De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 56: Animal Motion, Desire, and the Desirable Good

Transcript
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and not his, what, his noose, not his mind or reason. Or men sometimes follow their, what, sense desire, right, against their reason. So sense desire and in general desire can be both right and not right. And imagination can be both right and not right. But the noose, the kind of natural understanding that we have of right and wrong, that's always right, okay? So when we follow that natural understanding of right and wrong, we are going to be correct in our actions, right? But when we follow desire or imagination, without that, we might or might not be right. Whence, he says, the appetible or the desirable is what always moves, huh? And this is either the good or in some cases the, what, apparent good, right? So we, what, the man who has strong sense desire to him, adultery or fornication or something of this sort, will appear to be good, right, because of his desire, right? Or if I'm very angry at somebody, right, to really strike them or even kill them might appear to be good, right, because it fits my, what, anger, right, huh? Okay. Or, as I say in these madmen especially, you can see that they're, what, they're imagining things to be the way they're not, right? And they imagine, you know, that they've got a duty to kill somebody, right, huh? Yeah, sure. So some of these terrorists, I think, are following their desire. You know, they really have envy of Americans and anger with us, right? And so, and they also follow false imagination, right, huh? This is the way to go to the celestial paradise, right, to blow yourself up, huh? Can you be with the hooys or whatever it is that's, okay? So sometimes one is moved by the true good and sometimes by the apparent good, right? But the apparent good moves us only insofar as it, what, appears to be good, right, huh? Either through desire or imagination, huh? But now he says the good, though, that's moving us to action is the practical good, right? The good here and now, huh, in terms of the good, in fact, is contingent, right, huh? Okay. Is apparent, therefore, that this sort of power of the soul, that called appetite, moves, huh? Okay. Now, 375 is kind of just a footnote to this. He comes back again to his critique of those who divide the parts of the soul, right, and don't enumerate all the parts of the soul, huh? And it's kind of a reference, in a way, to what Plato does in the Republic, right, where he divides the powers of the soul into three, or the soul into three parts, right? Reason and then thumas, huh, which is where anger and confidence and boldness are, and then epithumia, right, huh? Okay, but there are many other powers of the soul that we've seen before, the feeding power and the sensing power and so on and so on, okay? And again, at the end of that 375, for these differ from each power more than the desiring of what gives spirit. Well, again, the Greek there is epithumia, for desiring there, right, and then thumikana, that's in the adjective. So you get the word from epithumia and thumasa, what's in the adjective form, so it's epithumatikana and thumikana, okay? Now, I mentioned this, huh, when you read Thomas, huh, when Thomas talks about those two powers in Latin, he'll call them the concubisal appetite, huh, and the erasphal appetite, okay? And the concubisal appetite, which is a translation of what Aristotle calls epithumia, or Plato calls epithumia, right? This is the part which concerns what is pleasant or disagreeable to the emotions, right? And you like what is agreeable to, I mean, to the senses. You like what is agreeable to the senses, what is pleasing to them, and you dislike or hate what is disagreeable to the senses, huh? And then this gives rise to what? Wanting or avoiding. Or to what? Joy or pleasure, when you get what you want, or pain or sadness, when what you want to avoid, you can't avoid. Okay? So, to see, so Plato had divided, you know, the soul into those three parts, right? And Aristotle's saying, well, that might make some sense in terms of what you're concerned with, especially in ethics, right? But as far as the division of the soul as a whole, it's quite, what, inadequate, okay? And so he's saying epithumia and thumas, the concubisable and irascible emotional powers, don't differ as much as, what, the feeding power and the sensing power and these other powers that we've talked about, huh? Okay? Now, in 376, huh, he's talking about the contrariety again, going more into the contrariety of desires that are in us, huh? And he gives a very fundamental distinction here. Sense desires, huh? Appetites there is just a broad word, erectus again. Sense desires come to be contrary to one another. And this happens when, what? Reason, huh? And now desires are contraries. Well, the translator is using desires for those, what? Sense desires, right? And so in the Greek there, it would be when logos, meaning reason, and the epithumia, huh? Okay, the sense desires, huh? And he says this contrariety, you don't have it in the other animals, huh? But you have it in man, huh? And we're interested in the way he refers to man here. This comes to be in things having a sense of, what? Time. That's very subtle what he says there, huh? He's saying that, yeah, that's the exact way the Greek is. In those, this comes about in those having a sense of time, huh? Now, remember the definition there of reason that we learned there from Shakespeare, right? That reason is the ability for a large discourse, huh? Looking before and after, right? And what completes the definition there of reason is this looking before and after. And then we learned in the text of Aristotle there, from the categories, that the first meaning of before and after is in time. So he's coming back to that, right, huh? And there's a way in which you can say man lives in time much more than any of the other animals, huh? He's always looking before and after in time, huh? In his life or in his day or in his week or whatever it is, right? We're always going back and forth, right? I've got to give exams next week, you know, I've got to prepare the exams, you know, and so on. And so... He's seen the contrariety right at that point, in the very beginning there, that the senses, if you just follow the senses, you're kind of limited to the here and now, and you don't look before and after, right? Like Lady Macbeth says, the ignorant present. So you're pursuing something pleasant without thinking of the consequences of it, right? Or you're avoiding something painful, right? Without thinking of the consequence of it, right? So there are some pleasures that one might refuse if he's looking before and after, right? And some pains that he might undergo, like going to the dentist or something, right? If he's looking before and after. Or let's take the simple example of someone who is trying to lose weight, right? Okay? So they're refusing dessert or something, let's say. Or refusing the candy bar or something, right, huh? Well, if we just remain the ignorant present, right? The candy bar or the dessert is something tasty and sweet and agreeable, right, huh? You see? But if you realize that you're going to be fat and you're not going to be attractive to the opposite sex and all this other stuff people worry about, right? You see? But then you're looking at, what, the effect of, what, many desserts turned down, right? Or many candy bars by path, right? And now you're going to see yourself three months from now looking slim and trim and attractive and handsome and so on. Okay. But sometimes when I talk about this, you know, you take kind of a stock example in college there, where they say, I never made a survey, but I think it's true, that freshmen, right, get sick to their stomach drinking more often than seniors do, right? And, you know, in a sense, you're pursuing the pleasure of drinking here and now, right, without seeing how you're going to be a couple hours from now, maybe throughout the night. You see? And if, you know, you look before and after, you say, well, if I drink moderately tonight, I'll get a good night's sleep and I'll be able to get up tomorrow and have some more. See? But in this other case, right, I can't, right? Okay? Sure. Or sometimes, you know, a smoker, right, huh? See, he wants to smoke now, right, huh? See? But maybe somebody, you know, some relative or somebody, you know, has got emphysema or something, you know, from smoking, right? Mm-hmm. You see? And so he kind of realizes what the cumulative effect is of all the smoking he's doing, you know? And so that he desists here and now from the pleasure of smoking because he, what, foresees down the road, right? The result of this smoking, huh? I was reading about Eisenhower, I guess, around the time of the Normandy landing, right? And afterwards, you know, when they were not sure what the Germans were going to do and so on. Eisenhower was smoking four packs of cigarettes a day. And he was starting to get, you know, lung problems and so on, right? Well, I've heard of two-pack men, you know, but he's a four-pack man. He must have been smoking all the time and kind of like a, you know, because they're so nervous as to this Normandy landing who's going to succeed or not and what the Germans are going to do and there's some, you know, some question marks at different times, you know? And then afterwards, you know, the Battle of the Bulge and so on, what the Germans are doing and so on. So, no, so a man might, well, I'll take a very crude example, but I'll give you a very significant example, you know? Some men might abstain from, you know, illicit sex or something of this sort, right? Because of the possibility of getting some disease, right? Okay? So for a momentary pleasure, right, they, what, don't take into account, you know, the health problems and maybe even death that are going to come from AIDS or whatever it is, right? You see? You know, it's just terrible in Africa, you know, how, you know, how prevalent AIDS is, right? You know? But it comes mainly from, you know, unlawful sexual contact to one side or another, right? Okay? And notice, huh? If someone avoids this thing to avoid AIDS, that's not the full reason for avoiding these things, right? You know? But you can see that that the man who takes these risks, you know, in Africa like they do all the time, they're just thinking of the momentary pleasure, right? They're not thinking of, what, the long-term consequences of this would be for them even in a bodily sense, right? Do you see? Mm-hmm. But likewise, when people, you know, overindulge in food or drink or something like that, right? And they get sick or very uncomfortable, right? You know? People often do this at Thanksgiving, you know, they've got to get up, you know, oh, I can't eat any desserts, you know, they've got to walk around, they've got to go out for a walk or something. But, I mean, they've eaten so much that they are positively uncomfortable, right? And if you consider, then, the time they spend at the table, right, just time-wise, enjoying themselves, and the time that they are in distress, right, afterwards, you can say that they're not maximizing their pleasures, right? You see? In the same way, you know, if I avoid going to the dentist and I have more problems that I didn't go and have it tended to right away when a tooth is broken down or something, you know, I'm going to have more problems, right? So, I'm not minimizing my pains by avoiding the dentist, right? I'm going to, over the course of time, maybe have more problems and maybe lose a tooth and all kinds of things, right? And, okay, do you see that? Mm-hmm. Okay. I think there's something like that, too, you know, as far as the student is concerned, huh? Because, you know, if the student has the alternative between going to the party or going to the pizza parlour or something like that and studying, right, huh? You know, if you just think, how much do you actually learn in a half hour or an hour? Maybe not too much, right? Mm-hmm. But if you see that over the course of many days, right, in the way understanding one thing helps you understand something else in the way you build up, right? Mm-hmm. You see? And you say, well, what do you got to show for all these parties? Yeah. You see? But if you'd put in, you know, over the course of time, studying, now you have knowledge built up and you go through life with that knowledge, right? And you can build more knowledge upon it, right? See? Mm-hmm. So there are some things that here and now don't seem that attractive, huh? But over the course of time, right? You see that, huh? Mm-hmm. So the student who may be, you know, not studying until the last moment, you know? The exam is tomorrow, you know, and they're trying to cram this stuff into their head. But all these times during the semester when they should have been studying, right, they were distracted by the music or the party or the pizza or the beer or whatever it was, right? And, uh, uh, now they're flunking out or something, right? No. You see? So that, they don't seem to have a sense of time, right? They seem to be like an animal just tied up with the, what, here and... Here and... And now, there's kind of a genius there in Shakespeare, if you ever read Henry IV, Part I, do you know that play? Well, among other reasons why that play is famous is that in Henry IV, Part I, Shakespeare introduces, for the first time, a character called Falstaff, right? Okay, and Falstaff is supposed to be perhaps his greatest comic creation, right? Okay, and if you read the introduction, when Falstaff first appears, and he happens to ask Prince Hel, you know what time it is, and he says, what does that got to do with you, you know, to know what time it is, right? And, you know, he's alluded to the fact that Falstaff is just pursuing what is what? For the moment. Yeah, yeah, sense pleasure, right? Food, drink, sex, and so on, right? So what's the time got to do with him, right? You know, he's gotten what's relevant to him, right? I've been saying it, right, you have to be like Shakespeare says, it's very funny the way he's introduced, right? But he's introduced as one who, in a sense, what? Time has no relevance to him, right? He's not acting as if he had any sense of time, right? He's just, you know, going up with his diseases and eating and so on, right? So it's very interesting the way Aristotle speaks here, right? He speaks of man as the one who has a sense of time, huh? But that's the first sense of before and after, huh? For the mind, he says, because of what is to come, right, commands restraint, right? While desire, because of what is immediate, huh? Again, the word desire there, I'm sure, is the word, what? Epithymia. Yeah, yeah, see? So he says, hogar noose, noose the mind, huh? An account of the future, right, huh? Looking thing. It commands one to, what, restrain or something, right? But epithymia, right, the sense desire due to the A-Day, right, huh? Now, Shakespeare has a very good understanding of that, right? You know? He speaks, you know, of, well, that famous poem is The Rape of Lucrece, right, huh? Oh. You know? Give an example of temptation, right, huh? Representation of temptation. And how a man, you know, pursues something, right, that he's going to regret ever having done, right? Mm-hmm. You know, but pursues the momentary pleasure, right, huh? The momentary act, huh? That phrase, the ignorant present, I notice that Dickens, you know, in his greatest novel there, borrows that phrase, huh? Oh. When David Copperfield and Dora get engaged, right, you know, you know, that they'd remain in the ignorant present, huh? Oh. Oh. Oh. I said, well, what a good phrase, and then I realized it comes from Shakespeare, right? You know, you'll find that in the novelists, you know, the English novelists, that they will use a phrase directed from Shakespeare, sometimes a paraphrase of it. Shakespeare says it so well, yeah. Yeah. And it goes on here on the next page. For the immediate pleasant thing, right, huh, appears to be both simply pleasant and simply good because of not seeing what is to what? Come, huh? Okay. Now, I think I've spoken about this before. We talked about the fallacies, right? But notice Aristotle is talking here about the kind of mistake, huh? That's being made, huh? Okay. Now, I think I mentioned before when I'm in logic, maybe, that in the book about sophisticated refutations, huh, Aristotle distinguishes the mistakes that come from language, huh, and then the mistakes that come outside of language, huh? And the first kind of mistake that comes from language is a mistake that comes from mixing up different senses of the same word, huh? Happiness is the end of human life. The end of human life is death. Therefore, happiness is death, right? I mentioned how, you know, I spent a lot of time in the philosophy of nature showing that nature acts for an end and so on. And if I get on the final exam, you know, a student saying, you know, nature can't be acting for an end because if nature acts for an end, all things would come to an end. But if they haven't come to an end, then for nature can't be acting for an end. Well, the student is obviously mixing up two senses of that, right? Okay, but there are five other kinds of mistakes from words he talks about there in the spiritual refutations. But then he goes to the seven kinds outside of language, right? And the first kind is the fallacy of the accidental, right? Mixing up as such and by happening, right? But then the second kind of mistake is the one that he's touching upon here, right? The mistake from mixing up what is so simply is what is so in some way, right? Okay. Now this is a distinction that people don't understand too well, huh? But you're overlooking that distinction, huh? Mistake from mixing up or not distinguishing, another way of saying it, between what is so simply or without qualification and what is so in some way, okay? Now, I often get a very simple example in class, you know, of this kind of statistical argument, huh? And I'll pick out a young lady and I'll say to her, do you know my brother Marcus? And she'll say, no. And I'll say, now, in the class, you all heard what she said, right? She doesn't know my brother Marcus, right? I'm going to make her contradict herself. Okay, you all heard what she said, she doesn't know my brother Marcus. Okay? And then I say, now, do you know what a man is? And she'll say, yes. That's what my brother Marcus is. She didn't know my brother Marcus. See? Now, has she really contradicted herself? No. No. Simply, she doesn't know my brother Marcus. But, in knowing what a man is, or even knowing what a brother is, she in some way knows my brother Marcus, right? In knowing what a man is, or what a brother is, in a way, you know every man in the world, don't you? Or every brother. Do you see? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, when you study the Mino, you see how easy men get deceived by this, huh? You go one way or the other, right? Socrates says he doesn't know what virtue is, right? And Mino says he does know, right? Well, Socrates has an examination conversation, and by the end of that conversation, it's clear that Mino doesn't know what virtue is either. So at that point, Socrates says, let's put our heads together and try to find out what virtue is. And Mino says, what? Well, how can you go looking for what you don't know? Yeah. And so if I say to you, you know, are we getting one? Are we getting one? Uh-huh. And you say, well, it'd be pretty by chance I got you what you wanted, because I know what you want. Yeah. Uh-huh. So how can we, you know, direct our thinking and our conversation towards what we don't know? Is that true? Is that true? See, if I go into the filling station, gasoline station, I ask the man, how do you get it? All right. I can't tell you how to get there if I don't know where you're going. So, is it possible to direct yourself to what you don't know? Is it? You see, if Muno's objection were good, there would be no art of logic and no art of counting or calculating either. Because logicae, as the Greeks called it, and logisticae, these are arts that direct us to knowing what we don't know. And someone might say, well, how can you direct yourself to what you don't know? You have to know what you're aiming at, right? Well, the point is that what you don't know, you could know in some way. And that might seem at first impossible, right? An example I always give in class, is a very simple one. If I have a large class, I say, how many students are in class today? I say, I don't know. Nobody knows here how many students are in class today, right? But I could direct myself to what I don't know with the greatest of ease. In fact, I know exactly how to get there by counting, right? And then I count the students, right? And let's say I end up with 28, huh? Okay. Now, how did I direct myself to 28 when I didn't know I was looking for 28? How did you do that? I didn't know I was trying to get to 28, did I? And yet I got to 28 with the greatest of ease. Well, in some way I did know 28, huh? Just like in some way that girl knew my brother Mark, in knowing what a man is, or brother is, see? I knew I was looking for the number of students in the class today, right? And 28 is in fact the number of students in class today, right? So in some imperfect way, 28 was already known to me, but not in the way that I came to know it by counting, you see? So I direct myself, right, to what I don't know by knowing it in some way, see? In something perfect, very deficient way, huh? See? And Socrates makes the same mistake later on when he says that the slave boy, right, already knew how to double a square. Because the way to double a square comes out of the answers that the slave boy gives. But the answers the slave boy gave, the things he knows already that he recalls with Socrates' questions, huh? Are things through which and by which he is able to come to know he doesn't know. Is that the same thing as to already actually know? I always take a simple example from the other art. Or, if I know the length and the width of a rectangle, and I know how to multiply, do I know the area of the rectangle? Yeah. But not before I multiply one by the other, right? Right. So I don't really know the area, do I? Except in ability. I know it in some way. In ability. Does that have to know it? In some way. Yeah. In that sense, the students know everything I want to say in class before I say it. In some way. In ability, right? But learning is what? Coming to know simply, huh? Without qualification. So when Socrates asks the slave boy, how do you double a square at first? The slave boy says you double the side, right? He not only doesn't know how to do it, he's mistaken, right? But eventually he comes to see that you take the diagonal, and he comes to know it, do things he knows already. But Socrates says what? The way to double a square came out of his answer, right? He already knew it. He was just recalling what he already knew. So Socrates is taking, what? The same kind of mistake here, right? He's saying that the slave boy already knew it, because in some way he did know it. You see the difference, huh? Suppose you got a door like that with no windows, right? You got a knock on the door, right? Do you know who that is? Do you know who's knocking at the door? And you say no, right? We open it, and it's the abbot, huh? It's Driscoll. Or it's your mother or somebody, right? You know? It's easy to know who's knocking at the door, right? It's your mother knocking at the door. You don't even know your own mother? Or it's Father Driscoll? You don't even know? Huh? You see? Notice. You know your mother, or you know Father Driscoll, right? But in some way you don't know your mother or Father Driscoll. You don't know them as the one, but knock me in the door, right? In some way they're unknown to you. Do you see that? So it's very easy to mix up those two, huh? And another example of this, knowing. Suppose the student asks a question, right? Okay. And you say now, does the student, when he asks a question, know what he wants to know? Does he know what he's looking for? Well, if he already knows what he's looking for and you ask a question, why does he bother to ask a question if he already knows the answer, right? If he doesn't know what he's looking for, how can I help him? If he doesn't even know himself what he's looking for. Yeah. And how could I possibly help him if I don't know what he's looking for? But if he knows what he's looking for, then what does he have to ask for? He already knows it. Isn't it? In other words, we ask questions before we get answers, right? So what do you get, when you ask the question, do we already know the answer? In a certain way. You got it in some way, right? Okay. Or the man who's being paid to find the cause of cancer, right? Does he know what he's looking for? He has a clue. Yeah. He knows he's looking for the cause of this disease, right? Right. But that's not to know the cause of this disease, is it? But it is to know in some way, right? Mm-hmm. We have different men that are being paid to research and try to find the cause of different diseases, right? The man is nobody trying to find out, how would you pay him to do this, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Mm-hmm. So you can see how easy it is to get those two mixed up, huh? Yeah. And if you ever have a chance to go through some of the books of wisdom, right, huh, we'll see that the final mistake about the universe, right, is a mistake of this kind, huh? The reason why they say matter is the beginning of all things rather than God is because of a mistake of this kind. Mm-hmm. But we'll see how we get to the ninth book of wisdom, huh? Okay? Mm-hmm. But as I tell the students, now that I'm having a hard time seeing what this distinction is and what this kind of mistake is, I say, we're doing this all day long in our daily life, right? Mm-hmm, mm-hmm. We're choosing something, what, bad because in some way it's good, see? I choose to rob the bank because in some way it's good, it's going to increase the money in my pocket if I don't get caught anyway, right, huh, see? Or I choose to murder somebody because they, what, annoy me, right, or because they stand in the way of my promotion, right? So in some very imperfect way, murdering them is good, isn't it? It gets rid of an annoyance in my life, right? It makes possible my promotion, right? So we're choosing something bad because in some way it's good, right? I might choose to drink a delicious poison because it's delicious, right? So is it good to drink a delicious poison? No, it's bad, right? But in some way it's good, it's delicious, you see? So we're choosing something bad because it's good in some way, right? Or vice versa, right? Okay, we don't do... What is good, because in some way it's what? Bad, right, huh? So I don't get up and go to Mass on Sunday like some people don't get up, right? Because it interferes with they're getting, what? Some more sleep, right? Sleeping it on. Or, as I say to the students, they don't study when they should study, right? Because it prevents them from going to the party. It prevents them from watching a movie or something, right? And notice, there's nothing in this world so good that doesn't prevent you from doing something else, which is good, right? So again, going to Mass prevents you from sleeping another hour. Study prevents you from going to the beer party, right? Is it? So we don't do what is good to do, because in some way it's what? Bad. Or we do what is bad, because in some way it's what? Good, right, huh? So those people will get an abortion because they're embarrassed by it or they want to, you know, want to have their career interrupted or something, right? You see? So they choose something bad because in some very imperfect way it's what? Good, right? You see that? So we're making that kind of mistake all the time. Whereas Donald is saying that, right? If you look at the Greek here, right? That's why the Greek is important in these things, you know, for making the connections there. But he gets a sense here, down here. For the immediate pleasant thing appears to be both simply pleasant and simply good because of not seeing what is to come, right? Okay? He says, Feinitite appears, right? Toeide hedu. What is here? Pleasant. Kai haplos hedu. We need to be simply, huh? Pleasant and simply good, right? On account of not seeing the future, right? Okay? So fornication can appear to be good, right? In some ways it's good, right? It's pleasant, right? To the senses, right? But if you consider the fact that you may get this disease, right? Or you may go to hell, right? Because of this, right? Then this is not a good thing to do, right? See? So you can say fornication is bad. Why do people choose it then? Because in some way it's good, right? And to look just at the here and now, and this pleasant here and now, then they're thinking that because it's good in some way, that simply speaking, it is what? Good, right? You see the idea? Okay? Or if I'm angry with you, right? I'm going to hit you and maybe even kill you or maim you or something, right? You know? What seems what? Desirable, here and now, it's going to relieve that anger I've got if I hit you. See? But if I look at the fact that I'm going to injure you, right? And not only that, but I myself may also be in trouble because of what I've done to you, right? And that momentary relief of my anger, right? Not what? Worth it, huh? Okay? I know sometimes when people get angry or somebody and they feel like saying something, you know, and it's better not to say something, right? You know? And that you'll regret having said and, you know, just let it roll off, you know? The insult or whatever it is that they did, right? You see? But if you're just thinking of the immediate moment, right? You want to relieve yourself by saying something nasty or something, right? But something that's going to get in the way of what you want your relation to be with this person maybe in the future, right? You see? You see the idea? That's what Aristotle's talking about there, right? But I think he's hitting the nail on the head, huh? Yeah. I mean, I wasn't thinking of this text in particular, but when I tried to explain this, this fallacy, right? You know? I'm trying to make it a little more concrete for them. You don't realize what a role it plays in our daily what? Life, huh? We're always choosing something bad because in some it's good, right? Yeah. Or refusing to do what is good because in some way it's what? Bad, right? I should get more exercise, right? Mm-hmm. It's good for me to get some exercise, right? The doctor looks at me and he says, you don't get too much exercise, do you? Mm-hmm. And he's sedentary. I guess, years ago, I guess, Ron MacArthur wasn't feeling so well, right? He didn't kind of a sedentary life, right? And he went to the doctor and he said, what was wrong with him? He said, there's nothing wrong with him. He said, you just don't get any exercise. Yeah. exercise is something you need to get from exercise, right? But in some way exercise is bad because it's a little bit painful, right? A little bit uncomfortable, right? So you put it off, right? Do you see the idea? Mm-hmm. So we're making this same, what, kind of mistake, right? Sarah Stow says in the ethics, the man who sins, right, is mistaken. Okay? But what kind of mistake is it, right? Well, I suppose it'd be more than one kind of mistake, but he's always, this seems to be the most common mistake, right? When he chooses to do what is bad because it's good in some way, right? He's mistaken into thinking that what is so in some way is so without qualification. And when he refuses to pursue what is good for him to do, right? Because in some way it's bad, right? He's thinking that something is bad because in some way it's bad. Prevents him from going to the party or whatever it is, right? Now, in the remaining part of the chapter here, he's simply unfolding a little more fully the order, right, of these movers, right? What is altogether first is the good or the what? Desirable itself. Right? And that's, as Aristotle says in a way, the unmoved mover in this series. For this moves not being moved, but it moves eventually, right, the body by being understood or imagined and also by being what? Desired, right? Okay. In number, however, the movers, the move-movers are many. Now, in 378, he's laying out the whole thing there, huh? Since over, there are three things here, you see in the order here, right? First of all, there's the mover, right? Then that by which it moves, right? And there he's thinking of the bodily part by which the animal moves, whether it be wings or legs or fins or whatever it has. And further, the thing moved, right? Okay, that's the order there, right? But the mover is twofold, right? One is the immobile, the unmoved mover, which in this case is the what? Good, understood or imagined and desired. And the other is what? The move-mover, okay? And that's especially desire, right? So the immobile mover is the practical good, right? The moving and being moved, the mood-mover, you could say, is the desiring power, right? For the thing desiring is moved insofar as it's what? As it desires, huh? And the appetite and act is a certain motion, but a motion, now not in the original sense of motion, but it's an activity, right? And the thing being moved is the what? Animal, right? So you see the order there, huh? First you have the good, right? The end, which is then understood or imagined, right? And desired, right? Especially the desire is the moved mover, right? And that moves some, what? He's going to say some organ of the body, right? Which then moves the animal, right? However, the organ by which the appetite moves, this already is bodily, right? Whence one must consider this among the works or acts common to the body and the soul. So Aristotle has two books on that subject, right? On the motion of animals, right? And on the progression of animals. But there you're considering what? The body more concretely, right? And so he's going to reserve it to that, huh? Okay? Here he's looking at it more from the point of view of the soul in itself, right? And so he's saying in the soul itself, what originally is the mover is either understanding or imagination and desire, right? But before them is the good desired and understood or imagined, huh? Okay? And 379 is merely an anticipation of that discussion you'll have in the more material books there when he gets down to the body, huh? Okay? He's talking about the circular aspect, right? With my arm here, right? Extend it and then comes back, right? The circular motion there, huh? Okay. That one moves by pushing and by pulling, right? Sounds like pulling towards oneself and then pushing away from oneself, huh? Okay? But that's just kind of an anticipation of what you're going to go into when he talks about the bodily organ, right? So let's take a little break here now before we look at the 16th reading of Thomas there that begins in 380 and goes through this next shorter chapter. Okay? What do I do here? So now in the 16th reading of Thomas there, which begins at 380 there, he's going to talk about a little bit of the difference among the animals, man and the other animals, huh? In regard to these two moving powers, right? Which are either reason or imagination and desire, right, huh? So he says, generally, therefore, as was said, as the animal is appetitive or desiring, by this it is motive of itself, right? But it is not desiring without what? Imagination, right? Okay? And now he makes a little distinction here. Why all imagination is rational or sensitive. Now what does he mean by that, huh? See? Well, he means that the imagination of man is in some way directed by what? His reason, right, huh? By the imagination of the other animals is merely what? A sense power, huh? That's not being directed by any reason that they have, right, huh? Okay? Even the other animals, he says, in fact, as he says, share in the latter, right, huh? Okay? That is imagination. Yeah. See, in the Greek it says fantasia passa. Every imagination is either logisticae, right, under the influence of reason, right, or esteticae, right, and merely a sense power, right? Okay. And of this, meaning the latter, the other zoop, the other animals partake, right? Okay? So in the, you know, we used to notice the way the cat would be down in the basement, right, and then in the morning she's coming out to get fed, right? She's being led upstairs, right? And she went up the stairs and down the hall and around the corner with the dishes, right? Well, she can't, what, sense around the corner, I don't think, to my knowledge, right? But she's got this image, right, of where her food is, huh? Yeah. You know? Okay? She goes directly to it, huh? Right. Okay? But it's not a logisticae, huh? It's an esteticae, huh? It's sensitive. Okay? Now, the next part here is talking about those very imperfect animals, huh? That don't really move from one place to another, right? But they seem to have some kind of motion because they do in the water, they live in the ocean, say, right? When something comes into contact to them, they will kind of grab it or take it in, right? And so on, huh? But they don't seem to have the senses like sight and hearing because those are senses that act over a distance, right? And so usually they speak of smell and then hearing, and especially sight, are senses that know things at a, what, distance, right, huh? So these vultures, you know, can smell a dead body from a great distance, huh? They'll come from a great distance, huh? And, you know, even the ants, right? Well, there's been some sweet thing spilt somewhere, they'll come from a great distance to these things, right? But these animals that resemble plants, you know, and are fixed to the floor of the ocean or something like that, they don't go from one place to another, right? So their food and so on comes to them through the motion of the, what, water, right, huh? But they do seem to have, what, pain and pleasure, because if you stick them, they, what, retract as if in pain, right? And yet they, when something edible comes into contact, they will grab it, right, huh? Okay. But they seem to act only through something like touch, right? Okay. So he's asking about them, whether there's imagination in them or not, huh? Well, essentially, there's pain and pleasure in what they do, the way they react to this thing. Whence of these, necessarily, there is also, what, desire, right, huh? Okay. And, of course, the Greek word there, which he's been translated by desire here all along, is epithumia, right, huh? As I say, I usually translate it by the phrase, sense-desire, right, because I want to give that sense of what kind of desire it is, huh? But how could imagination be in them, right? Okay. But Aristotle doesn't deny entirely this imagination in them, huh? Now, notice what imagination, how it was defined earlier. It's emotion caused by the sense and act, right? So he thinks that these forms of life have maybe some kind of a indeterminate or confused image, right, falling upon sensation. Because when something edible comes in contact, right, then they seem to, what, find it agreeable, right, and they pursue it, right? Or in something, like a pin or something is stuck in them, they seem to, what, contract, like in pain, right? So they seem to have some kind of a, what, motion falling upon senses whereby they recognize something is agreeable or disagreeable to their senses. But it seems to be, what, indeterminate or kind of confused compared to what the dog or the cat would have or the animal that goes a distance, right, and has to have some kind of, what, more determined imagination to be able to direct itself in some, you know, to go to where it needs to go. Mm-hmm. They're kind of just kind of fumbling with what's immediate there, huh? Okay. Now, in 382, he's going to contrast the other animals and man again in terms of the, what he spoke at the beginning of the chapter, in terms of their imagination, huh? And again, he's using that word that we saw before, the aesthetike, phantasia. Phantasia is a Greek word for imagination, right? And aesthetike is what? Sensing, huh? The sensitive word, right? Aesthetike? Yeah. So we get the word, that's a Greek word for a sensation, right? So he's got it all translated here when he says a sensitive imagination, right? Okay. So he says the sensitive imagination is found in the other animals, right? But the deliberative one is found in the, what? The ones having reason, right, huh? We deliberate, should I do this or should I do that, right, huh? Okay. For whether it will do this or that is already a work of reason. And of course, if you're going to decide between two things, he says you need a third thing whereby you can, what? measure these two, huh? And which is the one to do or not, right? So you've got to be able to combine.