De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 16: Wonder, Definition, and the Soul as First Act

Transcript
================================================================================

mean proportional, what does that mean? It means that one of the numbers is to it, and it is to the other, right? In this example here, that would be what? Six, right? So we do this in lines rather than numbers, right? At the end of what? Book two I think he shows how to make it right. Actually, you need that one, you know? But the immediate thing is to it, what? A rectangle, right? Any rectangle that's not a square, right? Turn it into a square or equal area, right? Okay? So you kind of find a mean proportion, right? Okay. And that gives in a way the reason why it's the same, right? Okay? So if you say, what you're trying to find here is a square that's equal to this rectangle, right? Okay? But that's going to be a square whose side is a what? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So which is like a middle term and which is like a conclusion? Yeah. And so if you have, if you find a square whose side is a mean proportional between the sides of the oblong, right? Then you will found a square which is equal to the what? Oblong. Oblong, right? Okay? Now, people a lot of times have discussed this here because it's kind of an interesting thing about that. Now, in the Posterior Litics, in Logic, then, they talk about the questions, what is it, and the questions, why is it so, right? Okay? And I've been talking about this a little bit before in Logic, but it's reviewed it, we call it it. Let's go back to something very fundamental. Logic is the tool of the man who, what? Thinks. Thinks. But he's the practical man who thinks, right? Okay. Okay? You could say he's the syllogizing. Let's go back to something you learned in the premium to wisdom, right? What was the beginning of philosophy according to one? Yeah. Yeah. One was the beginning of philosophy, right? Remember, I looked at the text in metaphysics, in Aristotle's premium to wisdom, and then the text before that, temporarily speaking, in the Theodosite, in the Theodosite. In the Theodosite, Theodos introduces his pupil, Theodosite, to Socrates. And this is his prized pupil, and he says to Socrates, he's something of a philosopher. Okay? And if they'll interest, you know, Socrates and Theodosite. In the course of the conversation, if you recall, Theodosite breaks out in wonder, right? And that's an occasion for Socrates to say, Theodos, I used to have guessed right about you, he says. For there is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder. So Socrates is very precise about that, right? There is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder. That's it. Aristotle teaches the same thing there in the premium to wisdom at the beginning of the metaphysics. It's in the place where he's trying to show that wisdom is knowledge that is pursued for the sake of understanding. It's looking knowledge, theoretical knowledge, speculative knowledge. It's not practical knowledge, right? It's not knowledge pursued for the sake of doing or making something. And he gives as a sign of that the fact that men in the beginning and now begin to philosophize out of what? Wonder, right? So, the two chief philosophers, as Thomas calls them, Plato and Aristotle, both agree in saying that wonder is the beginning of what? Philosophy. And so if you're doing something not out of wonder, you're not doing philosophy except in an equivocal sense, right? It's not philosophy in the original sense at all. And notice how that harmonizes with the word philosopher, right? The word philosopher means what? Philosophy. Yeah, yeah. Now, when I try to explain to students what the word philosopher means, but it is to be a lover of wisdom. And I explain to them something of what wisdom is, you know, a knowledge of first cause and ultimately a knowledge of God and so on. But I also point out, in order to really have a right to be called a philosopher, a man has to not only love wisdom, but he must love it in a certain way. See? And the first thing I point out is that he's got to love wisdom for its own sake. If he loves wisdom for the sake of making money, he loves wisdom for the sake of being admired by students or admired by the public for that matter, right? He's not really a lover of wisdom. He's not really a lover of wisdom. He's a lover of what? Money. Or he's a lover of fame or something of this sort, right? And I always make a simple comparison. I say, if the man loves the woman for her money, would you say he loves the woman or he loves money? And I say, if the girl confronts him and says, do you love me or your money? And in an honest fit he says, I love you for your money. Then she's going to say tearfully, right? Then you don't love me. And we'd all say that she's right, huh? I think I told you that. I saw one time that the heiress, did you ever see that thing? It's about the daughter of a wealthy man on the Hudson there, the Dutch, you know? And Olivia de Havilland, the one version I saw, Olivia de Havilland plays the young lady, right? You know how Olivia de Havilland is probably more Oscar than the other woman actors, right? But a handsome young man comes to court in there, right? And the father is suspicious that this young man is courting his daughter because the dad is money, right? And of course she's caught up with this young man and she doesn't want to believe that it doesn't mean you love her, right? But the father finally decides to confront the young man, you know? And so he meets the young man privately, right? And he offers him a sum of money, right? A considerable sum of money that he can take and go free and not be encumbered with this somewhat homely woman, right? Well, of course, he decides to take the money, right? Well, obviously, if he really loved the girl, he'd be, you know, indignant, you know, hurt to himself, right? Even the author, right? But obviously his taking the money is a sign, you know, sure sign that he's a lover of the money of the girl, right? But then, of course, you know, the rest of it is a psychological effect upon the girl, right? And, of course, her father because of this, right? He's just really trying to protect her, really, against pursuing her for her money. But that's the point, see, I'm saying that if I love the woman for her money, if I could have the money without the woman like that, I don't really love the woman. It's as simple as that, right? It's such a secundum quid, you know? The same way, if I love wisdom for the sake of anything other than wisdom, that's why I'm a lover of it, you see? You see the harmony there between, therefore, the meaning of a lover of wisdom and the fact that it begins in what wonder? Because wonder is a desire to know, not for the sake of making you're doing, but simply out of what? A desire to understand. You see that? So logic is the tool of the philosopher, right? You could also say logic is the tool of the man who wonders, right? Now, when we define the wonder, the wonder of the philosopher especially, usually what Aristotle or Thomas was doing, to say is that it's a desire to know the cause, right? It's a desire to know the unknown cause of a known what? In fact, right? So basically it's a desire to know causes. And Aristotle brings it out in that, bringing the wisdom from the father. And that's why we go back to that fragment of Democritus that we mentioned. Before, right? Where Democritus said, I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians. I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians. Now, as I often explain to students, the kingdom of the Persians would be the greatest kingdom in the world, that the Greeks would know about would be acquainted with them. And so if I was master of the kingdom of the Persians, I would be the wealthiest man in the world. I would be the most powerful man in the world. I would be worshipped as a god, right? The most honoured man in the world. I read that the Persian kings had a thousand chefs to prepare an excellent meal every night. And if they didn't, they would be up with their heads, right? And I'm sure they would have a hair, right? Okay. So what men, in general, want, you know, power or money, wealth, right? Fame and honor and sense of pleasure, right? All of these things that men seem to want, the master of the kingdom of the Persians would have to, what? Excess, right? Super Mondays, all these things. So it's a very strong statement he's making there, right? I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians. He has that intense desire, right? To know causes them. And therefore it's the origin of the very first cause they begin. So that's a good expression in that fragment that we have in Democritus, of the wonder that moved men to philosophize. And as you go through and read, you know, from Thales, who's supposed to have said that water is the beginning of all things, right? And all these other opinions, they all have a desire to know what? The causes of natural things, which are apparently the first causes of all things. Okay? So Aristotle and Thomas will often put a clause in the definition of this wonder, right? It's a desire to have a clause. But if you go to the text equally famous of Plato there in Theotapius, Theotapius, when he picked on wonder, he says, I wonder what these things are. Okay? And there the object of wonder there is what? And when Socrates talks about the wonder and the word afterwards about what they've been talking about, he says, now do you begin to understand why these things are so? Right? So sometimes we define wonder as a desire to know what and why. And in that childhood rhyme, twinkle, twinkle, little star, how I wonder what you are, right? That wonder is expressed in what it is. So, now in the second book of the Posteroanalytics, Aristotle is talking about these two questions. What and why? And how these two questions can be answered. Okay? So there you see how logic, in its culminating part, in Posteroanalytics, is the tool of the man who wonders, right? And that's why it's relevant to the man who wonders, or logic for him, to talk about these two questions, what and why. But there, Aristotle sees the dimension between what and why, and cause, another thing we're talking about. And why very clearly is asking for the cause of some effect, right? When you answer the question, what, you will also be able to cause this, that are responsible for the thing being what it is. Now, Aristotle will talk there about definition, which is the speech that answers the question, what, how we can arrive at definitions. And you talk about demonstration, which is the syllogism that answers the question, why. And so it's a comparison of these questions, and a comparison of definition and what? demonstration, right? And it's a very important comparison that he makes. And to sum up, I'm sorry, I'm not necessarily at the moment, but to sum up his teaching there, he says that definition can be the beginning of a demonstration, or it can be the conclusion of a demonstration, or it can be, in a way, the whole demonstration, but in a different form. Now, in order to understand that, you have to understand the connection between cause and definition of demonstration. And you have to understand what we understood in our study of four kinds of causes, that there's more than one kind of cause. And how does that play out in my son? Let's take a very simple example. Let's talk about an artificial gun. Let's talk about a knife, huh? Okay? Now, I might define the knife as a tool for a feather. Okay? And there, I am defining the knife by one of its causes, namely the end or purpose of the knife. Okay? Notice the kind of cause involved here. It would be the end. Now, I might also find the knife more by its parts, right? It's a tool composed of a blade and a hammer, right? Okay? It might be even more explicit and say it's a tool having a blade inserted in a hammer, right? And this, to speak kind of roughly, is a definition by parts, or, since parts are like matter, you can see it's a definition by matter, right? Okay? Two different definitions, right? Because there's different kinds of cause. Now, I could also combine these two and make one grand definition, right? I can say a knife is a tool for cutting composed of a blade and a hammer. Okay? Or I can say it's a tool composed of a blade and a hammer for the sake of cutting. Notice the difference here, right? It can be used to be definitions, right? Now, if I wanted to, I could reason from one of these definitions to another one, right? If the knife is a tool for cutting, and a tool for cutting has to have a blade, right, to cut with, and something that we can hold without being cut ourselves, then a tool for cutting is going to be a tool composed of a line of your blade and a hammer. Okay? Notice I made a solution just about this, haven't I? Okay? The conclusion of the syllogism is the knife is a tool composed of a, what, blade and handle. So this definition is like the conclusion of a demonstration. This here is like the middle term, which is the beginning. The beginning of a demonstration. Now remember that the demonstration, if you remember from logic, the demonstration is a syllogism, right? The syllogism has a very much rigor around those premises. So Aristotle says a definition can be as a conclusion of a demonstration or as a beginning of a demonstration. Or it can contain everything a demonstration does but in another form. So in a way this is including everything I had in the demonstration but in the form of a, what, definition. So this is an extreme interest in the man who wonders, to know all about this. Or take my definition of marriage, right? So I get the definition of marriage in terms of the four clauses, right? So I say marriage is a stable union of a man and woman by mutual choice for the sake of, what, children. That's a definition of which of these three senses. Yeah, it's a definition that differs from a demonstration, in form and position, as Aristotle says. But it contains in a sense everything that demonstration might contain. But suppose I reason in this way. And I said that marriage is a society for children, the sake of children. For the sake of generating children and educating them and raising them to mature citizens and mature members of the church, right? That would be like a, what, middle term. But society for generating children has to be composed, not of two men or two women, because they can't generate it, etc. But it must be one composed of a man and woman, right? It is going to be suitable for raising the children and so on. It's got to be a stable union and so on, right? Well, in that case, then, that marriage is a stable union of a man and woman, would be like the conclusion of a demonstration, right? Let's say society, or for the sake of children and so on, would be like a, what, beginning of a demonstration, right? But Berkowitz's definition, his complete definition of marriage, as the stable union of a man and woman, by mutual choice for the sake of children, that's like a, what, complete demonstration, but differing position, right? It's not set out as one part as middle term to conclude the other, right? But it includes all that, right? It includes what would be the conclusion of a demonstration, and what would be a, what, premise, right? Now, sometimes we talk about those two, because in that definition, I have something in the form, and I say stable union, right? And I say by, what, mutual choice, that's the move, right? But we've decided more in the discussion of the matter, because that's very clearly something, it has to be the definition, that's going to be complete, right? And it's very much a conclusion of that, right? From the end, right? It's got to have these parts. Now, actually, when Aristotle's taking up demonstration in book one, you have an illustration of this, right? Because he gives a definition of demonstration from the end or purpose of demonstration. And then he reasons from that to what the premises have to be. But it would be a little bit like if, in logic, if I had to find definition, in the logic of the first act, if I had to find definition as speech making known distinctly what a thing is, and then I'd define definition as speech composed of the genus and differences of a thing, I might be out of reason from one to the other, right? If a speech is going to make known distinctly what a thing is, it's got to say, in general, what it is, which is to give its genus, right? And also bring out its differences and other things that share that, right? So I can make a syllogism and say, a definition is speech making known distinctly what a thing is, and speech making known distinctly what a thing is is speech composed of the genus and differences of that thing. And there are one definition, speech making known what a thing is, would be as the middle term and as the beginning of the demonstration, and speech composed of the genus and differences of a thing, would be as the conclusion of that demonstration. But then I can combine those two together and make a grand definition of definition, and say, it's speech composed of the genus and differences of a thing, making known distinctly what that thing is, right? And then I have everything in the demonstration, but in a different, what, position, the position of the grand definition, rather than the position of a demonstration. So I kind of imitate with definition, that's what Aristotle does with demonstration in Book 1, right? But in Book 2 there, he talks about this in general. Now, he's going to do something like that with his soul, because he wants to, in a way, demonstrate, the soul giants, that the soul is what can be found by the division, and the combination there, the soul is the first act, the substantial form, if you want to say it, of a natural body composed of tools. But this is a serious point of being the first act, right? It's being the form of such a body, right? Okay? Now, what's he going to use as a little term, right? He finds a little term. And all that, what a little term is, right? Is the form of a body, right? Now, what's he going to take as a little term, right? It's going to be something more known to us, right? But also, in a way, it seems to me, something a little bit like the end, or purpose, namely the operations of life themselves, the second act, right? He's going to reason that that by which we first live, sense, move, and understand, that by which we first live, sense, move, and understand, is the form of the body, right? And the soul is that by which we first live, sense, move, and understand. So, in a way, he's going to reason, in a way, from something like the end, right? But more known to us, right? The operations of life, right? To the soul being what? The form of the body, right? A little bit like the Bible is going to try to, what? You know, reason to, a virtue, let's say, through its act, right? You say, temperance is that by which I eat and drink moderately, right? And that by which I eat and drink moderately, is that my appetite for food? No. No. It's a certain, what? Disposition or habit of that, right? Okay. I'm making a cute little appetite. Because we've all got to be cubes of appetite, right? Some of us, it's called a big deal, and most of us, it's a little compares it to a horse that's a little bit wild, right? They're trying to steer the horses, but it wants to run them up, so to speak, right? So it has to be what? It's like, trained, habituated, right, to obey the man, right? Did you ever read Irving's Tour on the Prairies? Beautiful, I think. And after he came back, you know, from all those years in Europe, the first time, not the first time, but the real long period in Europe, right? And he came back, and he made a tour of the West. Of course, the whole public expected him to write something about the West, so he had to write an account of his tour of the prairies. It's very, very interesting, very, very well written. Everything he writes, he's a master of English prose, right? But he describes these wild horses that they would capture, and how quickly they would tame, these horses, you see? But you can kind of see Plato's proportion, right? You know, that the emotions aren't the reasons, something like the horse is the man, right? And the horse at first, you know, or the witty, try to do what? He's a resistant man, doesn't want to obey the man. But if the man, you know, witty, puts the pressure on the horse, and so on, the horse succumbs and obeys the man, right? But the first reaction of the horse, should you get on the horse, he's going to try to throw you off, right? Well, if you give up, then the horse leads you. They get back on until the horse starts to, you know, calm down and start to obey, right? Okay? So, if a person was to reason, right, that temperance or moderation, right, is that by which a man, what, eats and drinks, so on, pursues sense pleasures moderately, right, in accordance with reason, right? Well, what is that? Is that the ability that we're all born with, to feel hunger and thirst and kill the desires of what is pleasant to the senses? No, we all have that, right? So, it's not the subject, is it? It must be the, what, the form, right? The habit or disposition that that has received, right? Okay? Just like if you said, you know, the horse out there, you know, to go back to Plato's analogy and so on, well, the horse has been tamed, and the horse out there in the field, they both got the same things by nature, right? But one has acquired a certain, what, custom or habit, right? It records with man, right? Maybe you've trained a dog or a cat or something, right? Train the dog more than the cat, I guess, but, so you can train the cat over to go to his box or something, or do something anyway, you know, that makes life a little more readable. Do you see? So, what Aristotle's going to do is to syllogize, right, in a way to demonstrate this definition of the soul that we saw already, right? To some extent, we already understand, right? But he's going to reason from, what, the second acts, which are less fundamental in reality, but more known to us, right? Okay, back to the definition, that's what he's going to do, right? So, in a way, you could also say it's something like having two definitions of the soul, right? The soul is the first act of a natural body composed of tools. The soul is that by which we first live, right? Sense, move, and understand, right? Living here, having the sense of what we have in common, the plants, right? So, he's going to have to develop, in a way, those two, what, premises, right? He wants to manifest, in other words, that the soul is, in fact, that by which we first live, sense, move, and understand. And, secondly, the major premise here, right? That by which we first live, sense, move, and understand is the form of the body rather than the matter, right? But notice, in general, even with other things that are more known to us, all these tools that we use, right? When are they first able to do their operation? Well, not when you just have the materials, right, out of which the tool is made, but when the materials have been shaped and formed, right? And ordered, right? In a way, it's suitable to that. So, it's really, when it has its form, that the tool is able to do what it does, right? Okay? A couple more fans of the house there, you know. You know, they come out of the box, you've got a simple thing, right? You know, you've got to do some of them. Then it does what it is. Once it has its form, its arrangement, right? Then it does, hopefully, what it's supposed to do, right? Okay? So, he's going to develop here, I guess, the minor premise first, huh? Starting 125 there. We say, therefore, taking the beginning of the inquiry, that the in-souled is to be divided from the un-souled by living. By living being spoken of in many ways, even should someone alone of these be present, we call the thing living, huh? Like understanding, sensing, moving around from one place to another, wherever motion or change according even to what? Nutrition, right? And growth and diminution, and so on. These are all the things that we attribute to what? Living things, right? Whence also all plants seem to be alive, right? For there appears in them the having such a power and principle to which they receive growth and diminution according to what? The places, huh? I know he insists upon that because he's trying to see how soul, in a way, is a little different from nature. Because nature seems to be determined to what? Yeah. Yeah. So, I'll take the example of the stone. You go to the stone and it, what? It falls down. I know it goes in only one direction. But the tree grows up and grows down, right? So, already there's kind of anticipation of what you see fully in the understanding, where there's the same knowledge of opposites. They kind of transcend that opposition, right? Notice, huh? If you have a lead balloon, what's it going to do? Down? Yeah. If you have a helium balloon, yeah. But the helium balloon doesn't go up and go down. It just goes in one direction, right? And that's the way these non-living things seem to do, right? They seem to be tied to one or two opposites, either down or up, but not both. How does a tree grow, up or down? You get to metaphysics, I'll explain how wisdom grows like that. So, in a way, it overcomes this dichotomy, or it's being limited to one or two opposites, huh? And you have this more in the animals, and most of all, in man, huh? It's like Shakespeare says there in Coriolanus. Nature not being able to be more than one thing. So, sometimes we call the soul a nature, but sometimes we divide it against nature, huh? Because it's not just determined to one, like nature, or something. It has its openness to opposites, huh? I was mentioning how before, in the beginning of natural hearing, in the physics, you learn the definition of nature, here we learn the definition of soul. And how you go through this process, you know, from the general to particular, but even more so, this process towards matter twice, in natural philosophy. Then you go from the physics, to the open universe, to the generation of corruption, you're going towards matter. Then you go from the soul to the other works. And... Do it again? Well, there's kind of a distinction between the nature and the soul. Most of all, between nature and reason, and nature and will, and get to the highest soul. It's kind of an anticipation of it, in the lowest here. For they do not grow up, but not down, but similarly in both, right? Whatever always feeds also lives until the end, as long as they're able to take in food. So we'll talk a little bit, particularly later on, about food and the fed, right? Aristotle was saying this discussion of whether the food is like the fed or unlike the fed. Because some of his predecessors said food is like the fed, and others said food is unlike the fed. And each of them have an element of truth, Aristotle says. We'll find out what the element of truth in both ways. But it's interesting how we sometimes, maybe even metaphorically, but similarly in some way, we carry the word food over, which is the object of these lower powers, power of nutrition and growth to some extent, right? The reproduction, right? If it's necessary for all of these. We carry it over sometimes and apply it to the objects of the other ones. And it's very common food for thought, right? But we also speak, you know, feeding somebody's anger or something like that, huh? Shakespeare a lot of times uses that. A very clear example of food as the object of these lower powers. And it's curious how we transfer the word food to the objects of these other powers sometimes. Socrates would talk about a feast of reason, right? Of course, in theology we use that a lot, don't we? Feast of faith. Yeah, convivium, you know. Thomas, you know, calls the Eucharist a convivium, right? A banquet. And also the Bittangrishness called a banquet, huh? But you have that in Scripture. It didn't start with Thomas, right? As if the riches of a soul, I mean, of a banquet, my soul shall be satisfied, right? With exultant lips, my mouth shall praise you. That's on there. O God, you are my God whom I seek. For you my flesh pines, my soul thirst. That one, huh? The earth parched, life is on the dark water. As if I gaze towards you in the sanctuary, you see a part of the glory. And then she speaks of it as being like a banquet, right? You can apply that to the Eucharist, as Thomas says sometimes, or to the Bittangrishness, right? Pray corte utat illud in a fabulae convivium, right? I pray that you, you know, lead me to that ineffable banquet, right? But he calls the Eucharist sometimes, or sacrum convivium, right? Now, in 127, he talks about how this power is found without the other powers, but not vice versa. In bodies, at least, right? This power is able to be separated from the others, but it is impossible in mortal things. Notice the exclusion he's making there, right? That the other be separated from this one. Notice, the plants, to some extent, in some way, nourish themselves, right? They grow and they reproduce, right? All the animals do the same thing, don't they? And even man does the same thing, right? So you can find nourishing and growing and reproducing without sensing, as you do in the plants, right? Without emotion, as you have in the plants, right? And without understanding and willing, like you have in man. But you don't find the higher things in mortal things, he says, right? You don't find sensing or emotions without finding what? Nourishing and growing and reproducing, right? And you don't find an animal that understands, like man does, and wills, who doesn't also, what? Eat and grow and reproduce. And notice the exception he makes. But it is impossible in mortal things that the others be separated from this one, huh? Because in the angels, right? And in God, you have, what? Understanding and willing, without sensing, right? The emotion. And without, what? Growing and reproducing and eating, yeah. So it's metaphorically, huh? You know, that Anisha says, you know, the higher angels are as food to the Lord's. You know, Thomas has to explain the words of St. Paul, you know, where he says, talking about the fatherhood of God the Father, right? After whom all fatherhood is named in heaven and on earth, right? And Thomas says, what does he mean? On earth we know what, you know, there are human fathers and animals even have father, right? Mother. But angels, right? One angel is not the father or mother of an angel, right? Thomas says, well, we speak of fatherhood there in the way we speak of a teacher as being a father, right? Okay. And the way, what is it? St. Catherine of Siena called St. Agnes of Montepulciano. You ever heard of her? St. Agnes of Montepulciano. She called her mother, right? Spiritual mother, right? Okay. An abbot, I guess, means what? Yeah, yeah. So in that sense, you have fatherhood in the angels, right? Because the higher angel illumines the lower angel, right? Like the teacher does. And the abbot might instruct, right? That's the way Thomas understands that fatherhood in heaven as well as on earth. But no, it's in a strict sense that one angel, angels don't reproduce, right? So it's very significant that Aristotle says, this power, the powers of what? Nourishing yourself, right? Power of growing, power of reproducing. These powers, these sense-living powers, can be separated from the other powers, like the power to sense and the power to what? For emotions, right? And the power to understand and to choose and so on. But they can't be separated from it in what? Mortal things, he says, right? I think that's what he's saying there, right? This is apparent, he says, in the planets. For not one other power of the soul is present in these, only these basic ones. Living, therefore, is present in living things with such a principle. But now the animals, he says in 128, they have something beyond this, right? Maybe that they're able to sense. Even the animals, some low ones that don't move from one place to another, right? But they have sensation. For things which should not move or switch place but do have sensation, we call animals and not only, what? Living, right? So he's using the word living there for the lowest common denominator in a sense, right? That's common to all living bodies, right? They take in some kind of nourishment, right? Some kind of food, right? And they grow and they reproduce themselves in some way. And he makes an analogy here. Of the senses, touch is present in all firsts. And so he's going to go to say that touch can be found without the higher senses, but you don't find the higher senses without the sense of what? Touch, right? And so there might be some of these lower forms of life that don't go from one place to another, but they seem to react and touch them, or if there's something that comes in contact, they can eat it, right? They don't need the senses like eyes and ears or smell, which are the senses of what? Of distance, right? It's just a touch and maybe taste, which is a kind of touch, because they only react to what comes in contact with them. So they don't need the senses to go from one place to another. But the animals that hunt at it have a sense of smell and a sense of sight and hearing, right? This touch is present in all first. Just as the nutritive power is able to be separated from touch and from all sensation, thus touch can be separated from the other senses. We call the nutritive power that part of the soul in which even plants share. But all animals appear to have the what? At least the sense of touch, not the higher senses. We will say later through what cause each of these occurs, right? Now, however, let this much alone be said that the soul is a principle of the things named, and is defined in a way by these, by the powers of nutrition, sensation, and, let's see, our thinking and motion. Now, you've touched upon some difficulties here, which is not going to entirely clear up here, but just look at them a bit. But whether each of these powers is a soul or part of a soul, and if part, whether it thus that it is separable in account alone or even in place, about some of these is not a difficult thing to see, but some present a difficulty. For just as among plants, some being divided, appear to live, even being separated from each other, as if there is in these a soul, one in act in each plant, but many in ability, many in potency. So when you divide the plant and both ones live, each one has a what? Soul, right? And that's because there isn't much diversity of what? Tools, right? Or organs in them, right? And this seems to be true even as some of the lower forms of life, like he talks about certain insects, like the worms, right? We seem to divide them and both parts move around, right? Okay. For each of the parts is sensation, motion according to place. But is sensation, then also imagination and appetite, meaning what? Desire, right? For wherever there is sensation, there is also what? Pain and pleasure. Wherever there is sensation, there is a sense of touch, right? At least. Where there is a sense of touch, there is pain and pleasure. And where these are, there is also what? Desire, because you want what is pleasant and you want to avoid what is painful, right? So even these things are attached to the floor of the ocean and seem to only touch, but you stick them with a pen and they'll react to it that this is not pleasant to them, right? Okay. So the desiring powers within, some of them at least, will follow upon the fact that you have sensation. It kind of shows that through the fact that if you have sensation, you have at least touch, right? And if you have touch, you have pleasure and pain, and then you're going to have desire for the pleasure and aversion for the pain. Okay? But in these lower forms of life, as he's talking about, where you don't have much diversity of organ, maybe you have enough in both parts that if you cut it, both parts have what they need to function, right? Or if you cut a man in half or something like that, the two parts are going to live because the two parts don't have all the parts that you need to live. That's why he gives man or even a dog an example of a substance before a plant, because a plant always seems to be what? Able to be divided into two substances, right? It's close to that, huh? And also certain lower forms of life. But then in these cases, it seems that throughout the body you have these powers, rather than this power in this part and this power in that part. Now in 133 again, this is kind of like a footnote at this point, right? About the power of the mind or consideration, nothing is yet clear. But it seems to be a different kind of soul, right? He's talking about the human soul, right? And this alone can be separated, right? As the eternal from the corruptible, right? And he's already hinting there at what he's going to show in the third book, right? That the human soul is the one that can be, what? Exist in separation from the body. And that's because it has a power that is not in the body. It is manifest from these considerations, however, that the remaining parts of the soul are not separable, as some say. But as we'll see later on more clearly, even these parts that might be in the same part of the body, they differ in definition, right? Even though they might not have a different location, huh? So the sense of touch, for example, might be throughout the body, right? Yet the sense of touch differs from the sense of sight, right? Even though my eye has touch as well as sight, huh? They're two different powers for you. But it is manifest that these remaining parts of the soul are different in account or definition. For being sensitive and being opinative are different, huh? If even sensing and opining are different, we'll find out later on what they are. Similar in each of the other parts mentioned, huh? Here, check a little bit there. I love Christoph's words sometimes. 133 there is translated, about the power of mind or consideration, right? The Greek says, peri-de-tu-nu, okay? Well, nu is, well, that's a genitive in there, but you should give it in the nominative. Nus, right? Okay? Jared Stower uses often his name for the understanding, right? But then, easy consideration, well, what he says, Kai teis theoretikes dunamelis. Okay? He calls it nus, which is one word, right? And then he calls it the, what? Theoretikes dunamelis, huh? Dunamelis is the Greek word for what? Theoretikes, right? Theoretikes, right? Theoretikes, right? Theoretikes, right? Theoretikes, right? Theoretikes, right? Theoretikes, right? Theoretikes, right? That comes the Greek word for what? Theorea is the Greek word for what? Theorea is the Greek word for what? Theoretikes. Looking. Looking, yeah. Like you can generally sometimes call these things theorems, right? What's a theorem? Something to look at. With the eye of the soul, right? So he calls it the theoretikes, right? The looking power, right? Writing a little bit of Shakespeare's definition there, right? The reason, huh? It's the ability for a large discourse. Looking before and after, right? Aristotle will have another word later on. We'll see it in the Greek text here, though. When he says distinguish the powers, he uses the word dia nuerike, in distinguishing reason from the other powers, right? But dia nuerike is the idea of knowing one thing through another. And it's almost like a synonym, therefore, what Shakespeare means by what? Discourse. Discourse, yeah. That's kind of interesting. If you look at the posterior analytics, you know, in the beginning of the posterior analytics, Aristotle was showing how all dia nuerike knowledge is through pre-existent knowledge. So he's using dia nuerike as an adjective, right? For that kind of knowledge, where one thing . . . .