De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 10: The Soul as Form of the Body: Three Divisions

Transcript
================================================================================

She kind of stopped the dead end, and we were introduced to ugly churches and ugly liturgy and so forth, and therefore we lose the sense of God. Sure, sure. Now, I mean, some of the music they play in church, you know, is just mediocre, and some of it is, you know, plainly scandalous, you know. A friend of mine was in church, and during communion time, they're playing Blue Moon, you know, it's something they danced to in the dance halls, and that was, you know, and he turns to Larry and says, he's like to dance, he says. She's going to finish and see the church, you know, but it's so ridiculous. It's very hard, I mean, you know, people trying to educate people, and you've got to a Gregorian chant, you know, and it's an uphill battle, you know. Things are so corrupt, you know. Well, yeah, I mean, it's something I want to, you know, modify a bit, but there's no question about the fact that our education is in a bad state, you know. When you talk about angelic pleasures, you mentioned understanding. Is there something, too, with the will? Well, that, too, yeah. Socrates, in the symposium, he talks about this kind of a ascent, you know, from, you know, the love of beautiful bodies, right, to the love of beautiful souls, and all the other, you know, to the beautiful itself, right? Well, you know, Augustine kind of begins that, doesn't he, the confessions, huh? Too later I come to know the ancient beauty, huh? The father, I mean, the popes, and they talk sometimes about the beautiful and the liturgy and so on, right? And how it's leading up to God, right? He was talking about one of the saints who wouldn't ever look at anything like a beautiful sunset or something, and he said that that's not necessarily very good for everyone to do that, because you need that. So he said, you know, some of the saints can do that, because they're maybe already up in the other ones, but that might be bad for you, he said. He said, you might need to see these beautiful things. So the Greek word, thumas, how would you put that more into English besides irascible, as far as covering all of them? Well, thumas, you know, like, it means anger or boldness, right? It's not really the correct way they translate it now a lot of times in the Greek text, they're spirited, you know, but there's some aspect of that, huh? See, in a way, the irascible is more closer to reason, in a way, than it gives them. And there's kind of a quid pro quo there, right? And it's kind of interesting here, if you compare, say, anger with, let's say, lust, you know, anger in an excessive sense of lust. Anger is said to hear reason, but what? Imperfectly. I'm going to punish you because you did this, right? Now, if I'm angry, I may punish you more than I should, or hurt you more than I should, right? But in a sense, I'm doing this because of that, right? So there's some aspect of reason there, right? And in general, the irascible ones, right, are for the sake of something else, right? So when one fights, one is not going to be doing something that's going to be pleasant. When the animal fights, right? But it's for the sake of something else, right? It's almost like thinking, huh? And that's why Clego, when he has the three parts of the soul there, he has one corresponding to reason, that's the highest, and then thumas, the second, and then epithumia, the last, right? And the republic, he compares it to three parts of the city, right? He had the ruling class, which is the reason, and then the soldiers, right? Which are thumas, and then the common people, which are down in epithumia. So the irascible, in some senses, is close to the reason, it seems, huh? So it's interesting that anger can be applied to God metaphorically, right? See? But he wouldn't speak of hunger or thirst metaphorically of God, huh? But he could speak metaphorically of our soul, you know? O God, you are my God, whom I seek from you my flesh pines, and my soul thirsts, right? It says in the psalm, right? So, there you're using the word thirst metaphorically, right? But it's appropriate, because there's a desire for God, right? It can be called metaphorically thirst, huh? I was thinking of that psalm the other day, after I came back talking to you people last time, because we talked about the deception there, right? And our Lord is saying that the Sadducees are, what, planeste, right? You err, you wander, right? It gives us the reason why, deity, he says here in the Greek, because you're ignorant, right, of the power of God and the scriptures, right? Well, it's interesting that emphasis upon the power of God, right? Because when the First Vatican Council talks about the motives of credibility, they are proportioned to everybody. It speaks of two, and one is the miracles, right? And the other is, what, the fulfillment of prophecies. But the miracles, in a sense, point to the, what? Power of God. Power of God, right? Now, of the miracles that say that our Lord worked on this earth, huh? Which are the greatest miracles? Is it curing the blind men, giving sight to the blind men, or is it raising Lazarus, and those other ones he raised from the dead? Which? The raising. Yeah. You know, when you read about Lazarus being raised from the dead there, this was leading to many conversions, right? And, in fact, the gospel says, too, that they were thinking of putting Lazarus to the dead, poor God, because he was an occasion for people, you know, being converted, right? Now, come back to that psalm. Now, I've got to think about this psalm again. It says, O God, you are my God whom I seek. For you, my flesh pines, and my soul thirsts. Like the earth, parched life is not water. That's if I gaze towards you in the sanctuary, to see your power and your, what? Glory, right? Now, usually when I say, you'll see those two words, to see your power and your glory, you're thinking, you know, of the kingdom of God, right? So, what do we say in the Mass sometimes? For thine is the, what? What do they say? God. Yeah, so you think, when you're looking to the kingdom of God, right? But, maybe you could also understand it in this way. My flesh pines the Lord when it's seeking, what? Resurrection. Resurrection, eventually, right? And my soul thirsts, right? And you just come back to it, it's power and glory. Power has a connection with the resurrection, right? And that's pointed out in Christ's criticism of the Sadducees, huh? They deny the resurrection, right? Because he says, you're ignorant of the power of God, right? Yeah. So, I'm looking for the power of God in the resurrection of my body, huh? You know? By glory, I'm looking for what? The vision of God, huh? It's like Thomas at the end of the other Ote, Devoted, he says, Jesus, He says, Visu, right? To a glory, right? He may become blessed in the sight of God's glory. So, you could kind of adapt power and glory there. One to the body, and the other to, what? The soul seeking the vision of God, huh? Kind of interesting, huh? It's kind of struck me, I never thought about that before, so much, because I've been thinking about that text, you know, we looked at it in the Gospel about the Sadducees, huh? Interesting. Interesting. Interesting. Interesting. Interesting. Interesting. You know, that thing, another kind of sider, but application, that thing about the order of these things that we saw before, where you have to know the object before the act and the act before the power. Well, you have a similar principle in ethics and also when you study the theological virtues. Since which is more known to us, the theological virtues or the acts of the theological virtues? In other words, don't you have to understand to love or to believe? The act before you can understand what the virtues are, right? But maybe in order to understand the act, you have to understand their what? Object, right? Now, when Thomas begins the treatment of the faith there in the secundi secundi, he talks about its object being what? The prima veritas, the first truth. You kind of see that in the autorote, derote, too. Credo quid quid dixi dei filius, I believe whatever the Son of God says. Then he gives a reason. Nil hoc verbo, veritatis, various, huh? Nothing is more true than this word of truth itself, huh? In the three theological virtues, the object in each case is God, but in a somewhat different way, right? So God is the object of faith, in a way, as he is the first truth. But God is the object of love, of charity, insofar as he's what? Yeah, yeah. He's the good itself. Goodness itself. When you come to hope, what is that? What way is God the object of hope? I mean, sometimes we think of the power of God, right? We think of his loving us, right? But also, it seems to be more very prominently, is the idea of what? His mercy. It kind of presupposes that he has what? He loves us, right? And he has a power to what? Remove our wretchedness and so on, right? Okay. So the mercy of God, in some ways, is very much the object of hope, huh? You know, I've seen that little thing that the Capuchins sent in the mail there. I guess they're going to Canaanize Padre Pio? Padre Pio on Sunday. This weekend, yeah. Father's Day. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. And of course, the Capuchins, the Franciscan Capuchins are there. They're saying that there's more people visiting Padre Pio's tomb now than go to Lourdes and Fatima. I don't know. But anyway, it's quite a thing, huh? But anyway, they had a little, you know, passage from him, you know? I think it was very good. He's talking about prayer, right? And, you know, he says, worry is useless. You know? Don't worry. Just pray. Okay? But those three words are kind of key if you read the text. Hope and pray. Of course, Augustine and Thomas always tap with hope and praying, right? And then the mercy of God, right? You know? You're saying, like, prayer is the key to God's heart, you know? But there you see the connection, hope and praying, and what? The mercy of God, huh? Yeah. What's the old saying in the scripture there? Is orat kwekantat? Do you heard that? He prays twice, who sings, right? Well, now, which two prayers in the Mass are sung? I'll talk to you about the symmetry of the Mass. The five things that are set to music? You know? A, B, C, B, A. Yeah. And the Kyrie and the Agnus Dei, right? See? The Gloria and the Sanctus are more what? Praise, right? And the Credo is not a prayer read at all, but it's a confession of faith, right? But the two prayers are what? The Kyrie Eleison and the Agnus Dei, right? But the both are using what? Mercy, right? To make it perfectly clear, one uses the Greek word, Eleison, and the other uses what? The Hatton word, Misere, right? But they're both asking for the divine mercy, right? So, Bis orat kwekantat. Kwekantat. These are the two principal things that we sing. You know? And they both have the same thing that Padipio has now. The thing that the caption sent me. The idea of mercy, right? So, notice, the theological virtues have God as an object, right? But there's three different theological virtues. God has to be an object in a somewhat different way. Otherwise, there'd be no distinction, right? So, God is the first truth, is in a way the object of faith. And God is goodness itself, is the object of love. And God is mercy, especially. Not only. It's curious, in the Summa there, when Thomas takes up the theological virtues, it was at one time, and the object of them. He puts faith and hope together in contrast with charity. A lot of times, we put hope and charity together because they're both in the will, right? Faith is in the reason, right? But he's just touching the object there. He puts faith and hope together in contrast with charity. In a sense, he's saying that in the case of charity, you're adhering to God as such, right? In the case of hope and faith, you're adhering to God as, what? The teacher of truth, right? As the truth you're going to get from him, so to speak. And as what is going to, what? Bestow all these goods upon you, like eternal life and so on, right? So in both cases, you're adhering to God as the one to whom you're going to get something. Well, in charity, you're adhering to God, not as the one to whom you're going to get something, but just as God. Because of the perfection of charity there, right? It's kind of interesting that he puts faith and hope together in the situation of against charity in that particular text, you know? He does like St. Paul in a sense. St. Paul does the same thing. When he talks about faith, hope, and charity, he says faith and hope will end. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Make that consideration in one particular place, or is it a spit eye in the most of it? Well, he talks about the object there in a number of places, but in each article. He talks about each of the virtues in particular. He also talks about them in general, you know, so you'll find him saying many times, talking about this, but I sent him to look at one text that I did this morning, and he was making that contrast kind of interesting. But you can do that in philosophy a lot if you have three things, right? You see, the family's divided into what? Parents, children, and children. Yeah, because you can say the father, the mother, and the children, right? That's into three. If you divide them into two, where would you put them? You put the father and mother together against the children, right? The parents and the children, right? But if you think of the father as the head of the family, and you put the mother and the children together, he's the head and they're the ruled, right? You don't rule the children mother in the same way as you rule the children, but... So, I mean, it's possible to do it in both ways, right? Or just like when you divide word, right? Set of many things. Thomas Sundays divides it right away into three. Word set of many things with exactly the same meaning in mind in each case, with entirely different meanings, and then partly the same and partly different. But now if you want to divide... these into two versus one. One most common way is to say names said equivocally of many things and names said univocally of many things. And then you subdivide names said equivocally of many things into the purely equivocal or equivocal by chance and the analogous, right? But couldn't you put the analogous word together with the univocal word and say names said of many things by reason? And then the names said of many things by chance, right? You could divide that way, right? You don't see it very often, but you could, right? It would bring out something, right? That these two are said, right? You know, we're said of many things and you have a reason to say these many things. I might run into somebody in life who's got the name Duane and why do the two of us have the same name, you know? He's not a philosopher, I don't know, whatever he is, right? We're not related, right? It just happened to have the same name, right? Now, in the 11th paragraph, after he's pointed out in the 10th paragraph that these emotions seem to clearly involve something bodily, right? He gave a couple of signs of that. And because of these things, he says, right away the consideration of the soul, either of all or of those of this sort, pertains the student of nature. Because natural philosophy is about things that involve what? Matter, right? Okay? And defined with matter, right? So now he goes on to explain it more fully. The student of nature, the dialectician, would define each of these, for example, what anger is differently. For the one, like the dialectician, would define it as an appetite or desire for a vexing in return, right? Desire to punish, huh? Or something like this. While the other would define it as a seeding of the blood and heat around the heart, in terms of the bodily aspect of it, right? Of these, the one, the second one there, gives the matter, right? The other, the species, and what it is, huh? Logos. For the account is the species of the thing, but if it will be, it is necessary that it be in this sort of matter, just as the account of a house is of this sort, that it is a shelter preventing destruction by wind and rain and heat, while the one will say it as stones and bricks and lumber, right? Two different definitions, right? The other will say it as a species and these for the sake of this. Which of these belongs to the student of nature? Is it the one about the matter, but ignoring the Logos, that's probably the word there, or the one about the Logos alone? Or rather, the one made from both? But then, who is each of the others? Well, the one that gives just the form, is considered what? The electrician does that. The electrician, right? Defines without matter. The one that gives just the matter, would belong to a natural philosopher, right? Because it uses matter. The one that uses both, would also belong to a natural philosopher, and be more perfect, huh? Is it the one about the matter, but ignoring the Logos? Or the one about the Logos alone? Or rather, the one made from both? Or is there not someone who considers the inseparable passions of matter not inseparable? That's a natural philosopher, right? Considered material things, and he brings matter into the definition. But the student of nature considers every body of this sort, and the works and passions of this sort. But another treats whatever is not such, and abouts some, the artist who gets a chance at the carpenter or the doctor. He would deal with what? The matter only insofar as it pertains to the art to do so. But the mathematician treats the things that are not separated from matter, but he doesn't consider them as passions of the body, and by abstraction he considers them. But the first philosopher treats these things insofar as they are separate, huh? But one must return once the argument was derived. He said then that the passions of the soul are in some way inseparable from the natural matter of animals. Just as courage and fear exist as such things, and not as line and surface, right? Which the mathematician considers in separation. So, notice, it's going to belong to the natural philosophy to consider the soul insofar as the soul is what? In matter, right? And if the soul was an immaterial substance that had to do with matter, it would in no way pertain to natural philosophy. And so, in the third book, when you arrive at the proof of the immortality of the human soul, then you are at the what? That's the border, right? Okay? Just like if you go north there and come to the border with Canada, and that border, that line there that divides Canada and the United States is the end of the United States and the beginning of what? Canada, right? So, just like when you arrive at the immateriality of the other move, right? You're at the what? Mexican frontier, right? Of the United States. So, when you arrive at the immortality of the soul, you're at the Canadian border of the United States, right? So, you know there's a science metataphysica after the consideration of what? Natural things are concerned, huh? So, the way the soul understands the separation from the body, that really belongs to metataphysica, right? When the dianima, we're concerned with how the soul understands what's in the body, huh? But therefore, it's the area when you talk about the emotions and the senses that involve an activity in the body, right? This pertains to what? Natural philosophy. Okay? So, let's go up. Let's start to look here a little bit at the second book now. Let what was handed down about the soul by our predecessors have been said. That's what he spends the rest of book one in doing. Let us begin again, as if from the beginning, trying to determine what the soul is and what would be the most common account or definition of it. Now, how is Aristotle going to go about investigating the definition of the soul here? Well, in the book called The Poster Analytics, Aristotle speaks of two ways of investigating a definition. And one way is to take many examples of the same thing, right? And compare those examples, right? And separate out what they have in common, right? And leave aside the differences. That's one way of doing it. So if we thought that the firemen that ran in the building with the building collapsing and rescued the little baby there in the building, right? We honor him for being courageous, right? And then when the man was attacked down in the water by a shark, and the girl swam out and dragged him in, baptized him on the shore, it was courageous, right? And then the soldier advancing across the field with the machine gun shooting at him, right? It's courageous, right? See, what do these three have in common? The firemen running into the burning building and rescuing the baby in there? The girl swimming out into the shark-infested water and dragging this man in. This actually happened one time. And the soldier advancing across the machine gun fire, right? They all have a shark, you know? They all have bullets, you know? They all have a building on fire and collapsing around you? What does the fire and the bullet and the shark have in common? Danger, life-threatening. Yeah, they're all life-threatening, right? They're fearful things, right? Things that could end your bodily life. What did these three persons do? Did they foolishly approach fire and shark and bullet for no good reason? For the fun of it? Or they have very good reason, right? Or the one advanced to save the man's life or to save his soul, right? And the fireman went there to save the baby, right? And the soldier went forward to defend his country, right? So they all reasonably, right, and for good reason, right, went to something that, what, is fearful, huh? Because it can threaten death to your body, right? So I'm separating out what they have in common, right, and leaving aside their, what, differences, right? Now what's the other way to investigate what something is? Yeah, yeah. And so if I'm going to define, let's say, the square, I might say, well, what is the square, right? Well, it's a figure of some sort, right? Is it a plain figure or is it a solid figure? It's on a flat surface or is it a three-dimensional figure? Plain figure, right? Is it one contained by a circular line or by straight lines? Straight lines. And by three or by four or by, you know? And so by a number of divisions, I might eventually arrive at what the square is, right? And maybe I'd have to, when I got down to, let's say, quadrilateral, I might have to divide in a couple of ways to arrive at square, right? Because are the four sides equal or unequal, right? But if they're equal, that still wouldn't give you what the square is, is it? Is that if the square is an equilateral quadrilateral? Well, yes, every square is an equilateral quadrilateral, but is the reverse true? It's something called the, what? Rhombus. Okay? So the rhombus is an equilateral quadrilateral, that Euclid has there, right? They're all four-sided, they're all quadrilaterals, but some are, what? Equilateral and some are, what? Not, right? That division would not be enough to arrive at the definition of square, would it? I've got to take into account the angles, huh? Some are right-angled, and some are, what? Not, right? But if I put those two together, I say the square is a, what? Equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. Now I have, what? Speech that is convertible with square. Equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. So those are the two ways that Aristotle talks about explicitly in the second book of the Posture Analytics. Because definition is the beginning of demonstration, this is a book about demonstration. So he has to talk about how we arrive at a definition, right? And he contrasts these two ways. Now, which of these two ways do you think he's going to investigate the soul by? Because unlike the square, you know, I mean, if I could investigate the square by this too, I mean, you might, you know, a little kid might recognize that to be a square, and this to be a square, and this is not a square, and so on, right? So what do these two have in common, right? You just start to single out, well, they both have four sides, and you might have to recognize that they have, you know, this kind of an angle, and maybe the equality, and so on. You can eventually separate out all that these two have in common, right? Okay? Leaving aside the differences that one is white and one is green or something, right? Okay? But can you take a bunch of souls like that and kind of live out there? No. The soul is not that accessible, right? So you need more to investigate it by what? Division. Yeah. I think in theology we proceed more by induction or by syllogism when you think of theology. Yeah. There's only one God, right? What's induction going to be? But now, he's going to do something different than what we did up here, though, right? Because is the soul going to be defined, do you think, as something by itself or as something of another? And if the soul is something of another, you might want to divide, to distinguish that other from other things, right? And you might want to divide in order to know what the something is, right? Okay? Just like you might say in regard to the definition of what? Time, right? Time is something of another, right? So Aristotle is going to give, actually you can enumerate six divisions here, right? But he's going to give three divisions to separate that of which it is something, right? From other things, right? He's going to give three divisions to get at what it is of this other, right? And we didn't go through the whole book one there. It had the dialectic. But what would make us think at first of the soul as something of another? It's going to be defined as something of another rather than as something by itself. So we can see the operation of the soul first through the body. Okay. Now, is the soul and the body the same thing? Now, why would you think the soul is something of the body? Because of the operations, right? That most of the operations, right, of the soul seem to be in and through the body, right? Most of the operations are the living thing, right? And the other reason to think that the soul is something of the body. Now, obviously, those who think the soul is the harmony of the body, right? The organization of the body, the order of the body, right? They think it's something of the body, right? But now, is there some element of the truth in that thinking? That the soul is the harmony of the body. That the soul is the order of the body, the organization of the body. Yeah. In other words, the body doesn't remain alive if the organization is lost, right? The soul goes, right? When the body is disorganized, huh? Okay. Now, let's go back to something more known to us, huh? Remember when Aristotle was... investigating um the definition of time right and how do you investigate the definition of time what was the starting point for investigating the definition of time i'm recalling this now because time like the soul is defined as something of another right what led aristotle to think of the soul as being something of another right because we don't do not notice okay now let's go back a little step before that right and say that in in the conversation of time the beginning right was that there's a connection between time and motion okay and some people speak of time as if it were emotion right okay so they speak of the flow of time right the passage of time right they speak of the time going fast the time going slow right okay but aristotle argued that time is not motion if time went fast or slow what does it mean to say that emotion is fast or slow we're going to have to have a time it doesn't go faster or slower to measure it right okay faster the slowness so you start off to egg into some connection between the two but then there's not a reason that time is not motion right but it's not perceived without some motion so time is not motion but it's not perceived without time without motion that kind of reaches the conclusion that time is something of motion without being motion itself and then he starts to investigate well what is time of motion right and then he actually got more precise as to it's being something of the before and after in motion right and then eventually he's found out that it's a number of that before and after in motion so three days or three hours is a number of the before and after in some motion and eventually he he saw it as being the most regular motion that you would find and so on okay so i'm not trying to teach time here again but make us a comparison here right that we are led gradually to see and that time is tied up in some way with motion but it's not motion but it's something of motion okay now the doctor talks about health right and um does the doctor ever find health without examining some body how's your refined sickness without examining some body huh what do you think no no so the connection between health and bodies right or some bodies anyway not stones or tables right but the living bodies right okay but now is health a body do you think but it's not perceived without examining the body right so it seems that health is something of a body right okay now if you wanted to define health you have to say well it's something of a body but but what kind of body a living body or a non-living body you see maybe a living body right yeah maybe an animal more than a plant body maybe a plant body could be sick too okay they used to be an animal okay but then you'd be dividing inside of that of which it is something right but now something again of the body right what would be the first division you might think it's something of a body something of a living body you know the division is derived that by which it is something was it the size of a body or the quality of a body is it the shape of the body or the condition or disposition of the body yeah is it a good decision or a bad decision of the body right you see well see i make a number of divisions there right you know is it quantity or quality is it quality is it disposition or shape or what is it right disposition is it a good one bad one right you might make three or four divisions there on the side of of health itself right and maybe one or two divisions on the side of that of which it is you know it says the natural body or artificial body something of a natural body not artificial body of a living natural body or a non-living natural body right okay so you might have a number of divisions on the side of that of which it is something right and what it is and a number of other divisions on the side of what it is about that something is that clear as my grandmother you see the point so if it's true that the soul is something of another right you might have to make a number of divisions to grasp what that other is right in fact there's how to give three divisions and then you might give a number of divisions on the side of what so itself is right okay so that's where you're going to begin it's going to be you're going to actually three divisions on the side of the something right there it is and three divisions on that of which it is something right just like if i was defined the point the point is the limit of something right what's the limit of it's a limit of an argument limit of your patience what's the limit of or something continuous it's a limit of right and i said the limit of something continuous in one or two or three dimensions it's a limit of a of a line right it's something of a line right is it a part of a line no it's a limit of a line right it's in the line right this is the opposite of the question you're still raised all things are all things defined in the same way well some things can be defined by themselves as if they were a complete substance right other things are defined as something of another right okay but let's go back now to the question presupposed to this right um what would you dare us now to say that the soul is something of another it's something in the way of the body in fact of experience okay first of all the greeks heard the word soul and we didn't go and read the the rest of the book on there but All the Greeks were convinced that we have a soul, right? There wasn't any doubt in the mind that we had a soul. What they were in doubt about was what the soul is. And we said that puzzled people now because of the way the word soul was used, right? That's really a difficulty in the use of the word. What did the Greeks understand by the word psuche, who we translate by the word soul? Why was it so familiar to them, right? Why to us the word soul is so unfamiliar, it seems, right? What it refers to, right, that men nowadays wonder, wouldn't they have a soul? And I mentioned this bad custom of eliminating the word soul from the Bible, right? You know, in the parishes there you see that. What do the Greeks understand by the word soul? We mentioned this before. The principle of the body that has life. Yeah. By the word soul, they meant the cause of life within living bodies. So the word soul is broader in meaning than just the human soul, right? If we use the word soul, if we use it all today, we think only of the what? Human soul, right? Okay. Now, you mentioned how in Latin there, the word anima, that very word animal, comes from the Latin word for soul, right? Now, that there is a cause of life within living bodies is that obvious in our experience. Because it's obvious in our experience that some bodies are alive and some bodies are not alive. that orange or that cat is alive, right? At least last time I saw her. Or her. Her. What? Her. Her. But the stone is not alive, right? Okay. And what do we mean when we say that a body is alive? What does anybody say that a body is alive? Yeah, yeah. And that means that it has within itself, right? A cause of its own emotion, right? So it's kind of obvious it is a cause of life within living bodies, huh? What is that cause, right? Is it the order, organization of the body, right? Or is it, like, Taylor seems to think, you know, that it's some other substance in the body temporarily, like a man in his boat? Or a man in his car, we'd say today, right? You see? But even that common notion, you might say, of what is meant by the word soul, right? It has a certain connection with the body, right? The cause of life within living bodies, right? Okay? Right there, there's a connection with something other than the soul, right? The body, right? Okay? But, if you think of the soul as being the harmony or the order of the body, which is one of the main opinions about what the soul is, then obviously it's something of another, right? Just like, you know, if you think that the soul, the word cat, is the order of the letters, right? Well, the order of the letters can't exist without the what? The letters, it's something of the letters, isn't it? Okay? So if the soul is the order of the body or the harmony of the body, the organization of the body, then the soul is clearly something of the body, right? Okay? But suppose the soul is not the harmony of the body, right? Okay? But, when the harmony of the body is lost, when the organization of the body is lost, right? When your head is chopped off, parts are separated, and so on, then the body no longer has a soul, right? So the soul seems to be, if not the order of the body, the organization of the body, the harmony of the body, it's only in a body, so what? Organized, right? So it has a connection there with that, order, right? Even if it's not the order, right? Now, there's a problem in saying that the soul is a complete substance, distinct from the body, you know, some of the modern philosophers, you know, they're in front of the position about the soul that's a ghost in a machine, right? That's kind of their expression, right? But if the soul was a ghost in the body, right? A ghost in a machine, right? Then the soul could presumably, what? Leave a body at the back end. This doesn't make much sense, right? Or the soul could be in just, what? Anybody, right? But also, it doesn't make sense in terms of the, what? Our inward experience of the unity of the human being, right? And when my body is in pain, or my body is injured, right? Or if I have a limb applicated, right? Or something, right? But this is not like having, you know, part of my car removed or something, right? This is me! You know? Except there was a movie there where I was reading one of the movies, and he's injured in the movie and his leg has to be removed, right? I don't know what they do here. I'm touched if this happens or something, you know. And that's a horrible shock. You know, you have to, where's the rest of me, you know? I think it's a very serious, tragic scene, you know, it's a horrible thing. Do I know? I think you realize that your leg is longer there, right? But that's the reaction. Where's the rest of me, right? Now what happened to my car? Where's my leg? Where's the rest of me? Right? So, the soul seems to be then not a complete substance distinct from the body, because then you can't understand the unity of man. Okay? The body is part of man. Now, there's also the arguments that Socrates gives in the Phaedo against the soul being the harmony of the body. And we mentioned that one of the arguments is that the soul resists the inclination of the body sometimes. And therefore, it seems to be something like that. Something substantial, right? And not just the order of the body, because how the order of the body pulls the body, right? Okay? Or he argues that the soul is sometimes disordered. And the philosophers are trying to order the soul, right? Well, you don't have an order of order. And again, the order of the body doesn't seem to be the same thing as the order of the soul. It doesn't seem to be simply the order of the body. So those are some things that would lead you to think that the soul is something of the body. You can do it with the body in some way. But exactly what is it of the body, right? So he's going to investigate then the soul by dividing both in ways that will lead us to see what the soul is something of and divide in other ways to see what that something is that it is of another. Okay? Now he's very brief here and that's why you need Thomas in his commentary if you had a chance to come. In 112, he gives three divisions in order to arrive at what the soul is. And then in 113, right, he gives three more divisions to arrive at that of which the soul is something. Let's look at 113 first because it's going to be a little bit.