De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 40: Composition, Parts, and Divine Simplicity

Transcript
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We could say the man in the car, but he's not really one thing. And that, as I say, contradicts our experience that the man who's feeling pain in his foot or hand, or whoever it is, is the one who's thinking about what to do about it. How do you leave that pain, you see? So they can't really understand the unity of man, because they're thinking of body and soul as two complete substances. But we might say that the soul, man is put together from, what, a body and a soul, right? But that first meaning of put together goes back to the continuous. It seems very fundamental in our thinking. It kind of struck me, you know, I was just thinking in my own mind of... of that question in Thomas, that God is not composed in any way. And is that something different than saying God has no parts? Well, they're not exactly the same, but they're very much alike. But then when you start to think of the first meaning of parts, it's something, what, quantitative, and first the quantitative in the sense of the continuous. And if you think of the first meaning of composed or put together, you're thinking of something that is kind of quantitative. And as Aristotle says, when he defines quantitative, the continuous in the fifth book of wisdom, he says that the continuous, which is divisible, into things that are, each can be a this something, right? Each can be an individual substance, huh? Okay? So if I broke this piece of chalk in half, this half could be all by itself over there, this one over there, right? But I can't take the chalk and its shape and put the chalk here and the shape here. So it's not divisible in that way, right? And there's a real distinction between them because we could change the shape of the chalk, huh? So the chalk and its shape are not the same thing, but they're not things that can exist individually by themselves. But the continuous seems to be of that sort. But the other side of it is when you put these things together, right? If you're thinking of, you know, you put together something, this thing here is just by itself, this thing is just by itself, and you put the nut and the bolt together, right? Or insert this, you know, and you screw them together or something, right? You glue them together, right? And we just put them together alongside each other, right? And how do you make a brick wall, you know? You put together bricks like this. Maybe just cement or something. But sometimes they put together, you'll see these stones, you know, where they just fit the stones in, you know, kind of an artist can do this sort of thing, right? Right. But what he's putting together can both exist, you know, kind of do one or the other. As I said, the old materialist, you know, who says, I've been cutting open bodies for years, dissecting bodies, I never, you know, I have the liver here and the stomach here and the eyes there, but I never had the soul there. But it's not a part like that, so you could have this here and that there. So is it the sense that a part is a kind of, there's some sort of composition of parts, so composition would be more general and something with parts is, I'm trying to get the difference between something not composed, something without parts. You see, Aristotle in the fifth book of wisdom there, fifth book of metaphysics, he gives four meanings of the word part, and you could say three of these meanings are of what we call a composed whole, and one of them is what we call the universal whole. Now, if you go back, if you go back to the beginning of natural philosophy there, the first book of natural hearing, the first book of the so-called physics, Aristotle was saying we should go from the general to particular, right? Okay. And the reason why we should consider things in general before in particular is because we naturally know things in a confused way before distinctly. And he wants to manifest, right? He gives a reason for that, but we won't move to that now, it's so difficult. But he wants to manifest that in fact we do know things in a confused way before distinctly, huh? And the first kind of example he gives is that of a, what? Sensible, composed whole. That's really a, what? Something continuous, huh? Or something who's put together from things that are either continuous or at least touching, right? Okay? So you take the example, you know, of a salad dressing or something like this, or, you know, a painting of his parts and so on. And then the second kind of example he gives is that of the understandable composed whole. How we name a thing before we, what? Define it, right? Okay? And those are two of the meanings of whole and part that are found in the fifth book of wisdom. Okay? Then he gives something very much like the general in particular, but that's another sense of whole and part. What you call the universal whole, which is not put together from its parts, but it's, what? A set of its parts, huh? Okay? And Aristotle directly compares those two wholes and he says the general is to the particular something like the, what? Whole is to the parts, right? Well, there he's thinking of whole and parts in the first sense of a composed whole, right? Now, in English, you know, the words themselves are kind of significant. I think I mentioned this in the top. But in English, we say the general is to the particular as the whole, or particular as the whole is to the parts. Okay? Aristotle says, well, if the whole is known before the parts are distinguished, right, then the general would be known before the what? Particulars, right? Okay? But notice, huh, the word particular particular is taken from the word, what? Part, right? That's not by chance, huh? Now, the Greek word Aristotle uses there it's not taken from part. The ekosystem is the word in Greek, right? Although, in the later Greek commentators, sometimes you'll see the word merikon, right? Perpeticular, which is taken from the word for part in the Greek, right? But, the Greek word for general there is what? Kakalimon, and it's taken from what? It's a letter there, kakalolos, right? According to the what? Whole, right? So, you'd see the Greek word, the word whole, the Greek word, the general whole, just like in the English word or Latin deriva word, particular, right? You see the word part, right? So, it kind of helps you to see that there's a likeness here, kakalimon. Now, why did I mention that, right? Well, the two kinds of, the first two kinds of examples Aristotle gives are taken, are examples of composed whole, and two of the meanings of whole in part in the fifth book. The quantitative whole is parts, right? Which is the sensible whole, and then the, what? Composition of genius and difference, right? The definition is another sense that he gives in the fifth book. And he compares to the universal whole in this part, right? So, if you wanted to say that God has no parts, right? And you wanted to show the university, you'd show that God has, what? No quantitative parts, he's not a body, which is the first sense he's not composed in that sense. Secondly, he has no parts, this is another meaning given in the fifth book, in the sense of matter and form, right? That's the second thing shown in the Summa, right? Now, the other senses, the third and the fourth senses, are not found in the fifth book, right? But they would be led... back to matter and form, because it's in similarity. So you say that Socrates and what a man is are not identical. But what a man is, is to Socrates something like form is to matter. That's why we call it a species, form, right? And then there's no composition in God of what? Substance and existence. That's like matter and form, ability and act, right? Okay? You can see it very clearly in the second book of the Summa God and Gentiles, Thomas shows, you know, there's some composition of the angels, not a composition of matter and form, but a composition of substance and existence, why in God there's no such composition. But then he has another chapter to point out that the composition of substance and existence is not the composition of matter and form, but it's in similarity, right? Okay? So the second, third, and fourth articles in the Summa and the question three would take one of the senses apart, that's the central sense, and two ones that would be attached to it, right? Okay? Then the fifth article would be denying what? Genus indifference, which is another sense of whole and part, right? But if you want to say that God has no parts completely, you'd want to eliminate this kind of parts too. And then you'd be saying that God, what? There aren't many particular kinds of gods, but even many particular gods. There's only one God. So he has no parts in that sense, right? You see? Okay? So in that sense you have something that you don't have, because the only kind of whole that you're excluding from God is a composed whole, right? And so, in addition to that, you'd want to conclude that God is not a universal whole either. Now, that's a problem in some theology, but maybe it didn't come out when you show the unity of God or something of that sort, right? Or it's easily deduced in the fact that what God is and God are identical. Okay? You can, you know, reason from that, from God being his own existence, you can reason from both of those that there can only be one God, right? And therefore he has no parts in the sense of what? Subject parts. But explicitly if you wanted to eliminate every sense of whole and part in the, you have to have another article there, right? Okay? Because when I divide, let's say, triangle into quadrilateral, if I divide quadrilateral into square, and Alba, and Ramos, and Romboy, and Pidzi, you wouldn't say that quadrilateral was put together from those four, if I would, or if I divided triangle into what? Equilateral and isosceles and scalene, you wouldn't say triangle is put together from those. You know, unless you're a John Locke or somebody, right? It's all none of these. I mentioned that before, right? Yeah. Somebody's admitted physically, I can give them that little passage, you know, from Locke there, huh? Which, and Barclay, because Barclay quotes Locke and says, you know, he can't make any sense out of either, so he'd give up. But, you know, this is a different kind of whole, right? It's said of its parts rather than, what? Put together from them. Remember how I was giving you that, that sophisticated argument of the students to deny the axiom that the whole is more than the part? See, I get the students to admit, huh, that man is an animal, right? But he's not just an animal. He's an animal with reason, right? Okay? And so, an animal is only a part of what man is. And then I say, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, right? So here's a part including more than the whole. Gee, you could say, you know. Gee, sometimes a part is more than the whole. Well, this is obviously a sophisticated argument based upon mixing up, right, the senses of the word whole and part, huh? Because when you say that animal is a, what, part of man, you mean it's a part of the definition of man. It's a composing part of the definition. When you say that animal is, uh, includes more than man, you're taking animal as a universal whole, said of man, dog, cat, and horse, right? See? Well, the universal whole is always said of more than any one of its parts, right? The composed whole is always composed of more than one of its parts, right? Which makes me have the two senses. You see how these guys are being deceived, right, huh? So it's very important, huh? But unless you know that chapter, um, you could be deceived, like my students are deceived about being deceived. When I first take the argument, they, oh yeah, yeah. it seems like, right? But it's like, you know, you could do it, you know, all these words that are in the axioms are equivocal by reason, huh? If I say to you, for example, you know, if, um, A is before B, and B is before C, you could conclude that A is before what? C, okay? Now, um, now we have an axiom about before and after. Nothing is before or after itself, right? Okay? Now, uh, Chaucer came before Shakespeare, right? In English literature, okay? But all the critics put Shakespeare before what? Chaucer, right? So therefore, Chaucer is before Chaucer, right? Therefore, I've contradicted the axiom that nothing is before itself. Well, obviously, I'm mixing up, right, two senses, right? Because Chaucer is before Shakespeare in the first sense in time. Shakespeare is before Chaucer in the, what, fourth sense is better, right? Now, if you have one sense, if I said that Chaucer is better than Shakespeare, and Shakespeare is better than Chaucer, then Chaucer is better than itself, right? You see? If, if, if, uh, yesterday is before today, and today is before tomorrow, then yesterday is before what? Tomorrow. See? But if I say, you know, today is much better than yesterday. That's another sense of being before, right, huh? And, so in some sense, today might be before yesterday. If yesterday is before today, then today would be before today, right? See? Right? That's obviously mixing up different senses, right? See? So this is, this is something, not the only thing, but the wise man, right? And Aristotle is really, you know, the first man to fully understand the words he uses everywhere. And nobody before him fully understood the words they used everywhere. You see, you know, Plato, you know, you know, saying, until we know this, we don't know, understand this word, but he can't quite do these things. And, uh, hardly, Aristotle is not only the first man, but almost the last man. Yeah. You know? The only man after him, maybe, you know, would be somebody like, like, Thomas. But, but most people, you know, they never heard these things. But, um, uh, you don't understand distinctly, right, the axioms, right? And you can't defend them from these sophisticated objections that are based upon mixing up the senses of these words, right? It's the most common mistake made, unless you know this, huh? So, as I say, you know, to people, um, in these two statements, if you know the meanings of the words you use, are you wise, then you are wise, true or false. Yeah. But if you don't know the meanings of the words you use, then you're not wise. I mean, that's true, right? Is it? And this is not the greatest thing Aristotle did, but it was an essential thing, right? So it's, you know, the sense of before and after, right? You could perhaps know the meanings of the words you use without being wise, but you certainly can't be wise without knowing the meanings of the words you use, right? Yeah. You see? See? So it's before, huh? And it's kind of hard to see that, huh? You know, the, you know, the, the moderns when they, when they come across Aristotle's metaphysics, they don't know what the hell he's doing in book five. It's some kind of a dictionary or something, you know? You can stick it for us anywhere, you know, like a dictionary by having yourself there, you know? But no, this is presupposed too wide. So, what? What? What? in wisdom you especially use those common words, right? And in the defense of the axioms presupposes this in a way, but all philosophy presupposes this, because we use these words everywhere. So in a way it's almost the same thing, to say God is not composed and he doesn't enter into composition anything, and to say God has no parts, right? And he's not a part of anything. But there's one, as I say, whole and part, the universal whole, you see, and in a way you do show them theology. You know, you know how the Mohammedans, they think that we're, you know, we're polytheists, you know, because we say the Father and the Son, right? So they don't really understand what we're saying, right? See? But God the Father and the Son and God the Holy Spirit are one God, and not three particular gods, you see? But if the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit were three particular gods, then God would have parts in one sense, in the sense in which the universal whole has what? Parts, right? And it's very important, you know, and especially, you know, comes up in the study of the Trinity, that God is not what? Doesn't have these three parts, Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, right? The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are in no way a, what? Parts. They're not parts of God, and they're not parts of the Trinity, strictly speaking, they're not parts at all. A part is always something, what? Imperfect, huh? And that's an extremely important thing to see, huh? And obviously the Mohammedans are misunderstanding what Christianity is, the Church is teaching there, huh? You see? So it's important to see that God has no parts even in that sense, huh? So, since then, we say that the use of the number there is one and three. Well, look at that in the trees and the Trinity when you get there, right? Yeah. But it's not the three that is studied in the science of numbers. Right. In other words, you know, if that was so, then, see, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit would be more than the Father and the Son. So many more people can easily go astray, right? See, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as St. Augustine so well teaches, and Boethius following Augustine and Thomas following them both, right? The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished by anything absolute, but only towards each other, right? Yeah, right. So I'll mention how, you know, if you've been taught by Aristotle there, right, and you know that in the categories, he talks about Father and the Son and double and half and so on, he doesn't call this relation, he calls it what? Post-tee. Post-tee, you know, which in Albert, you know, Thomas would be translated, ad-aliquid, right? Towards something, right? So it's not something in itself, but towards another, you see? That's very important to see, it's not, nothing absolute, it's towards another. And that's why, as you say, the, you know, the Greek there of St. John, he says, in Archeinologos, beginning was the word, Kayologos ein pros, towards, huh? Tontheyan, huh? Tontheyan, huh? Okay, and Tontheyan there is standing for the, what, the Father, right? And the Logos was God, right? Yeah. Okay? So, um, um, if you were to say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together are more than the Father, you'd be making, what? There's multiplicity, something absolute, rather than, what? Towards another, huh? And that's what you have with the original number, right? So if the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit were three gods, you know, the Father and the Son would be more than the Father, right? And the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit would be more than the Father and the Son, right? But they're not more. Because their distinction is not in something absolute, right? What is absolute? They're one and the same. The Father and I are one. I still think you haven't explained how parts of number are put together. What I'm saying, I'm saying, um, the word put together, right, is what? Equivocal. Yeah. It's equivocal by reason, right? And it seems to me that it's one of those names, right, that is placed first upon the continuous or what is in the continuous, right? And then it's carried over to other things, huh? And it seems to me that any kind of composed whole, right, as opposed to the universal whole, right? I don't think the case of the universal whole, we'd say that it's put together from its parts, right? So, you know, Thomas makes a distinction there, and Aristotle does too, in the first reading there, between a composed whole and a what? Universal whole, right? But he sees a certain likeness of what? Ratios there, right? You see, the, this is the, you know how I saw the seeds there, right? You know? He's manifesting that we know things in a confused way before distinctly by three kinds of examples, as Thomas explains, okay? And the first kind of example is a sensible, composed whole, right? A whole that is put together from its parts, but that can be sensed, huh? And he points out that in such a whole, we seem to know the whole, indistinctly, at first, and then gradually we distinguish all the parts, right? Okay? So he's using that to manifest that, in fact, we know things are confused way before distinctly. But then he makes a direct comparison to this, right? Okay? In other words, he uses the fact that a sensible, composed whole is known indistinctly at first, right? Before we distinguish all the parts. He uses that to manifest the universal thing, and we know things are confused way before distinctly, right? Which is the reason why we should do this, right? He also makes a direct comparison to this in disproportionate. Okay? That's incredible what he does there in a way, right? That's sort of how clearly he understands what he's doing. But in seeing this proportion, right? See? That helps me to understand in the chapter on part and whole, right? How the word whole and part could be carried over from the composed whole and parts, right? The universal whole and parts, right? That there is a certain, what? Proportional likeness therapy instead of distance, right? Okay? Then the second example he takes is the, what? Understandable composed whole, the definition, right? And maybe that's easier to see than matter of the coin, which is the other sense of it. Because, um, in a way, I can understand... quadrilateral and equilateral or the right angle independently one or the other, right? And then you kind of bring it together, right? Okay? By matter and form, it's kind of hard. But I mean, at least, you know, when you name the genus and the differences, you can have the name separately, right? You know, it's a little bit, you know? It kind of helps the imagination and the reason to see this, right? But Aristotle, it's kind of interesting. He leaves out, you know, the one that he's most concerned about in Book 1 matter in what form, right? Okay? So, what is a number, right? You say a number has parts, right? Okay? If we go back to the categories, we say they divide quantity into continuous and discrete, right? And the difference is that what they have in common is that they both have parts, right? But the difference is that it continues as parts that have a common boundary, right? Parts of the media are common boundary. So, if the parts of the line needed a point, the parts of the surface had a, what, line, parts of the body and the surface, and so on. But the discrete quantity is one whose, what, parts do not need. So, he says in number seven, let's say, we're going to take the two and the five and the three and the four and we're going to divide, right? We don't really need common boundary, right? So, when you say that two and three are parts of five, let's say, are they composing parts or subject parts? Parts. Yeah. But you can't say two is a five. Like you would say that two is a even number, right? So, two is a, what, a subject part of what? Yeah, an even number, yeah. But it's a composing part of five. So, we say five is put together from two and three, right? Okay. But now, when you come back and examine those words put together, right, they themselves would seem to be, what, equivocal, right? And the first meaning of put together is where you put them side by side, so to speak, right? And their extremities, what, become one, or at least they coincide, they touch, right? And that can be the meaning of put together when you have a, what, matter of form, right? Or when you have genus and differences, right? In the definition of square, does right-angled and quadrado meet somewhere? They have a common boundary, right? The same way with matter and form, they meet somewhere, right? And still, we might say, right, the definition is put together from the genus and the differences. Can you see that, right? It doesn't seem to be too forced, right? But you couldn't say put together of the, what, subject parts, right? You couldn't say that number is put together from odd number and even number, right? Unless you don't want. See? Okay? So, are the parts of a number put together in the way that the matter and form are put together, right? The genus and what difference is? Are they put together like two heads of a semicircle? The head may be resembled to both, right? Because it is a quantitative hole, right? And the circle, you could say, is more than the semicircle, right? And five is more than three or two, right? You know? But, in other ways, it's got to be like the definition or like matter and form because, like them, it has no, what, boundaries, right? It seems that's the only likeness, but it's really more, to me, it's more like the parts putting together the parts of the semicircle. That's what I say, it's sort of in between, right? Because it is a quantitative hole, right? And therefore, it's more like the semicircles, right? Or the triangle making it the parallelogram. but yet it's more like matter and form or genus and difference than the continuous hole is. In some sense, but there's, it seems there is another, there is a real composition of matter and form in the number and the form is not the, either the two or the three or the last one but it's all the ones are like matter and there's some other form five minutes or something. Well, no, you see, what makes it to be five is the fifth one. So you have to see that there's an order there, right? That's not the real form of the number is the fifth one, right? The form is... Well, the form is what makes it to be actually five. The fifth one makes it to be five. I think that's the implication. It makes it to be a... You see, I'm a grandfather, right? Okay? And I think I think my seventh grandchild, right? Miles, the little boy, right? Okay? So Miles made my grandchildren be seven. Now, Kate, she's my first grandchild, It's special technically, Kate, she's the first grandchild, right? You know, I was going to say that, right? And the first grandchild needs something, you know? It's like your first child is a human being, right? There's a father and a mother, right? But your first grandchild is in a special place, right? But Kate didn't make my grandchildren be seven, right? Miles made them be seven. Whatever comes the next... if you have set tognets, if you have set tognets, then none of them would be the... what would be the form? Oh, the last without a group. I think it's life. You could say it's like the form, the last one, but it's not the form. The form is something other than any of the forms. No, but you see, number in a sense arises by counting, right? And counting there's an order there, right? And that's what people say, you know, how sometimes when you've got to have a certain number of things, right? You know, you misplace things or else, you know. We should have seven books here or seven wherever it is, right? Here's one, okay, two, and finally you get to the seventh one, right? Or it's maybe over there, you know, got lost, you know, how that does, right? Ah, and this makes what? Seven. Did you say that? Yeah. It's like, it's like we're going to have a class here, and we're going to have, let's say, seven people, right? And we need seven chairs, let's say, yeah. There's only six chairs in here, right? And so here's one, two, three, four, five, six. Oh, we're short, we're short. Someone's going to have to stand, right? Oh, there's a chair over here. Okay, that makes seven, okay, it's the seventh chair that makes it to be seven. But that wasn't the form of all the others. No, no, it's not, I'm going to say it's the same meaning, you see. But I'm saying there is a real, there is a proper meaning of form and matter in numbers, and the form, in the proper meaning of form and matter is not the last one, but all the ones are material with respect to that form. No, but you see, if you look at them as being just seven ones, right? Right? And so they're all kind of, you know, you're democratic here, right? They're all equal, right? And there's no order among them, right? But then what makes them to be one? There's nothing to make them one. They remain seven ones. Because they can't come together like the two semicircles because they don't have an extremity. You've got to be a computer. That's why I see that mistake. It still isn't answered how they come together. No, but you see, coming together there doesn't mean, right, what it means when you speak of the circle there, right? Right. Okay. What does it mean? It's still that it doesn't mean matter and form either. No, but as you say, it has a likeness to matter and form, right? Yeah. It has a likeness to the quantitative parts too, right? Because, after all, seven is a quantity, right? Okay. And so if you say the first meaning of parts is quantity of parts, you might say, well, seven, then it's like that, right? Okay. But you can't put together these seven ones, or whatever it is, like you put together the parts that are continuous. And you have to put them together in a way like matter and form put together. But also in a way unlike them. Yeah, but, but... So what do they really... Well, the point is that you have to see ability and act there. My grandchildren are seven now, but they could become eight, you know? I've heard, I don't know, that makes me think they're going to become eight, but do they make one of these days become eight? Mm-hmm. You take away one from eight, what do you have? You don't have an eight, you have a seven. You take away reason from man, and I'll get it as an animal, right? A beast. I can see some truth on both sides. It's a likeness. You say the likeness, but it seems like you still aren't saying... That is, the eight ones are an eight in ability. No, but it's like, it's like what I was saying here about the, the, um, the, uh, the word cat there, right? Let's see. The word cat, the three letters in the word cat, right, are able to be the word cat, are able to be the word act, right? Are able to be, abbreviation there for Thomas Aquinas, T-A-C, referred to it, right? Okay? And maybe other things too, right? I don't know what T-C-A means, but anyway. But assuming those letters are able to be the word cat, they're able to be the word act, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? What makes them to be one or the other? It's in the order, right? Well, the order is not really, it's in the form, though it's in the form, right? Well, there's a different kind of order in the number, but it, but, but order is like, what? The form of the number. Just like the order of the letters is like the form of the word, right? Yeah. Yeah. That's something other than the last one. The last is a name of order. When you add the one to seven to make eight, what does it add mean? Well, it has something of the idea of what? Actualizing that ability, right? Well, so you add... If it didn't, then you'd have really a seven and a one, right? You wouldn't have an eight. Suppose I add the seven to the one. Yeah. You see, you're forgetting that once you see ability to act here, you're forgetting that in the strict sense, you're able to be something when you're one step away from it, huh? So, so, so, so if you say one is able to be eight in the strict sense, no, one is able to be only, what? Two. Yeah. And two is able to be, what? Three, right? And three is able to be four. But strictly speaking, three is not able to be five, right? So, that would seem to be a reason for distinguishing adding from making actual, because I can add two and two in the strict sense of add. Yeah. I don't just add one. Yeah, but that's more the calculation, right? We treat the numbers as units, right? There's a collection of twos in this case, right? I don't know, it seems, even in adding two and two, max four, I mean, not just four units, but... Well, it's kind of contracting, which we were saying before, right? You know, it's a kind of simplification of that, right? Two can become three by addition of one. And you've got another one, you've got four. You can just kind of write it together, right? Unless you're imitating, you know, they'll be around saying that four is two twos. And saying that, it looks like saying two is what, two ones and not one two. It's a democratic mind there, democratic customs. When I think of two as two ones rather than one two, you want two to be more than one. But the one that I add to the seven to make the eight, it doesn't exist by itself. Well, you have to see that one, though, as you sit in order, right? Why don't you even understand what the number is? I still think the form of the eight is not the last one. How many of us are here at the table? Three. If someone else comes in, you'd make it four, right? Yeah, maybe the fourth one. The fourth one would make us four. Think about that. You know how it's like, you need a foursome, you know, for golf, whatever it is, right? For a game or something, you know. You have four people playing cards, right? You need a foursome, right? When I first gave a assumption, you know, some faculty wife asked me if I played cards. But in order to play this game, you need maybe four people, I'd say, right? So maybe they had three people who were crazy about playing cards, right? And they need a fourth person, right? The three are made four, but they're a fourth person, right? That wasn't going to be the fourth person, so. What about this power of retaining images you talked about? You said it's separate. ...of a Disteria investigation to be what? Incomplete. Okay.