De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 54: The Powers of the Soul and Locomotion

Transcript
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He's talking about the statement in words, right? When he defines it, he doesn't define it as a, like he speaks here in the Dhyanima, a synthesis or a supploke of the hematone, of thoughts, but he defines it as a phone, a vocal sound. A statement is vocal sound. It's generically speaking, right? It's going to signify the true or the false, but it's vocal sound he's talking about there. I always quote those words, you know, of Prospero to, even Prospero is some question about do the lines belong to Prospero or to Miranda, but until they taught Taliban to speak, he didn't even know his own thought. So, you know, I certainly don't know what you think if you can't put it into words, right? But do you know what you yourself think? Until you put it into words, right? And when I try to define something, I've got to define it in words, right? Even though the definition might involve this condition of thoughts, right? I can't inspect my thoughts without using words. You know, when I think about something, I'm in a way thinking in words, right? And, you know, a sign of that is, you know, how commonly the human mind is deceived by the equivocation of a word. I see it all the time with my students, and how easily they're deceived by the equivocation of words, the general in particular, you know, like they're there sometimes on that thing. They all think Aristotle's contradiction himself, and they can't distinguish the two senses of particular and general. You know, but only a mind that depended me upon the senses could be deceived, you know? They're thinking that there's one thing there, or even one thought there, that there's one word. What's his name? You know, Marx and Engels, you know, they read Forbach, you know, enthusiastically, you know, they were young, right? And Forbach's syllogism is basically what? Man's mind is infinite. The infinite is God. Therefore, man's mind is God. And this is the first little work called The Essence of Christianity, right? Where Forbach says, the secret of Christianity is not that God became man, but that man himself is God. So you can see the enormous pride here, you know? I mean, we see enormous pride in that thing. But from a logical point of view, it's the fallacy of equivocation, right? And the way in which man's mind is infinite, and the word infinite, when you say infinite is God, is not the same meaning, right? But deceives everybody, kind of, you know, Marx and Engels and so on, huh? A little bit of pride helps to... to be deceived in this flattering way, you know? But it shows you how dependent the mind is upon the senses, huh? They can be deceived by such a thing. Okay? So next time we'll go on to the... He's going to go on now to talk about the, what? The motive powers in this, the appetite, huh? Okay, so he's still talking about the senses and reason by themselves, and now he's going to talk about what moves the animal, right? So I'm going to end up with those words, that the words of... He went to listen to Jerome because he had a beautiful Ciceronian style, I guess, with the words that he was drinking in, you know, the wonderful style, actually the thoughts correspond to those words. You know, that's how Augustine speaks, right, huh? And Augustine's, you know, a pretty good mind, you know? But even with him, right? How important the words are there? I don't know, we used to always joke about that, you know, when you hear these things in French, you know, you're not too good in your French, you know, but you understand what the guy's saying, but it doesn't seem to be to come home until you get into English, right? And that's why you use the metaphors all the time, because that just appeals to the imagination, and you see the image, and that's pleasing. Yeah, yeah, now you see, the thing that's striking there in the Summa there in the first question is, the objection is that Scripture should not use metaphors, right? Because Scripture is the highest teaching of all, and poetry is infima doctrina, the lowest teaching, and what's appropriate to the lowest should not be used in the highest, right? And Thomas, you know, the answer he gives there is that what they're dealing with, things that are beyond reason, right? But in the case of poetry, things that are below reason, and therefore outside of reason, right? And theology, things that are above reason, right? So in a way, it's for contrary reasons that we, what, do that, right? Just like when Judas kisses Christ, right? He said you betray the Son of Man with a kiss, right? So he's using the kiss for the opposite of love, right? To betray the man, huh? You know, so the metaphor is used in those two because they're beyond reason, different directions, huh? My old friend Jim Franz, I used to say, you know, you tell her I can't understand you, you know? They like that, he says, you know? But why can't you understand them, he said? Is it because they're all the way above you, you know, they're all the way above you, or because they're below reason? It's almost the only place that says you can corrupt someone's understanding by corrupting their imagination. For one reason, you have one to listen to music, right? But it seems you have, in the politics or in the book there, eventually three reasons, right? And one is a, what, relaxation, right? And there's how to praise it to the use of music, I mean, to the dance and so on, right? Okay? And then he talks about music for moral education, and then he talks about it being a diagoge, right? And of course, you don't have Thomas's commentary in the later books of politics, you know? Thomas's commentary breaks off in book three, right? But diagoge translated literally into Latin as deduxio. Well, it kind of struck me to the day when I was thinking about it again, that music is a preparation for the moral life, right? And for the life of the mind, right? And the second reason Aristarchical it is in terms of the moral life, huh? It's moving our emotions in a way that is both pleasing to the emotions, but also in harmony with reason, right? And therefore it's disposing us, at least in a remote way, for moral virtue, and for those moral virtues that restrain and order the passions, right? But then, insofar as music has order and a beginning, middle, and end, right? And so on, it's preparing us for the life of the mind, right? It would be, you know, a very high thing you could say about music, huh? Aristarchical's painting doesn't do this at all to the degree that music does, huh? And let's not be a preparation for the moral life for the, seems to me, the life of the mind, huh? I was listening to Fantasia there in the minor key, there was a 397 there. Very important, maybe a CD, you know? Well, at Mars, at least that is, you know? It was kind of like, like pervading the life of the mind, huh? You see? And I used to joke, you know, that the D major quintet of Mozart, the commercial of 593 there, gives me the emotions of the philosopher at work, right? And I thought, playfully, they would say this, you know, but it really is something very much like that, right? Well, you look at the five of the last six symphonies there, 30, what, six, 30, what? Yeah, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, right? That's really the most clearly part of more education, huh? Really something the way he does it in those pieces. But I think the most certainly part of more education. How important music is. I think the same thing we said about Shakespeare's plays, right? Shakespeare's plays are, like Paul VI said, you know, more education. It's really, really impressive, you know. At the same time, you know, Shakespeare's plays are also a preparation of the life of the mind, huh? So you have to admire Mozart and Shakespeare, that they could do that. And they're kind of the par excellence example of how music and fiction can be both of those things, huh? You know, at least a remote disposition for the moral life, right? And at least a remote disposition for the mind, huh? I was thinking, you know, I've got to give the fresh American take, you know. Of course, we do use that training to wisdom, right? In the Taoist, there's a reason that Shakespeare's expectation to use reason, right? And that I have to see what they can do with the idea of, is the love of wisdom and the love of reason separable? Can you love one without loving the other? They know, to some extent, what wisdom is from the thing, and they know somewhat what reason is from Shakespeare's expectation, who's gone through that. I sometimes, you know, use the mannyadakshu there, can you love health without loving your body? I mean, you love your body without loving health. Make sense? Do I really love my body if I don't love health? Can I really love health without loving my body? So, could I really love wisdom without loving reason? If wisdom is the greatest good of reason, huh? And could I love reason without loving wisdom? And then the other thing, I'm not sure you're going to admit that. Now, I may not give this, but, you know, for a complete thing, you might want to say, can you love reason without loving distinction and order? Or, can you love distinction and order without loving reason? In the same way, can you love wisdom without loving distinction and order? Except me, I have to say, sort of, alright. And can you love distinction and order without loving wisdom? See? So, those loves, I think, are really insimable, basically. Okay, then you go to the next thing, but set those three, you know, to the picture. Now, can you love yourself without loving, what? Reason. You see, if you love to sleep and feed, is your chief good? You know, you're loving yourself as a beast, right? So, you're really loving yourself, since you're not a beast, I see. It's in the Psalms, if I remember, right, isn't it? Where it says, the man who loves iniquity hates his own soul. Isn't that in the Psalms? I don't know exactly what it was, but I think it appears at least twice in the Psalms, huh? Do you remember that or not? I don't know. It's going to be an old man now for big, you know? I don't remember the verse, but I don't remember where it is. Yeah, I thought it was in one of the Psalms. But, and it's interesting, right? You see? Because, since iniquity is the evil of the soul, right? The bad of the soul, right? Like saying, you know, can you love sickness and love your body? See, the man who loves sickness hates his own body, right? You'd have to say, right? It could be that, that mistaken, right? To love with sickness, right? But if you did love sickness, then you would hate your own body, wouldn't you? Because to love the body is to wish good to the body. To hate the body is to wish evil to it, right? You know? And, um, so, if man is an animal with reason, he can't love himself without loving reason. He can't love reason without loving wisdom, right? So, you've got to be a philosopher if you love yourself. You've got to be so much careful in that somehow, because I don't, you know, I don't want to say he's got to be a philosopher, right? I mean, it's like you said that, right? You know, you've got to think a little bit about this. You know, I mean, I mean, this thing may seem, what's love and wisdom got to do with me, right? You know, well, maybe you can't love yourself, unless you love wisdom, right? And, and basically, you know, if wisdom is a knowledge of God, right? Then, uh, the beatific vision, right? Seeing God as he is, as St. John says, seeing God face to face, as St. Paul says, maybe that's, most of all, wisdom for us, right? So, you know, unless you, you love that vision of God as he is, that vision of God as eternal life, right? Um, you don't really love yourself, right? And I see Shakespeare's most profound, you know, statement of this is in the, the dream of Richard III, do you know that? Because he, it's on that, right? Does Richard really love himself, right? And fools think well they self, right? You know, but then he, he's done all these evil things, right? So, you know, so he, he's really seeing in the, in a sense, in an unusual moment of clarity, right? It's in the dream there, um, that he's, to really love himself. Yeah, it's got to be very, very interesting, just think this, the state of, of mind that he's in there, Um, so I'll tell you, there's still a bit of that thing, right? They don't love reason, and they don't love wisdom, they don't really love themselves, right? It's a kind of, he said, but I love myself, that is Richard is Richard, as I am I. You see? But, A priest, he was explaining, saying that, doing penance is really loving yourself. It looks like, they're hating themselves, you know? He says, that's real, true self-love, he said. Yeah, yeah, it's interesting, yeah. See, and Aristotle talks about, um, love for another comes from, love for oneself, right? And then, of course, usually self-love has a pejorative sense, a bad sense, right? He loves himself, you know? But, um, usually, I mean, at least the most concrete example of that, that is the man who, who, uh, favors his body, right, huh? And, uh, he's loving his soul, right? And indulging his body's, as men tend to do, right? You know? Um, that's self-love, kind of in the bad sense, right? That's, you know, indulging it, you know, to the detriment of the good of the soul, huh? That's where Aristotle is saying, that there's a, uh, a good, but also maybe, you might say, a true love of the soul, right? Love, or love of oneself, right? And so, um, you know, in the second commandment theory, to love your neighbor, as yourself, right? So, it must obviously be a, a good sense of loving yourself, and, uh, a sense of loving yourself, and that you should love yourself, right? And then we saw you in maturity, right? But it's kind of interesting, that he doesn't, uh, make that the commandment, right? You know? The commandment to love God, and glad to love your neighbor, where's the commandment to love yourself? Well, it seems like, it's a privilege, right? Because you naturally love yourself, but, there's a little something there to be brought out, nevertheless, it seems to me, right? Because, um, The man who's chief put his to sleep and feed doesn't really love himself. Does Saddam Hussein love himself? I've read some spiritual writers, more widely ones, talking about people who have a problem loving themselves because, say, their parents didn't love them. They have a problem in the spiritual life, even loving God or believing that God loves them. Because they don't have that kind of natural love of themselves. An obstacle. That's interesting. It's kind of easy to see that if your father was mean to you, you'd have a hard time relating to God the Father, right? That's kind of a common thing, right? You've heard people who had a terrible father abuse them in some way. And, you know, the opposite there of a sudden, I could say, towards the end of her life there, you know. What are you thinking about when the sisters ask her? She's just meditating on the words of our Father. In the beginning of our Father, you know how sweet it is to call him Father, right? How come could she? You've got to tell you how sweet it is to call God our Father if she had not had a wonderful earthly father, you know? Ha, ha, ha. It would be very hard to do that, right? But this is a more subtle thing there, but, you know, if you don't love yourself because, you know, your parents didn't show love for you, you know, that you'd have a problem there in loving God. In the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, orden and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, and help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. As I was mentioning to, before you came in, some of you couldn't have a short class today, okay, because I have to go see the grandchildren there, and I have to do some cooking, and guests are coming, and all kinds of things, so. But I didn't want to break our rhythm too much, so. So today we'll be looking at chapter 9 here, which is the, corresponds to the 14th Alexio in Thomas. And this chapter is really dialectical, raising certain problems, and then these will be resolved after chapter 9. Now he recalls something that was emphasized in the first book, in the dialectic of the first book, in the very first sentence. He says, Now, Aristotle and the other Greeks sometimes say that life in the plants is hidden. So when the Greeks, before Aristotle, investigated the soul, they investigated the soul, where life was manifest, and that is in the animals. And they had not yet distinguished between sense and, what, reason too much, huh? And if I can use a little metaphor there from Shakespeare, he's always alluding to sleep, thou ape of death, huh? He was dead asleep, we say sometimes, right? Well, notice, when you're asleep, you're not apparently sensing what's going on around you, and you're not moving from one place to another. All you have, maybe, is digestion and things of that sort. Growth, huh? But when you're asleep, you resemble death, right? As if the plant life in you, digestion and growth, is hidden, right? That that's life, huh? And because you're not apparently sensing, and you're not moving from place to place, you don't seem to be, what? A lie. A lie, huh? Like that dramatic scene in Henry IV there, where the king is dying, right? And Prince Hal, his son, comes in, and he thinks his father's died, doesn't see any sign of life in him. And so he picks up the crown, which is now his, and he goes into the other room with the crown, and of course his father wakes up, couldn't you wait until I had died, he said. It's a very interesting scene between the two of them, right? Okay? But that's just an example. All kinds of references in Shakespeare to how the sleeping man seems to be, what? Dead, huh? Okay? And of course Christians, you know, say that when you die, you fall asleep, right? But we use that part that we have a hope of resurrection, right? Okay? So Aristotle's referring back to Book I, where when he talked about the investigation of the soul, the cause of life, first cause of life and living bodies, they investigated what was the cause of sensation, right? And before that, what was the cause of what? Motion from one place to another. Now Aristotle has just gotten through talking about the senses in Book II and the beginning of Book III, and then about the mind or the understanding of the reason in what we just finished last time, in chapters, what, 4 through 8, I guess, about. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. So now it remains to what? Talk about the cause of motion from one place to another. And so he raises that question here. However, one must inquire about the moving power, what it is of the soul, whether some one part of the soul, one particular ability of the soul, you might say, being separable either in magnitude, having its own place in the body, or at least being separable as to what it is, its account of its definition, or what is the entire soul itself, or some part? What is something proper beyond those usually named and those mentioned, or some one of these? As I mentioned already, the rest of this chapter now will be taken up with some dialectic, raising of certain questions. And it's divided into two parts. And the first part is talking in general, how does one divide the powers of the soul? So he takes it up again, right? Because it's relevant in some sense to what part or power of the soul is this ability to move from place to place. And then the second part of the dialectic is about, in particular, what is the power that moves us from one place to another. Okay? Now he's alluding to some divisions of the powers of the soul that were given by Plato, and which Aristotle himself sometimes touches upon in the Nicomachean Ethics. So he begins with this question. There is a difficulty right away. How one must name the parts of the soul and how many there are? For in some way they appear infinite. If you take everything that the living thing might do, there seems to be no end to the different things the living thing does, right? But then he talks about what? Some of these divisions proposed, especially in Ethics. Being not only what some who determine this say, the rational and the spirited and the desiring parts. That's the division that Plato uses in the Republic. And he divides the soul into three parts. One part being reason. The other part, which they're not always sure how to translate, thumos, which in Greek can mean anger, right? Confidence, boldness, right? Sometimes they translate it as he does spirited. What the Latins call the irascible appetite. And then the sense appetite, which in Greek is called epithumia. Epithumia, and in Latin, the concupiscible appetite. None of the Republic had ever had a chance to read that. He talks about these three parts of the soul. And he makes an analogy, huh? Between these three parts of the soul and three parts of the, what? City, huh? And he compares the reason to the part of the city, the rulers, you might say. Those who direct everybody else in the city. And the irascible appetite, he compares to the soldiers. Because they need, what? Boldness and confidence, huh? And then the common people, down here to the concupiscible appetite. Okay? Common people as a way. And if you study the Republic as a whole, he's trying to show from the order of these parts and what it should be in the city, what should be the order of these parts, huh? I was rereading de Tocqueville's recollections of the French Revolution of 1848, huh? Very interesting work, man. It's like a novel almost. It's very exciting to read. But the common people are arming themselves in Paris and overthrowing the government. And there's chaos, right? And the soldiers are trying to stop the thing and so on. So you have that same three parts there in Paris at the time. The government and the soldiers and the rabble down here, right? That are rising up and blockading the streets and threatening the lives of people and so on. So, now, epithumia is the part that's concerned with sensible pleasures and pains, huh? And so, in this part of the soul, they put the famous virtue of temperance, huh? Or moderation, huh? And in dumas, they put the virtue of courage. And in reason, the virtue of, what? Foresight, huh? Or prudence, as they call it for this. The Latin word for foresight, huh? And then, socrates is the place for where does justice belong. Because justice is actually found in the will, right? And the will is not the same thing as reason, but it follows upon what reason, huh? So he doesn't really have a place to put the will. And so he kind of has the will being the, what, order arrangement of all of these together, right? Underneath reason and so on. Well, this makes some sense as a, what, division of the powers of the soul that are involved in human action, huh? And with reason, you can bring in the will, because the will follows upon reason, huh? And reason determines what's good or bad, huh? Okay? Like in Shakespeare's words there in, uh, Hammond says, what, he chose, what, Horatio is his friend, right? Well, choice is an act of the will, but he knows his words. Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished. That's the act of reason, right? To distinguish men, huh? Her election is sealed before itself, right? Okay? So you could understand the will somewhat with reason, huh? Because the will follows upon reason, huh? But then, these are the two kinds of emotions that we have. The incubusable emotions are the emotions that are concerned with what is pleasing or painful to the senses. And thumas is concerned with difficulties that arise in getting what is pleasant or avoiding what is painful, huh? So, in the other animals, huh, as Aristotle says, they fight about food and sex. That's what they fight about. And they fight about these pleasant things, right? So, if someone else is competing for the food or for the partner there, then they, what, even though it's not pleasant, they will fight them, okay? Or if their life is threatened, they will, what, maybe run away if they are a small animal, huh? So, Aesop tells the story there, you know, the little animal got away from the big animal. And they were laughing at the big animal, but he couldn't catch the little animal. And the big animal said, well, he says, it's one thing to be running for your dinner, he says. Another to be running for your life. Okay? So you could defend this division to some extent in reference to what? Human action, right? Okay? But, it's not adequate as a division of all the powers of the soul, as he's going to go on. Sometimes they make an even briefer division. And they'll speak of, what, the rational part of the soul, right? And then the irrational part of the soul, right? And again, that makes some sense when you're in ethics, huh? And you're talking about reasonable action and so on. And so you want to divide the powers in terms of reason and what doesn't have reason. But it can listen to reason, right? But often resists reason, huh? Okay? And those are very relevant to our actions, huh? Because our reason and our will and our emotions seem to determine our actions, huh? And the way these... Related to each other, huh? So now in 362 there, he begins to criticize that division. For according to the differences to which they separate those parts, other parts appear having greater distance than these, about which something was now said in the previous parts of this book. The feeding part, right? The nutritive part. I like to translate it with the exact word there. The feeding part, right? Which is both in plants and in all animals, huh? Because the plants in some way take in something like food for themselves, right? Through the soil and so on. Water. And then again, the sense powers we've been talking about, right? So that doesn't seem to come into these divisions, do they? Moreover, the part we talked about after the senses, the imaginative part, right? Which in being, or definition, is different from all. If one will put down separate parts of the soul, it presents a great difficulty. With which of these it is the same or different? And we saw some of those difficulties before. Now in 364, he says, Well, when you classify the powers of the soul, as we did back in the beginning of the second book, after we defined the soul, that classification was based upon their objects, huh? And in a way, the will up here, and these ones down here, they're all concerned with what? The good or the bad, right? They're all concerned with desire in some sense, huh? And you're kind of breaking up that natural division, right? The desiring powers, huh? The sense-desiring powers and the rational-desiring power, right? But in a sense, separate things that should be put together in the same, what, category or the same genus of powers, huh? So he says, Besides these, there is the appetitive, huh? The desiring power, to use the English word, or the desiring genus of powers, which both in account and in power would seem to be different from all. And indeed, it is strange to tear this apart, right? For will, and of course the Greek word there is what? Pulesis, right? For pulesis, or will, comes to be in the rational part. And desire, sense-desire, epithumia, and thumasa, I don't like that translation of spirit, but it's very common to translate it that way. In the, what? Irrational, huh? Okay? So you have these three kinds of appetite that should be put in the same genus of powers, huh? The desiring powers, huh? So these are some problems with the adequacy of these divisions that are common in, what? Ethics, right? And if you ever study the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that a knowledge of the soul is to ethics as a knowledge of the body is to the medical art. So the man who's going to, what? Acquire the medical art completely or fully has to know something about what the body is by nature. As he says in the biological works, the better medical doctors push their investigations back into the knowledge of what the body is by nature, right? And vice versa, those who study what the body is by nature, at the end they start to give some medical advice on the basis of this, huh? So he says the same way, in ethics you need a certain knowledge of the soul. And of course in ethics you take up a lot of the different virtues and they're in different parts of the soul. So foresight is in reason and justice is in the will and courage is in the irrational appetite and temperance or moderation in the concubial appetite. So to know something about the parts of the soul is relevant to the, what? Student of ethics, huh? But at the same time, Aristotle says, he doesn't have to go into that full knowledge of the soul and its powers and ethics that you have in the study of the soul here. Okay? So some divisions that are not as complete or exhaustive, huh? But have some relevance to what you're studying in ethics might be acceptable in ethics, right? But not for the student of the soul, right? Because he sees other powers that aren't really included in those divisions and powers that are further apart, right? And have greater differences than these powers that enumerated have, right? Plus there's another problem, you know, of switching and putting the will with the reason or somewhere else, right? Rather than with the other desiring powers. Okay? Now that ends the first half of the dialectic, huh? And in a way, someone might say it's almost out of place here, the dialectic of this first part because it's back in the beginning of the, not the beginning, but after the definition of the soul in the second book that he divided up the powers of the soul into five geni, if you recall, right? Okay? And now he seems to be coming back to that, right? Okay? But it's kind of a recollection, you know, about the divisions of the powers and he's going to take up an entirely new kind of power here, in a way. So he calls those things, right? But now the more particular dialectic begins here at 365 where he's going to say, now what is it that's responsible for the movement of an animal from one place to another, right? So you and I are always moving from one place to another, right? What's the cause of that in us, huh? Of course, when people talk about life, you know, the first idea we have of life is what? Self-motion, huh? So if I'm walking through the woods and I kick the stone and it rolls, I don't say, it's a lie, do I? Because it didn't move itself. I kicked it, right? But if I slip on something and I'm like kicking, and all of a sudden it shoots across the path. Ah! It jumps. It's a surprise. It's a high! Right? You know, there are these things that you don't think are a lie sometimes, and all of a sudden they start moving. And they're maybe uglier others, they're just surprised they're moving, right? But it's this idea of self-motion, huh? And of course, the first philosophers tried to explain to the soul what would be the cause of the self-motion, huh? And they had various strange positions, huh? Okay? Like the Theogarion said, it's a self-moving number, huh? But what the Marxists thought was these atoms that are always in motion, huh? And they're moving the body, huh? So what's the cause, huh? Why do you move from one place to another, right? See? And so he's going to relate it now to the more exhaustive, what, division of powers that we gave in the beginning of Book Two, right after the definition of the soul, right? Maybe that's why he has this general dialectic here about the powers, too, because he's trying to recall, right, the division of the different genera, the five genera of powers, because that's going to set the stage. Now, where does the locomotive powers, huh, fit in, right? Or how do they fit in? And so he's got to have an adequate division of the powers of the soul. And so he wants to recall that adequate division, but do so in a way by criticizing the, what, inadequate divisions that some people, what, would have in mind, huh? Okay? I mean, Aristotle spent, what, 20 years in the school of Plato, huh? That's a long time to spend in school, right? Must have been a little bit of a slow student, right? The story is told of Plato coming in one day and everybody there was Aristotle, and he says, well, he says, he's a whole school of himself, right? And the other anecdote is that he's supposed to have called Aristotle the mind of the school, which is a great compliment, right, to pay a teacher, a teacher to pay a student, huh? Just like Albert the Great there when he had Thomas in his class and realized that the student was superior to the teacher. He should be teaching and I should be learning, right? So, maybe it's kind of marvelous to see that in Plato if those anecdotes are true, right? And what we know from Albertown that there's no envy of the younger man even when he excels you, right? But notice, Plato's school is so famous that the whole academic world gets its name from Plato's school. And every school called an academy gets its name from Plato's school. Plato sent up his what? His school in the grove dedicated to the hero Academius in Athens. And so from the place where he set up his school, it became known as the what? Academy, right? So the fact that the whole academic world and every academic department and every academic professor and every academy is named from Plato's school is one reason why you should be acquainted with Plato. And in this very famous work, The Republic, Plato has this division of the soul into those three parts, right? So someone might, coming in to Aristotle's lectures on the soul, have in mind that, right? And Aristotle says, well, that makes some sense as a division to be used in ethics, right? It's kind of ad hoc in a way, right? And imperfect as far as, it's ad hoc to the ethical concern, right? But it's not really adequate to the, what, consideration of the soul as a whole and the five general powers that are involved. So, in 365 he begins, And indeed, about that which the present argument concerns, what is the mover according to place for Adam? Of course, he begins by going back to the first kind of power we talked about, the kind of powers that we share even with the plants in a way, right? The feeding and growing and reproductive powers, huh? Okay. For in regard to motion according to growth and diminution, like you find even in the plants, being in all, being in all living things, right? I mean, among all living bodies, that is to say. That which is in all would seem to move, the generative and nutritive. However, we must look into breathing in and out and sleep and waking later. Aristotle wrote some, what, individual works on breathing and on sleep and waking, huh? Because they have special problems, huh? Okay. But he's going to eliminate, of course, in 366, that these powers that we share with the plants are the source of motion from one place to another. That's kind of obvious, right? Because the plants don't move from one place to another, right? But one must inquire about motion according to place. What moves the animal in regard to progression going from one place to another, going forward? It is clear, then, that this power is not the nutritive power, the feeding power, right? For this motion, huh, from one place to another, is always for the sake of something and is with imagination or appetite, huh, desire of some sort. For nothing not having appetite or desire or avoidance is moved except by violence. Now, of course, the animals, I mean, the plants don't have those things, right? Moreover, he says, the plants would be, what, motive. They would move from one place to another if they had this, what, power, right? And they would also have some, what, organic part for this motion, huh? Aristotle has a book in particular on the progression of animals and another one on the motion of animals, huh, and the different ways that they move forward, right, huh? You see these kind of worm-like things, you know, they hump up their back and then they spread it out and, you know, it's like if you lay on the floor there and you hump up your back, you know, and then you move forward. All these different ways that they have of moving themselves, huh? But here he's not going to get into that great detail, right, of the organic bodily parts, right? But if the plants had this power, they would have, what, the organs for moving from one place to another, like a wing or a leg or a fin or something of this sort, right? Okay? That's pretty obvious, it's not the plant things. But now, is it the sensing powers, huh? That makes maybe more sense, right? When I was a little boy, I used to have this cat, and the cat would be out in kind of the shed that was attached to the garage there at nighttime, it would be the door open, so the cat could go inside there. But in the morning, huh, you'd go to the back door and just turn the latch, you know, as silent as you could, and that cat would jump down, and then you're running up the sidewalk, you know, and it's longer than this, it was a nice long sidewalk to the garage there, and running up the stiff, you know, to get the food, huh? Okay? So, you might think that it's that, right, huh? You're seeing the cat there, you know, you know, hiding in the bushes or something, right? The neighbor had a kind of water place, so the birds came down, you know, to the water, and the cat would like to get into the high plants around there, you know, and wait till the... So obviously he's moving from one place to another. You see the way the cat's in there about to jump, you know, and then kind of wiggle back and forth, you know, and boom! So, you might think that what's the sense powers then that move the animal, right? But he says, Nevertheless, there are many animals which have sense, but are stable and unmoved till the end, huh? Now, what is he thinking of, huh? Are there animals that have sensation, but don't move from one place to another? Yeah. Now, some of these things are attached to the floor of the ocean. And Aristotle was a marine biologist, among other things, huh? Maybe he went to Troy at after the death of Plato, right? He went to live with a friend there, huh? And that's what he did, I think, when I was marine biology. So there are things that sense, if you poke these things, they, what, react like in pain, huh? And when something edible comes in, what, contact, they will grab it up, you see? But they don't move from one place to another. And they don't have to because the water brings everything to them, huh? Talk about being lazy, right? Okay. So he's saying, well, these are animals then, because an animal is defined by sense, right? And they have senses, but they don't move from one place to another. So how can sense be the cause of motion from one place to another? Now, someone says, well, they have sensation, but they don't have the organs to move from one place to another. Aristotle says, well, nature does nothing in vain, right? And it does not lack anything, what? Necessary, right? Except in, what? Mutilated and incomplete things, huh? It's like a man might lose his legs or something like that, right? Okay, or be paralyzed, right? Injured and so on. Well, these sorts of animals are complete and are not, what? Mutilated, huh? Now, the sign that they are complete animals is that they, what? Generate their own kind, huh? Okay. And they have full growth and diminution. Once, if they had the, what? Whatever is the cause of motion, if that was sense, for example, they would also have, by nature, the, what? Organ, huh? Organic parts, huh? Necessary for this, what? Motion from one place to another. Okay? In other words, if the sense power was the cause of motion one place to another, nature would not have given them that power without giving them the organ whereby they could move from one place to another. Okay? But indeed, huh? Neither is the rational power, meaning reason itself, or what is called the mind, huh? Now, let's look at the Greek there again, huh? I bet it's what? Dianoya and then Nusa. Now, here he uses the term tologisticana, huh? Okay? Before I used the word dianoya, but here he uses, see, at the very beginning of this reading, huh? And he said, sense over the soul of animals is defined according to two powers, by being able to discern, which is the work of thought and the sense. There he had used the word dianoya, huh? Okay? Which we talked about before, I think, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? And I say sehosa. But here he uses the word logisticon and nus. Do you remember saying logisticon before? Yeah, I think so. But to logisticon, kai ho kalumenas, what is called the nus. Nus is usually translated in Latin by what? Intellectus. And in English by understanding. Logisticon is usually the word logas, which will be translated by what? It's reason, right? Logisticon is more the reasoning part, right, you might say. I think I mentioned how they have two arts in Greek, which they called logike and logistike. Oh, it's logistike, like calculating? Yeah, yeah. And logike was the art of defining and reasoning, but we might call it logic, right? And then logistike was the art of counting and calculating. And that's where we get the word logistic, but that doesn't have exactly that sense in English, right? That has some relation to it, though. Logistics, you know? Yeah. Getting all the, you know, if we're going to invade Iraq now, there's a logistical problem, getting all the things, you know, they're at the right time, and enough at the right time, and so on. So, interesting that Aristotle has a number of words, huh? Now, sometimes we divide the reason into looking reason and what? Practical reason, huh? And so he descends now to both of these, huh? They differ in their end or purpose, huh? Because the end of looking reason is to know the truth, period. The end of practical reason is to make or do something, right? Now, it's more obvious that the looking reason, which they translate here by speculative, the Latin word for looking, be theoretical in Greek, huh? Incidentally, the word for God in Greek is what? Yeah, yeah. Thomas takes that as a sign of what? God sees, huh? He understands everything. He's named from seeing, huh? That's the way Thomas understands the word, huh? It's interesting, huh? That the theoretical mind, its end is what? To know theos, huh? Theos itself understands everything. Interesting, huh? For the looking reason, in Greek they'd say the theoretical, in Latin the speculative. I don't like those words in English because speculative has taken on, what, other meanings in English today, right? Right. So, when you play the stock market, that's speculation, right? How is it? Nothing like that, huh? A lot of times you see the phrase speculative thinking, right? And by that they mean what? Guessing. Guessing, yeah. Yeah, I see. But as you know, what in geometry we call theorem, right? It means something to look at, right? Okay, but it's not guessing. Well, you might guess it first, but when you get the demonstration in geometry, you know that this is so, right? So, I don't like to translate it speculative, but I like to shock you by translating it looking. The looking mind, right? The looking reason. The looking understanding. Well, that considers no thing to be done, right? Okay? Nor does it speak about what is to be fled and what is to be pursued, right? While motion is always something of what is fleeing or what? Pursuing, right, huh? Okay? Okay? So, speaking of a motion there from one place to another, right? Here's the word Greek, the kinesis, huh? So, that's not the concern of looking mind, right? It's very immobile. But neither, when it looks at some such thing, does it right away urge fleeing or pursuing. Just as often something fearful or pleasant is thought on, but it does not urge being frightened. But the heart is moved while it should be pleasant to some other part, huh? It's a discreet way of speaking, I should say. Okay? So, maybe he's thinking there of the fact that sometimes when we talk about a science like ethics, huh? And this is kind of a subtle thing when they divide these things up, see? And they say, when they divide up the virtues of reason, huh? One way of dividing them, that Thomas uses in the Prima sequinde, is into the virtues of looking reason, or the speculative, intellect, right? In Latin, with electives, magnitudes, and the virtues of, what, practical reason, huh? And I think we've given this before, but just to recall to your mind, there are three virtues of looking reason, huh? There's natural understanding, that we understand that a whole is more than a part, for example. That's true. And then there's reasoned out understanding, which in Greek is called, what, episteme. In Latin, they translated it by scientia. In Greek, they call this nous, and in Latin, it's electus. And then, wisdom, which is the head of both of these kinds of understanding. But now, where would you put, well, let me finish this first, then I'll come back here. Now, actually, there's only one natural understanding, only one virtue. There's only one wisdom. But there's many forms of, what, reasoned out understanding, huh? So these are low species, as the Egyptians say, but this is still a genus, huh? Now, the virtues of practical reason are, one is concerned with doing, and that's called, in English, foresight, in Latin, prudencia, we get the word prudence, and then phronesis, in Greek, huh? And then you have making, and we take the word English from the Latin, the word art, in Greek you'd have the word technia, the word technology. Now, there are many arts, right? And every time you have a material out of which you're going to make something that requires different tools and a different way of being worked, then you have a different, what, art, huh? So the art of the tailor, which works with cloth, right, is different than the art of the carpenter that works with wood. And you can't use a scissors and a needle to make something out of wood, right? But you don't use a hammer and a saw to make something out of cloth, huh? And, of course, the glassblower, he has a different kind of matter and a different way of, what, working with that, huh? And the metalworker, again, would be different, huh? So my father's factory there, when they're making something in metal, they might heat the metal and, what, bend the metal, right? You do that with wood? I don't think so. You know, eat it and tend it. Okay. So there are many arts, right, huh? Now, foresight, huh? In the Summa...