De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 20: Pleasures, Desire, and the Hierarchy of Souls

Transcript
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so as I say I use a phrase instead it's all a chosen life when Aristotle is in the metaphysics he's just comparing the philosopher to the sophist right and he says they differ by their choice of life right and you know the famous way of saying it is that the philosopher would rather what be wise than appear wise he had to choose between the two right why the sophist would rather appear wise than be wise so they differ by their choice right so I think what Aristotle is touching upon there is that the love of wisdom is a what dalexia right it's a chosen law right so the love of wisdom is not down here it can't be until your reason could distinguish between wisdom and other kinds of knowledge right not until your reason could see then the excellence of wisdom right could you really love it and be a lover of what of wisdom right but in Greek you see the word philosophia it comes to the Greek where the word for love there is philia right it's not the word eros okay which would mean more a sense love right but since that love is more sensible it's more known to us right and so you know in contemporary life when they use the word love they they're thinking of eros usually right but it kind of stands out that kind of love right so if we say somebody's a lover we're not thinking of a philosopher usually we're thinking of romantic love right but nevertheless you can speak of the wisdom right so before St. Paul the Greeks used agape yeah what would they use it for well again we're more familiar with the use of it in scripture you know Aristotle does he use that for me not particularly I don't think no he'll distinguish between eros say and philia right so when he says for appetite is desire and anger and will well let's say the Greek is epithumia which I would if I want to make more precise I would translate appetite as desire and then this is sense desire right and then anger what does it say it's not anger see anger seems to be a desire for what revenge you know a desire to get even as I say it doesn't include just that emotion you're talking about thumas right now he's going on to give the reason why if they have the sensing powers they also have the desiring powers all animals however have at least one of the senses namely what touch but in whatever sensation is present whatever has touch will also have what pleasure and pain right and we have pleasure or pain then you have desire for the pleasure and aversion for the what pain whatever these things are desire is also right but this is appetite for the pleasant so there the word is epithumia which is translated desire it's consistent in this translation there right and then when it goes on for this is appetite for the pleasancy then it goes back to the word orexes right so epithumia is the desire for what is pleasant to the senses so in a way the senses that's the way the senses know good and bad by what is agreeable or disagreeable to their what senses so they have a more limited way of knowing good and bad than reason does them I think I mentioned how you know you get to in ethics there you get to say John Stuart Mill and the epicoreans and the utilitarians for them the whole criterion of good or bad is what pleasure and pain right maybe they'll add to that maybe you know the greater pleasure the greater number or something right or the less so but some people then attack them saying what that their philosophy is what rescue right and I think I mentioned how Mill tries to reply to that tries to turn the what objection against those who object right and say you're the beast right because you're assuming that man has no pleasures that the beast doesn't have right now and there's something good in that reply but there's still something insufficient about it right and you know I kind of you know improve upon Mill as I mentioned I think before you know he distinguishes two kinds of pleasures right pleasures that we share with the beast and then the ones that only human beings seem to pursue right and of course he maintains that those who have tasted both pleasures prefer the human pleasures but just a matter of experience you know there's not there's any reason for it right well I say there's really following Austerle there's three kinds of pleasures right there's the animal pleasures and there's the angelic pleasures and in between there's the human pleasures and like suggested by Austerle's remark there that the pleasures of Mozart and the pleasures of Shakespeare and so on these pleasures are too high for the animals and too low for the angels see but they're most pleasingly proportioned to man because he's body and soul right so the animal pleasures we share with the other beasts although we have our pleasures of eating in a more refined way you know oat cuisine and so on but cook our food and season and so on but basically we have these pleasures in common with the other animals and then the pleasures of understanding the pleasures of understanding God understanding the soul we have those pleasures in common with the angels and with God but in an inferior way because we don't understand very well we'll have those pleasures more perfectly once we see God right you know scripture talks about that right but then there's these pleasures that are what human pleasures that kind of involve the union of body and soul the union of the senses and the reason right so as Mozart said right music can never be displeasing to the ear if it were it would cease to be music see but I played Mozart for years for my cats there I don't say for them but they're being present there and they seem to completely ignore Mozart right can't get through them right once in a while I pretend that they you know that I Mozart but I don't don't really seriously maintain that they do but you go out to the kitchen right and try to get a little sandwich meat or something out and try to be as quiet as you know opiate and you look down there's a tavern right there looking up at you when you're playing this music you know blah blah I mean a loud sound and it's deep right you know it's a thing to bring wax people where it is right there and but so he has anything to say right that there are pleasures that man enjoys right gather animals don't right that's kind of a partial answer to the objection that his philosophy is best sharing and you know Plato and Aristotle talk about how the common man doesn't taste these higher pleasures right so he tends to go to some excess in the lower pleasures and therefore it's you know you know you know you know you know more excusable, you might say, in the common man than it would be in the man who contains these higher pleasures, right? But nevertheless, if pleasure is your whole criterion for judging, right, which is to be pursued, then your way of judging is still the way of judging of a, what, beast, right? So he's not really entirely overcoming the objection that his philosophy is a philosophy for beasts, right? See? Although there's something to be said in what he's saying and worth saying to you, I think. But reason can see other reasons, right, for loving something besides the fact that it is, what, pleasant or real in some way to us, huh? In fact, reason can see reasons why truth or justice are desirable and they can do with pleasure, right? So we have a little excursion here to understand that one sentence there in 140. For appetite or desire is epithumia and thumas caibulasis, right? In the Greek, huh? Or in the Latin they say, concubisable and irascible and voluntary, right? But now, in the last sentence of 140, as we said here, he's giving a reason, right, why those who have the sensing powers also have the desiring powers. And the middle term there is what? Pleasure and pain, right? The pleasant and the painful. Now, in a somewhat similar way, he wants to point out how among the senses, touch and perhaps taste, which is a kind of touch, are common to all animals. Moreover, all animals have the sense of food. For touch is a sense of food. For all animals are fed by the dry and the moist and the hot and the cold. Well, touch is a sense of these, but they are fed by the other sense of those accidentally. For sound and color and odor contribute nothing to food, but flavor is someone to tangibles. Is that exaggerated or not? Because obviously our stuff doesn't mean that the food smells bad. But notice, hunger and thirst are desires. Hunger is for what is dry and hot. Thirst for what is moist and what? Cold, right? And those are the objects of the sense of what? Touch more, right? Flavor is like some seasoning of these, right? One must be more certain about these things. I'm going to make it more clear later on. But now let so much be said about them that in the living thing, huh? In the living things, having touch, desire also is what? Present, right? Once you have touch, you have pleasure and what? Pain, right? And therefore desire, huh? Now another thing you'd say about touch, of course, too, is that touch seems to involve the very what? Life of the body, right? Your body is being destroyed, right? By being cut up, right? It's by touch that you know this primarily, right? And if something's too hot, it's by touch, right? If something's too cold, right? It's by touch, right? Okay? He sets aside the imagination, which he'll investigate in the third book. But you've got to realize, too, that the word imagination has got some equivocation in it, too. We'll see. But in addition to these, now in addition to having the sensing powers, at least touch, and desiring powers, right? Which go together. In addition to these, in the higher animals, you could say the power of, what? Moving from one place to another is also present, right? And finally in sum, you have the, what? Thinking power and mind, huh? In men, huh? And should it be the case and some other such thing? He's hitting, right? At the angel of sin and God. Or something more honorable, right? Than man, huh? Okay? Now again, let's look at the Greek word there, huh? Sometimes if you look at the Greek word, you make certain connections with other texts, the various styles that you don't otherwise, huh? Now again, thinking power there, the Greek is dianoedikon, okay? And mind is what? Nus, huh? And we mentioned how the word dianoedikon, right? It's like the word, what? Discursive power, right? The power of moving from one to another. The power to know one thing to another. But nus is the word they translate in Latin by, what? Intellectus, right? And in, what? English by understanding. Understanding, yeah. Now, sometimes we use understanding as a synonym for reason, but it's being named from a little different act than reason, huh? Because reason is tied up with reasoning, which is discourse, right? Inoedikon, right? And nus is tied up with, what? Understanding, right? So in Greek you have nus, I'll kind of anglicize it here. In Latin that's translated usually intellectus, in English, understanding. Now, in English, of course, the word understanding can name the act, right? Or it can name the ability for that act, right? Intellectus usually names the power, intelligible by the act. But he also uses intellectus and nus to name one of the virtues of reason, which you understand naturally, or come to understand naturally without ever to reason it out. So Aristotle will use nus in the Nicomachian Ethics for the name of a virtue, of nus in this sense here, right? Thomas, in Latin, we use the word intellectus for this power that we have of understanding, but he also used the word intellectus for the name of that virtue corresponding to Aristotle's nus here, right? Now, in English, we could call that virtue understanding, right? I sometimes call it natural understanding, right? Because I translate, as I mentioned before, epistime, by reasoned out understanding, right? But, it's not bad just to call it understanding period, because it's not understanding that you don't have to reason out. So it's kind of just understanding period, right? So you can call it understanding or natural understanding. I call it natural understanding usually, but in the Nicomachian, they don't do through a natural name. They understand what they're talking about. But then they have another name here for what? when you reason something out on the basis of nus and other things, right? Then you have in Greek what they call epistime, another virtue. And so, you know, geometry would be called epistime, natural philosophy would be called epistime, right? This would be called epistime, they're engaging right now. Wisdom is an epistime, right? it's an epistime, it's an epistime, it's an epistime, it's an epistime, and in Latin they translate that by scientia. Now in English you could translate that by science, but the word science has been kind of taken over by what we call experimental science, which is not the same thing as this at all. So, sometimes I imitate the etymology episteme, which means coming to a halt or a stop. And then I explain it by the proportion of weightis that gives us an ridiculous tactic. Let me just repeat that. The way it says that reasoning is to understanding, as motion in a way is to rest, right? So when the mind is reasoning, it's going from one thing to another, right? And therefore it has an act like motion. When it's understanding, as the word stand indicates, the etymology there, it's what? It's penetrated something, it understands it, right? But it's not moving from one thing to another. Well then, I point out that motion can come before or after rest. When I'm in class I say, now, I'm at rest, right? This is before motion, but I'll see now. You can see. Now I'm at rest again, right? So you can speak of a rest before motion and a rest after motion, right? Well, can you speak of understanding both before and after reasoning? Or is that pushing the analogy too far? Well, some things we understand after we reason them out. But, if you understood nothing, then you would what? If you understood nothing before reasoning, you'd have nothing at all to what? Reason from. Reason from, right? So maybe there's an understanding that is before reasoning, an understanding that is after reasoning, right? Nepisteme in Greek means coming to a halt or a stop. So episteme in Greek names the understanding, right? That's after reasoning. It names, therefore, a reasoned out, a thought out understanding, right? Or the reasoning, the understanding before reasoning, what are you going to call that? I could call it natural understanding to contrast it with this reasoned out understanding. But the Greeks would simply call it neus, and this episteme. Thomas, the intellectus, and scientia, right? So anyway, you use the word neus there, and the word dinoetite, which, a lot of times you translate the word neus by what? Mind, huh? Okay? But intellect or understanding would be maybe more precise, but mind is sometimes used for, even if it goes on inside of us, you know? So mind includes, sometimes they include imagination, memory, sometimes even emotions, right? There used to be a column in the newspaper called mirror of your mind, which is dealing with people's psychological problems. Okay? So again, he's kind of consistent, at least in his translation here, right? Where he says, thinking power and mind, right? So thinking power is dinoetikan, right? And nus, right? Dinoetikan is a word we mentioned before, right? At the beginning of your thinking power, which he translated thinking power, the discursive power to use Shakespeare's word, right? You have another question? Yeah, I was just wondering about the use of hispene and scientia. Would the gifts of the Holy Spirit, you know, distinguish understanding and knowledge? Yeah, well again, that's another use of the words, yeah? Okay. Better not get into that, right? Okay. But there's some connection, you know, between the way those words are used there, right? Okay. As in men, he says, and if there's something such other or more, what, honorable, right? The definition of the soul that he's come up with is to all these particular souls. Mm-hmm. And instead of making the mathematical or arithmatical example that I gave, right, he gives it with what? Challenge. Yeah, yeah. It is clear, therefore, that the account of the soul and a shape would be one in the same way. For in the one case there is no shape beyond the triangle and the quadrilateral and the pentagon, right? And the consequent shapes, right? Nor in the other cases are so beyond the sorts mentioned. But there can be a common account with regard to shapes, which will then be fit all shapes, will be properly no shape. I think he's thinking a little more precisely there. He's talking about what Euclid calls a rectilineal plane figure, right? Okay. So the definition of rectilineal plane figure is common to what? Triangle, quadrilateral, pentagon, hexagon, and each of the other ones, right? Okay. And likewise the definition of soul, right, that we gave, it's the first act of a natural body composed of tools that's common to the plant soul and the animal soul and to the understanding soul, right? Okay. But there's no soul apart from those three souls, right? Okay. And likewise there's no shape, there's no rectilineal plane figure that is not either, in fact, a triangle or quadrilateral or pentagon or some other numbered side, huh? Similarly in the case of the souls mentioned. Whence it is laughable to seek, in these cases and others, a common account which will be the proper account of no beings and will not be of the proper indivisible species, while omitting such a proper account. In this consideration about shapes and about the soul are similar. For among shapes in the soul, the prior is always in the consequent impotency, as the triangle and the square are the nutritive and the sensitive. So he's thinking of the fact that any square or that matter, any parallelogram, you've got what? Some triangles, right? So the triangle is included in the quadrilateral, right? And so this is the way the souls are, right? What the plant soul has is in a way included in the animal soul, right? But something more. What the animal soul has is included in the understanding soul, but something more, right? The same way you can do with numbers, right? Aristotle sometimes creates the numbers, right? Two includes one, but something more than one, right? In a way there's a two and three, isn't it? But something more, right? Four, there's a, what? Three, but something, what? More, right? Sometimes they call this in my opinion a potestive hole, right? As if the human soul is a hole that has the whole power of the soul, right? As you go down, the grades of life to the plant soul, you get less and less of a whole power, which a soul can have, right? So sometimes they say the soul, the plant is a soul, sometimes they say it's part of a soul. Okay, but it's a part of the full power, huh? Whence one must ask, he goes on to 143 now. Whence one must ask about each of them, huh? What is the soul of each, right? Because what is the soul of the plant, and what is the soul of man, and what is the soul of the what? The beast, right? Okay? So we're not going to be satisfied just with knowing, what? The definition of the soul that we saw in the first part of this book, right? That the soul is the first act of a natural body composed of tools, right? We want to know... now what is the plant soul right and therefore you have to study each of these powers in particular to see right what the plant soul or the living soul if you take living in the those come down right there right the living soul and the sensing soul and the what understanding soul right and as you'll see these souls can be understood by the power that what completes them right okay just as four differs from three really by what it has in addition to three right that completes four that fourth one now so we're going to be distinguishing each of those particular kinds of soul and then as you know distinction leads on to a consideration of order right one must inquire due to what cause they are thus in sequence why is the sensing power not without the what feeding power right while the feeding power is separated from the sensing power in plants right again not one of the other senses is present without touch but touch is present without the others at least without smell or sight or hearing right for many of the animals have neither sight nor hearing nor the sense of smell but why is that so right you see and as sensing things some have the power of moving from one place to another well some do not last be the fewest things have reason and what thinking right okay now what are the words that he translates there by reason and uh thinking huh yeah probably the reason i don't know what yeah yeah yeah the greek word is uh logismana or the gizmos in the uh the uh gizmos in a greek dictionary probably give us the first meaning uh calculated right and then the reasoning right and maybe it means also the faculty of the ability to calculate and to again that's very close to what shakespeare is saying because when shakespeare says that reason is the ability for discourse uh the two chief discourses of our mind are uh counting and calculating right and then you know defining reason right so the gizmos has that sense of calculating and uh what reasoning now you can see in english now we tend to borrow the words from uh how do you are calculating and apply them to reasoning so the teacher says put two and do together and he means not add but he means what put two premises together and draw conclusion right and the hillbilly says i reckon that's so or figure that's so right but i reckon i figure originally you know probably applied to what how can you calculate yourself starting but again as i say it's close to the word discourse to me and we always hopefully everybody would deannoy right but it's almost like you know to understand through something right that knowledge brings out what it is so again aristotle uh uses those words when he's first distinguishing this from the others more than the words say knowing right which would be like to understand then if we had the word noetic in english every part to understand right there's usually more of these words right that indicate the movement of reason the discourse of reason because things and motions and it keeps the eye and whatnot when you're reasoning you seem to be doing something with your reason just understanding you don't seem to do anything and they said going back to the the proportion of waytheists huh that reasoning is to understanding like motion is to rest for rest you don't seem to be doing anything do you but god he understands everything and doesn't do any reasoning at all never reasons he understands reasoning but he doesn't reason okay never thinks anything out god hasn't thought on anything and yet he understands more than we understand by thinking out things i'm a very very very weak mind you know very weak of mortal things right in whatever reason is present in these all the rest of the powers are too while reason is not in all those in which each of these other powers is and some there is not even imagination well some live by this alone now talking about the animals that live by imagining right rather than by thinking but there's a different account in the case of the speculative mind he's going to distinguish between that and imagination in book three it's clear therefore that the most proper account of the soul is the accomplishes about each of these sorts of souls okay incidentally when thomas talks about man and the angels right you have these two words in latin you have intellectus ratio well sometimes he says the intellectus of the angel will call intellectus and intellectus of a man will call ratio or reason right i mentioned this before how this is a example you know of one kind of what name equivocal by reason let me just review that for a second just to see the word there's two ways that a name becomes equivocal by reason one is when a name is said let's take the simplest case of two things in one case when the name is said of two things right and it's kept by one of those two things right as its own name and the other one gets a new name and then the other is where the name of one thing is what carried over to another thing right the reason is some connection between them now this is an example where a name becomes equivocal by reason because in one sense reason is a intellectus other case we're distinguishing between intellectus and ratio right okay now um there's two ways that that is done okay here are the two ways in which which a name becomes equivocal by reason of being kept by one of the two things which it is said but the others get a new name the one is when something is added so it gets a new name that's one one right yeah okay and the other is when one of the two has fully or perfectly or completely, right, what's understood by the common name, right? Okay, let me give you two simple examples of that, right? Let's take cat, set of cat and kitten, okay? Now someone asked, you know, Daddy, what's the difference between a kitten and a puppy? Well, a kitten is a little cat, right? So a kitten, in the sense, is a cat, and a puppy is a what? A dog, right? Okay? But then sometimes we distinguish between a cat and a what? A kitten, right? So why does cat keep the name cat and kitten get a new name? Because the kitten is imperfect, right? It doesn't have the full development of the cat. But now, if we said animal, let's say, And sometimes we say man is an animal without insulting you. Other times we insult you by calling you an animal, right? Because sometimes we divide animal against man. And other times we, what? Say man is an animal with reason, right? Now, is this the same reason why that cat and new name? Is kitten that new name? Is it man is not fully an animal? No, no. But it's because man has something very noteworthy, right? In addition to what is meant by an animal. An animal is a living body having sensation. So the man and the dog, both are living bodies having sensation, right? But man has something very noteworthy in addition to that, that he has reason. But the animal, the beast, right? Has nothing noteworthy like reason in addition to being a living body sensation. So he keeps the common name, and man is different than what? You see that? Those are two ways, right? Yeah. Now, when you divide understanding here, meaning now the power of understanding, right? Which is common to man and the, what? Angels, right? But sometimes that power of understanding in the angel is called an understanding, and that power of understanding in man is called a, what? Reason. So man has reason and not understanding. Well, which case is that? Well, it's true. The first case? Yeah, yeah. Because the imperfection of understanding, right? We don't understand very much, and what we understand, we basically have to use, most of it we have to think it out, right? Reason it out, right? So it's kind of a defective understanding here, right? In the sentences, Thomas often quotes the, I guess the Greek surgeon, it's that intellectus, overshadowed intellect. Kind of dark understanding, huh? Now, sometimes we use the words luster, you know, I mean, when Thomas is explaining the definition of Boethius, right? Of person, right? Individual person of a, what? Rational nature, right? We're using rational, you know, almost as a synonym for this, right? Otherwise, he couldn't speak of, what? An angel's being a person, you know, he couldn't speak of three persons and God, right? You know, okay? Now, I'm still using the word logismos here at the end, in that way that Boethius does in the definition, right? Because in a strict sense, he wouldn't say there's logismos in these more honorable things, right? Because there's no, what, calculating or reasoning, right? You understand everything we understand by calculating reasoning. And a lot more, a lot better, too. You know? My old teacher, Kasirik, used to say, you know, you're guarding the angel watching you trying to make a, reach a decision, right? It's like you're watching an angleworm, you know, trying to figure out where to go. It's amazing how much, you know, Aristotle or Thomas understand in comparison to us, huh? But, you know, in comparison to an angel, right? Thomas says, you know, the distance between the greatest human mind and the angelic mind, you know, is much greater than between the greatest philosopher and the most ignorant peasant, you know, out there in the field. My teacher, Kasirik, would say, you know, when you first encounter your, you know, you're guarding the angel after your soul separates in your body, you know, this is God, you know, this is God, I mean, how would he be an angel? It's like, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen, listen. you have any ability, how do you know you have the ability to see? It's through the fact that you do see, right? And the ability to walk, right? You're walking. And how do you know that the ability to see and the ability to walk are not the same ability? Through the fact that seeing and walking are not the same, right? So if you want to define these two abilities, you'd have to know that one is the ability to see and the other is the ability to walk. So you'd have to know what seeing and walking is before you could know you even had these abilities, let alone what they are ability for, right? So seeing and walking are before in what? Definition, right? Okay. If ever one must first have considered the things corresponding to these, the works and deeds, due to the same cause not determined first about these. Now he's saying what? That for the same reason, the objects, right? Now, the Greek word for object is what? Antichimena, as if what? The opposites. What's an object? What's object? That's the word used from Latin. What does object mean? You get the same root there in objection. Yeah. Yeah, something gets in your way, right? Going down the road, there's an object there. If your mind is going down, there's an objection, right? Actually, use the word Antichimena. It's a Greek word for opposites, right? There's kind of a relative opposition there, right? But he says, due to the same, what? Cause, huh? De-a-ten, out-ten-a-ten. Why? Because they're before in definition, right? So, let's just exemplify that with one example. So the definition of the ability to see is to see, right? Okay. Now, if to see is to sense color, and to hear is to sense sound, then color is in the definition of what? Here. Okay? So the objects are before the acts in definition, and the acts are before the powers in definition. And through the powers, we know what? The soul. The soul, yeah. Now, sometimes, you know, people get a little mixed up because he's defining the soul in general, right? Before it goes into the powers in particular. But he's coming to know the soul in general, through its, what? Powers and through its acts, right? Sometimes, when I talk, you know, years ago, the Dhyana, or this material sometimes, sometimes, you know, I even began with the powers just to avoid people getting a misunderstanding of this, right? And then come to the definition of the soul at the end, right? Okay? Because, in a way, through a less distinct knowledge of the powers, right, he's writing the general definition of soul, and now through a more distinct knowledge of the powers, he's going to arrive at the definition of the particular soul, right? Okay? But you've never really said the fact that, basically, the order is from the objects, to the acts, to the powers or abilities, to the soul, yeah. And when your soul is separated from your body, it's going to be reversed. Your soul is going to know itself, not dispersively like this, but the soul is going to know itself directly through itself. And it would be like the way the angel knows itself, right? Because your soul will now be to be separated from matter, and therefore to be fully understandable to itself, itself. Now, in this life, we'll see it in this way here. So you can see why the seven wise men of Greece put up the words, know thyself, right? Because man is capable of knowing itself, and the soul, in particular, is capable of knowing itself, but only through a long, what? And so it needs to be urged to try to know itself, right? Now that's a very, you know, fundamental thing. And there's something similar to that in ethics, say, when you're defining the virtues, right? Is the virtue or the acts of the virtues known first, right? Yeah. And is the acts of the virtues known first, or the objects of those acts? In other words, you have to know, just take the first two virtues you do, you deal with an ethics, which are courage and moderation or temperance, right? Well, courage is about something which is, what? Not being too precise, huh? Something that is destructive of the body, right? Okay? Something painful, destructive of your body. Temperance or moderation is about something that is, what? Pleasing to your body, right? Something that preserves your body or preserves your kind of body, right? So once you understand that difference, then you see the acts going to be somewhat different, right? Because something that is pleasing to your body is something you have to go for, right? And that's why the virtue has to, in a way, what? Moderate or temper, you know, restore it, go back on the thing. But because the object of courage is something which is painful and destructive of the body, right? It's something that you have to be kind of, what, strengthened in order to go towards, right? Because you naturally want to withdraw from such a thing, huh? You see? So, in a way, you know, you can apply it also to the, even to the highest virtues, like the theological virtues, right? In other words, you have to know what it is to love God before you can know what charity really is, right? Okay, to love God and love your neighbor, right? But you have to know what God is in some way, before you can know what it is to love God, right, huh? When you talk about the theological virtues, what do they have in common, the theological virtues that separates them from the human virtues that Aristotle talks about? Yeah. Their object is God, right? God in himself, right? So, in some sense, you have to know the object of those, right? And then the act, right? And then, in that way, you come to know the virtue, right? So, that's similar to the order that he has here. It's very important to see that. But in the Ninth Book of Wisdom there, you see in a very general way that act is before ability, right? In definition, right? That's the first thing he almost says about them when he compares them in order. So, when we talk about feeding power, we've got to talk about what? Food first, right? Right. So, let's stop this. right okay that's where thomas ends his lecture right now he's going to start to talk about the living powers huh the powers of feeding and growing and reproducing yourself right and eventually to understanding of the what plant soul right what defines it okay and then he'll go on to talk about the sense powers in particular right that are on the third book about the understanding power i don't think you're going to speak to understand right okay they're seeing some there's a postmaster right and we mailed it every twice a week you know and he worked as of course a lawyer so he did a lot of in fact they say he appeared before the illinois supreme court about 300 times he he argued cases before you know before 1861. wow and he was a you know clerk in the store right and he started his own store with another guy you know he didn't know it got too well you know reminds me of Truman you know he was successful in the store business in Truman you know and because he had this interest in politics and so on and then of course it's following his matrimony interests too you know and one of the ones he was just about the trilogy she died and when they're always dying buildings in those days but uh finally you know he he broke off one time with mary todd and finally married her right but he was you know like some movies are rather nervous on the day of their wedding you know he was very nervous in the day and somebody saw him polishing his boots or whatever it was and he said where are you going he says the hell i suppose he says he was a nurse so and he was he was involved almost in the duel i actually was involved just about um he was you know in you know one of the newspapers there right so he was very much in the whig party as opposed to the democratic party at the time the whig party and uh he wrote these under a pseudonym right this mockery of the democratic candidate and he infuriated the democratic candidate and he demanded the newspaper who had written this right and actually about that time he was getting engaged to this mary todd right and and she actually helped to write a little bit of some of the satire she had she and uh and then a lady friend of hers and of course he was demanding you know we should have the newspaper we didn't get there so uh lincoln took on upon himself the whole responsibility for the articles he didn't want to marry to get involved and so and uh so the guy had a military background see with every kind of candidate so choose your weapons you know and he sent general so-and-so around with his challenge and so on well lincoln of course is a big man i mean he's a tall man six feet four right but there he goes you know i mean much better shot so lincoln had had some experience he had been a soldier a lot too right and uh so he chose you know the sword right and so there's a law against i guess sword doodling in illinois so they're all set to meet across the border right and uh down there and then some i guess mutual friends from like that you know came down there and uh because lincoln was not going to withdraw his his attack on this other guy who didn't ask you to reply with two hills right so finally it revealed upon the the the offended democrat to to withdraw the remarks he had made in the letter he had written in you know attacking the attacker and then and uh lincoln said nothing personal intent it was just a political so i mean they're already to fight you know until you know very italic has got some people down there doing both of them or something you know it's not the thing so he might end up like like uh all he's gonna help him you know so bring all these these little little details about this kind of kind of he's kind of giving you know i knew the depression and boats of you know kind of pressure i remember reading how um i was curious to read about the white house so it wasn't really a practicing thing you know but you know when he was uh very depressed you know the woman gave him the bible and said he suddenly died a little way you know he says you know so and you know so it's uh something standing for a while he was a believer in what he called the doctor necessity you know which would kind of go against you know freedom of the world and take value i understand that i mean it's not it's not really clear that he was a believing christian you know or i mean you may just say a lot of statements would indicate a belief in god too but just to