De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 26: The Three Meanings of Sensible and Proper vs. Accidental Sensation

Transcript
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comes to be due to what generates, right? When a thing is generated, it already has, like, knowledge. Now, maybe it should be translated by sense there, see? You know, it makes more sense. Okay? But sensing according to act, that's the act now, right? It's said similarly to considering, huh? Translated as clearly as it could be there. Now, in 182, though, he's going to point out some very interesting differences between the two. They differ now. Sensing and understanding, right? Power. Because what is productive of the act of the one is outside. And that's the act of which. Yeah. The visible and the audible, right? And the tasteable and the smellable and so on, right? Okay? It says the cause is that sense according to act is of the singulars, huh? Which are outside us. Well, science is of the universals. But these are somehow in the soul itself. Now, Thomas, you know, we'll stop and talk about that, huh? You find all these things in the sonnets of Shakespeare, you know, where the lover is separated from his love, right, huh? And he can't see his beloved, right? Okay? Maybe you can remember her, but, you know, even Romeo says, you know, a rat can see her, you know? But he can't, right? His eyes are deprived, right, of the sight of Juliet, right? Why do you have a rat? He might see so on. He's very bitter about this, huh? His exile, huh? You see? But, you know, I can think about what a triangle is anytime I want to, right? I can think about what a man is, right? I can't see this man, though, right, huh? So, my senses are the singulars, and these singulars exist outside of me. And so I can't see this man or that man without having this or that man present, right? But I can think about what a man is, right? Even if no man is present, right? And that's because man is something universal. And something is universal only in the, what? Soul. Now, Thomas points out, huh? According to this statistical fallacy, right? And I suppose you say that Socrates is a man. And man is a, what, species. Therefore, Socrates is a species, huh? Well, what's wrong with that, huh? This is the fallacy of the accident, huh? Man, inside of reason, right, is universal. And if you consider the existence of man in the mind, where he's universal, that way of existence doesn't belong to Socrates, the individual man in the real world, right? But you can say Socrates is a man, truly, right? Because man signifies, what, the nature of man, right? The nature of man is something found in Socrates, right? But the universality, the nature of man, as it's considered in reason, the universality belongs to it only in the mind. So what pertains to that universality cannot be said of what? Of man. The only what pertains to the nature of man can be said of man. But, nevertheless, huh? You can say that man is something universal, and as universal, it's in the mind. And therefore, we can think about what a man is without having the individual man present. But I can't see Socrates as the individual man is present, right? Whence, he says, to understand is in him when he wishes, right? But to sense is not in him. You see the difference, right? Once I've learned, let's say, the definition of perfect number, right? Whenever I want to, I can think about what a perfect number is. No problem. Now, my students who may not have learned what a perfect number is, or even myself before I learned from my master here in Euclid, what a perfect number is, I wasn't able to think about what a perfect number is whenever I wanted to, could I? Didn't know what it was, right? But once I've acquired the science of geometry, or science of arithmetic, rather, and I've learned the definition of perfect number, then if nothing exterior prevents, whenever I want to, I can think about it, right? But I can't see my friend or my grandchild whenever I want to, right? I've got to have them present here in order to, what, see them, huh? So there's a difference, then, in going from ability to act with the senses, right? And with the, what, reason, that last, that second kind of ability we're talking about, right, to the ultimate act, right? If I want to see the Mona Lisa, right, right now, I can't. It's not here. If I want to understand what a perfect number is right now, I can do it. But why? Because Mona Lisa is a singular, sensible thing, existing outside of me, and I'm in potency to that, right? But the other is already in me, because it's something universal. Okay? A thing is singular when sensed, as Boethius says, and universal when understood, huh? As Albert the Great says, you know, the first thing to be considered in logic is the, what? Personal. Yeah. But Boethius says the first thing to be considered in logic is, his name said of many things. A little more sensible answer. But, nevertheless, inspired by what Albert says, huh? For it is necessary for a sensible to be present. This is so, too, in the sciences concerned with the sensibles, under the same cause. Because the sensibles are among particulars and things outside. But the proper place to clarify these things will come in turn about them. Understand them. It doesn't take enough the understanding at this point, you know, except to manifest something about the senses. Now, the last paragraph in chapter 5 here is just, as Thomas is kind of recalling what has been shown. For now, however, let this much be determined. That being in potency, right? Or being in ability is not spoken as simply, that is to say, with just one meaning, huh? But it's said in two ways. He exemplifies this. But in one case it is said, as we might say, the boy is able to command an army. In the sense that he could, what? Go to West Point and learn how to be a commanding officer, right? In another, as the one who is in his prime, right? Like Douglas MacArthur, graduated now from West Point, right? Now he's ready to command. So, too, the sensitive, right? But since the difference of these is unnamed, let it be determined about these that they are other and how they are other, right? It is necessary to use suffering and altering as proper names. But in these later, what? Senses, they're different senses, right? The sensitive in potency, however, is like the sensible non-actuality, as was said. Therefore, not being likened, suffered, while having suffered, has been likened, and is such as that. He wants to really emphasize that idea, right? That the one who's acted upon becomes like the one who acts upon him. That the one who acts upon him is like the one who acts upon him, right? That the one who acts upon him is like the one who acts upon him, right? That the one who acts upon him is like the one who acts upon him, right? That the one who acts upon him is like the one who acts upon him, right? That's why Sartre doesn't want to be acted upon, right? He wants to be himself, right? And to be acted upon is always an imposition in the worst sense of the word, right? But there's a way of being acted upon that is not contrary to your nature, right? What's his name there, the French existentialist Catholic one? Marcel. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He is good when he criticizes Sartre about that matter, right? Because Sartre sees no way of being acted upon that is not harmful to you. Because that would make, what, teaching impossible? It would make friendship impossible, right? You know? I think, you know, with good friends, you know, they act upon each other, you know? And you learn something from your friend, and your friend learns something from you, right? But if you see all acted upon as suffering, you know, you know, it's what Sartre's thing, all Pharisees ultra, hell is the others, right? You know? Well, it makes teaching and friendship and all the higher things impossible. Not to mention, you know, God acted upon us, you know, but imposition. St. Paul, compare us to the clay, you know, that can be shaped like the Sartre. But Sartre, in a sense, is like, once you're beyond, you know, when those people stuck on the first meaning, you can't move the word, you know? You can't move the word. That's a problem with most modern philosophers, they can't move the word. Now, chapter 6 here is kind of a prelude to a consideration of what we call the, what, exterior or outward senses, right? Senses, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. And the rest of book 2 is going to be taken up now in the consideration of the outward senses, right? But the outward senses have to be known by their acts, and their acts have to be known by their object, right? Which is a sensible. And as he's going to point out in chapter 6, sensible is said in more than one way. And you've got to see the distinctions of the meanings of sensible before you can understand how an understanding of the sensible enables you to, what, distinguish the different senses of them. Now, in the beginning of book 3, he's going to be talking about inward senses, right? Like memory and things of that sort, huh? A little bit about that. But the inward senses have to be confused with understanding and reason than the outward senses. Just like with most of our contemporaries, nobody thinks that the eye is reason, or the ear is reason, or the tongue is reason, or the hand is reason, but they think the brain, right? You know, this inward thing is reason, right? You see? And so he starts to take up, in the beginning of book 3, the inward senses, and to see eventually there's a difference between even them and what? And reason, right? And that's why he begins, Thomas thinks, you know, book 3 there, you know? Because there he's getting really into what is really close to the consideration of what? Of reason, right? But now he's going to, in chapter 6 here, distinguish the various meanings of sensible, and this is a prelude and necessary to understand the distinctions of sensibles that will give rise to different outward senses, huh? Okay? So let's start to look at chapter 6 here. One must first, however, according to each sense, speak about the sensibles, huh? And that's according to the order of learning we saw, right? That you have to, what? Distinguish the abilities or powers of the soul by their acts, and their acts by their, what? Object, right? So the ability to see and the ability to walk or the ability to see and the ability to hear are different because seeing and hearing are different, right? Or seeing and walking are different, huh? But seeing and hearing are both a kind of sensing. And seeing is sensing, what? Color and hearing is sensing sound. So you have to see the difference between color and sound. To see the difference between seeing and hearing. And through that, the difference between the ability to see and the ability to hear, right? So this is fundamental. Now, in daily life, all three senses of sensible that he'll bring out here are spoken of as the object of sight. So I might say, you know, you see the color of this wine, okay? See the color of the table, right? You see the shape of the table? You see the shape of this glass, huh? Right? You see a man over here? Right? See? So all of these are said to be the object of the sensing, isn't it? Right? Just look at those things, eh? I see the color of the wine. I see the shape of the table. I might say, I see the color of the man. It's a white man or a black man or something, right? I see the color of the man. I see the shape of the man, right? You might also say, I see a what? Man, right? Okay? You use it differently, right? Or you might say, I hear a sound, right? Okay? Let's say, I hear a sound. I hear a number of sounds. I hear a cat. I hear a dog. I hear a mosquito these days. Okay? A sound, a number of sounds, a cat, they're all said to be things I hear, right? Is color and shape in the man an object of sight in the same way? Is the sound, a number of sounds? Do I hear a cat reading the way I hear a sound? See, you'll notice in the 80s speech, everybody speaks of all these three things as what they see or hear, right? Aristotle's saying there's three meanings here. He'll say, these two are seen as such. This is not seen as such, but he says it's seen accidentally. What does that mean? He means that something else in us is aware of it when we sense these. We don't sense the man as such. I hear the sound of the cat as such. I hear a number of sounds as such. Do I hear the cat as such, or is it when I hear this sound, I think of what? Of a cat. I've learned that that's the sound that a cat makes. Right? So something else in me recognizes that there's a cat at the back door when I hear a meow. Right? Do you hear Moppet? You'll see in the morning there, you know, because Moppet's going, wah! It's getting awful. She's old age now, she's drinking now. Wah! So he said, who's the neighbor's going to hear this horrible sound? You have to feed Moppet, huh? But I always say, do you hear Moppet? Yeah, yeah, I've heard Moppet, yeah. But we'll all speak that way, right? But did I really hear Moppet as such? Or did I hear this awful sound that Moppet makes in the morning? See? Or you're upstairs, or someplace, and somebody you know comes in there talking, you know. Oh, I hear so-and-so now. I hear Joe. You know? Do you really hear Joe? Well, we do say that we hear Joe, don't we? See? Now, why do we say that, you see, when we don't really hear Joe as such? But when we hear the sounds that Joe makes, I recognize the tone of voice and so on, right? Something else in me recognizes that Joe is at the, what? Door, right, huh? Okay? You see that? Now, he's going to distinguish between what is sensible, as such, sometimes you'll see the Latin word, per se, huh? Okay? He uses the word per se, you know. The Greek is kak-a-to, see? Two of them, see, he calls kak-a-to, out-to, in the plural, kak-a-to, which is translated, or as an alphabet, per se, and in English as, as such, or through itself, right? I think, as such is probably a better hearing. So these things are sensed as such, this is sensed what? By happening, we say, right? They speak in English, right? Accidentally, huh? It's not sensed as such. Maybe don't mislead that. That's when you see that thing. Besides, I quote Shakespeare's sonnet there, the one about the mistress, huh? And the line goes, I love to hear my mistress's voice, although I know that music has a far more pleasant sound. Notice, he rejoices when he hears the voice of his mistress. Because the voice is beautiful? No. Because the voice of music, the sound of music is more beautiful, right? Okay? So, you might say, it's gratinance, right? It's not as such that he rejoices when he hears the sound of his voice, huh? Okay? In the same way, you know, if you pick up the telephone, and you hear, you know, Pomerati or some other guy singing, you might not rejoice as much as if you hear the voice of somebody you, what, love very much, right? But doesn't have particularly, you know, Pomerati voice, right? Or quickly sonorous or beautiful voice. But you rejoice more, right? Not in the sound as such though, right? Because it happens to someone that you, what, love very much, right? Right. Okay? You see that, right? The distinction between the two, huh? Could you say, by belonging to or by happening? No, I think by happening is better, because that brings out the fact that it's not as such, right? You know, sometimes people, you know, they hear a melody, right? And it reminds them of some place they were where that melody was being played, right? It reminds them of some person that they like, you know, they associate that melody with, right? So they love that melody, not because it's really their favorite melody as such, but really because of something else that happens to it, right? Because that melody was played when they were with so-and-so, right? When they were having a good time with so-and-so, right? Okay? Or they associate, I associate certain, you know, melodies with San Francisco, right? You know, played when I was in San Francisco, you know? Mm-hmm. But that's kind of accidental, right? They associate a particular melody with a particular, what, place or person, right? Yeah. See? It doesn't pertain to that person or place as such, does it? But something had happened, right? The time I was in San Francisco, they were playing this, you know, basically Google. You see that? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, again, down here. I hear the sound, a number of sounds, as such. I don't hear the cat as such, right? But this is by happening or accidentally, huh? That's in Bibikos. So he says, the sensible is said in three ways, two of which we say are sensed in virtue themselves or as such. Well, the one is sensed accidentally, per accidents, kind of some Bibikos in Greek, huh? It's not really sensed as such at all. See? They might say, well, why do we say that, right? See? I noticed Aristotle is the philosopher who tries to remain close to everybody's way of speaking so far as we can, right? And we all will say, I hear the cat. We all say that, right? And is there a reason why we say that when we don't hear the cat? Right? Is there a reason why we do that? Yeah. That way you could say, to be a cat happens to that sound. Or that sound happens to a cat, right? Okay? But there has to be something else in us that knows that, huh? Now, Aristotle sometimes, in Thomas book 2, more explicitly, sometimes we speak of something as being an accidental sensible in the complete sense, the full sense, that no sense as such knows it. Okay? And the example of that would be the individual substance. Only understanding knows substance, as they indicated the word substance before, right? Okay? Only the understanding of the reason knows substance, huh? But sometimes the object of one sense is said to be accidental to the object of another one sense, huh? So I might be, you know, looking at dessert and say, that looks awful sweet. Right? You know? And so sweet there is what? Accidental to what I see. I don't see the sweetness, you see? Okay? But when I see something, something else in me recognizes that is associated in some way with sweet desserts, right? See a lot of frosting on the thing and so on, you know? See, it looks sweet, huh? Yeah. But I don't actually see the sweetness of it. You have to use plaster instead of... I could be deceived, right? You see? You know, some of these artificial fruits that people have in these bowls, huh? Yeah. Occasionally somebody grabs one of them, you know, thinking it's a real fruit, you know? It looks, you know, delicious, sweet, you know? Okay. You realize it isn't, huh? Okay. Now, he makes a distinction among the two sensibles as such, huh? One is perceived by only one sense. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. And he also adds, and is not apt to be deceived about that. The other is perceived by more than one sense, right? Some by all of them, some by more than one, but in general, right? Now, you translate this one, proper sensible, that's the way I always grew up hearing it referred to as a proper sensible, right? Again, that's probably working on the Latin word proprium, right? The Greek word, of course, is idios, okay? Idion. But I think sometimes we don't translate this Latin word proprium properly. It's like when we speak of the common good sometimes, and what's the other good? The proper good? But maybe the sense is more really the private, private, idios, private. In other words, I mean, private is really the opposite there to be contrasted with common, right? What is sensed as such, right, is either sensed by only one sense, right? And therefore it's private to have one sense. Or it's common to more than one sense, right? So people are so apt to translate that proprium by proper that they kind of are scandalized when I translate it by private, but I think that really has the meaning better, you know? See, I noticed that in logic there, or in general, I'm talking about roads, and Thomas distinguishes in Latin between the communis modis poche identity, right? He's going to speak of the communis modis poche identity, right? A common way of proceeding in the sciences. He says, this is studying in logic, right? Okay. And then he speaks of the proprious modis, right? The proprious modis, say a geometry, let's say, right? Well, they translate that. How do you translate it proprium, huh? Proprious. I would speak of the private way of... When I say private, I don't mean it's private to one way. But it's private to that one particular science, right? You'd call it special, you know? Let's call it the proper way of proceeding. Pretty good. Translation of it, you know? Because it's having a sense of, like, correct, or... Yeah. Yeah, proper is more the opposite of improper, right? Like, private is more contrasted with what? Common, you know? Yeah. So he says, I call proper or private, but cannot be sensed by another sense, right? And about which it cannot earn, unless it's, what? Damaged urine, yeah. And notice the difference he's making there, right? And this is something the modis don't do. You know, the modis are very anxious to talk about the unreliability of the senses, right? Right. And they don't see the difference between the private sensible and the common sensible and the common sensible and the, what? Accidental sensible. That one is more apt... That's the private sensible. That one is more apt to be deceived about the common sensible or about the private one, right? I mean, excuse me, the accidental sensible than one is about the private sensible. Now, what we call optical illusions, for example, right? You see? They are concerned, let's say, with the length of lines or the shape of the lines, huh? And one is easily deceived by those things, huh? And again, when my... You call somebody's house, you know, and one of the children answers, and you think it's one. My wife is getting mixed up with the grandchildren there, right? Sometimes, huh? And I have a pretty good meow. People really think there's a cat around me, you know? I mean, you know, meow sounds much like a cat, right? And, you know, the famous guy who wants to have an alibi for crime, you know, and he has a recording, right? He has a recording of playing, you know? So they hear the voices upstairs talking, right? And then he goes out and quits the murder and gets back. And, of course, he's got people downstairs with us saying that, you know, yeah, they were upstairs all the time they were talking. He wasn't up there at all, right? So was he deceived about the sound? He didn't hear what he heard? When they hear my meow, did they do that? Did I hear that? Or take this example, you know, the old joke, you know, where they... Let's say you have a little bowl of sugar there, right? And the nasty little kid, you know, pours out the sugar and fills it up with salt, right? And so Uncle Sonso takes a spoonful of what he thinks is sugar and stirs it up into his cup and is mad after which, right? Was he mistaken about the private sensible? No, see? If there's something black in there instead of white, he would have hesitated to put it in his coffee because it could be pepper or something, right? Right. See? But being that it has the same color, the salt is the sugar, right? And it's in the same place, right? He's easily, what, deceived. But he's deceived not about it being white, which is the private sensible, but about the accidental sensible. Is it salt or sugar, right? Substance. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He's very easily deceived by that, right? So Aristotle is seeing, you know, a distinction, right? That the senses are easily deceived about the common sensibles or the accidental sensibles in a way they're not deceived by their private sensible. And in a way, as we'll see, if you think about this a little more deeply, you can see that the common sensibles are known as a kind of modification of the, what, private sensible. So I know, for example, the shape of this card here, let's say, because the color only goes that far, right? See? So it's through color that I, in a way, know the shape of this card by my eye. But if I know it by a sense of touch, I don't know it through color. I know it through what? Hardness, right? Or it resists and it gives way, right? See, so I can kind of feel the shape of the thing in the same way the shape of this, right? So the common sensible is known, now not really by what we call a discourse so much, you know, like reason and ghost for one thing or another, but it's known in a way through the private sensible because it's a kind of, what, modification, you might say, of the private sensible. How far does the color extend, right? But still sensible as such, and kind of the stock example is there, you know, looking at something white, let's say, on a bright sunny day, and there's a little, you know, piece of white paper like that, not hard to look at, but suddenly you have the sight of a barn or something that's all white, what's kind of, you know, too much of the eyes, right? So the eyes acted upon differently as such by a small surface and by a, what? A long surface, right? You know, a large surface, huh? But the accidental sensible as such in no way, what, affects it, huh? As such. Okay. So I call proper or private, idios, forget the word idiot, right? Idiot is a man who lives in a world of his own. I call private what cannot be sensed but other sense, and about which it cannot err, huh? As sight is of color, hearing a sound, taste of flavor. While touch, indeed, is referenced to many differences. But each sense discerns these things and does not err that this is color or that it is sound. But about what is colored or where the color it is, right? Or what or where the sounding is. Such things, therefore, are called the proper or private sensibles of each sense, huh? Idiot. That's what I might say Why aren't the senses sometimes maybe deceived Well, if the organ maybe is affected, right? Like my mother used to say to me as a child Eat your orange before you eat your candy, right? Because if you eat my candy before my orange My orange is going to taste what? Yeah So if the organ is in some way You know, affected that way, right? Then there can be some corruption, right? But if the organ is sound, right? And not affected that way You're not going to be deceived about the taste of a thing, right? But what it's a taste of Now, in 186 he gives enumeration here Of the common sensibles And notice the order in which he gives them, right? Motion and rest and number Those first three seem to be known By all five outward senses But shape and magnitude They're continuous, in other words They're known by only what two senses? Yeah, yeah Now I notice the translator here, you know It's translated the chapter on sight And the chapter on touch here, right? He chose those, huh? It's interesting, right? I'm confused It seems to me I can hear Can you hear the shape of something? Well, I get a little confused, you know That the poets say yes I don't know I mean, I guess no No You can't really smell Smell the shape of something, right? I don't see And you can't really taste the shape I mean, except in so far It's a taste of the kind of touch But it's really only touch and sight That know the shape of a thing, huh? Now, doesn't Shakespeare somewhere, you know Mix the senses, sort of, you know Like the shape of the color There might be some metaphorical use in some case, you know But you have to examine that But I'm sure it would be a metaphorical use of it, huh? Or else something, you know Accident You know, like, for example Shakespeare will speak of Your sweet form Okay That's a good one Yeah, yeah But notice, sweet there is a metaphor, huh? Now, Thomas Aquinas gives the best explanation Of the metaphor of sweet I think I mentioned that before In the commentary on the Psalms You know, it says Taste and see how sweet is the Lord Right Well, the Lord is said to be sweet metaphoric And this is a metaphor A metaphor is based upon likeness, huh? And Thomas says Well, what is a likeness in metaphor of sweet, huh? And he explains three things about the metaphor of sweet The sweet is, what? Pleasant, huh? Okay And you notice this with children How all children, you know Seem to like candy, right? I remember the old priest My mother came from a small town And I never saw that Water town, you know One priest, you know One church in the town, right? And he'd come over from Ireland You know, priest town And so sometimes when I go back to visit grandmother Or something like that My mother would take me up to see Father He'd read, you know A little kid, you know He'd go up to the shelter He'd have a little sack And he'd go down And he'd have some candy in that sack, you know So we really thought that he was quite the thing So, some things are called sweet Because they are pleasant, right? How sweet it is, right? How pleasant it is, huh? And the second thing Thomas points out The second thing he points out in the sweet Is that it's, what? Restful And I always take two examples of that In the old days, you know It was customary in the police departments That they picked up a kid A little kid who was lost, right? And maybe somebody picked You know, brought him in or something, you know Kid doesn't know he knows his home is But you've got a bawling kid A crying kid in a police station You've got to shut him up somewhere And before you find the parents, right? Until you find the parents And so what they do is They go out and buy an ice cream cone But they kind of shut the kid, you know And I found that, you know One time we were driving across the country With beautiful little kids My wife and I And they get pretty restless in the car A little while So what I did beforehand Was I got a bunch of little packages You know, like M&M's And three different kinds And I put them in a little bag, you see And staple it And then I get together different kinds And put them in a little bag And staple them I had a bunch of these little bags Put them in a big bag And get them in the front seat They say And then when they got too much The noise in the back seat They were the two little kids It was time for their daddy to treat them So I'd pull one of these bags And pass it back And each of them would get their one And they would share it And they'd talk and laugh And be, you know, quiet For a half hour So it's restful, see And then, you know, with all these machines now They're coming up there The radio's on And the guy was saying, you know, that Children are getting obese, right? Because there's too many these slot machines In their schools, you know And they're getting all these candy bars And things, okay But people, you know, often go get a candy bar In the day, afternoon or something Or a soda To pick them up, right? So it's what? It kind of It's not jazzy Yeah, yeah It refreshes, you know, let's say, right? Yeah, what times do you say? Refresh I think that's really Beautiful explanation So That's one reason why He said to be sweet, right? But also because He's, what? Pleasant to think about, right? Come to me, all you who are You know Burdens and I'll refresh you, right? Okay So, for all three reasons God could be said to be Sweet, right? Okay Now Let's say something more known Than God When we use that same thing Take, for example We speak of Your sweetheart, huh? Okay A very common metaphor, right? Well There's heart here There's a metal name Or a synecdoche, right? And heart for the whole, right? But why is that heart that loves you? It's a heart that loves you, right? Why is that heart that loves you said to be sweet? Well, one, because it's pleasant to be loved Right? Okay Unpleasant to be hated Right? Okay Is it restful to be loved? Unpleasant to be loved? Yeah You know, we like to be with someone, you know Who loves us, huh? We're our rest with that person Right? And I, you might say, right? Okay Okay And we find it very refreshing to be loved, right? Like Shakespeare says in the songs, right? If I It goes to all the mysteries of life, you know But if I think of you, dear friend And, you know And all the things are restored And so on Okay, I was saying A little Unmediate by here Last night, remember? A grandchild there, right? Very refreshing to see her, right? Okay She picks me up Every time I see her So you have those three things there, right? Now When Shakespeare says Your sweet form Okay That's a A metaphor sweet there For what? Beautiful Beautiful, yeah See This is what he's talking about A beautiful form Now You often define the beautiful As what pleases when seen, right? Okay We often describe A beautiful scenery, you know As restful How restful I hear people say that all the time If you go to a place And you look out There's a beautiful lake Or a beautiful, you know Something How restful See You kind of rest in the beautiful Now people can look You know At a beautiful painting You know And just kind of You know Study it in there At rest, right? Okay