De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 53: The Soul as All Things: Knowledge, Form, and Phantasm

Transcript
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They're only in the soul, in what? Ability, right? In potency, huh? So, but one mass must ask, how this is so, right? Okay? Is it so in the way that Empedocles and the other's thought, right? Does the soul know all things because it, what? Actually is composed of all things, right? See? So he says, science and sense, therefore, are divided to correspond to things. Now, what way do they correspond to things? Well, when you go to the ninth book of wisdom, you'll see that things are divided according to act and ability. And this is something like that with the senses, huh? Because they're all things and ability first. So the eye is able to receive all colors, right? And the ear to receive all sounds, huh? And the tongue, all flavors and so on, right? And reason is able to receive, what? The natures of all material things, huh? But then later, they all, what? Receive, actually, these things, right? Okay? So in a way, it is divided like things aren't, ability and act, huh? What is in potency or ability to what is in potency? What is in act to what is in act? That the sensing part and the scientific part of the soul are in potency, these things, right? So that's in contrast to what Empedocles had said, huh? That they are actually composed of what they know, huh? And the other problem with Empedocles is that he saw them as being, what? In their immaterial way, right? Well, then the wooden chair, because it has wood in it, you know what wood is, right? And my favorite example is that of what? Goliath, right, huh? That when he got him in the forehead with the stone, right? He should have understood more what a stone is. But actually, it was through knowing, right? At that point, huh? Okay? And then the second difference, as I say, is the one we're just talking about here, that he goes on to in 356, right? That's in there in a, what? In material way, right? Formal way, as he says here. It's necessary for the soul to be either the things themselves in this material way, or the, what? Species, the form of them, huh? But it is certainly not the things themselves. For the stone is not in the soul, right? So I think Aristotle would have liked my example of Goliath, right? But it's species, it's form, right? And that makes a beautiful comparison. Whence the soul is like the hand, huh? Now, what way is the soul like the hand, huh? Well, if you compare the hand with the claw of the animal, let's say, right? The claw of the animal, the paw, is like a definite, what? Tool, right? Why the hand is kind of like the, what? Tool of tools, right? With the hand, you can make all kinds of tools, a hammer, a saw, a knife, you name it, right? But you can also, with your hand, what? Use the knife, use the fork, use the ballpoint pen, etc., etc., etc., right? So it seems to be, what? The tool of tools, right? And that's why you could say that the hand and reason are made for each other, huh? And there's a famous remark of Aristotle in the biological works where he refers to Anax Egris, right? And Anax Egris says, man is the most intelligent of the animals because he has a, what? Hand, huh? And Aristotle says, no, it's the reverse. He has a hand because he's the most intelligent of the animals. Because reason is able to know, what? An infinity of things, right? And therefore to do an infinity of things, huh? It wouldn't be appropriate for you to have a, what? A hammer or a knife or a ballpoint pen here at the end of my, what? Arm here, right? Because then it would be because I'm made to, what? Do just one thing, more or less, huh? So the cat can have the claws there because he's going to, you know, grab his victim and hold it and so on. And, or defend itself, scratching, right? But because there's limited things he has to do with his paw, you can have a paw with the claws, the tractable, what? Claws, right? And it's sufficient for defending itself from the dog, right? You know, if a dog is going to get a cat, he's got to get him by what? The neck, huh? You know? But forward, the cat can scratch the dog, you know, and usually on the nose is enough to discourage the dog from doing that. So usually a cat wins the fight between itself and the dog, you know? So it can use that for defense, and then it can use it for capturing the mouse or the bird or something else, right? And that's all it needs, but it's a limited number of things he's going to do, right? But man, with his hands, he might be doing what? There's infinite things he might be doing with his hands, huh? He might be painting, not painting, right? And now he's got to put a little paintbrush in his hand, right? He might be painting the house, okay, paintbrush, you may know. And now he may be writing notes, right? This kind of a thing, right? But now he may be eating soup with, this is no good to eat soup with, right? Now he's got to have a, what? Spoon, right? Spoon, right? You know? Go on, this is the way, not paintbrush, this way, I guess. You know? You see? So now he's going to be sawing wood, right? Now he's got to have a saw, right? So this is the tool of all tools, so to speak, huh? Right? So the hand is given to man because of the universality of his reason. Enables him to do things. So he says, just as the hand is the tool of all tools, so the soul, in a way, is the form of all what? Of all forms, huh? Okay? It's able to receive all forms, right? Okay? In a sense, make all forms, huh? Understandable. Just as a hand is able to make all things and to use them, right? So that's a marvelous comparison he makes there. For the hand is the tool of tools, and the mind is the species of species. The sense, the species, the sensibles, and the form of forms. So there's evidence there, you might say, even in the body, right? That man is not really determined as some part of the world or some activity in particular. A biologist saying to me one time, you could just say from examining the body of man that he doesn't have a niche in nature. You examine the body of the fish, obviously, and if it fits the water, it doesn't fit the land, huh? But even the ape, which is closest to man, you know, their hands are more like for swinging in trees and doing things of that sort, huh? So they have a niche, so to speak, in nature, huh? A man doesn't really have a niche in that sense. But sometimes they compare, what, not only the hand, but they compare words to, what, reason to, huh? Because in words we can signify just about anything, right? And the cat doesn't have words, does he? He has a meow, and maybe he has some variety of meows, but it's limited what he can, what, express by his meow. He can signify by his meow. There's a purr and so on, huh? So, remember how in the beginning of the book there in the premium, Aristotle said that a knowledge of the soul, like all knowledge is good, right? But one knowledge is better than another because it's about better things, right? Or because it's more certain. And then he spoke of the soul being, what, very high in that way, huh? A knowledge of the soul being very high. Well, part of the reason for that is because the soul, especially the animal soul, and most of all the human soul, is in some way, what, all things, right? And the whole is better than the part, isn't it? So man can receive the natures of all things in the material world. And in the form of a definition, where you know kind of distinctly the natures of things, it's kind of, you don't stop and wonder about that, but it is kind of wonderful, right? That man is not, in a sense, limited. And if you go back to that fragment that we had on the mind there from Anaxagoras, the first thing he says about the mind is that it's what? Unlimited, right? But there's something unlimited about the hand, as you were saying before, right? And a fortiori, about the reason. Can you see that being unlimited, especially when you talk about the what? The universal, right? Because universal, in a way, covers an infinity of things. When I say no odd number is even, I'm covering how many things. How many things does an odd number cover? You couldn't go through them all, right? These must be your life, right? Three, five, seven, nine, right? So you can see the universe out to the mind that's open to knowing all things. That's not true so much about the senses, right? But maybe the eye is open to receiving all colors, right? And the ear all sounds, but the eye doesn't receive everything, right? It's color, right? And the ear is sound, and so on. But the common sense is more like reason, huh? Receiving all these senses. Okay, now, in 357, though, he comes back to the dependence here of reason upon the, what? Senses again, huh? And maybe more explicit even here. But since there is nothing separated beyond sensible magnitudes that the soul knows directly, as it seems, the sensibles being separated. The understandables are in the sensible species, huh? Both those set in abstraction, the mathematical things, and whatever are states and passions of the sensibles. So just as I see the color in the object over there, right, I see the red in this little thing here, so I consider what a triangle is in, what? The image, right? That I imagine of a triangle. And because of this, he says, no one not sensing can learn or understand, huh? But it's not only that you originally acquired these through that, and whatever one considers, right? Even after I've learned what a triangle is, if I want to think about what a triangle is, or understand what a triangle is, actually, again, I have to, what? Imagine a triangle, huh? Okay? The phantasms are like the sensibles in this respect, huh? They are to reason something like the exterior sensible is to the, what? Senses, huh? Except the exterior sensible is something material, right? And the image is already something kind of, what, immaterial, okay? Now, in the last two paragraphs here, 358 and 359, he's going to be distinguishing again between imagination here, which is so closely related to thinking, and to thought. As I mentioned there, the great John Locke himself, right? The philosopher of the glorious revolution, as it's called, right? When the Catholics finally lost out of England, right? You know? You know what the glorious revolution is, right? No, I don't know. Well, when James II was about to, what, become king, right, huh? And they were afraid that he had, what, he was too Catholic, right? When was this? Maybe, what, 1688 is about the time of the glorious revolution, yeah. And what you have, you know, is what? You have, what, James I, James VI of Scotland, who becomes James I of England, right, after the death of Queen Elizabeth, right? And he's a Protestant or a Lutheran or whatever you call it now. He's a, you know, Church of England man. And then comes, what, Charles I, right? Who's Episcopalian too, we'd say, not Catholic, but there's still some connection there. And he's the one that loses his head, right? And that's the Civil War there, right? And that's where Cromwell takes over, right? And he's really, family, anti-Caplic, you know, and he goes into Ireland and chops people up and so on. And, but finally they get tired of him and he dies or whatever. And then they, what, decide they need a king again, right? So they bring back the playboy, right? Charles II, right, who'd been over in France, huh? And then you have, finally, what, when he dies, you have James II, right? But he's got real, what, Catholic ties, right? And they're not even sure about Charles II. I mean, they think the priest came out the back entrance, right? The last rites and so on, right? So there's kind of a deathbed repentance there for the playboy king. But, so, they were afraid of a Catholic restoration of James II, huh? They plotted against him and brought over, what's his name? William of Orange, right? Get William and Mary as king, huh? So if you go, if you go in the, in the St. Peter's there, right, in the front there, you know, these kind of freestanding things they have, there's a, there's a, what, monument to the stewards there. I would say, when I go in and I see it, I always, I go and look at it, you know, and say, I wonder what the English think when they come in here, you know? And you just wander around there, you know, St. Peter's like, you know, Anglican might do, right? Just to see the church and so on, right? And, uh... It's a monument to the, what, stewards, huh? So John Mack tried to then, what, you know, justify, you know, these political arrangements, right? And, uh, so he's called the philosopher of the glorious revolution, right? And he's, um, uh, he writes a famous letter on toleration, right? Except for Catholics, of course. Except for, you can't talk about Catholics, but they're, they're a parasite intolerant, see? So, but when Locke is, along with Montesquieu, the famous philosophers who influenced our, what, forefathers of that, huh? So Locke, you know, influenced James Madison, people like that, but anyway, um, we're not concerned with his political philosophy right now, or his moral philosophy, but his, what, natural philosophy, right? And so, same, he confuses the image with the, what? Thought. Thought, huh? Okay? And, um, notice, huh? Let's go back to the example of Locke there. Locke is trying to kind of attack the idea that the general is more known to us than the particular. And, uh, he wants to show, um, this by showing that the general ideas are really rather difficult ideas. He takes as an example, then, the general idea of triangle, huh? Okay? Now, if you say, what is the general idea of triangle, huh? Well, the general idea of triangle is this. I use the word idea here, because that's going to lend itself to the confusion there of thought in this idea. The general idea of triangle is a, what? A plain figure contained by three straight lines. Okay? Something like that would be the general idea of triangle, right, huh? So, in the idea of triangle, in general, is three straight lines, okay? And, as you know, straight lines have got to be either equal or unequal. So, are the three straight lines in the definition of triangle, are they equal or unequal? 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Well, you see, but if you're imagining straight lines, they've got to be the equal or unequal, don't they? Now, if you imagine these three straight lines in the definition of triangle in general to be equal, then the general idea of triangle doesn't fit the, say, scaling triangle, does it, huh? If you imagine those lines to be unequal, say, all of them, it doesn't fit the, what, equilateral triangle, right? So, it's got to, in some sense, be both of these, right? And neither of these, right? Or if you take all three possibilities, right? It's got to be all of these and what? None of these, right? And, of course, it applies to the same thing, you know, it's got to be either right-angled or acute-angled or two-sangled, right? In other words, these two sides here have got to meet at a right angle or two-sangled angle, right? Acute angle, right? Okay. And, of course, if you imagine those lines meeting, you've got to imagine a meeting at a right angle or at a two-sangled angle or an acute angle, right? Okay. So, which are these two lines meeting at? If you say, at a right angle, it doesn't fit these. You say, at this, it doesn't fit these too. If you've been in a acute angle, it doesn't fit these, right? So, somehow, it seems to be all of these, right? And yet it can't be any of them, can't it? So, he ends up by saying it's all and what? None of these, right? Well, I think I mentioned how Barclay quotes that exact paragraph where he says it now. He doesn't work on the principles of human understanding. And he says, well, that doesn't make any sense, right? So, Barclay concludes we have no general ideas. Okay? And that's his mistake. But Locke's mistake is that this general idea of triangle is all and none of these things, right? It's like you have the equilateral triangle and the sausage triangle, the skating triangle, but you have a clear idea of each of these, right? And you ram them together, right? And you get the general idea of triangle. You see? And that's really a false understanding of what it is, huh? Because you don't get the general idea of triangle by ramming together, equal out of what sausage is and scaly. That'd be like saying, you know, you get a general understanding of what a man is by taking a white man and a black man and a yellow man and ramming them together, right? And getting kind of, you know? Yeah. Is man in general white or yellow or black, what would you say? Well, it's all and none of these, right? Well, what's the mistake there, right? I mean, there's more than one mistake that he's making here, but in regard to his thing there, three straight lines must be either each one or each one, right? It must be that a right-hand-goer and a cutie and out two-seller, right? So the three straight lines of the definition of triangle must be doing one of those things. Well, what's the real answer to that, huh? Are these three straight lines equal or aren't equal? What would you say? We can say it's both equal and unequal in ability, but neither in what? Act. Yeah, yeah. These three lines are equilateral, sausage, scaly, in ability, all in ability, but none of those three in what? Act. So, part of Locke's, I use this example sometimes to show that Locke doesn't understand what? Ability, right? Right. Okay? And what is in something in ability, he's imagining falsely to be actually in there. Now, I think I quoted a very interesting statement by Weitzacker. Weitzacker is the physicist, he was a pupil of Heisenberg for a while, so that was where he was pretty good at. We did Heisenberg's tutelage. But he's the guy who explained, I guess, why the sun can go on so long without burning out. But Weitzacker made an interesting statement. He says that when we imagine something, we make it actual in our imagination. We can't really imagine ability any more than you can what? Sensibility. Any kind of ability. So when you see a ball player on the field there, do you actually see his ability? Or do you see what he does because of his ability? When the great pianist sits down, the great piano, right, do you see his ability? And he sits down? You don't see his ability in him. You see what he does because of his ability, right? And that's how reason comes to understand ability, in relation to act. But the senses and the imagination don't know one thing in comparison to another. They don't know one thing in order, or reshield to another. So, in a way he has the same problem that Anne Xavier has, right? Anne Xavier is saying you can't get something out of nothing. So if all these things come to be out of matter, they must be what? Actually in there, right? And he doesn't distinguish between them all being in their inability, but only one of them in what? Act, right? So if I had a piece of clay, for example, right? Out of a piece of clay I could get a sphere, a cube, a cylinder, a pyramid, an infinity of different things out of that one piece of clay, right? But are all those shapes actually in the clay? They're in their inability, yeah. Only one of them is there in act, but they're all there in ability, yeah? So people falsely imagine everything that is in the ability of matter to be what? actually in there. And that's how Anne Xavier seems up in that strange position that everything is inside of everything. But he runs into problems because there are limits to how small things can get. But when I teach that part there, sometimes I bring in Heisenberg's Introduction to the Unified Field Theory. And Heisenberg is talking about the students of elementary particles and how the well-known formula among them was that every elementary particle is composed of all the rest. And the reason why they spoke that way is because out of any elementary particle, you can eventually get all the rest. They must already be in there, right? But actually they have the same problem if that is taken from what is actually being said in words there, right, that Anne Xavier says, is that the elementary particles would be getting smaller and smaller and smaller and smaller, right? And that's contrary to our experience of the elementary particles is each having a definite, you know, mass and so on, size. So, now in a way, Socrates is making that same mistake in the Meno, right? When he says that the slave boy already knew what, how to double a square. Because it comes out of what the slave boy does in fact know. But in fact the slave boy was mistaken, he didn't know how to double a square to begin with. But he was able to know it. But is that the same thing as to actually know it? If you know the length and width of a rectangle, do you actually know the area? Well, if you never multiplied the length by the which you don't actually know the area, do you? But you are able to know the area if you know the length and the width and how to multiply it. So people sometimes, with one or another kind of ability, falsely imagined, right? That what is in something in ability is actually what? In there, right? You can't get blood out of eternity. Why not? Because there's no blood in there, right? You can't get money out of my pocket if there's no money in my pocket, right? And yet, you know, you can get a chair in the next room if there's a chair in the next room, right? And yet, right? And yet, you can get a chair in the next room, right? And yet, you can get a chair in the next room, right? In some way, we get chairs out of the trees. So there's such a thing as what? Getting something out of something was not actually in there. That sounds crazy at first, doesn't it, right? Yeah. And that's not the same thing as getting something out of nothing, because ability is not what? Nothing, contrary to the Megarians, that we read in Book Nine of Wisdom, who thought there's no such thing as ability. But, so, in a sense, Locke, you know, I'll mention he's having a somewhat similar problem, right? Because he's not able to understand how these three lines, right, include equilateralized sauces and scaly. It includes all the particular kinds, or obtuse and right-angle and acute-angle triangles. It includes all of those in ability, right? But not in that, right? So, you could say the three straight lines are all of these in ability, not in act. And therefore, the general is a little bit like matter, different kind of ability, but there's a similarity there. In the same way, you could say that man in general, is he, what, white, or is he yellow, or is he black, or brown, or is he? Well, man in general is able to be all these, right? But he's none of these, like, in act, right? We're talking about number in general, so not even. Both of these are neither of these. What's able to be both, right? It's actually neither. And because you find theorems about number in general, you could say it's what? A number is either a part or parts of another number, unless you're in the greater, right? So, what's he talking about there? Odd number, even number. Odd number, even number. Or a number in general that is either a part or parts of another number, the lesser or the greater. It's neither, right? An ability, right? So, you can't understand ability, but part of the reason for not understanding ability, as they say, goes back to imagination, to what the right side was set up. When you imagine something, you, what? Make it act through the imagination. So, when you try to imagine ability of any kind, you tend to be deceived by false imagination. You imagine something you cannot be imagined. You're making actual something that is not actual, and therefore you're falsifying. But notice, another way you can explain his difficulty is, that he's trying to, what? He's confusing the image of a triangle with the thought of triangle. Any triangle you imagine, you've got to either imagine it as either equilateral or as sausage or scaling, right? Just like any triangle you draw on the board here, you must be either what? Yikila or asats of these or scaling, right? It's got to be one or the other, right? It can't be all and none, right? See? But you can understand what's common to all of these, right? Leaving aside the differences, but you can't imagine what's common to all of them. The actual triangle you imagine will be one or the other. But when you're demonstrating in general, what you understand is not exactly what you imagine, is it? So, it's interesting the way our staff proceeds here, because in 358, he says, imagination is different from affirmation and negation, for the true or the false is an entwining of thoughts. The Greek word is simploke, right? The one that's so fond of from the categories. Here he says it's simploke, noematon, I think we pointed out before. Before he called it a synthesis, a putting together of thoughts, right? Now he says it's an intertwining, entwining of thoughts. So, is an image true or false? But this statement, in the mind, is either true or what? False, so if I imagine a glass mountain, right? Is it true or false? Strictly speaking, is it true or false? If I say there are glass mountains in the world, But that's not an image. No, see, that's a statement, and that's either true or false. If I imagine a unicorn, true or false? I'm not saying that something is or is not, right? So truth means that you're saying what is, is, and what is not, is not. And falsehood means you're saying that what is, is not. Or what is not, is. Right? Well, the image doesn't say that something is or isn't, does it? So it's, it's very clear there that the image is not this kind of thought, right? Okay? Now, in the last paragraph, he doesn't really point out what the distinction is there, although Thomas does, huh? But by what, well, the first thoughts differ so as not to be phantasms, huh? What would be the thought, say, of what a man is, or the thought of what a stone is, or the thought of what a triangle is? This is the example of, that Locke is not seeing, right? Yet, neither are those first thoughts phantasms, right? But they are not without phantasms, right? Now, the difference there, Thomas makes it explicit, but Aristotle knows it, I'm sure, that the thought is, what? Of the universal, and the image is of the, what? Single, right? Not only do I imagine a particular kind of triangle, right? But I imagine an individual of that particular kind, right? Okay? Now, it's interesting, huh? If you remember logic, you know, we talked about three acts of reason, right? And the first act of reason is understanding what something is. And the second act of reason is understanding the truth or the false. And in that second act, as he says, putting together, or intertwining, or entwining, two things understood by the first act, right? So I understand what a man is, I understand what an animal is, I understand what a stone is, right? And then, I put these together and say a man is an animal, or a man is not an animal, right? Or a man is a stone, or a man is not a stone, right? And then I have something true or false, right? And then I put together these statements and I start to reason, right? Okay? But in distinguishing between imagining and thinking, he goes in the, what, reverse order, right? Because if you look back when he first distinguished imagining and thinking, he says, I can imagine something without having any reason for imagining it. I can imagine a terrorist out there without having any reason to think there's a terrorist out there, right? But I can't really think that there's a terrorist out there without having some reason to do so. You see? I can imagine myself being into a terrible accident on the highway on the way home today, huh? Semi-trucks coming in both ends and boom! You know? But I have no reason to think that that is going to happen, right? To me and my home, I'd stay here. Right? Oh no! If I thought it was going to happen, I thought I was going to get hit by semis, right? You see? In fact, I have a reason to think I'm going to get hit by semis, huh? And I don't have at the moment, anyway. Any reason to think that there's going to be two semis coming at either ends at that intersection where you kind of are going to be down there, it's got a 25-mile speed limit, you know, so it doesn't plenty of time to get you after coming down the other highway, right? You know, going too fast, huh? You see? So he first distinguishes between the third act and imagining, right? And it's kind of easier to see, huh? And then he comes to the second act here in 358, where there's truth or falsity, right? And that's easier to see too, right? The most difficult thing to see is how, what? The image is of the singular, and the thought is of the, what? Universal. And that's where Locke is having his difficulty there, right? Because he's trying to imagine, right, the universal. We don't have an image of the universal as such. We always have the image of a particular kind of triangle, and not even of that, but of an individual of that particular kind. But I have a thought of a particular kind of triangle, and I have a thought of triangle in general. But the thought is of the, what? Universal. But notice that follows from the fact that the thought is of the what it is, right? And what it is of a sensible or imaginable thing, of a natural or mathematical thing, is something universal. What a triangle is or what a man is, right? Something common. That's the most fundamental difference and the most, but the most difficult to, what? See, right, huh? You see that? I think it's kind of marvelous to see the way Aristotle proceeds, huh? And that's why, again, coming back to Shakespeare's definition of reason there, huh? He defines reason not by its knowing universal, but by, what? Discourse, right? Which is, you know, knowing one thing to another, right? Huh? See? But you're not doing that when you imagine, right? So you're not in the way of a reason, anyway. But you see how imagining, you know, in a way resembles discourse a bit, because in imagining I could take, you know, I've seen gold and I've seen mountains, and then I kind of form this image of a gold mountain, right? See? And that's a little bit like what reason does, right? Putting together thoughts, huh? There's a sumploke, right? But as I say, you see also in the way we speak in English, how we do use the word, what? Imagine and thinking sometimes. Think they're going to win the game this Saturday? Yeah, I think so. Yeah. I imagine so. Yeah. Do you think so and so is going to be re-elected? Yeah. I think so. I imagine so. It's just that meant the same thing, right? Right. I was mentioning how I was looking at Partridge there, you know, the etymological dictionary, and the word think and thought, you know, and talking about me think, you know, seems to me, right? Kind of has that sense almost of the words that Aristotle uses in talking about the phantasm, right? So they're very similar, huh? And a good place in Shakespeare where you see that use is in the prologues there in Henry V, right, where he's trying to get the audience, you know, to fill in what he can if he's on the stage fully, right? Where you see a couple of guys, you know, whacking and putting swords, you know? Imagine, you know, two armies, you know, and two nations here at war, you know, in 100 years' war and so on. And imagine the horses, you know, with their hoofs, you know, putting in the sand and so on. And, but, but he's appealing to their imagination, right, to fill out the picture, but sometimes he uses the word image and sometimes the word, what, thought there, right? It just kind of actually does it and you wouldn't notice it, I mean, unless you're a philosopher or something like that, because we tend to use them in that kind of a interchangeable way. So it's really most necessary to separate those two. See, when Locke uses the word idea, you see, idea there is often in English that can be used to refer to a thought or to an image and there's a likeness between those two and the fact that when you think, you have to imagine, right? That's another reason why you tend to confuse these two, huh? That's it. You don't have one without the, what, other, right? You don't have a thought without an image in any way, huh? Something about that seems puzzling to me, that you never have a thought without an image and that seems like sometimes some sort of, like, sort of understanding a thing intuitively all at once sometimes seems to happen without imagination or image, or is it just one that's unaware of what's going on? Well, yeah, you're not really concentrating on the image in that sense, but what you're understanding, you know. But there's kind of a reason why you don't think without an image, The reason why? Well, that is that the object of the reason is that what it is is something sensed or imagined, right? I think you have to understand that through the help of that proportion that we gave earlier, right? Right. See? What is the object of the eye, see? It's a color of something outside the eye, right? Right. And so does the eye see the color of your clothes, or the color of the bricks over there, without the bricks? Yeah. Yeah. And the reason knows that what it is of something sensed or imagined. So that what is sensed or imagined is to thinking, like the exterior bricks are to the eye, right? And so I don't see the color of the bricks without the bricks being there. I don't understand what it is of something sensed or imagined without imagining it, at least. If what it is was like Plato thought existing in a world by itself, right? And our soul was knowing it by being in contact with that world, then it would know the universal, what it is, without turning to the what? Images, right? Right. But if it doesn't make sense to say that there is man himself and by himself, as Plato calls them. Right. It doesn't make sense. Because it's the nature of man to be material, right? And this man himself and by himself would not even be material. To be himself, right? Yeah. Yeah. But man is. You see, once you understand that, then you understand a lot of other things, you know? Why does man have to express his affection, let's say, with a hug or a kiss or something like this, right? Let's say, or a handshake or something, right? It's because he's not an angel, right? But he's an animal with reason, huh? And this is why, you know, they speak of the sacraments as being, what, proportioned to man, huh? Right. That he needs a sensible sign, right, in order to receive grace, right? Even though, I presume that grace is being received in the soul rather than the body, right? Yeah. But nevertheless, you know, it's appropriate to man to receive it through a sensible sign, huh? It's kind of interesting when Aristotle talks about definition and statement and syllogism and logic there. He's always talking about the definition in words, not the definition in thoughts. That's right. That's right. That's right. That's right. That's right. That's right. That's right. That's right.