De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 18: The Five Powers of the Soul and Four Grades of Life

Transcript
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...devotion or something to propagate the mystery of the sacred heart, Christ, you know, you always go back to, you know, Margaret Mary on a cult, you know, but then you go, I mean, the literature, you know, on that matter, then you go back to some of your saints and go back to the great, I mean, some of these, you know, saints are preparing the way for, you know, most of these revelations, I mean, you know, even the Lord's, they're not, you know, things all together new, you know, I mean, nobody ever heard of it, you know, you know, it's not as if the sacred heart of Mary was not, I mean, Christ. It was not heard of before, Margaret Mary on a cult, or, there's no devotions to the sacred heart before then, you know, or, you know, so all these women saints, you know, love Christ more than I do, you see, they're going to see Him more clearly than I am, and so all this study, you know, is, you know, going to be a straw compared to what they see, you see. So, you know, like Guston says, you know, talking about the Bible, there are more things that he didn't understand that he did understand, right? I don't know if I would say exactly the same thing about Aristotle, you know, but I mean, you know, I read Aristotle and Thomas, I read them a long time in my life, but they're probably, you know, I mean, there's a lot of things I don't understand fully, right? And even Thomas didn't understand fully everything that Aristotle said, right? And you might want to work on more, you know, but... I could say it, you know, he's... It's not the same stuff, I don't know what Jesus is, you know, I pray to Thomas, you know, that everything we naturally desire to understand will understand when we have video vision, right? Otherwise, it would not be our last in, right? I mean, primarily, you know, seeing God as he is, but, you know, understand, you know, the universe, you know? Mm-hmm. Maybe. The cosmologists try to understand when it's the only same thing, right? What's that book I'm reading at the table? Was that the last... The Intellectual Life by Sergei Lot or something like that? Okay, I do. Like, in the article that we had me, in the article, you know, the picture of me there, you're talking about devotion, right? I don't know if you ever talked about it, but it's kind of interesting when they asked St. Francis for permission to teach theology in the Franciscan order, which is not a very intellectual order, you know, compared to the Dominican order, you know? Mm-hmm. And St. Francis, I've seen that there's a lot of the text, you know, an official thing. Well, he saw the need for them to state theology, right? But he says, he gave permission, provided it does not extinguish the spirit of devotion. That's actual words, right? That's, right? Mm-hmm. And it's kind of interesting, right? Devotion, of course, is what? The principal act of the virtue of religion, right? Which is, among all the more virtues, the one that is the closest to the theological virtues, huh? So, but maybe because knowledge inflates, as St. Paul says, right? It will be the occasion for pride, right? That sort of thing. Um, it will extinguish the spirit of devotion, right? In a way, you could say that, you know, faith is ordered to hope and hope to charity, right? And Thomas argues that hope is a greater virtue than faith, right? When he takes up, he begins to assume a theologiae there, you know, he, and he's saying that theology is a science. He quotes, uh, best in there, it's a science for which faith is engendered, nourished, strengthened, and defended, right? So the whole theology is seen as ordered to what? Faith, right? But faith is ordered to hope, and hope eventually to what? Love, right, huh? Well, of course, hope and devotion are very closely related, huh? And you can see that because of their connection with prayer, right? See, devotion is a primary act of religion, and a secondary act of religion is prayer, right? Devotion is in the heart, the will. Prayer is an act of reason, but it's commanded by the will, right? And, uh, but as Augustine and Thomas, they take up, you know, Christian doctrine according to faith over charity, they always consider prayer with hope, right? They're very close, right? If you look at Thomas' thing there in the Our Father there, and the dispositions of will, right? Five things that must be in a prayer, right? Two of them are more in the sight of reason, but three in the will. So, basically, you know, the things are what, are, um, hope and, uh, devotion and, uh, because humility is the third thing, I think. These are five things for? The prayer is recta, ordinata, uh, devote, devout, humble, that'd be hope, right? Yeah, confident hope, yeah. But recta means you're asking for the right things, right, in your prayer. Ordinata in the right order, right? So, he's showing how, the Our Father, you're asking for the right things, right? Not saying, O God, make me wealthy, O God, make me... But also in a proper order, right? The Christ assigns them, right? But then he'll talk about the other three things. But if you go through the Inchiridium intelligences, you know, you'll, you can kind of see how they mention sometimes devotion, right? You know? It's kind of understood in all of them, in the text, because they mention all. And they talk about humility, right? Mm-hmm. And they talk about hope, right? It's kind of the three things, right? Mm-hmm. So... Do you ever form the definition for devotion, and do you ever thought that in example, now, when I think about that? Yeah, well, you know, just kind of start with the word itself means, you know, kind of like, it's related to the word vow, right, huh? You know, it's kind of bound, you know, in your heart to God, right? Oh. Do you want to render to God what is to Him, right? Mm-hmm. But, you know, look at Thomas' text again. Mm-hmm. That goes along with... But I'm just saying, you know, that it's kind of interesting that our friend, St. Francis there, said, it's okay, provided you don't extinguish the spirit of, what, devotion, yeah. And sometimes I call that theology that deals with hope and prayer and, if it's sort of with charity, I call it kind of, what, spiritual theology, that's the phrase we use sometimes, right? Would you say that as soon as the loggiae is spiritual theology, I don't think that would be the name you'd give it, probably, huh? The spiritual theology is ordered more to hope and charity. In what sense? You want to assume that we're talking about hope and... Well, see, yeah, I see, that word spirit, in a way, you know, when Thomas explains why the Holy Spirit, it's called spirit, right? And he gives, sometimes you give an explanation, you know, simply that the Holy Spirit is best known, in a way, or hidden, right? And therefore, just use the common names, like Holy and Spirit, which apply to God, you know, God is the spirit, he's holy, right? Okay. So he keeps a common name, right? Especially. But then other times, Thomas will say, but there's something in the word spirit, right? Wind and breath, right? That fits love and its power to move things and sports, right? So in that sense, spirit could be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, right? Okay, nothing we can call the Father Spirit, you know. Spirit goes, Spirit will, right? And so. And you know how the Holy Spirit is sometimes even attributed to him, he groans in our heart, right? In our prayers, you know, he's kind of a heart, texting, explaining exactly how, you know, but he's inspiring our prayer, right? But therefore, it's the, all right, the Holy Spirit is, we, you know, appropriate to him, right? Charity, right? We say, come Holy Spirit, fill the hearts of thy faithful, and kind of love the Father. We say, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy Spirit, come Holy love, right? Appropriate to the, you know, Holy Spirit. So in that sense of what Spirit might seem to fit more hope and prayer and love, right? And therefore, spiritual theology is more, more... Was the hope part of God that he's the power of love and he's got... Yeah, yeah, I kind of toy with it, you know, the definition, you know, the theology in the sense of the Summa Theologiae, right? Summa Gentilis. You might, you know, take Anselm's definition, right? It's what? Seeking... Yeah, Fides Quere in Delectum, right? Faith or belief, right? Seeking, understanding, right? That's not a bad definition in some ways, right? Now, I'm going to imitate that, St. Anselm, in spiritual theology. And the definition he came up with was hope seeking love. Which makes some sense, I think. Hope seeking love. Which works of scripture are most exclusively about charity? Every book isn't something about charity and love God, but which ones are exclusively about this? Song of Songs. Yeah, yeah. Now, Song of Songs, the name is interesting there, isn't it, right? Because there's a connection between music and love, huh? Do you know, there, give me that copy, I have it, or what the hell's talking about? Paul the Sixes talked there on music and love and so on. It's really kind of a, you know, Colazio, there are texts from Augustine, right? You know? And very interesting texts from Augustine, right? Augustine, you know, say, about the one who we love and want to sing, you know? And singing is a natural sign of love, right? Okay. I think you see this, you know, in secular music, too, right? Mm-hmm. In opera, you know? Love, well. I mean, how natural it is, you know, and it's great love arias, right? You see? And I think the Kierkegaard is pretty good when he says that, I don't know if you read Kierkegaard in Don Giovanni, you know? The Don Giovanni of Mozart, huh? Is the opera what the Iliad is, the epic. In other words, this is it, the Iliad, right? There's never going to be a greater opera than Don Giovanni. It can't be. And that if Ibe wanted to, you know, maintain Mozart, right? You could do it by Don Giovanni over again, right? It's a bit different. Don Giovanni has got all kinds of love represented in it, right? You know? It's got a universal picture of love, right? But it seems so significant about it being the opera of operas, right? If you really know that now, you can recognize that as being the opera of operas, right? That's it. But there's the connection between music and what? And love, right? But that's in the very title of the Song of Songs. Now, the second work is the songs, right? Which are the musical origin of the title, of the instrument, right? But the songs are more a book of what? Prayer, right? It's already something musical, right? Bis or wat? Pequanta, isn't it in the scripture? He sings twice, he prays twice, he sings, right? Okay. Okay. Okay. So, I have a question to you. You got to go, I don't know. You're the example, isn't it? Yeah, you're going to give up. I didn't say that you were the one. So, um… It was twice, he sings. What? You were saying how we prays twice, he sings. Yeah, yeah, actually that's an example, right? The musical connection between these things, right? And, uh, but the, uh… The musical mode, I mean, is different than the mode of the Summa, right? That's not spiritual theology. In some books it will say spiritual theology, but it's… It's more like doing what the Summa does, but about… Yeah, no, no. It's a little bit different the way it proceeds, see, you know? Going back there, I just kind of got thinking about things again, because I was thinking on that remark about devotion, right, that you had in your thing there, right? Mm-hmm. And this, what, what, Brother Richard one time, a little thing from the Franciscans, you know, and had the very likely text there, you know, where, uh, that's where I got this, um, where, uh, Francis had given the permission, right? But, but the qualification, you could say, or what I'm going to call, you gave permission for the teaching of theology in the Franciscan order, provided that it does not extinguish the spirit of devotion, right? Mm-hmm. As if there was a, what? Opposition. Not an opposition, but a certain danger there, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. But part of the danger is because, uh, the way of proceeding, so to speak, right, is not the same, right? Mm-hmm. And, uh, if you go back and just look at, you know, Shakespeare's words on music and love, you see, perfectly understands that connection, right? So I have a lot of things like church sometimes, you know? Mm-hmm. But, um, so that was kind of my imitation of St. Cancer myself, hope-seeking love, right? Mm-hmm. Now, Father Harden kind of defines devotion as being willing to do what God wants at any time. Kind of, as I see in a nutshell, as he says. It kind of fits in balance in your heart to God. Well, it's about obedience, though. It's obedience. Yeah, it runs to God with His due to Him. That was, you put something along those lines, well, it's simple. See, see, when Thomas explained the devotion in the Our Father there, Mm-hmm. So prayer has to be developed, he says, right? And, um, when it's reflected in the Our Father is when we say Our Father, right? And then there you have the love of the Father, right? The Father's name of love. And ours is love from your, you know, neighbor and so on. And Thomas' devotion proceeds from love, right? Mm-hmm. So I think we'd say even in human affairs, right, you know, we're devoted to somebody that we love, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So if we love God and love a neighbor, then we're going to be devout in this spiritual sense, right? So there's a connection between devotion and love, right? At the same time, because devotion is the fundamental act of religion, whose second act is prayer, but with other acts as sacrifice, you know, sacrifice and that sort of reflection, all these other things. Um, and these are related very much to what? Hope also, though, right? Because hope is, is, uh, very much to end up with prayer, right? The fundamental act of religion, that's a big statement, isn't it? Yeah, I mean, look at Thomas' secundi secundi when he takes up justice, right? And the church is like justice, and religion is like justice, right? Religion is giving to God his due, right? Okay? And then he stirs the act, he makes devotion, the fundamental act. He's very close to, he's going to say, in other places, the religion is the virtue closest to, the moral virtue closest to, uh, the theological virtues, huh? So faith, hope, or not, would be more a part of religion? Well, in some sense they speak of interior sacrifice, right? You know, you give yourself to God, your intellect, and your will to God, your faith, you know, the church. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, stream from the lights of our minds, order whom our images, and rouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise God. Help us to understand all that you're between. God, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. I couldn't help but think of this chorus this morning. The reading was from, I think, the 8th chapter of the prophet Hussi. And he's talking about the idolatry and so on, and how the statues, you know, that they're worshipping. They have eyes, but they see not. They have ears, but they hear not. They have nose, but they don't smell. Of course, I don't know how many parts of the body, you know, but they, you know, exactly what Aristotle was talking about. You know, an eye that doesn't see, an ear that doesn't hear, is an eye or an ear equivocally, okay? I remember just thinking about that, right? That if the, you know, the eye was, you know, a natural body of a life and potency, its soul would be its power of seeing, right? So if it lacks that power of seeing, it's not really an eye, right? Except equivocally. It's like when you speak of a dead man. Well, a dead man, he's a man? No. A dead man is, you're going to call a dead man a man. What kind of a man? He's a dead man. You're using the word man equivocally. It's not like saying, you know, white man or black man, you know, where you're still a man in the same sense of the word, right? But a living man and a dead man are not a man in the sense of the word. So, before we go on now to Chapter 3 here, just look very briefly at the Church's two texts there from the Consuls I mentioned. Now, you probably have some ones, of course, in Korean symbol arm, but this is kind of an interesting little volume that they put out, I think, during the Second Vatican Council. I have a little handbook in case someone wanted to refer to the official documents of the previous twenty academic councils. So, you've got all that in text there, right? One of the English editions, you know, they don't follow that order. They follow kind of the order of doctrine, huh? And this is one that, actually, Ron is involved in, but Nuna Russe, you know. Oh, yeah. So, it's kind of an interesting thing here. So, I'll give you the English text here a little bit here. This is, the first one is from the General Council of Vienna, or Vienna, I guess it is. 1311, 1312. And this particular part is against the errors of Peter, John, and Liew. Now, a lot of this is not relevant to what we want to say here, but. Well, Liew was one of the leading figures of the spirituals in the great struggle over poverty in the Franciscan order. They favored the evangelical idea of poverty in all strictness, as opposed to the opposite tendency among the conventionals. In his lifetime, he was called before the general chapter of his order in Paris. After his death, his teaching was once more indicted by the conventionals in order to hit up the spirituals by condemnation of the leader of their party. The question came before the Council of Vienna, where, among other things, his doctrine of the relation of body and soul is dealt with. That's the part we interested in. Is it always doctrine of what, the relation of body and soul? The relation of body and soul, they're dealt with, yeah. How do you spell his name? Last name is O-L-I-E-U. Yeah, that's in Bo-L-I-U. In the name of S-V-I-U, huh? Bo-L-I-U. Peter, John, you. So this is the text there, the relevant part here. Further, with the approval of the said Holy Council, we reject this erroneous and contrary to the truth of the Catholic faith. Any doctrine or position which rashly asserts or calls into doubt that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not truly and of itself the form of the human body. So it's both erroneous, a mistake, an error, and contrary also to the Catholic faith, to deny that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not but the form of the human body. So that the truth of the pure faith shall be known to all, and that the entry of all errors that might step in shall be barred, or we define that from now on, whoever shall presume to assert, defend, or obstinately hold that the rational intellectual soul is not in itself and essentially the form of the human body is to be censured as a, what, heretic, right? So it's actually considered, since the Council of Vienna, they're heretical not to accept, right? And this again comes up in the Fifth Lateran General Council, 8th Session in 1513, so this is about, what, 200 years later, right? This involved Pietro Pomponazzi, huh? Okay? And who was teaching kind of a false doctrine about the soul, huh? Influenced by the Veribus and so on, huh? So it says, Since the sower of Kakao, ancient enemy of the human race, has dared to oversow and to cause to grow in the field of the Lord certain most pernicious errors, always rejected by the faithful, in particular concerning the nature of the rational soul, that it is mortal, huh? Or that one and the same soul is found in all men. And since some people rash in their philosophical thinking, assert this to be, at least philosophically speaking, true, We therefore, are desirous of applying the appropriate remedy to such mischief, and with the approval of the Second Council, condemn and reject all those who assert that the intellectual soul is mortal, or one soul common to all men, or who call in doubt that the soul is not only truly and of itself, and essentially the form of the human body. As a state in the canon of Clement V, that's what I quoted earlier, our predecessor of blessed memory, issued by the Council of the End, but is also mortal, and can be multiplied in accordance with multiple bodies, like we're talking about, into which it has been infused, has been and will be so multiplied, huh? So I just, those are two main texts there, you know, I believe those are repeated also, a reference to me to this, in the, uh, Catechism of the Catholic Church, huh? There's a regular text, the one again, this one here. So that's in the, uh, Fifth Lateral Council, 1513, huh? Now, if you want the Latin, I can do the Latin here too, but, English will suffice for today, okay? So there are some things that can be known, both by, what, natural reason alone, and by, what, faith, right? And this business about the soul being the form of the body, is, uh, something that, both the natural light of reason, and the light of faith, they're moving, huh? So, let us turn now to, chapter, three here, huh? Fifth Lesson in Thomas, huh? So let's look on page 10 of our text, number 139 there. Of the aforesaid powers of the soul, of the aforesaid powers of the soul, all are present in some, namely in man. Some of them are in some, and one alone in some. Now he gives a distinction of five, what, genera powers. Now we call them genera, because each is a genus having under it more than one, what, hour, right? And the first one in your text there is called, what, in the translation, nutritive, huh? And the Greek word is threptikon, okay? And threptikon in Greek can refer to feeding or to growing. Growing, okay? So perhaps the English words are more clear than to say nutritive, although we sometimes tend to use that word. But the feeding or growing power, okay? And this is one genus, huh? So when you take up that power, we have to talk about food. That won't make you hungry when you read about food, huh? I can remember getting in trouble in grade school there. We're doing a geography lesson, and we're talking about some country where peanuts are growing. And I'm there, kind of, pretending to eat true peanuts. And sister says, you know, what are you eating, Dwayne? I said, I'm just pretending to eat peanuts. Well, stop pretending to eat peanuts. I wasn't eating peanuts, pretending to eat peanuts. That's a geography lesson on this peanut country, whatever it was. So that's the first power he mentions. And we'll see eventually that you'll distinguish under that first power, the power to obviously feed yourself, right? The power to what? Grow, right? And last but not least, but actually greatest, the power to what? Reproduce yourself, right? And it's that genus of powers that the plants alone, that's the only one that they have. But the animals and man have that genus of powers, plus some other ones that man will have some that the other animals don't have. And some animals will have some that the others don't have. That's the first one he mentions, huh? The second one he mentions here is the sensitive, huh? In Greek there, aestheticon, huh? Aesthesis. They could call that, you know, the sensing power, right? The power of sensing. And that will include, yeah? Yeah, yeah. It's kind of a terrible word, you know? It kind of puts the emphasis upon the senses of the man knowing rather than the object, right? It's kind of a modern invention, right? Yeah. Now, the sensing power is a genus again, and as we'll find out later on, it includes not only what we call later on the outward senses, the sense of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, but also certain inward senses, huh? Which we'll talk about at the beginning of the third book, huh? Now, the third genus he mentions of powers is the, in Greek, oreptikana, and this is translated in Latin by a petitive. He takes over the Latin word there, huh? But the basic idea is the desiring powers, huh? Okay? Apetitus is a word for desire, huh? And oreptikana is that the idea in Greek of the desiring powers. And as we'll find out, there are certain desiring powers that all animals have because they have sensation. So acts like hunger and thirst, sexual desire, desire to reproduce, and so on. These desires, right, will be common to not only man, but the other animals, right? But then there'll be certain desiring powers that are, what, follow upon reason, or one desiring power. Okay? So, you could translate, as he does, a petitive, but if you use the English word, maybe more clear, the desiring powers, huh? Okay? Then the fourth one he mentions is the kinetika and katatopana. Katatopana, what is a mover according to what? Place, right? And by this he means we go from one place to another, right? And of course, the higher animals, like the dog and the cat and the horse and so on, and the insects even, they go from one place to another, right? But there are some forms of animal life that are hard to distinguish sometimes from plants, huh? But they seem to have at least a sense of touch, maybe, maybe taste, but they are fixed to the floor of the ocean or something like that, and they don't go from one place to another, right? But the higher animals will have this, and along with that, to have senses that enable them to know things at a distance, like the sense of sight or smell, hearing and so on, right? Okay. And that would belong to this fourth gen? Genes of powers? Well, the fourth, actually he's going to point out later on in the fourth or third book, the sensing or knowing powers in general and the desiring powers move this fourth kind of power, huh? Okay? Yeah. But this fourth kind of power is found not in all the animals, right? Yeah. But only in the higher animals, right? Right. And the higher animals that have, if you want to move from place to place, will have those higher senses that know things at a distance. It's like sense of sight, hearing, and smell, right? Okay. And then the fourth kind of power, which he translates here as the, what? Thinking power, right? Okay. Now, the Greek word is, I think I mentioned it before here, is this word, diano-wetikana. And this is the word, a little different verb form, the grammatical form, but this is the form that, or the adjective or style uses in the beginning of the posturalytics. When he says that all knowledge that is diano-wetikana is from preexistent knowledge. And if you look at the beginning of the posturalytics, he has an induction there, right? So he shows how, you know, the sciences like geometry, they proceed from preexistent knowledge. Like you reason from the axioms and the postulates and the definitions, right? And from one theorem to another theorem, right? And then he points out how in dialectic you reason from opinion, right? You reason by induction from things that you sense and so on. And even rhetoric, huh? You reason by example. You take a similar thing from the past and reason from that to some like event in the future. Or even the end to me, right? You reason from likely wood and from signs. So he makes a kind of induction there, huh? That all knowledge that is diano-wetikana is from preexistent knowledge. So, notice that word is similar to the word discourse in Shakespeare. Because discourse means what? Yeah, it means running and means coming to know, right? Coming to know the unknown through the known, right? So it implies a running from one thing to another, right? The mind is knowing one thing to another, right? Now that's not all that the mind does, because if the mind had to know everything it knows to something else, it couldn't begin to know anything, would it? What's interesting, there may be names at this point, what we sometimes, or he sometimes in the text, calls nous, right? Understanding, intellectus. He uses this word here. He uses this word here. He uses this word here. He uses this word here. Which is like the word Shakespeare uses in defining what? Reason. Now if you look at Plato in the 6th Book of the Republic, he's distinguishing four kinds of knowing, using knowing in the loose sense. At the top he has something that is close to loose or natural understanding, right? And dialectic which leads to that. And then he has geometry, he uses that same word, the annoying, okay? So, you could translate the thinking power, but maybe even using Shakespeare's words, you could call it the discursive power, right? Although the word discursive is not so familiar now in English, right? But the Greek word has that sense, and it's used by Plato and Aristotle in that sense usually, okay? And, you know, I compare it sometimes to the fact that he names the third power there. He called them the, what? Erecticon, or the repetitive, or the desiring power, right? And, you know this, huh? Desiring is a bit like what? Reasoning. In what sense is desiring like reasoning? Yeah? And it's more like emotion too, right? It's more like emotion, and it's in order to get something you don't have, right? Okay? But, it's interesting that we tend to name the desiring power from desire, rather than from liking or what? Loving. Although liking or loving is really more basic than desire. As I mentioned before, I think, huh? And when I like something or love it, if I don't have it, then I want it or desire it. And if I get it, I'm pleased or joyful, right? So really, desire, he supposes, liking. I wouldn't want a beer, or I wouldn't want a wine, I wouldn't want candy, I wouldn't want dinner, I wouldn't want steak or chicken or whatever it is, unless I like those things, right? Okay? But it's interesting, huh? It's named from what? The act is more like motion. Things in motion sooner catch the eye, Shakespeare says, and what not stirs. And it's interesting that the act of reason that grabs our attention, is the act of reason that is more like emotion, rather than understanding. And the act of the desiring power that grabs our attention more, is the one that is more like emotion, namely desire or wanting. Because that's it, huh? And of course, I suppose, when you don't have what you like, you're more aware of that, right? That struggle involved, maybe, in pursuit, right? In the same way, when you're thinking or reasoning, you don't know yet, right? Your mind's a kind of emotion, you know? It's not bad because of thinking there either, because thinking in a way, as opposed to understanding, right? Thinking is more like what? Emotion. When I'm thinking about something, my mind seems to be emotional. And understanding, you know, Rita, I found that the Greek is supposed to jump out of the bathtub. He saw the solution, some different questions. Rita, I found it! It was right down the street, and I was like, it was a towel, I guess. And the point was, he was still thinking at that point, right? Because that's what I'm saying, because he's so excited, right? But so long as I'm thinking, I'm still kind of what? In motion in my mind. That's one of the senses of Wacus there, that Thomas explains. Ratsiabiliter, when the mind continues in motion, doesn't come to rest. As opposed to epistemia, which means, as we said before, coming to a halt, or a stop. So, as it guards the names that the translator here gives, as I say, nutritive could be translated more familiarly in English with what? The feeding or growing power, right? Both senses of the Greek word. Sensitive is okay, but I tend to say sensing more, right? You know, sensing powers. Appetitive, maybe more familiar in English with the desiring powers, right? The wanting powers, right? More than according to places, I wouldn't change that much. The thinking power, if you understand thinking there, it's having the idea of, you know, motion, right? Knowing one thing to another. Okay? That's okay. If you want to have a Shakespeare's definition, you can call it the discursive power, right? And we'll make that point again when you come back, when he starts to distinguish between this last power here, the dia noetikon, as he calls it in the Greek, and the imagination, right? You'll do so not in terms, at first, of the imagination, knowing the singular, and reason, understanding, universal, but you'll use it in the terms of what? The freedom of imagination to imagine whatever he wants to imagine, almost, and reasons lack of freedom to think just anything, and it's need to have some reason to think this or that. Okay? Another example I gave you. You know, I can imagine a terrorist out there with machine guns that'll come in here and illuminate us, right? Okay? I don't have any reason to think there's a terrorist out there. I can imagine it, though, nevertheless, right? Imagine John Paul II walking in the door now, can't you? See? Okay? But I don't think that there are terrorists out there, right? I'm not free to think that John Paul is going to walk in here. Another minute, right? See? I have to have some reason to think there's a terrorist out there. Some reason to think John Paul II is making a visitation here to the Holy Trinity. Do you see that? See? And I have no such reason. But notice, to have a reason for thinking something is to go from one thing to another, right? Do you see that? So, when he first distinguishes that fifth power from imagination, which is still a sense power, a sensing power, he does so by its discursive act, right? Now, later on, you see what Guetheus says, you know, a thing is singular and sensed and universal and understood, but that's a harder thing to see, you know. So, just note, then, the importance of the way Aristotle names these, right? Now, Thomas, in his commentary, if you had a chance to look at it, he gives a kind of reason there why there are five genera of powers, right? Okay? That's kind of unusual the way he shows these five genera of powers, huh? And he begins by pointing out how, what's the most fundamental thing is its being or its existence, right? When you get to the case of the soul, and especially look at the higher souls, like the animal soul, or especially the human soul, you see two kinds of being that we have. We have a kind of material being, because we are our body, right? And our body is material, and we need certain things to keep our body living, right? And so on. We need water, just like the plants do, right? But then, with man's mind, his understanding, you have a kind of what? Immaterial being, huh? Okay? And this is something unique, huh? To living bodies, huh? You don't have this immaterial being at all in the, None living things, huh? They have merely material being, right? So corresponding to the material being, the preservation of that, is that first group of powers, right? I can eat. The feeding powers, right? We'll call them feeding powers. powers. The corresponding to this immaterial being, if you take it in the full sense of immaterial being, it would be that last power, right? The last one Aristotle mentions. Let's call it the thinking power. Of course, we get to the third book, of course, we'll see the reasons for thinking that would be what? Understanding the reason of man is not a body, right? The reason for not being the brain, as we sometimes think, right? Okay? Now, where do you put the Simpson powers? Are they a material power or an immaterial power? There's something immaterial about it, too, right? See? Because my eye, for example, receives the shape of everything in this, what, room, right? And it goes to, eventually, my memory, right? So if I go home tonight, I can remember you people by your shape and your color and so on. I can remember the shape of the room, maybe the windows and the fan and the chairs and the table, etc., right? Okay? But did I receive all these shapes and the things in this room in a material way? When I look at the fan, you know, does my eye become round? You know? The way that a piece of clay or a piece of wood would receive the shape, right? What is the difference in the way that a piece of wood or marble, let's say, under the guidance of Michael Angelo or some other artist, would receive your shape, right? And the way that I receive your shape through my eye, store your shape in my memory, right? If you cover my head, right? Would you find inside my head a little piece of bone with your shape on it? Or a piece of flesh or something like that, right? I seem to be able to receive the shapes of other things and their colors without losing the color or shape I have myself, right? And without what? And receive me in a way, not as my own shape, but as a shape of something else, right? Okay? So, but nevertheless, with the case of the senses, you're receiving in a bodily organ, right? So, sort of in between these two of them, and that's why we can speak of the sensing powers, huh? So he distinguishes three of those five, right? By the fact that the being of a thing is fundamental in it, but you have in the higher souls, at least, right? A kind of material being and a kind of immaterial being, plus one sort of what? In between, right? Okay? But then he points out that in the sort of immaterial reception of other things, what's received is like a form, right? And he says, following upon your form is some kind of information. So, following upon these powers here, you have the desiring powers, right? That's what he gets in the fourth one, right? And then if you know something and you desire it, then you go for it, right? And then you get the idea, right? Last one, we have to mention here, namely the Kinetikon, Kaptopopa now, but is moving according to what? Place, right? The mover according to place. So, now sometimes they will distinguish not only five kinds of powers here, five general powers, but they'll distinguish four grades of life, as he goes on to talk a little bit about the orders of these. And sometimes three, what? Souls, right? If you look at Heath's notes on the Pythagorean theorem, right? Interesting things about that, right? But one interesting thing about that is that what is the first right angle triangle on whole numbers? Is it 1, 2, 3? Or is it 2, 3, 4? Or is it 3, 4, 5? That's the first Pythagorean theorem in whole numbers. 3, 4, 5, yeah. Because 1, 2, 3. 3 is 9 squared, right? 2 is 4, 1 is 1. 4 and 1 don't have to 9, is it? It's not right angle triangle. 2, 3, 4. 2 squared is 4, 3 squared is 9, 4 and 9 are 13, right? 4 squared is what? 16. The first one is 3, what? 4, 5. Apparently the Egyptians had discovered that in particular, right? 3, 4, 5 is the first right angle triangle on whole numbers. So, I like to make use of 3, 4, 5, right? And, as I say, sometimes we distinguish 5 powers of life, living things, living bodies, 4 gradings of life, 5, and 3 souls, or 3 kinds of souls. And why this reduction from 5 to 4 to 3, huh? Well, I've just been going through, in a way, the reason why there are 5 generative powers, huh? Okay? Following Thomas' brief explanation of that. But now, as he's going to go on, and you see that in the text there, he's going to say, the feeding powers can be found without all the rest, right? The feeding powers and the sensing powers can be found without, what? The locomotive powers, and without the thinking powers, not vice versa. The feeding powers, the sensing powers, and the, what? Move according to place powers, moving according to place powers, can be found without the thinking powers, not vice versa. And then, like the thinking powers, immortals, he says, right? And I've found out these other 4, other 3. So, he's going to distinguish 4 grades of life, right? Those that have only the, what? Feeding powers, right? Including in the feeding, growing, and reducing, right? Okay? Okay? And then above that, those that have, in addition, the sensing powers, but not the, what? Moving powers, right? Those that have, in addition, the higher senses and the moving powers, and finding those on top that have the power of understanding, power of reasoning, and so on. And as I say, the order here, in mortals, is that the lowest one can be without all the rest, but not vice versa. The first two can be without the last two, but not vice versa. The first three can be without the power of understanding, but not vice versa. But the desiring powers don't give you a separate grade of life, why not? Yeah. Because where you have sensing powers, you always have some kind of desiring powers. Emotions, huh? Sense desire. And where you have the thinking power, you always have the will. Okay? So, the desiring powers go along with the sensing and thinking powers. So, they don't constitute a, what? Fifth grade of life, huh? Okay? They always go with the second grade, and also with that fourth grade, huh? You see that? So, although there are five powers of life, there's only four.