De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 55: The Two Movers: Intellect and Desire in Local Motion

Transcript
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Theologiae, when Thomas takes up foresight, he distinguishes four forms of foresight. And you could call them the foresight of the individual man and his individual life, right? The foresight of the, what, father, right? For his whole family. And then the foresight of Douglas MacArthur, the general. And then the foresight of George Bush, the president of the head of the community, the prince or the king, or whatever it may be, right? So foresight is concerned with the, what, here and now, right? What should I as an individual do here and now? And what should I as a father or as a general or as a president or king or something do? Now, where would you put ethics, huh? Is ethics the same thing, or is political philosophy the same thing as one of these kinds of foresight? Kind of the same thing? Yeah. And therefore you put it really among a form of what, reasoned out knowledge, right? So when I consider in ethics what courage is or what temperance is, um, I'm not, uh, talking about, uh, whether I should go to battle tomorrow or not, right, huh? You see? I was seeing somebody, they're interviewing, they're having some program they've done in the, the college down south in the Citadel, I guess, where it's in South Carolina. Of course, it's a military school, right? Everybody's had this, like, the military all shaven and so on. Uh, and, uh, so the guy turned to the audience and he says, uh, how many of you are willing to go to Iraq? Everybody says, yeah, everybody! I want to go! So, he's literally couldn't do much about that, you know, he's kind of outnumbered, right? But that's the question of, uh, of what? The singular, right, huh? You see? In other words, doing there, you don't fight battles in general, you, you fight Iraq or you fight this man or this country, right? Okay? But ethics or political philosophy is something more, what, general, right, huh? And, uh, so when you consider these things there, you're not really, what, doing anything, are you? And that's where Aristotle speaks of the useless here of ethics, you know, the man who hears about these things and then he doesn't act on them, right? Okay? But you can be a useless here of these things, huh? But that's not the nature of foresight, huh? Foresight is, involves, uh, not only console and judgment, but most of all, what? Command, right, huh? Okay? So even if the looking reason should, you know, talk about something practical, it doesn't talk about it in a fully practical way, right? Okay? But now, what about this practical reason down here, you see, huh? Okay? The one that says, now I should, what? Eat no more of this dessert here, right? Or I should, what? You know, charge that hill, right, huh? Okay? I'll take that hill, MacArthur said, I won't come back. He took it. Okay? But he says, often in the man that we call the incontinent man, right, the man who lacks self-control, what his reason says he should do, he, what? Doesn't do, huh? Okay? Moreover, he says, even when the mind urges on, and thought is saying to flee something or to pursue it, one is not moved, right? But acts according to desire, meaning what? Sense desire there, huh? Okay? The Greek word is, what? Karatein epithumia, now. Epithumia is the one for that sense desire that is concerned with what is pleasing to the senses, right? Okay? So Shakespeare, you know, talks about that in some of the, what, sonnets, huh? Past reason hunted, right? Past reason hated afterwards, right? So the incontinent man does what his reason tells him he shouldn't do, right? Or doesn't do what his reason tells him he should do, right? Like the dental coward, right, huh? I know a guy, a professor who was a dental coward one time, right? His teeth were in bad shape. So he admitted he's a dental coward, he should have been going to the dentist, right? But he just couldn't. Okay? And, you know, sometimes, you know, I know a smoker, you know, who will say, you know, don't ever take it up, you know. But he can't give it up, right? And they make a joke, you know, about how many doctors actually smoke. So they may tell their patients, you know, don't smoke or something like that. And yet they themselves do this, right? So how can you say even practical reason, right? Or even if you read St. Augustine's Confessions there, right, huh? He's going to repent now, huh? But not today, you know, he'll wait another week or something. So the man who's lacking self-control, right, huh? So how can you say that even practical reason is the cause of motion? Reason tells you to get up and charge at a hill and you don't do it because you're scared stiff, right? Okay? Or reason tells you you should, you know, not drink the rest of the bottle and you drink it, right? I told you that story when I worked in the package store. Every Saturday this guy would come in in the morning in the package store. And he would order seven half bottles of this whiskey. And he wanted me to put the seven half bottles in seven little bags. And then put the seven bags in one big bag. Well, I never had the audacity to ask him why he wanted this, but I think the reason was kind of obvious, right? That he was trying to pace himself, huh? And if you, and that's very uneconomical to buy seven little bottles because you're paying more for the same amount if you bought one big bottle. But apparently if he had one big bottle, he would open and keep on drinking. Well, if he has seven little bottles in the thing in each separate bags, he'd take one out and if he finishes that bottle, that's it for the day, right? So, okay? It's a good thing like people who have a problem this way, you know? And we have the other guy that come in, he used to be from the other store there, kind of the floor manager or something like that. He always come around getting his nips, right? But he carries his little bottle of, you know, shaving, after-shave lotion, something like that, and he's like, like that, with his face. So that if someone gets near him, they don't smell the shot he has that they get this, you know, so they get fairly strong, those things. So, your reason might tell you that you shouldn't do this or you should do this, but you don't do it, right? Or you don't not do it. So, how can you say that even practical reason, huh, is what moves us, when practical reason is saying here and now, I should do this or I shouldn't do this, and yet you do it or don't do it. And generally, he says, we see that the one having the doctor's art does not always, what? Doctor, right? Aristotle's always taking examples from the doctor's art, huh? Because his own father was, what? One of the greatest doctors at the time, huh? His father became the medical doctor at the court of, what? Macedonia. And that's how Aristotle himself became known to the court of Macedon and how he was selected then to be the teacher of the future Alexander the Great, huh? So, there's an interesting connection there between Aristotle and Alexander the Great. Aristotle's supposed to have written a, what? A book on Homer just for Alexander, right? A book just on Homer. It's one of those things that had been lost. But Plutarch, in his life of Alexander there, huh, he speaks about the time when Aristotle's metaphysics is being, what? Published, so to speak, right? And Alexander is writing Aristotle saying he didn't want him to publish it, he wanted it all for himself. And Aristotle replies, he says, don't worry, only those who already understand the subject will understand the book. I don't know if that's authentic history or not, but Plutarch recounts this, huh? But it's in the, you know, in a sense fits the metaphysics, right? Only those who already understand the matter will understand the book. Well, now you're left to what? Emotions, right? Well, it must be the emotions, huh, that make us, what, act, right, huh, okay? But now he takes the opposite thing. The man of self-control, right? The man who has a, what? Struggle, right? But his reason, right? Works out against his emotions, huh? But neither, indeed, neither is appetite lord of motion, huh? Okay? Of course, in the Greek there, he uses eventually the word epithumontes, huh? For that word, epithumia. So it's that sense desire. For continent men, huh? Men of self-control, they can contain themselves, have appetite, right? And are desiring to do something, but they do not, what? Do it, but they follow, what? Mind, huh? Okay? So down, down, right? You know, like the Homer says, you know. So he's keeping his emotions there, but he's got a, what? A struggle, right, huh? Okay? So with the, what do you call it? The Alcoholics Anonymous, right, huh? Okay? So these men have a hard time, right? And so they call up their buddy, I guess they have a buddy or a system or something. You call up your buddy, and your buddy comes over and holds your hand or distracts you or does something else, right? And so you don't always follow your emotions, right? What is the Greek? Does it actually say kurios, for Lord? Or is that just... For Lord of motion, you say? Yeah, what is that? Yeah. Yeah. Kuria. Yeah. K-U-R-I-A. That's where you get the word in the church, too, right? The kuria. What's a kuria? You know, it's kind of, I see it in the early years. It's a kuria in the church. Yeah. It's a kind of rule, right? I don't know if you read it at the end of the book, there. I have to have titles for feminine. Is that why it's kuria? Um, Orexis. I don't know if Orexis is feminine. Yeah, it is. He, Orexis, yeah. Yeah, okay. Just like in Shakespeare's there, you know, since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, why does he say mistress rather than master? He's so close to the Latin, right? Yeah. To where soul is anima, is what? Feminine, huh? Sure. Okay. Okay, again, the word for mind there is noose, huh? Right. When he says that the continent desiring, or regomenoi, kai epithumuntes, I use that word for the sense desire, right? Okay. So you see that, too. Even a person who's dieting or fasting or something of this sort, right, they have a desire to, what? Sense desire to eat, huh? And they don't always follow it. Okay. So, how can you say sense desire and emotion is what moves us, huh? Okay? Now, maybe I'll leave you at that problem, right, huh? Okay? Yeah. So you're going to start to say what is the, especially from the side of the soul, right, what is the origin of what? Motion from one place to another, right? But in the later books, like the parts of animals or the motion of animals and the progression of animals, then he talks about the, what, bodily parts that are being used to move and they're different in different animals, huh? And the fish and the bird and the dog and the worm and so on, huh? There's some strange ways of getting from one place to another, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Let me come back just a bit to the divisions of the powers of the soul. It happens in other places when he talks about these divisions of the powers of the soul. It says that the division that Aristotle gives in the second book here, in the soul, it's dividing the powers by their acts and their acts by their objects, right? So, ultimately, you're dividing the powers by their, what, objects, right? Okay? So, that's the basic way Aristotle does in the second book. Dividing the powers or abilities by their acts and their acts by their objects. He says there's another way to divide them and sometimes Aristotle himself, huh, divides in this other way, right? Okay? This one is more by their, what, root, you might say, in the soul, huh? And there they're thinking of the fact that the human soul is the most immaterial of the souls, right? The most rises above matter, right? And the animal soul, the sensing soul, not so much will rise above matter, but more so than the, what, feeding soul, okay? And so, sometimes they'll divide it according to the understanding soul and the sensing soul, feeding soul, the living soul. So, the feeding soul, you have, what, the power of feeding, obviously, but also the power of, what, growing, right? And finally, the power of, what, reproducing, right? Okay? In the sensing soul, you have, what, the senses, the exterior senses, and maybe some of the interior senses, and then you have the desiring powers that follow upon sensing, huh? And that's the epithumia and the thumas that were talked about there, what they call the concubisal appetite and the irascible appetite. Aristotle, here, doesn't break down the various emotions there are feelings in the incubusable or irascible, but Thomas does so very explicitly in the summa theologiae and the prima secunde and in the di veritate, question is dispitate di veritate. So, that those emotions that are concerned directly with what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses belong to the, what, concubisal appetite. So, I like what is agreeable to my senses, right? If I really like it a lot, I might say I love it, but I like or love it, and if I don't have it, then I, what, want it, right? There's kind of a sense desire for candy or whatever it is that's agreeable to my senses, right? And then if I get what is agreeable, if I get the candy, then I have, what, pleasure, right? I enjoy my licorice or chocolate or whatever it is that I like, okay? And then there's three other emotions that are concerned of what is disagreeable, see? I dislike, in fact, I hate salmon, okay? And so, if I can avoid salmon, I do. But, I was afraid at somebody's house and the lady was serving salmon, so what am I supposed to do? Well, I'm forced to eat the salmon now, I don't want to say, you know? So, now I have sadness, right? Or pain, right? As I eat this thing that I couldn't avoid, see? I don't know. Okay? So, those are the six emotions of the concupisable, huh? Liking or love, right? Or the sense of love, right? Which gives rise to desire in the absence of what you like, but pleasure in the presence of it, right? And then, this dislike or hate, I hate salmon, and then the string away from it was forced upon me, pain and sad. At least, we put out the sadness and some of it, I think. Yeah. Only good, I used to say, it was terrible saying, you know, the only good Indian is a dead Indian, you know, I used to say that. I said, the only good fish is a disguised fish, right? Oh, right. Like fish and chips and like that. But, I mean, salmon is a fish you can't disguise, it's such a potent fishy character that comes out so strongly, right? Okay. So those six emotions are what? In the, what? Epiphoemia, as Aristotle calls it, it can give us appetite. But, we notice in the animals that they will, what? Experience difficulty in getting what is pleasing to them, or they will experience difficulty in avoiding what is painful, So there arise the other emotions in regard to the difficult good or the difficult bad, huh? The good that is difficult to achieve or the bad that is difficult. So, in regard to a good that's difficult to achieve, there are two possible emotions, hope and what? Despair, right? Hope if you can, think you can overcome the difficulties and despair if you, what? Think you can't, right? Okay? In regard to something bad that's threatening, huh? Like you're gonna beat me up or something and I kind of sense it, right? If I think I can handle you pretty easily, then I have boldness, right? But if I don't think that I'm gonna be able to handle you, you might beat the heck out of me, then I have, what? Some fear, right? Okay? Okay? But now, if you are actually inflicting pain on a man, and I think I can do something about it, then there arises an emotion called what? Anger, right? Okay? So if you're stepping on my foot and I say, hey, you're on my foot, do you know that? And you say, so what? Then I start to get angry, see? But there's no emotion irascible that arises from pleasure. Because then the soul is what, the animal soul at least is satisfied, right, with pleasure, right? But the animal soul doesn't accept pain if it can, get rid of it, huh? So you get angry, right, huh? The fear and boldness would arise from aversion, feeling of aversion, and could you say that anger would arise from a sadness? Yeah, sadness is appropriate. Yeah, sadness or pain, yeah. But wait, I think I can do something about overcoming it, right? Now, as I mentioned before, I think the two main forms of fiction, tragedy and comedy, right, are about what they consider the principal emotions here. So tragedy is about, what, pity, which is a form of sadness, and fear. And Plato and Aristotle, when they define tragedy, they put pity and fear in the very definition of tragedy. And you look at the premium of, not premium, the prologue of Shakespeare to Roman Juliet. That's the two emotions he mentions, pity and fear. The fearful passage of their death-marked love, right? Whose misadventure, piteous overthrow, as he says, right? But Shakespeare is right on the nose there, right? But in comedy, you have a form of, what, joy, which is called mirth, and hope, huh? So, and now when you go to music, you know, classical music, you see that, let's say, Mozart was the most accurate of all, his use of the keys. He'll tend to use certain keys for certain, what, emotions, right? So, sadness will be in a minor key always, huh? And joy will be in a major key. Hope will tend to be in a major key. Despair in a, what, minor key. Boldness in a major key. Fear in a, what, minor key. Anger in a minor key, right? So, like in the piano concertos, which are very much imitated of these things, the, in the B minor piano concerto, you have representation of anger, right? Okay? Of course, they don't stay in that same key all the time, right? At the end of the B minor concerto, you turn to joy, right? Okay, and confidence. But we're representing the anger, he's using the minor key, huh? And, uh, in the requiem, or in the Don Giovanni's going down to hell, or in the Borello's referring for his life in the thing, right? It's D minor in all those cases, huh? And, uh, in, in, uh, the 24th piano concerto, you know, some of that anger, too. But it's in C minor, huh? And sometimes you'll see, you know, there's a little plot, you know, where it goes from hope to despair. And you'll bring back the same melody, those are the major key, and you'll put it into the, what, minor key, right? Okay? But you'll tend to use a D major for a march, huh? For boldness, more, huh? Or C major for hope, you know? But you'll tend to use, uh, G major or B flat or something of that sort, more for concupisable joy, huh? It's the same tendency to use these keys, so. Uh, which has a certain feel for the key, huh? So, uh, but in the sensing soul, you see, you have, uh, the senses to begin with, but then following upon them, you have this, what we might call sense desire, right? Or in the understanding soul, you have the, the, the acting upon understanding, right? The undergoing understanding, but then the will that follows upon them, right? Like in that passage I was quoted in Shakespeare, since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, right? Now, choice is the act of the will, huh? And could have been distinguished, right? Say, by his reason, huh? Her election, in other words, for choice, has sealed before herself, right? Once his reason was developed to the point that he could see the differences among men, right? Then he chose, right, as his friend, what, Horatio, right? As he says in the words, give me that man that is not, what, passion slave, right? Now, where in my heart's core, eh, in my heart of art, as I do thee, right? Okay? So, it's reason that we'd see that difference between the man who's a slave of some passion, right? Like the coward is a slave of his fear, and the impotent man, maybe, of his sense desire, and so on, huh? The irascible man is a slave of his anger, and so on, huh? Okay? But Horatio is, what, not the slave of any passion, right? So, reason sees that difference, huh? I mentioned, you know, that was, happened to just, by chance, we read the, André Marois' barography there, Israeli, you know, the British prime minister. Very interesting thing there. But he wanted to marry this woman, right? And he kind of proposed to her, and she said, Give me a year, she said, to study your character. So, what a... What a dumb remark, right? And she finally didn't marry him, you know, but she had friends, you know, saying, He's in love with your money, you know? Which he wasn't really, but I mean, she was a widow, you know? And she was actually, what, 12 years, I think, older than he was, right? And so, helping in love with a woman, you know, 12 years older than himself, you know, he must be after her money, which wasn't really true, I don't think. But, he said, give me a year to study your character. Well, you know, that's, you know, choice, right? That's not something of passion, right? I mean, I know my brother Richard got married, and the priest was, you know, was quite happy to marry them, but he speaks, you know, how many times he's asked to marry people he doesn't think should be, what, married, huh? That they're not really ready, they don't really know what they're doing, right? And, you know, when the priest says, do you take so-and-so as your wife, you know, he's not asking him, do you have a wonderful feeling about her? He's doing what you do, but I thought he was asking you. He's saying, are you choosing, you know, this person, right? This is a choice, and that really depends upon what? Some deliberation, right? Give me a year to study your character. You know, marvelous, you know? George Washington married a widow, too, huh? Right? Yeah. I don't think she was 12 years old, I don't think so. So, no, it's such a different way, huh? So sometimes Aristotle would say, the will is in reason. And what does he mean by saying that, right? He means that the will is in the rational part. Now, sometimes in Christianity, they'll speak of this part as being the men's, huh? Which we translate as mind, but maybe it doesn't give the full meaning of it, huh? But the image of God is in this part of the soul. So you have to bring in the reason and the will, right? To see the, what, image of the soul, I mean, image of God in the soul, right? But then you're saying, the image of God is found in this part of the soul. In the men's, as I said, in the lack of it. The men there includes not only the mind, the reason, that is to say, but also the what will, right? So this is another way of dividing the parts of the what? Soul, right? But you're looking at their kind of root in the soul here, and the soul is something rising more or less above what? Ordinary matter. And so this is more the immortal part. And this is the part that is like what you have in the what? Angels, right? Because in the angels you have understanding and you have will, right? But you don't have feeding in the ordinary sense. You don't have a body, right? And you don't have what? The senses or emotions, huh? Of course, to us the emotions and the sensing part are more known in a way than this higher part, huh? And therefore it's hard for us to understand sometimes the angels or God, and the kind of shackle will say, they have no emotions, you know? It's like, sounds kind of strange, huh? And C.S. Lewis, you know, he's trying to, I guess, understand the angels a little bit better. He speaks of the love of the angels as being, what? Ferocious. It's an all-consuming love, right, huh? And sometimes even Scripture speaks that way about God, right? It says love is all-consuming, right? And therefore, he's metaphorically said to be, what, jealous and so on, huh? You see, and, uh, but, uh, their love is more, what, unified and therefore more intense than our love is, huh? We're kind of, you know, divided between our will and our emotions, and, uh, have that same, uh, unity and intensity that they can have, huh? An amazing thing, huh? It's not that losing something, because they don't have these things, right? But they have a more unified way, everything that we have, divided into these two, huh? That's what I was saying before, that the pleasures of the fine arts involve both the sensing soul and the understanding soul. See, where the pleasures of philosophy are more pleasures just of the understanding soul, huh? And so we have to kind of ascend from the, uh, the pleasure of the fine arts, of good music and good painting and good fiction and so on, to the pleasures of philosophy and, what, theology and so on. And, uh, I think, I think even the metaphors in Scripture, you know, they're more ordered to the reason than they are to pleasing the imagination, although they have something for the imagination, they tend to elevate it. But it doesn't exactly try to appeal to the imagination in the way that the poet does. Let's hear a little prayer first. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order to open our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have done. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to chapter 10 here, right, on page 47. And the previous part, as you recall, had been dialectical. Now he's going to determine the truth here, right? And first in general, in this, of Thomas' 15th reading there, and then some particular differences starting down in 380 and going into chapter 11. So he begins by saying, It appears, however, that these two are movers, huh? And the Greek word there for mind is noose, right? If someone should put down imagination, huh? As a certain, what? Understanding or thinking, huh? That's interesting the way Aristotle's speaking here, right, huh? He's using mind here to include both the reason or understanding and the imagination, right, huh? Okay. Now I think I was mentioning how Thomas brought in, in fact, in Henry V there, right? Shakespeare is putting on a play that is hard to confine on a little stage, right? And so each act almost has a chorus that comes out and asking you to use your imagination, you know, and use your thinking, you know, to fill out the stage. But the way he alternates back and forth between, what? Imagining and thinking, huh? Okay. And so he's saying that the two movers are, what? Desire and either, what? Understanding or imagination, huh? For many things, he says, follow imagination contrary to, what? Knowledge, right? To science, huh? Meaning, what? There are many men, right? Who act on images rather than on, what? Understanding or thought, right? And in the other animals who don't have mind or reason, it has to be the imagination on which they, what? Act, right, huh? Therefore, both of these, huh? Mind, including now imagination, and desire, are motive according to place, huh? He's talking about what is the first, what? Origin, you might say, of motion from one place to another, right? And he says, there's two sources of this, right? One is mind or imagination, and the other is some kind of, what? Desire, right, huh? Okay. Now, in the next part here, he's going to reduce, to some extent, these two causes to something before them, something one, right? That unites the two, huh? And that's going to turn out to be, what? The good desired, right, huh? Because that good, and ultimately that good is an end, that end is both desired or wanted, but it's also, what? No, right? And reason, reasons out how that end can be achieved, right? And so that end or good desired is the starting point for the practical reasons discourse as to how this end can be, what? Achieved, right, huh? But, of course, as he goes on to point out, this is going to be the practical mind, huh? The practical reason, huh? I mean, however, that mind which reasons for the sake of something and is, what? Practical, right? It differs from the speculative mind by its, what? End, huh? Okay. So in the Greek word, you're speaking of the praktikos, the practical, right? Nous, or understanding, as opposed to the, what? Theoretical, right? Or looking, huh? Now this is a distinction that is made, now not in the sense that man has two different, oh, there you go, okay. Not in the sense that man has two different minds or reasons, right? But you're talking about one and the same mind or reason with two different, what? Inns, huh? Okay. So, what they call theoretical, if you want to speak English, looking reason, right? There, the end or purpose is simply to know, what? The truth, huh? About something, okay? But the practical, if I want to use the word doing, right? The practical or doing reason, there the end is not truth, but the doing or making of something, huh? Now notice you have anticipation of that in the eye, right? And sometimes we speak of reason as the eye of the soul. The word eye originally refers, of course, to the bodily eye, right? But, say, Gregory the Great, huh? In his Moralion, we refer to reason sometimes as the eye of the soul. And so there's a concrete way of speaking. He says, anger disturbs the eye of the soul. So the eye of the soul, meaning reason, doesn't see so clearly when you're angry, right? When you calm down, you see more clearly, right? So, but notice, huh? In the eye of the body, the eye of the original sense of the word, we sometimes use our eye just to see something, huh? So somebody might go out, you know, to look at the fall foliage, right? Just because it's, what? Beautiful, right? And so he's looking at the foliage, not for the sake of making or doing anything, but there's no end beyond the seeing itself, huh? The seeing is something beautiful. But when I drive my car up here, I'm looking at the road and the other cars, not because they're beautiful, but so I can drive my car and have a reasonable chance of getting it, right? Okay? So sometimes I use my eye to what? Just to see. And sometimes to do or make something, huh? And the same with my ear, right? I might listen to Mozart in my ear just to hear it, right? When somebody yells, Watch out! I'm going to be hearing that, not because that is a beautiful sound, but because I can act upon that, right? Or when I stop at the gasoline station and ask directions or something, right? It's not because he's Pavarotti and he's got a beautiful voice, but I want to hear something in order to do something, right? So this is an important distinction, huh? It's not like we have two different powers there, right? It's not like, you know, with one eye I see for its own sake and the other eye I see to do or make. No. It's the same eyes that have both ends, right? But sometimes the end is just to know, other times the end is to make or to do something. Incidentally, with that use of Aristotle's there, of the mind there to kind of include the imagination, huh? I know Shakespeare uses the phrase sometimes for the imagination. He calls it the mind's eye, like in Hamlet there, right? In Hamlet. In Hamlet. In Hamlet. Horatio and his, what, are so, and so on, they have seen with their eye, right, the ghost of Hamlet's father, right? And they've come to tell Hamlet about this. Something's rocking in the state of Denmark. And before they have a chance to tell Hamlet about what they've seen at the night watch, Hamlet says, I can see my father now. And they're looking around for the ghost, right? And Hamlet is saying, in my mind's eye. Meaning he can picture his father and what his father looked like. So it's interesting, huh, that he uses the mind's eye there for the, what? Imagination, for it pictures things. Why Gregory the Great uses, what, the word eye there, the eye of the soul, to what? To name the reason itself, huh? So there's some similarity there, right? Between the imagination and reason, which is that they can both know something in the absence of it, huh? The senses can know something only in its, what? Presence, right? But the reason or the imagination can know things even in their, what, physical absence, huh? So this is an important distinction between looking reason and practical reason. I think I mentioned before how in the Prima Secundae, when Thomas divides the five virtues of reason, he puts three of them in looking reason and two of them in practical or doing reason. So natural understanding and reasoned out understanding, like geometry and so on, and wisdom itself are all looking reason. But the various arts, the various forms of foresight are in, what, practical reason, huh? So foresight or prudence is called right reason about doing. And art is defined as right reason about making, huh? But these other virtues are just concerned with knowing the truth, huh? So noose, as he calls it there, he's that word for natural understanding. Those truths that are naturally understood without having to be reasoned out, really. And episteme, or reasoned out understanding, for those truths that are, have to be demonstrated, right? And proven, like the conclusions of geometry, right? And then wisdom, which in a way heads both of them. And is a knowledge of the first cause, ultimately, of God, huh? Okay? So in talking then about mind as being a source of motion from one place to another, he says, well, it's practical mind, right? Not the theoretical mind, huh? Now, he's going to show how these two different things, desire and practical mind, are united in the, what? Good, which is desired, huh? For of what the desire is, namely of the good and the end, huh? This is the principle of the, what? Practical mind, huh? Now, what does he mean by saying it's the principle of the practical mind, huh? The practical mind knows the good or end desired, right? And then the practical mind tries to figure out the way of, what? Fulfilling that. Yeah, getting that end, huh? Okay? And it says, well, if I want to achieve this end, I've got to do this. But before I can do this, I've got to do this. And finally it gets down to something, which is the extremist, he says, which is the actual action it can begin to do, right? See? So suppose I desire to get rid of my headache, right? Okay? Well, getting rid of my headache is a good desire by me, huh? Okay? And reason is aware of that end, huh? Okay? And reason says, now how can you get rid of a headache? Maybe reason figures out that you can take aspirin, right? Okay? But I don't have any aspirin, right? And reason says, well, you can go to the drugstore and get aspirin. They have aspirin in the drugstore, okay? And then reason says, well, okay, where's the drugstore? Well, go left and down there, right? And now you finally get down with something I can actually do, right? I can take a little walk to the drugstore. And that's what he calls the extreme there, right? See? See, I start with the idea that I get rid of a headache and end up with the idea that now I'm going to walk down here. And I get the aspirin, then I'll take the aspirin. Eventually I get rid of my headache or something like that, huh? So, notice what he's doing there, right? In the first paragraph at the beginning of 372 there, he spoke of two movers, right? But these two movers, if they're causing one motion, like my walking down to the drugstore, right? How are the two united, right? See? Well, what is desired, the end that is desired, is, as known, the beginning of the deliberation of practical reason as to how this can best be, what? Achieved, huh? Do you see that? What is this Greek word for appetite and desire? Okay, it would be orexis, I think, is the word he's using here. Orexis, okay. Yeah. But you've got to be careful because sometimes he'll be using a more particular word of epithumia, right, for the sense desire. But here he's using the broader word, orexis, huh? Yeah, so it is broader. Okay. Okay. Yeah. Which they translate in Latin by pittitus, right? Which the translator has taken over your... Appetite. Okay. Okay. But appetite is broader in meaning than, it tends to be in English, we tend to use appetite for... Sense, yeah, food. Yeah, for desire for food, right? Yeah. Okay. Whence these things, huh? Desire and practical mind reasonably appear to be the movers, right? For, and I notice he's saying that the very first mover is the desirable, right? It's not desire or practical mind, but the desirable, the end, right? And that moves us, right, to desire it, and it's also the beginning of our practical thinking, huh? And that's the way these two movers are united in one thing, okay? For the desirable moves, and through this, thought moves, because it's principle, right? The beginning of its reasoning is the appetible, huh? Okay. So you might say you want a, what? A apple pie, right, huh? Okay. Well, the apple pie now is what is desired, right? That's the starting point, really, huh? And reason knows what an apple pie is, right? And then reason, practical reason now, says, well, how do you make a, what? Apple pie, right? And then we can have apples, and you got to have flour, and so on, right? And then we're working to get some apples, right? Well, in the store, in the orchard, or if you have an apple in your yard, right? See? And finally I go out and I start picking the apples or something of that sort, right? Or I go buy the apples in the store, right? So what is desired is also the beginning of my reason, huh? And likewise, whenever the imagination moves, one, right? It does not move without the appetite, huh? So I imagine, what? An apple or something like that, right? And I have a desire for an apple, right? And so I go to a place where I can get an apple, right? So he ends up then by saying something one, then. He's reducing, in a way, these two to something one, right? That unifies them. Something one, then, is the mover, which is the appetible, or the desirable, you could say in English, huh? The good or the end, huh? For if you've got these two things, right? They've got to be unified in some way to cause one action, right? But how are mind, or imagination, either one, and desire, unified, huh? In causing one thing, like my going to the store to get apples, right? Or going to the orchard to pick some apples, and so on, right? Well, they're moving according to some kind of common form, right? Because it's the same thing, which is, what, desired and is known by the reason or the imagination. But now he said, The mind does not appear to be a mover without, what? Appetite, huh? Now, Thomas, there in the commentary, he makes a reference there to what Aristotle points out there in the ninth book of wisdom, ninth book of metaphysics, that there's the same knowledge of, what? Opposites, huh? And that through knowledge, you can do opposite things. So the doctor, by his knowledge, right, is capable of making you healthy, but he's also capable of making you sick. Through the same knowledge, right, of logic, I can reason well or reason badly, right? And I know from logic both how to teach somebody and how to deceive them. Right. So through my knowledge of grammar, right, I know how to speak correctly and to say that I am a man, right, and how to speak incorrectly and say I is a man, right? And so the knowledge gives you an ability for opposites, huh? So something other than knowledge is required before there's going to be emotion, and that is the desire to speak correctly, right? Or the desire to make someone healthy, right? Okay? But one or the other. In the fifth book of the politics, Aristotle shows you both how to preserve a government and how to, what, overthrow it. And as I mentioned, you know, the student kind of a wag there when I was teaching at St. Mary's saying, you know, you shouldn't be teaching ethics because when you learn ethics, you learn not only how to become good, but also how to become bad. He says, because most people are inclined to be bad, he says. Because this knowledge is making them worse. He had a point there, right? He's touching upon an important point, huh? See? Okay. But like Aristotle says in the rhetoric there, some people object to rhetoric because rhetoric can be used for good or for bad. And so apparently people like Hitler or even Fidel Castro were, you know, could move the crowd and they spoke persuasively, huh? And, but Aristotle says that this is an objection you could make to just about any art, huh? That enables you to do good or bad, huh? If I know how to cook the steak, I know how to ruin it, too, and burn it. We've got a, um, a, uh, high-tech, uh, toaster there in the kitchen now. We've got those bags. And it was always, you know, kind of a wide thing. You could put wide things in there and long things and so on. And, uh, but when you push it down, there's a, you have to push a button, right? And it's like one to, I don't know, nine, ten, or something like that, you see? And, uh, you have to know which button is, right? Yeah. So, I mean, if you have, you know, um, a piece of, uh, dark whole wheat bread, you might want to put it on eight or, you know? And, uh, but if you have, uh, uh, cinnamon bread or something with raisins in it, you know, that kind of a thing, maybe only four or five, see? So, you gotta know what to do, right? See? But you learn what, you know, temperature to put it at, right? Yeah. Or what button to push. But I know also how to ruin a piece, then, huh? Not to cook it, to do it too much. So, um, that's what he's, what he's hitting upon there. But now the mind does not appear to be a mover without appetite on it. So the contrast Aristotle makes in the Ninth Book of Wisdom there, in the text that Thomas is referring to, is a difference between a natural thing, like fire, where fire is determined to, what, heat things and not to cool them, right? And, uh, a rational power, like the medical art, right? See? Whereby you're capable of opposites, right? And that's why you need very much desire, right? To determine which of the two you're going to do. And he points out that the will is also a, what? Appetite, huh? It's a form of an ability to desire. However, when one is moved according to reason, one is also moved according to the, what? Will, right, huh? So the Greek word there for, uh, will there is poulesis, huh? But now when he says, um, uh, desire can also move against reason, right? And then when he says, desire is a certain appetite, well, uh, the Greek word there is more precise. And the Greek word is, what, epithumia, right? Which is the word that is translated in Latin by concupiscentia, right? Okay? Which has a sense of, what, sense desire, right? A desire for what is pleasant and agreeable to the, what, senses, right? And he's saying that, um, there's not only this desire that follows upon reason, namely the will, right? But there's also, in us, this other desire that can, what, follow what is agreeable to the senses even against, what, reason? Like an adultery, right? Or something like that, right? Which word is the subject there? Is that, to me, the desire? You see, it says here, when he says, apodiver moves even against reason. There he's still using the, the broad word, orexes, right? Orexes, right. Okay? And then he says, for desire is an appetite. He's thinking of, desire there is, is epithumia, right? Okay. For desire, epithumia is a orexistis, uh, it's a certain, uh, uh, kind of desire, right, huh? Okay? I usually translate in English epithumia for want of a better thing by a phrase there, sense desire, right, huh? Yeah. Okay? You know, um, you can almost hear me say sensual desire, but maybe that's too particular meaning, but it has something in that sense, huh? Sure. Okay? Just like the Latin word, uh, concubiscencia, right, is kind of the idea of, uh, desire for what is agreeable to the senses, huh? Mm-hmm. Um, okay? Mm-hmm. So he's going to come back to this again later on in this reading, um, the fact that there's these, there can be contrary desires in man, right? So his will and his emotions can be, what, opposed sometimes, huh? And you can have a body desire for what is, you know, agreeable to the senses, or a body desire to avoid what is disagreeable to the senses, right? And the will can be opposed to this, right? So the will, you want to get up, right? But then there's a sitting leg there, huh? These people have these clocks, you know, you can press another five minutes, another ten minutes, right? I've known people you don't have, I have a, you know, alarm clock way across the room, so they can't really turn it off without getting up, and then... 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