De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 44: Understanding as Immaterial Reception: Reason's Object and Potency

Transcript
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He's going to clarify some more that this likeness should not be overextended, right? And that the receiving of the senses and their reason is in many ways different. And the difference he's pointing out here is that when we smell something very strong, very pungent, that temporarily prevents us from what? Smelling other things, right? You know, like you eat something highly seasoned, you know, and you can't really taste other things, huh? So that's why, you know, if you're going, if you're tasting wine, like a wine tasting thing, right? You, you know, bread is probably the best thing to have there, right? Something very bland, like bread is, huh? Rather than chili or corn chips or something, you know, that is going to interfere with your tasting the, what? The wines, huh? You see? And, you know, when a very bright light hits you, right? You're temporarily, what? Blinded, as it were. Okay? But, with reason, it's the reverse, right? When it thinks about something very understandable, then it turns to lesser things, and it's easier for it to, what? Understand that, huh? That the impossibility is not similar in the sensitive and intellectual parts is clear from the sense organs and the senses. For the sense is not able to sense after sensing what is very sensible, as sound after a great sound. In fact, you might be made permanently deaf if the sound is too great, right? Nor after strong color or smell is it able to see or smell. But whenever the mind understands something very understandable, it does not understand less understandable things less, but rather more. Now, what's the reason for this, huh? Well, because the senses have a bodily organ, right? They're going to be affected in some way like matter is affected, huh? And if the thing is very strong, it's going to destroy or temporarily interrupt, right, the operation of the organ. But because reason doesn't have an organ, right, it can't be affected that way at all. So when it understands something very understandable, and it turns to something lesser, it's, what, seems, what, easy to understand, huh? Okay? I was taking an example there with the students out at Thomas Aquinas College, right, huh? In their freshman year, maybe they're doing some Euclid, huh? In the first books of Euclid. And it seems difficult to understand these things at first, huh? The first time you meet them, huh? And, you know, if I give my students a logic, a theorem in Euclid, you know, they're, oh, oh, oh, you know, they go complaining to the dean, you know, oh, he's doing such difficult things, you know. He's, oh, we can't use those things, you know, it's too difficult for them. But at TAC, after they've gone through a number of books of Euclid, and then gone on to even more difficult to understand things, right, you know, then these earlier things they learn seem kind of, what, awfully easy, right, huh? You see? I sometimes, you know, apply this a little bit to the judgment of, what, music, right? Because music is rational by, what, participation. It's not essentially rational. But the best philosophers I've known, like Siric and Iconic and Dion and so on, they all recognize Mozart as the best composer. But they obviously recognize, you know, the excellence of the music of the 18th century over the, what, Romantic period, huh? Like in Australis' essays towards evaluation of music, they realize that this music is far more, what, reasonable, right? And that the Romantics are not aiming at being reasonable. It's so obvious to them, right? But this is something much less understandable, right, than geometry or philosophy of nature or, you know, logic or these things, right? Well, when they turn to these lesser things, they're not prevented from the fact that they studied these higher things. They can see these things even more, what, more clearly, right? You see? Just the opposite of what happens to the senses when they are acted upon by a very strong object of their kind, huh? They might be temporarily, or even permanently in some cases, right? Incapacitated. Used to work in the factory there in the summer, you know, and you get down next to one of these rookie men, and he's bang, bang! You know, he's, you know, like, reading my ears, you know, and I see, you know, how come it doesn't bother him? Well, of course, he's not actually hearing that sound anymore. He's actually deaf to that sound, you see? So he's not hearing better for having, bang, you know, being acted upon by something very audible, right? But now he's less able to hear things, huh, huh, you see? But that's because it's a, what, material organ now, the senses, huh? My friend Jim, he always said it was a little hard to hear, he won't hear it, because when he boxed, that's the ear that got hit, you know? He said, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah before I've learned the Pythagorean Theorem, right? But after I've learned the Pythagorean Theorem, I find Pythagoras after I've discovered it, right? I'm not always thinking about it, right? And then I'm able to think about it in a way I couldn't before I learned it from Euclid or discovered it by myself. So he says, when the mind comes to be each thing, as a knower according to act is said to do, this happens when it's able to work through itself, when it wants to. Even then it is in potency or in ability in some way, but not in the same way as before learning or discovering. And he points out something, which he'll come back to in that difficulty at 331, and then is able to what? Understand itself. So he's saying that reason has to understand something else before it can, what, understand itself, right? But he's not really going into that at this point. He's just kind of an aside almost there, right? At this point, he's merely bringing out, right, that there's a kind of a double potency here, right? And a double act, right? Because he's been saying in the previous reading there, that reason is an ability towards this object, right? Okay? And then later on, it's an act, right? But you might think, well, okay, that's two, ability and act. No. Because ability in two ways, and corresponding to that act in two ways, right? Okay? And that's the distinction we saw before, first act and second act, right? So I'm able to know the Pythagorean theorem when I get into the geometry class on the first day, right? Or someday, I mean, anyway, I'm able to know it, right? But after I've learned the theorem, after I've gone through the proof, right, then I'm able to know the theorem in another way, right? I'm able to think it, how, whenever I, what? Want, you know, you see? I usually do it during final exams, you know. Kids are in the final exams, I go through the proof of the theory with the theorem on the board. Just so I don't forget it. You see? But thus, I'm in ability to understanding that theorem a different way than I was before I read Euclid, then. You see that? Because before I read Euclid, because I didn't discover it, but I learned it from another, right? Whether you discover it or learn it, there's a struggle there, right? And you can't think about it or understand it whenever you want to, right? But once you've learned it, really, really learned it from Euclid, or once you've really discovered it by yourself, then whenever you want to, you can, what? Think about that truth, right? So there's two kinds of, what? Ability, right? Ability, before you've learned or discovered, and the ability that you're in to think about this thing that you've learned or discovered but are not actually thinking about now. Or there's two acts, you know, corresponding to that, right? One is the, what? The possession of this science now, right? And the other is actually thinking about the things in which this science is the science of. Okay? So again, what I was pointing out, you know, something we talked about regarding the senses, too, that there's two senses here of ability to act, huh? So he's clarifying, you know, a little bit how reason goes from ability to act, huh? It's not as if there's ability to act, that's it. But there is, what? An ability for your mind to be formed, right? By discovery or learning. And then the ability to think about these things once your mind has been, what? Formed, huh? Okay? But second ability and first act are really the same. Hmm? Yeah, but they're not, you're not thinking about the same aspect of it when you say both, right? Okay. You know, one day the apostle says to our Lord, teach us how to pray, right? And so he taught them the words of the Our Father. He gave them the words of the Our Father, right? Okay. So, as a child, maybe you memorized the Our Father, I assume you did, right? Okay. And once you memorized the Our Father and understood the prayer to some extent, then you can use that prayer whenever you want to use it, right? Okay. And I think a lot of us have, you know, a certain number of prayers we've memorized. And not every prayer we use we have memorized, but maybe a certain number of prayers that we use a lot. I noticed, I was going to bring it up there, where the latest Pope Speaks had the people addressed there that he gives every year to the priests there, the one that he gives for a Holy Thursday. Yeah. So, he was talking about the Eucharist there a little bit at the beginning. He was thinking about penance he was talking about. I don't know if you've seen it. But, you know, he's quoting Thomas there, Adorote Devote, that prayer, right? Yeah. You know? And that's the prayer that Thomas apparently said, I think he said it when, right after he consecrated. Okay. Now, I use it like when I go into a chapel, or a church, you know, before Mass, you know, I tend to use it then because I can't use it when I go on the Mass because Mass is going on, you know, after the consecration, you know, but it's kind of a way of, you know. So, I can use that prayer, I've memorized that prayer. I can use that whenever I want to use it, right? Okay. But I'm not always saying that prayer, maybe saying some other prayer, I'm not saying any prayer at all, right? Okay. So, there's again, you can make the same distinction there, right? Before I learned that prayer, I was in, I was in potency, right? But after I learned the prayer, I'm not always saying that prayer, right? Right. So, I'm able to say that prayer when I want to. So, there's two kinds of ability there, isn't there? And two kinds of what? Act, right? I actually know that prayer. I think I do. Okay? See, my, because I'm not a pronunciation, but, I pretty well know what the words mean and everything, right? You see? See? I actually know the Our Father and the Hail Mary and a few other prayers, see? See? I'm not always actually saying them, right? So, there's two kinds of act, two kinds of ability, right? So, that's not too hard to understand, right? But it's important to see those, what, distinctions. It's important to get to ethics, too, right? Because, is happiness a habit? Or is it, you know, what virtue really is? Or is it an act proceeding from and in accordance with the virtue? Which is it? What's the ultimate thing, see? Perceiving from Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, Aristotle will not say that virtue, which is the habit, is happiness, right? But, well then, what's virtue got to do with happiness? Well, virtue enables you to do this act well, right? See? So, when our Lord taught the apostles the words of the Our Father and I assume they memorized the words and that's how we got the words, it's down for us, huh? I don't know, Luke has a little less than Matthew. And, and, and, and Mark and John don't have it all, right? But, but, but we followed Matthew's words, right? More, more distinct, more complete. But, you know, there was an ability to have been actualized by those words, huh? Yeah, okay? So, I mean, this is a distinction. Once you see a distinction like that, Aristotle, you know, was comparing that earlier where he was talking about the senses, right? And he says, you know, the first act in the senses is when you're generated, right? And you, and you get by nature, right? These senses, and then you're ready to go to the second act right away. But the reason you have to do what? Maybe acquire this habit before the act can be what? Perfect, right? That's why sensing is easier, right, than understanding, but the angel is like that, like the one that's already given. Think about whatever he understands, actually, whatever he wants to, right? His mind is, as Dionysius says, right? Fill it with forms. We have to acquire these forms, and then we can think in accordance with them. But the angelic mind is created with, already formed. Because there are many other ways the angelic mind is always more actual, too. There's always something he's actually understanding, huh? But I don't know if we're always understanding much. So, that ends the first of three parts here now, what he wants to say about the undergoing understanding, right? There's going to be an act of understanding to talk about later on. But what he's been mainly emphasizing is the fact that this is a, what? An ability that is acted upon by its object, right? And because it's able to receive, in some way, all the material natures, these things around it, it itself can't have any material nature, huh? Okay? Just the senses, right? Don't have the object that they're able to receive, huh? Okay, now, in 329 and 330, which are very brief, but very profound and very important, he's going to say, now, what is that object, huh? Of reason, huh? So, obviously you need Thomas' commentary here, right? You obviously need this to be unfolded a bit, huh? Aristotle is a little bit, uh, what did the Kierkegaard say? I mean, a book would not be so long if it was not so short. But since the magnitude is other than big magnitude, and water and being water, now, what does that mean, huh? Well, Aristotle has a phrase, which you'll meet a lot in metaphysics, among other places. He's talking about definition. He used the phrase, what was to be, okay? And it's kind of strange that he speaks that way, but I think there's a reason why he does. If you go back to the second book of natural hearing there, Aristotle is distinguishing the four kinds of causes, right? And the first kind of cause, and the most known kind of cause, is called what? Matter, right? Okay? And he defines matter as that from which something comes to be, and is inside of that thing, right? That from which something comes to be, existing within it. And so the metal chair came to be from metal, and the metal is within the chair, right? The wooden chair came to be from wood, and the wood is within it, right? And the brick wall, whatever it is, the fireplace, came to be from bricks, right? And the bricks are in it, right? Okay? But, in each of these cases, what came to be, a chair, a bookcase, a table, was finally determined not by the material that it came to be from, but by the form, or the shape, that the, what, brick player, or the carpenter, or the metal worker gave it, right? Okay? So, what is this? We'd say it's a chair, right? But more in terms of its form, than in terms of its metal. Because what is that? A chair, right? Okay? So Aristotle has this phrase, what was to be? It might be a chair, it might be a table, right? And it's determined by the form. So he tends to use that phrase, right? And then for some, I won't say God's sake, and reason, but for some reason, he, a kind of contraction of that, right, is, what, he'll say, to be. Which is sometimes translated by, by being, right? Okay? But it would be more clear to us, if he was to say, but since magnitude, and what a magnitude is, are not the same, right? Okay? And water, and what water is, are not the same. Okay? There's some distinction between them, right? That's why he starts off by pointing that out, huh? Now, the two examples he gives are very significant. Because one is taken from mathematics, right? And the other is taken from what? Natural philosophy, right? So he's saying, for example, let's make it a little more, right? A circle, and what a circle is, are not entirely the same. Okay? A circle, what a circle is, are other, huh? They're not the same, there's some distinction between them, right? And water, let's see, take an example. Water. And, what water is, I want to say entirely the same, but not entirely the same. And notice, it doesn't make any difference what the example I took. I could say, a square, and what a square is, are not entirely the same. A man, and what a man is. A dog, and what a dog is, are not entirely the same. Now, why does he say that? Well, if, let's say, let's take an example here. If Socrates, huh? And what a man is, were entirely the same. If there's no difference at all between Socrates, and what a man is, then to be a man, you'd have to be Socrates. To be a man, and to be Socrates, would be the same thing. And is Socrates, the only man around? No. If there's no difference, between Champion, the great horse, the Genoctri, right? Do you ever meet Champion? I saw Champion in person one time, if I can say it in person. My son was just out in Los Angeles there, and I guess they have, you know, they have movie stars in their fingers, or whatever it is, you know, in the cement, right? Well, they got done, Genoctri's hands, or feet, or whatever it is, and the hoof of Champion out there. So, but I was a little boy, I went down to the Taiwan Genoctri, he came at the rodeo there, and Champion, the magnificent horse, you know. And at the end, you know, he waved his hat, you know, and Champion went sideways, all around the whole, the whole huge thing, you know. Prancing, it's done, and there was, I just did all. So, but is Champion, and what a horse is, the same thing? Or is there some distinction? Yeah. If, to be a horse, was to be Champion, then Champion would be the only horse there is, right? You see that? Mm-hmm. That's what I was pointing out, right? What a horse is, and a horse, not the same thing, you know? We have this cat back home, Muppet, right? Now, to be a cat, and to be Muppet, is that exactly the same thing? See, what a cat is, seems to be common to all cats, right? You can't simply say that, what a cat is, is identical, okay? Even the Muppet is a cat. Okay? Now the same thing is true, with these mathematical things, right? Is a circle, and what a circle is, identical? Are they exactly the same thing? If they were, could there be two circles? Would you get to that first theorem, Euclid? You know, you're going to construct a, what, equilateral triangle on a straight line, and so you, what, rotate this line around this end point, and then you rotate around the other end point, and then you draw the lines to the inside. But you have two circles there, right? So if a circle and what a circle is were identical, there's no distinction at all. Could there be two circles that we have here? If a circle, like this circle right here, and what a circle were the same, then to be a circle wouldn't have to be this circle. This would be the only circle there is. So Aristotle is pointing out something very interesting, right? That in natural things, right, and in mathematical things, right, or more generally you could say, in things since, or things, what, at least imagined, right, the thing and what it is are not identical. Now you have to see that, right? Because you're going to point out that the senses or the imagination directly know a man, or a dog, right, or a cat, or a body of water, right? And the imagination knows directly a circle, or a triangle, or a square that you can imagine. But the reason knows what a square is, what a circle is, right? And it's knowing, as you saw before, when it defines what a square is, it leaves out what's individual or singular in these things, right? When I define what a circle is, I don't put this circle, or this circle, or this circle, or the next circle, in the definition, do I? I don't say it's something here rather than there. Because that pertains to the distinction between a circle and another. A circle, right? And he's pointing out something very profound that most people have never seen, clearly. By reason is knowing the what it is of a mathematical thing, or the what it is of a what? Natural thing, right? Or, more generally, right? It's knowing the what it is of a thing sensed, or the what it is of a thing imagined. Now, what the earth doesn't go on to point out here, is that our reason's own object is what it is of a thing sensed, or imagined. And therefore, it doesn't understand what a thing is that cannot be sensed, or imagined. Although it might know something about a thing that cannot be sensed, or imagined. But only by what? Reasoning, right? From the things that it can sense, or imagine. But when it speaks about what those things are, right, it has to maybe speak by the likeness that they have to these things, right? But it's going to have to negate what belongs to the things sensed or imagined, right? Like, for example, when we talk about God, we say God, what? Is incorporeal, right? God is not a, what? Body, right? So we're understanding first, what a body is, right? And then we reason from bodies in some way, that we can see when we study the inclusiveness of God. But we understand more what God is not, than what he is. And so we say God is, what? Not a body, right? And even the words that might be affirmative, grammatically, like, God is simple, right? That's the first thing we have about God. Question three, actually, existence. And like St. Teresa of Avila says, right? God is altogether simple. And the closer you get to God, the simpler you become. Okay? The simplicity of the angel, of the saints, huh? But, when Thomas shows that God is simple, he shows that he's not composed as a body is composed. He's not composed of matter and form. He's not composed in any way, right? See? So it's really knowing more what God is, but not what he is. As distinguished from what we call the, what, beatific vision, right? Or, you know, St. John there is talking in, what's the first, I think it is, article or chapter 3, verse 2, something like that. Where he's saying, you know, we're the children of God. It does not yet appear what we shall be, though. But, when he appears, we shall be like him, he says. For we shall see him as he is, right? Well, the church takes those words, as you're referring to the beatific vision, right? There's two ways that scripture speaks of this, huh? Seeing God as he is, seeing him face to face, right? Okay? Immediate knowledge, huh? But this is a supernatural knowledge, it's not our natural knowledge, right? Now, St. John's talking about the natural knowledge of man, right? And the natural object of our reason, as you're going to go on to say, is the what it is of a natural thing, or the what it is of a mathematical thing, or you could say it perhaps more generally, the what it is of a thing sensed, right? And that explains a lot of things, right? That explains why, as I mentioned before, I think, why when we talk about God, as the great Dionysius says, and Thomas following him, no name is really, what, adequate to talking about God, huh? Well, if we say God is good, that seems to imply that he has goodness. And therefore, some distinction between the have and the have, but there is no distinction in God between God and his goodness, huh? But if we say God is goodness, well, then we seem to be saying not that he's good, but that he's that by which something is good. Because goodness signifies that by which the good is good, right? By good signifies what has the goodness, huh? Well, neither one fits God exactly, but we can't avoid using those words. So we say God is good because he really is good. He's not just that by which something is good, but he is good himself. But we also say he's goodness itself, because there's no composition between God and his goodness. God is whatever he has. But, why do we have that funny way of speaking about God, right? Because the natural object of our mind is that what it is that things sense to imagine. And in these things, what something is, and what has that, are not the same thing. You always have this composition of matter and form. And so all of our words reflect that. That's what we have, what we call something, the concrete, like good, and the abstract word, like goodness, right? Health and what? Healthy, right? So, my body isn't health. But my body might has this disposition called health, this condition called health. And if my body has health, then my body is not health, but it is healthy, right? In the same way, if I had the virtue of justice, I am not the virtue of justice. I'm not justice itself, but I have justice. So you have those two kinds of words, right? Because the things we know, the things we know, the have and the had are not the same thing, right? And one word signifies what is had, and the other, what has that. He's nominated from it. But in God, the one who has something, is what he has. And so you have to negate, huh? So, so the great Dionysius, and Thomas, I was in this regard, and he just said, all these words can be affirmed and denied with God, right? He can really be said to be, we can affirm that God is good because he really is good, right? We can deny that God is good as far as what? Good meaning has goodness, right? Because that seems to imply a distinction, right? We can say that God is truly goodness itself because of the simplicity, right? What we can mean, deny that, it doesn't fit because goodness seems to signify that by which something is good. But God is not just that by which something is good, he's good himself! You know? So, as a great, who is it? Is it William? He says, our mind stutters when he talks about God. Why do we stutter? Because our mind, what, is an actual object, right? It's not adequate to talk about God. So we'll come back to 329 and 330, right? The second part here, but it's a little deduction, right? But think about that, right? Is a chair and what a chair is identical? This is a chair, right? Is this chair here, and what a chair is, the same exactly? No, because then to be a chair you'd have to be this chair, right? It's a chair. Yeah. We only have one chair. We really have a fight, wouldn't we? See? So this is a good place, though, because Thomas, as I say, divides this, what we call chapter 4 here, into these three parts, right? And the second part is beginning in 329 and 330, where he's going to talk about the object now, more precisely, of what reason is. We know from the first part that it's in potency to its object, right? It receives its object, right? And he argues in that. But now he's saying more precisely what it is. But I sometimes summarize the teaching here by saying that reason's own object is the what it is of a thing sensed or imagined, huh? And that's why natural philosophy and mathematical philosophy are two basic kinds of philosophy, really. What it is of a thing imagined or a natural thing or a mathematical thing, primarily. And that's why, you know, the early Grecian, they thought, you know, that's all it was. These things you can sense or perhaps these things you can imagine, right? But that's it. And St. Francis knows all Franciscans, maybe, yeah. I don't care. But that's because he, in some way, is the father of all Franciscans, or Dominic is the father of all Dominicans. And so, maybe he has a certain providence or concern or whatever. If you make an act of will, opening the energy of your thoughts, isn't there still another obstacle for the angel to know our thoughts? Would God have to reveal our thoughts to him, even if we made an act of the will? How about when St. Thomas says the angel can order our images, but he can also strengthen the light of our mind? So he must have some direct contact with our mind, besides through our body, if he's going to strengthen the light of our mind. A stronger light fortifies a lesser light. Or does he unite our mind by the images, order, you know? Yeah, but Thomas, those are separate things. Thomas speaks of both of those, yeah. Like strength and stuff. So that, it seems like a contradiction there to say that the angel can only act on us through our body. And then to say the angel can strengthen the light of our mind. How would you resolve that? Well, I don't know if I was asserting the first thing that you said. Okay, I thought St. Thomas was, because he was saying, you know, the... Well, I know, you talk about the doubles and so on, right? But they don't want to strengthen the light of our mind, because they want it to deceive us. It's interesting, huh, that distinction of grasping and judging, right? You know, sometimes Thomas, when he speaks of it, it's kind of interesting that the images are more directly related to grasping, right? And the light of the reason, judging, right? Okay? Because in a sense, it's from the images that we get our ideas, our basic ideas. And we separate out what's common to the beings. And so that's kind of pretty very grasping, right? But the light of the reason enables us to judge, see? So, the devil might, you know, move our images, right? But he comes to us and so on, right? Okay? But he doesn't want to speak to the light of our reason, because he doesn't want to judge us, to deceive us, right? So he doesn't want to give us, help us to separate the truth from the false, right? The good from the bad, right? And the great Shakespeare, right? You know what he puts it there, huh? Because the witches, huh? We're kind of leaving the devil, too, at least. Fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hovereth through the thaw, and fifth the ear. We were talking about that one time. No, it's the first line. No, it's written in what? What meter? Fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hovereth the thaw. In clinic, right? Yeah. When they say in clinic, it's, you know, well, like in the ordinary sense. But they do have some direct access to a spiritual part of us, even without the body. Yeah, I think so. Oh, do they administer the graces to us sometimes? They give us grace directly, no. But they, you know, they reveal things to us, right? Well, St. Thomas said they also know what we can sense. So, like, they would know if I'm hungry. I could be even knows if I'm hungry. Yeah, yeah, he could free was to mention, you know. There are all these images of food, you know. He kind of is up to, you know. He seems to even tell what our body's doing, like if we're excited, our heart's racing, you know. Oh, yeah, oh, yeah. And all that other stuff. He knows what I'm seeing. He knows what I'm seeing. That's through the image. He's what I'm smelling. Appeal to greatness, huh? That's going to come out fully in the 36th of Linz and something. And the Jupiterite, this representation of magnanimity, you know. It's kind of appeal to greatness, huh? It's very, very wise, the appeal to greatness in them. So, I was kind of, you know. Sometimes C Major, of course, he's been Mozart, you know. For joy rather than magnanimity, right? Like in the C Major plantet, say, you know. When the C Major simply says...