De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 38: Imagination as Motion: Distinguished from Sensation and Opinion

Transcript
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Now there he's talking about the power of sense, right? That's always present, but not imagination. So we're not always dreaming and so on. But if it is the same as a sense and act, it would happen that imagination is in all beasts, but it seems not to be as in ants and bees and worms. I'm not sure if that's true or not. But Aristotle is thinking of the fact that some animals seem to act in regard only to what is actually, what, present to them, right? And other animals seem to, what, act on the basis of some kind of, what, memory, right? So they seem to have a more developed, what, imagining, huh? Because they act in these images, right, which I'll talk about later on again, as if they were sensing them. So, you know, when an animal sits off for the place where it goes hunting, right, huh? Yeah. It's not sensing that area right now, right? But it's remembering it, right? Right. And so it has images, huh, more developed, images whereby it lives, huh? Okay? But I say perhaps the main argument is from dreams, huh? Because there it's very clear, right? That the man is not sensing, right? But he's, what, imagining. So they don't seem to be the same thing, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Again, he says the senses are always true by imaginings and are often false, huh? And so we speak of false imagination as being the chief cause of, what, deception, right? Yeah. It's interesting when there's an accident and there's four or five witnesses to the car collision or something like that, right? Yeah. Policemen and other people know from experience that you've got to get these people to write down what they saw as soon as possible. And if they write down right after it happened what they saw, there'll be much more agreement among the witnesses. But if you ask them the next day what they saw, you start to get this, what? Divergency, right? And that's a sign that they're kind of, what? Following the images, right? That are left over in them, right? But they're somewhat, what? Distorted, huh? And not as, what? Accurate, huh? Okay. And indeed, he says, and I'm talking about this idea of the senses being true. And indeed, we do not say when we are working with certitude in regard to sensible that this appears to us to be a man. But rather, when we sense not clearly, then it is either, what? True or false, huh? Notice how we use in English the word, what? It seems, right? It appears to me, right? But I wouldn't say now, you know, it appears to me that you are sitting there, right? I mean, it's clear, right? That you're sitting there, right? I'm not really in doubt to that, huh? So he's talking about this incertitude or lack of certitude that there seems to be in, what? Imagining, right? Okay. But sometimes you use that for the senses, too, if you see something at a distance, right? There seems to be a man up there, right? There seems to be a dog up there or something else up there in the hill, right? It's not very clear, right? Okay. So it seems to be a difference, then, between the senses in their certitude when you sense something and when you imagine something, right? And it seems or appears to you to be so, right? So that's another way he's distinguishing the two. And what we said earlier, then, something appears even when the eyes are, what, closed, huh? Okay. So he's, first of all, eliminating that imagining is simply, what, the sense or sensing, huh? And now, very briefly, he's going to eliminate both of these together. And what's the reason he gives for saying it's neither natural understanding nor is it demonstrated knowledge, huh? Reasonable knowledge, huh? If you have a geometry. If you have a real demonstration, it's necessarily true, right? And A4, C4, for natural understanding. But the images are often, what, false, huh? You see things, huh? As he said. So in 312, then, he's eliminating those two. But indeed, neither will imagination be one of the powers which are always true, like science or understanding. Again, the question there, the translation there, powers. For imagination is also false, huh? It remains, therefore, to see if it is opinion, because that's the one that it would seem to resemble the most. For opinion comes to be both true and what? False, right? Now, this is perhaps not a bad translation. The Greek word there for conviction is pistis, the same word you have for faith, right? But it's not, obviously, supernatural faith he's talking about here, right? He's talking about the mind being, what? Believing something, right? Being convinced of it, right? For one cannot be opining things of which one does not seem to have conviction. So does the other animal seem to have opinions about things of which they are convinced? However, conviction is present in that one of the beasts, while imagination is in what? Many of the animals, right? All the higher animals. Now, the second reason he gives, Thomas says, in the next paragraph, is kind of backing this up. He says, So he's saying, if you have an opinion and you're convinced of it, right? It's because you've been persuaded of that opinion and you've been persuaded of that opinion by reason, right? If you don't really have conviction without reason, but the other animals don't have reason, therefore, but they do have imagining, right? Therefore, imagining cannot be, what? Opinion, right? Which is tied up with belief and persuasion and therefore reason. Okay? Now, at that point, he's eliminated all four of these, right? And now he comes to an opinion that you, another de-estimate, that Plato has in the in the sophist, the data upon the sophist, right? And it's kind of interesting here because Plato is talking there about imagining but maybe has only these four kinds of knowing, right? So what is this imagining? And so Plato says it's kind of a, what? A combination of opinion and sense. It's a kind of, what? Opinion tied or based upon some kind of sensation. Well, that's getting fairly close to what imagining is because Aristotle will say in the next reading, 315, imagining originally is a motion produced by the senses, where the senses are moving something more within us. But Plato's thinking of imagining as being kind of opinion you have when you're sensing. Now Aristotle's going to reject that idea. It is apparent, he says, 315 announcing his intention, it is apparent through the following things, therefore that imagination would be neither opinion with sense nor opinion to sense nor an entwining of opinion and sense. Now why does he reject that? Well, first of all, he sets down, what does it have to mean? It would have to mean that you're Opinion was about what you sense, right? And it's going to show the difficulty in that. And it is clear that the opinion, huh, is not of another thing in this case, but of that, if it is, of which there is sensation. I mean that imagining, in this opinion of Plato, right, is the entwining of the opinion of white and the sensation of white. For surely it truly is not from the opinion of the good and the sensation of the white. Therefore, imagining is opining just what is sense, not what, accidentally, huh? That's how he's supposed to. Pardon me, he's going to get in this paragraph. He's saying that if imagining is an opinion based on sense or from sense, it's going to be an opinion about the very thing you, what? Sense, huh? Okay? Now, in the next paragraph, he's taking a common example where something that you sense seems to be, right, such and such, but you think, your opinion is, that it's not such and such. Okay? Let's look at his example here. Maybe we can get another example there. But indeed, the false appears about that of which, at the same time, one has a true belief. For example, the sun appears to be a foot in diameter, but one is convinced that it is greater than the, what? Inhabited part of the earth, huh? If we just look at the sun in the sky, it seems to be, you know, I can block it out with my hand, right? It doesn't seem to be very big, right? But I think that the sun is, what? Larger than the earth, huh? That's my opinion, right? So, what would be my, if you say my imagining, or it's seeming to me to be smaller than it is, is that another opinion, tied with my sensing of it? Well, then I'd have, at the same time, I'd have the opinion that it is no bigger than my hand, or smaller than my hand, and that it's, what? Bigger than the earth, right? How could I have these two opinions at the same time? I couldn't, really. Could I? It seems that you could. You're not sure about either. Yeah, I know, but I mean, if I believe one of these things, right? See? If I believe that the sun, I don't really know, you know, how do I know? I've been told this and so on. I believe that the sun is larger than the earth, right? But it seems to me, when I look at it, it's smaller than the earth, right? Okay? So that seeming, is that another opinion? See? It doesn't seem so, right? It seems to be an opposition now between my opinion and what seems to be so, right? Okay? So he's going on to explain that. Therefore, the thing remaining, if he actually started to think, right, that it is no bigger than the earth, right? Or small than the earth, it happens either that the true opinion which he had is left behind him, right? Though he neither forgets his opinion, right? Nor is he persuaded otherwise, or else, if he still has it, it is necessary that the same thing be both true and false. But it would become false when it escapes notice that the thing is changing. Imagination, therefore, is not some one of these, nor is it from these. He's saying a man changes his opinion or sometimes gives it up when he forgets his opinion, right? Or when he, what, has a reason to give it up, right? Or when the thing itself has changed, right? But in this case, how would he give his true opinion that the sun is larger than the earth, right? When it appears to him to, right, to be smaller than the earth, right? If he hasn't forgotten his true opinion, and he hasn't thought that the moon has suddenly, the earth, the sun has suddenly shrunk or something, right? Nor does he think, he has some reason to think that it's false, right? Okay? Now, take the simple example here with the optical illusion. Take the simplest one that we all know. Apparently there's a whole art of optical illusions. One time, years ago, the Sakhal's department put on an exhibit in the library of all these ways of making lines appear to be longer or shorter than they are, or to be bent when they're straight and so on, right? Okay? But suppose, let's take a simple example of this. Suppose you draw two straight lines exactly what? Equal, right? Okay? Then you do something like this. No, the one on top now seems to be, what? Longer than the one below, right? Do I think, is it my opinion, that this is longer than that? No. So, if it's seeming, the one on top longer than the one below, if that was an opinion, right? And if it was my sensation of this, then what happens to my true opinion, that these two lines are, in fact, what? Equal, right? Why would I have been giving a better opinion to now think that they're unequal? If I didn't forget the opinion I had and had a reason for it, for thinking that they're equal, right? When I first threw them. And, when I don't think that, what, this line has been shrinking, I mean, reason to think it's shrinking, right? And, so, I have now a true opinion that these two lines are equal, even though they seem not to be equal and one seems to be longer, right? That kind of, a sign of my seeming is not really, what, my thinking, my opinion. Now, in English, as they say, we often use the word thinking for, what, not being sure that something is so, right? We're maybe inclined that way, right? Or we have, so someone says to me now, would George Bush, let's say, have a second term, right? I might say, I think he will have a second term, right? I think he will be re-elected. Do you know he'll be re-elected? And I say, no, I don't know he's going to be re-elected, right? I'm not sure, right? But I think he's going to be re-elected, right? Well, in a sense, when I say I don't know, but I think he's going to be re-elected, I'm making clear that this is an opinion of Dwayne Burkowitz, right? This is not part of his, what, knowledge in the strict sense, huh? But in English, we'll often say, what? I imagine he will be. You might say, instead of, he's thinking, right? So the two of them seem, what, fairly, what, close, right, huh? Okay? It seems to me, right? What does that mean? I think those lines are equal, though, huh? It's my opinion that they're equal. But it seems to me now that the one on top is longer. Doesn't it seem that to you? I wish I'd remember it all in the different ways they had to know. But they've been kind of fascinating to see. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And I used to, when I taught logic, you know, I kind of refer to the fact that there's actually an art, you know, of making lines appear other than they are. Yeah. And in the physical part of logic, right, there's an art in making, what, the false appear. Really true, right? You might not think there could be an art, right, but there are definite ways of doing this, huh? It shows you how the eye of the soul, right, and the eye of the body are in some way, what, alike, right? There are definite ways that I can deceive the students and I know how to do it. You know, Aristotle taught me thirteen ways to deceive the students. And, but, but, as I say, the psychologists and so on, they have discovered ways of what, in a sense, deceiving the, what, eye, right? What's that, what they call it, Trump-d'oeil, you know, you see sometimes in the, again, the wallpaper, where it seems to be like a wooden thing coming up and so on. It's kind of amazing to see that, right now. You might seem to be carved, but it's actually what? Just flat, huh? Interesting. There's a scene down in the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum there. It's a scene of an enunciation painting, I should say. And it's got a, you know, between the Mary and the angel that is kind of a pavement, right, in the painting. And if you get on the right side, it's looking straight down the pavement. But you get over the left side, it's looking straight down the pavement. I don't know how they do this thing, right? I have a, I know it's by Count Little or after Count Little, but it's a canal scene from Venice, right? And if you get on the right side, way over here, you look at the painting, looking straight down the, what, coming up. You follow around the room, and you're still looking straight down the pavement. You get all the way over here, and you're still looking straight down the pavement. It's kind of a, first time you notice that, it's kind of amazing to see that. And I guess some painters, too, they can paint the eyes so that the eyes of the person in the painting there are looking directly towards you. If you're over there, and you follow them around, and they still seem to be looking at you directly, following you right around the room. So, Washington Irving, you know, alludes to this in one of those stories of the old mansions in England, you know, and how the servants are kind of superstitious about the painting, of so-and-so, the portraits, like the old portraits of the former members of the family, because those eyes do seem to follow you right around the room. But how do they do that? I don't really know, do you? So there's sort of the arts of what? The seed in the eye, huh? There was a story told of a, of a, yeah, a painter where, I guess he painted something, I guess, to eat or something like that, and he invited the painter, or he said, well, have one, you know, and the guy reached for it, and it was a painting. So he wanted to get even with the other painter. So on those days, Sundays, you have a painting you wanted to keep, you know, hidden until you were able to display, right? You have a big curtain over there, and you pull the curtain, and then reveal the painting, right? So he painted the curtain with the tassel and everything, right? So I want you to see this painting now, right? The guy goes over to pull the thing that you do. That's a painting, right? That's kind of marvelous to, uh, to, uh, to see, you know, a person, huh? Of course, in Shakespeare, you see the witch's tale, haven't you? That play, where the, the, the king, right? He accuses his wife of infidelity, right? And this is false, right? And then she feigns, whatever it is, and the false rumor is given that she has died, right? And actually, she goes into hiding, right? Gave her husband a long period to be pet, huh? Well, then in the reconciliation scene, right, you know, uh, Alina tells the king, you know, that, um, she had this famous artist do a statue of the wife, huh? Oh. And, uh, it's really remarkable, this painting, this statue, right? So the king and everybody comes in to see the statue, right? Of course, it's, it's, it's, and, uh, uh, of course, he almost wants to kiss the statue, right? Don't, don't, the paint is not yet dry, you know? The statue's, uh, you know, gradually comes alive, right? But, uh, it's kind of a, kind of a marvelous, uh, uh, ending of that, uh, you have to read the, uh, script, you know, the wonder people are filled with, it's amazing, amazing play in that sense. So, up to this point, the Aristotle has been showing what, uh, imagination is not, right? It's not sensing, it's not opinion, it's not, um, natural understanding, or demonstrative knowledge, reasoned out knowledge, nor is it a combination of opinion with, what, sensing, huh? Okay? Now he's going to try to go on and say what it is. Now you want to take your little break now, because it's appropriate time to take between the fifth and the sixth. Okay, let's look at the sixth reading now in Thomas here, which is starting in 318 and going to the end here on page 35. Perhaps there's some confusion in English there when you read the text there because when you use the word imagination in English, right, what are we usually thinking of? Yeah, we're kind of thinking of the ability that we have to come back upon our images and to what? Manipulate them, right? Okay. So I can imagine a gold mountain, right? I remember a fairy tale there when I read the kids' fairy tales and there's a, what, glass mountain, right? And how can the prince and his horse get up the glass mountain? Well, you see, I've seen gold or I've seen glass, right? Uh-huh. And I've seen mountains, right? Right. But I've never seen a gold mountain or a glass mountain, right? Yeah. But I can combine these and make a new, what, image, right? Sure. That's not really what he's talking about here, right? Okay. He's talking about, when I look at you, let's say for a moment, right? Yeah. And then I close my eyes and I still kind of, what? See you. You're still there in front of me, right? Yeah. But you're a little bit, what, faded compared to when I was looking at you, huh? Yeah. But if you look at something for a while and then you close your eyes, you continue to see it. It appears still to you, right? And that's what he's really talking about here, right? He's not talking about the preservation of images and the memory, we're going to say it's kept, right? And then our ability to come back upon those preserved images, right? And to, what, manipulate them in the way that a poet can do, okay? He's talking about, what, something that's very close to the senses, huh? And that's why he begins the way he does here, huh? But since a thing having been moved, another is moved by this, huh? And I was recalling something we saw back in the books of natural hearing, that there's a moved mover, right? As well as the unmoved mover, huh? And so if you play pool, right? And you can have a, what? Moved mover, right? Okay? So if I push this case over here, this text is a, what? Moved mover, right? Okay? And he's going to say that imagining is a result of, what? The senses being moved by an object outside of them, right? And the senses in turn, moving, what? Something more within. And so the senses there are a, what? Moved mover, okay? So you act upon my eye now when I see you. But that, my eye being moved by you, sets up a, what? Another motion in me, right? And because you move a thing in a similar way to the way you've been moved, right? That's why this image is going to resemble the sensing of you. But it's going to be weaker, right? Just like if I throw a ball and it hits something down there, it's going to move that thing, but maybe that thing will be, what? Not as vigorous in its motion as the original thing, okay? So he says, having recalled the idea that there's a moved mover as well as an unmoved mover. While imagination seems to be a certain, what? Motion, huh? Well, it's being moved in some way, right? And not to come to be without sense, huh? But it is in what senses and is of what there is a sensation, right? It's of the same object, right? But motion can come to be from the act of sense. Now, the act of senses is being moved by the exterior object, right? But in being moved, it can move what? Something else. And it's going to move it in a way like it itself has been moved. So the movement caused by the moved mover will be like the movement of the moved mover. And therefore, imagining as a result of being moved by the senses will be a little bit like sensing, right? So when I close my eyes, I still kind of see you, right? But my eyes are not being acted upon by you, right? But that has moved something else in me, more inwardly. And you still kind of persist in a way, huh? It's like with the bigger ball. You hit one ball and this ball stops, that one keeps moving, right? You hit another one, it keeps on going, right? But motion can come to be from the act of sense. That's going back to the idea that sensing is a being moved. It's a being acted upon, right? And what is a moved can be also a mover, right? And it's necessary that the same motion, the motion caused by the sense when it's moved, the motion caused by the sense of the moved mover, would be similar to the sensation, right? This imagination would be a motion, neither occurring without sense, huh? Nor present in what does not have sense. But the one having imagination does and suffers many things due to it, huh? He acts upon it sometimes as if he was, what? Sensing, huh? Okay? And it is both, what? True and false, huh? I'm going to start to explain why they should be so. And now he goes back to the senses and to, we have to recall, the division of the sensible, remember that? Now, he's going to talk about deception even in the senses, but much more so in the case of imagining. But, in regard to the three sensibles that we talked about before, we talked about the sensible as such, and the sensible by happening, huh? And the first we divided into two, if you recall. The private sensibles that are known only by one sense, right? Sometimes you see the proper sensibles, but proper in the sense, proper or private to one, right? And then the common sensibles that are known by more than one sense, huh? Now, remember, huh? In daily life, huh? We'll say we see all of these and not distinguish between them. I see the color of your robes, right? Okay? I see your shape, right? And I see a man, right? Now, we don't make any distinction dramatically, right? In the way of speech. But do I see the blackness of your robe? Do I see your shape? And do I see you? Amen. Are these all objects of my eye in the same way? No. The blackness of your clothing is seen only by my eye. I can't hear that blackness. I can't smell it or taste it or touch it, right? But your shape, I can see your shape. I could feel your shape, right? Okay? So that shape would be called a common sensible. It's sensed by more than one sense. Okay? And your extension, right? Okay? I can feel the surface of the desk. I can see the surface of the desk. So the surface of the desk or the table here is a common, what, sensible, right? But now, do I see a man as such? Or do I just see the color and the shape of a man and his size? And none of this is the man himself. And see why Descartes got mixed up, right? Because in material things, he said their substance is their, what, length and width and depth. Is that what's most fundamental in a body, in a man or a dog or a tree or a stone? It's length, width and depth. I make a joke and I say Descartes never grew up. Because if your size was what's most fundamental in you, if that's you, your size, then you couldn't grow up, would you? Growing up means that the same person has, what, a different size, right? So the person is something more fundamental than his, what, size. But the senses know nothing more fundamental than size, length and width and what, depth, right? So, when you use the word body saying geometry, when you say a sphere is a, what, body, right? We use the word body in the genus of substance, the word is equivocon. But there's a connection between the two meanings, right? So, as far as these three are concerned, Aristotle is going to go on now and talk a bit about deception. Of these three, which is the senses hardly ever deceived about? Yeah. It's only if the sense organs in some way, what, maybe injured or affected, right? If you're eating a lot of candy or eating a lot of hot stuff, right? You know, you can't taste other things properly. If you're sick, something might not taste right or something, right? But unless the sense organ is, what, injured or sick or something like that, it's going to, the sweet is going to taste sweet, right? The salt is going to taste salty, right? Until you get somebody a potato chip or a potato chip or something, you know. In fact, oh, this is sweet, you know. I mean, I hardly ever see anybody in that situation, do you? Give them a piece of candy, oh, this is salty. You don't seem to make any mistake about that, okay? But we know, like, you know, I always mentioned my mother saying, you know, eat your orange before you eat your candy, right? Because if you eat the candy first, your tongue is affected, and the orange seems, what, bitter, see? Okay? So, in wine cases, sometimes talk about, well, if you had this kind of food or material, right? Before, the wine's going to taste a little bit, what, different, right? So if your organ is already affected. But generally speaking, you could say that the senses, the most part, have deceived about their own private, what, objects, eh? The heart is not going to feel soft, right? If you lay your head on a stone, it's not going to feel soft. If you lay your head on the soft pillow, it's not going to feel hard, right? But now, of these other two, which one is more apt to deceive us? Well, we are deceived by that often, but as much as we are deceived by the common sensible. When I see a man, or a dog, or a cat, you know, I saw a dog in here a little while ago, right? And sometimes I see a cat in here, right? And I deceive very often about those things? A fish, right? But we're giving that simple example before, right? A common sensible, right? Where linked, you're easily deceived, right? By your parents or something like that, eh? And you know how people say, you know, you've been sitting sometime, maybe the train station, waiting for the train to go out? And sometimes you think your train's in motion, or the train hits you? You're confused, right? So that you're easily deceived by those things. Things at a distance, you know, when it's small, when you get closer. I remember being down in southwest of the tube, you know, around Las Vegas, you know, right across the plains. It's not very far away. It seems to drive, to drive, to drive, you know? So you're easily deceived as to how far something is away, right? How tall it is and so on. So, so I was going to talk first about sensing and then about imagining by reference to these three things. So in 319 he says, the sensation of the proper sensibles, give it proper now in the sense of private to one's sense, is true, or at least it's what has least falsity, right? Okay? But if your tongue is infected or you're sick and fever and so on, you might be infected or bad. Second, however, is sensing those things which are accidents of the sensibles. And here one can already be deceived. For one is not deceived that white is, but one is deceived as to whether the white is this or something else. So if I put the, what, sugar and the salt in the sugar bowl, you might be deceived temporarily, right? Okay? But not for too long, right? Third is sensation of the common sensibles. The things falling upon the accidental sensibles in which the propers are present. And he means motion and magnitude and the other five of what we spoke, right? Shape and so on, huh? There have been some of these 18th century houses, they had a real sense of symmetry, huh? That we don't have, I guess. A lot of rooms would have to have what? We don't have just one door there, you have a door on either side, right? To make it symmetrical. Well, sometimes they have a real door here and a parent door over there, right? Kind of interesting, right? But they might be deceiving you even about whether it's what? Engraved or, you know, has depth and so on. So you're more easily deceived by the common sensibles than by the accidental sensibles, huh? Concerning which right away erring according to sense is greatest. And that's kind of strange because you'd think the accidental would be, what, be more likely deceived because these are sensed as such. I suppose it's because of the reason being present, huh? And so when I see the shape of a man or the shape of a dog or the shape of a cat, I'd usually recognize this as a man or a dog or a cat or something. The common sense of this is very easily deceived, huh? I'm sorry, but is it sensible by happening? What is that advantage? It's something that's not sensed as such, but it's known by something else in us like reason when we sense, huh? Okay, so that's what you say when we see something white and I think it's sugar when it's salt. Yeah, sugar is not perceived as such. The color of the sugar, right, or the shape of the sugar is seen, right? Okay. Yeah. There's a lesser sense in which we speak of what's known by one sense as being accidental to another sense, right? Okay. Shakespeare says in the sonnet, I love to hear my mistress's voice, he says, although I know that music hath a far more pleasant sound. Okay. So you're not rejoicing in the sound of her voice as such, right? So if the telephone rings, I pick it up and it's someone I love and I recognize their tone of their voice right away, right? I rejoice more than if I have Pavarotti maybe at the other end of the line or somebody that has a beautiful voice, right? But it's not as voice that I'm delighting in this, right? It was that person, right? Now it's some kind of communication with, right? Do you see? And of course, we notice that happens a lot, you know, where people will associate sometimes a song, right? With a certain place where they heard that song or they associate even a smell, right? A certain place, right? Where that smell was predominant, right? And make them think of a certain place when they come across the smell again. So if it's accidental, right? Right. I remember Mother saying, you know, sometimes, you know, I never liked that name, you see? You know how people like some names and others you don't like. But then you get or meet somebody who has that name and you like the person. All of a sudden you start to like the name, right? Are you really liking the name as such, huh? See? No, but you don't realize that it's kind of, what, accidental now that you rejoice in that name, huh? I was reading the list of the names yesterday and there was a girl whose name was, uh, last name is Champagne, huh? I said, do you like it? I said, she must have a lot of jokes about this name, huh? Emil Champagne. But you get a little, you know, different names that are kind of funny in some ways, huh? But, uh, it was quite accidental to person, right? You see? But it kind of attracts me, the name Champagne. Can't help but notice this person. But accidental in the strict sense is something that none of the senses as such know. But reason, right? I mentioned before how the Latin word substance has the same etymology as the English word, what? Understanding. Understanding, yeah. And that's a kind of a sign that substance is known only by the, what, understanding. It's a proper object of understanding. It's very significant. Substance is named because it stands under all the, what, accidents, huh? And the private sensibles, they're all accidents and the third species of quality, right? And the common sensibles are tied up with the continuous, but that's quantity, right? So the senses as such don't know, what, substance, right? It's the understanding that knows substance, huh? So that's a marvelous word, understanding in English, huh? It's one of the, you know, I'm seeing what Ian used to say, you know, when he talked about Greek and Latin and French and English and so on, those common languages up there. Now, sometimes one language has a better word than the other languages do, and sometimes vice versa. I think the, you know, the Latin word for wisdom, sapiensis, is marvelous because it comes from the idea of savor, right? Something to savor, right? I don't think the English word wisdom has that same, what, concrete, that's not something in the Latin.