And so, likewise, there couldn't be really hope or despair in God that then presupposes a desire. But you can love something, whether you have it or don't have it. And you love it more when you have it, if it's good, than you did before. So, love and joy can be said properly in God, but as far as our formal aspect is concerned, not as far as the bodily aspect of it. But these ones that concern the bad cannot be said of God at all. So none of these. But sometimes, metaphorically, one of these can be said of God, like this is a metaphor for the divine justice, right? Here is that Psalm 94, which is at the beginning of the office of the day, right? I swore my anger, right? Meaning it's justice, right? They will not enter into my rest, and so on. But things like despair and fear, there is no way to say that God is even metaphorically. There is not really a life despair. You're saying in English, the two groups, concupisable and erasible, what do you say, the desiring and the angering? Well, sometimes I use the term sense-desire for that first one, you know? See, when they name it in Greek, epithumia, and they name it in Latin, the concupisal archetype, right? So concupisentia really means sense-desire, right? And we're more aware of that, right? You're very much aware of your hunger and your thirst, right? And that's why it's meaning to what stands out. And desire is more like emotion than joy, right? Remember how I was explaining the other day there, when I was talking about the metaphor sweet? Well, part of the metaphor there was that the sweet is what? Pleasant, right? But also the idea is being restful. So when you enjoy something, you're kind of, your soul is at rest. But desire, your soul is in kind of, what? Pursuit of something, right? So emotion is what's most known to us. And so desire is more known to us, huh? But also the fact that if you don't have what you want, right, it's kind of vivid to us. So sometimes I call it a sense-desire, right? But again, you're naming, in a sense, the whole from the part, right? Because it's not desire. It's not desire, right? But it's tied up with what's agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, huh? So you can see in Latin there, you can see the word appetitus, right? You know, to use, you know, even for the will and for, you know, the senses and so on, I mean, for the emotions. But appetitus, really, is where we get our right appetite. It's really from desire, right? You're still naming it from that, huh? I was talking about Shakespeare's definition of reason, I made that comparison, huh? And a way to define reason by discourse, by the act of reason that it's like emotion, is like, you know, naming the, what? Desiring power by desire. So the ability or the power to feel these emotions, any of them, they'll speak of them in Latin as the appetitive powers, right? The desirative powers, huh? Even though desirative is speaking the name of one of them, right? But it's because that stands out in some way, right? And so, likewise, as Shakespeare says, huh, things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stir, huh? And so, that's true in a way, even of reason itself, right? Reason in motion is more known to us, or stands out more, than reason at, what? Rest, reason, understanding. Watch your attention, now move around, right? And so, the acts here, they're more like motion, grab our attention, anger, right? Very volatile thing. That means your motion, right? Stands out, huh? Is it possible, thinking of the soul separated from the body, is it possible in this life, then, for us, even to have any concept of what the soul would experience, these formal aspects of what we sense, of joy and fear and all kinds of things, the soul has these two, but in a different aspect, you're saying. The will, yeah. It's the will. In an unboggling way, yeah. But we can't, it seems to me then, from what you're saying, we can't even conceive of how, what that would be like. We can only conceive of what we are now. We can't even imagine what the soul would feel like. Well, you see, we can understand the formal aspect of the emotions, right? Well, I know it is a word, I can understand it, but I'm not sure that I... Yeah. But we can understand, you know, something about what fear or anger is in a formal way, huh? I don't know how... See? You know, when they define anger, say, as a desire for revenge, right? Yes, yeah. Okay? That doesn't... First of all, I'll call that dialectical definition, right? Because it's not in terms of the bodily change going on, right? And he says, really, to be in natural philosophy, in natural science, you've got to bring in the body, huh? Yeah. The matter, right? Mm-hmm. But we understand something of the bodily changes going on in the emotions, and you can study that, I mean, okay? He doesn't, I don't know, because he's considering the soul kind of, you know, somewhat separation there, but as he goes on, you can talk about the bodily changes, and those who study the emotions, bodily, right? They can talk about the actions in the body going on. But we also understand the formal aspect, this desire for revenge. And so, when he carried the word over to the acts of the will, we drop out one part, right? The bodily part, and just keep the formal aspect. Well, we understand that even the emotions, huh? When I think of what sadness is, or joy, even as an emotion, I'm not thinking just of the bodily change that undergo, right? When I'm joyful or sad. But it's in the possession of something good, right? Or in the, something bad has been forced upon you, right? They can't avoid. I still think of it in a body. But it's anything less known, yeah. I remember as a child, sitting in church, you know, and the priest is talking about the love of God. And of course, when I heard the word love, I'm thinking of girls or something, right? And the love of God is not really an emotion, see? And I say, what does that really mean? I mean, I was kind of a proto-philosopher, philosopher there, right? See? Because somehow I knew that the love of God was not exactly this thing I felt for girls, right? And it's funny, when I was in college there, I used to drive with one philosophy professor kind of crazy, you know? A little Polish philosopher. And he was in the symbolic library, you can see. And I was always using the syllogism, right? One day in class, he was frustrated with me. He says, Berkowitz, he says, do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism? I just laughed and said, well, I could have an emotional attachment for a girl, but I certainly could have an emotional attachment to the syllogism. But notice, my will was attached to the, what, syllogism, right? Because I understand that in the syllogism, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, right? So my reason is impressed with the goodness of an argument, where the conclusion, in fact, does follow necessarily from the premises. And so I love that kind of an argument in terms of the criterion that Aristotle gave in the first part there, in terms of its certitude, right? You see? But that's a love that's in my will, so I don't have an emotional attachment to the syllogism, right? But I have a rational. I have. You see? I must have had an emotional intipathy to the syllogism. Does that mean that when we love God in the well, or when the soul leaves the body, and we're in the presence of God, that our sense of the love of God is different completely than the sense that we have today in the body? Do you think that it's totally different then? Well, you've got to be much more aware of what it is, yeah. But even in this life, we see, I know that my love of wisdom, my love of the syllogism, is a tool, right? It's much different from my love of candy or something like that, huh? Yeah. But you see, when you get to what we call the fine arts, the fine arts are kind of in between. Yes. I think Austerle spoke very well in his essay there towards an evaluation of music. He's talking about how the pleasures and so on of the fine arts are not the highest thing for man. It's not as high as, say, philosophy or theology or something like that. But he says that the works of the fine arts are what are most pleasingly proportioned to man. So when I talk sometimes about John Stuart Mill, right? John Stuart Mill has got a kind of defective understanding of ethics. He's a utilitarian, right? And pleasure is kind of the criterion, right? Greatest pleasure or the greater number or something like that. And, but Mill's kind of a more reasonable defender in this position. And he says, sometimes we utilitarians, he says, we're attacked because our philosophy is fit for the beasts. You know? And of course, he tries to turn the table on those who attack them, saying that you are the beasts, right? We're making this objection. If you think that man has no pleasures other than what the beast has. Okay? So there are some pleasures that the beast has, that we share with the beast, like the pleasures of eating and drinking and sleeping and so on, right? Other pleasures that man has that the beast doesn't have, right? And he says that the man who's tasted both pleasures, right? Really? The man who's tasted the higher pleasures, the pleasures that man alone has, prefers those, right? It's only the man who's never tasted the higher pleasures, right? That thinks the pleasures of eating and drinking and sex and so on are the greatest pleasures, huh? Okay? But, I think that distinction, you can improve upon it, right? And say that there are three pleasures. There are the pleasures that man shares with the other animals, pleasures of eating and drinking and sleeping and so on, sexual pleasure. There are the pleasures that man shares with the angels, and with that, which is the pleasures of what? Understanding. And then there are the pleasures that are human, human in the sense that man alone really has them, right? And those are the pleasures of listening to Mozart, or looking at Titian, or Raphael, or Da Vinci, or somebody, right? Or reading, you know, Shakespeare's plays, and breaking your imagination, and so on. Now, Austerly's way of speaking of that was very interesting, I think. He said, the pleasures of the fine arts are too high for the animals, and too low for the angels. So, sometimes I call them the animal pleasures, the angelic pleasures, and then the human pleasures, in the more narrow sense of human, right? The only man has, right? And the human pleasures are better than the animal pleasures, and the angelic pleasures are greater than the human pleasures. But, if you compare those, you can say man has the pleasures, the pleasures that man shares with the animals. Man has those in a higher way. So, with old cuisine, you know, and wine, and all this sort of stuff, we have the pleasures of eating that the animals have, but in a more refined way, in a more interesting way, right? Okay? But, at the other end, the pleasures of understanding, we have them imperfectly. Because we very perfectly understand, compare it to the angels of God. But the pleasures in the middle, are, as Ospi says, the ones most pleasingly proportioned to man, because we're not just an animal, we're not just reason, we're an animal with reason. And, therefore, these are most proportioned to us. And what's interesting about that, and kind of a sign of that, too, is that one can pursue those intermediary pleasures longer than either of the other ones. So, when you eat or drink, there's, what I say, a diminishing return there, right? My brother Mark says, you know, the first glass of beer tastes much better than the second glass. In fact, he says, the first sip tastes better than the rest. You know? So, you're drinking more, but enjoying it less, right? See? Well, in the case of understanding, you know, it's such a difficult for us to understand, we get kind of tired after a while. And so, we, you know, we can sit down, maybe, and read a novel for two or three hours, for a little longer. See an opera, you know, hear a Mozart opera for two or three hours, right? Or spend two or three hours looking at the paintings in the museum, right? You see? And, it's kind of more proportioned to us, right? So, really, the proper education is to lead people away from this excess of the animal pleasures through the human pleasures, right? You know, to the higher pleasures, right? I used to joke, you know, about having a room set up, right? And you come into the first room, and they serve dinner there, right? But you have, you know, manners, you have to have the dinner table, right? And there's wine served, but you've got to drink in moderation, and appreciate the wine, and so on, right? And, uh, there's a door at the other side of the room there, but it's closed. And after people have learned to eat, and enjoy the table the way they should, all of a sudden, after dinner, that room is open. You walk in there, and there's some beautiful paintings, and some Mozart music playing, and so on, right? You know? Another door beyond that, right? Closed. And there, there's got nice editions of Shakespeare, right? And Homer, and Sophocles, and so on, right? And then, there's another door beyond that that's closed, right? And inside there, there's what? Euclid, and so on, huh? And then actual philosophy, eventually, right? And wisdom, and finally, what? Theology, right? You know? See? But, I mean, you have to kind of be led, you know, up through the intermediary ones, huh? So it's hard for, you know, a human being to go from animal pleasures to the pleasures of understanding, right? Without going through the intermediary ones. The one who would stop at the intermediary ones, right? As if they were the highest thing, huh? So I know people who have some appreciation of good music, or appreciation of good literature, that don't philosophize or pursue theology, right? But I've never met a good philosopher or a good theologian who didn't have a good appreciation of good music. And it wouldn't make any sense to mess with the rock and roll and the theologians. It wouldn't make any sense at all. You'd have to be crazy, you know? You know? Yeah. Any comments, sir? Just regarding, it seems like the past few centuries, anyway, this order you've just been discussing in education is either disregarded or it's simply lacking. Yeah. Do you think it seems that wreaking havoc can something like this be restored without a miracle from God? Or, you know, do you think, just your thoughts on this whole modern educational system that could be precisely... Well, to see, there are some schools, like the Trivian School, you know, take out for high school, you know? You see? But, I mean, that's why it's so important is this homeschooling now, you know? Because there you can... They read good literature, these kids, you know? Right, sure. And they hear good music and they go to the museum and so on, right? Mm-hmm. Father Boulay, you know, made a nice collection from the ancients on the importance of music, huh? Oh. Thomas there, this commentary, Matthew, I think I pointed that out, you know? I could put that part in the scripture there where, you know, we played this and you didn't do this and so on. And Thomas says, nothing so changes the soul of man than music. This is quite a commentary, too, on some of the problems of the church. Sure. She seems not to be aware in the modern age of leading people through beauty and these things we're talking about to the higher thoughts of God. Mm-hmm. She expects...