De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 62: The Soul Is Not a Body: Refuting Materialist Theories

Transcript
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The opinion that Socrates is defending has a important element of the truth. The soul is something, the human soul especially, is something substantial, right? Something subsistence even, okay? But it's not a, what, complete substance, right? Okay? Now the whole truth about the soul is that it's a substantial form of a body, yeah? Yeah. Could you give an example of what an accidental form? Your health. Your shape. So health is itself as a form. Yeah, yeah. And notice when you say form there, you don't mean just shape, right? Sure. See? Using that for the act of the matter, right? Okay? So it could be the shape, right? It could be the disposition of the matter. It could be the ratio of the matter, right? It could be the order of the matter, right? So all those things, huh? Yeah. So if I was talking about Manhattan, right? Well, if I make a Manhattan, you've got to make it out of the standard formula anyway. It's rye whiskey, right? And sweet vermouth. But you have to combine them in the ratio of what? Two to one. Two parts whiskey to one part sweet vermouth, right? So two to one is the form, and rye whiskey and what? Vermouth. Yeah, yeah. The same way you could say, you know, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are made out of the same matter, right? But monoxide, the ratio is one to one. And carbon dioxide, the ratio is two to one. So that ratio of one to one will kill you, I said, right? But two to one, that's five. You see? Okay. But if you take the word cat and the word act, right? And you say, well, they have the same letters, but the order is different, right? And cat and act, huh? So, if a living body, right, is made out of the same things a non-living body is, right? Ultimately, right? You might say, well, you've got a living body protoplasm or something like this, right? But if you take apart the protoplasm and so on, keep taking it apart, you end up with the same kind of things that you find in the non-living world. So the living body doesn't differ from the non-living body. But ultimately, being made out of a different matter. But it's the way the matter is, what? Put together, right? It makes it living, huh? And that way of being put together is what we call, it's what? Form, right, huh? But they're thinking of a form now that exists, what? In another, right? And is not really substantial, right, huh? Okay? A little bit like the order of the letters in the word cat, right? You know, C-A-N-T are more substantial, but the order there is something that exists only when they're brought together, right? It's not something, what? Subsistent, as the second article shows here, right? Okay? But it's especially the human soul that, and through its operation, you know this. The fact that the human soul has an activity, right, that's not bodily, shows that it's something substantial, right? So, eventually, Aristotle put together the two parts of the truth that are divided in the two most probable opinions. And from one, he took the truth that it's a form of the body, right? From the other, that it's something substantial. But he left out the falsity in the one position that it's something accidental, and the other that it's a complete spiritual substance, right? That really has no connection with the body. It's just imprisoned somehow in the body, huh? Do you see? And they'll come back, in a way, in these first two articles, because in that first article, besides the negative conclusion that it's not a body, right, Thomas will be arguing that it's a form, right? But then in the second article, that it's something substantial, in fact, something, what? Subsistence, huh? That can exist by itself, right? But once you see that, you see you sometimes are inclined to go to the opposite extreme, right? And think that it's something complete in itself, you know, complete substance, huh? Okay? Of course, now the souls of the brood animals, which I talk about in the third article, there's something substantial, right? But they don't, what? Subsist, they can't subsist by themselves apart. They have no operation that's not in the body. As Aristotle announces there in the beginning of the, in the premium there to Dianima, he says, he talks about this question, you know, does the human soul survive death, right? Does the human soul have existence only in the body, right? So when the body perishes, it perishes, right? Or does the human soul have an existence that's not immersed, right, in the body, huh? Not entirely, it's shared in by the body, but it's not immersed in the body. He says, well, he says, the answer to that question depends upon the answer to another question. Does the soul do anything not in the body? If it does something only in the body, like the souls of the animals or the plants, say, for its area, there's no reason to think that its existence is not immersed in the body, right? But if it has some kind of activity, like understanding, some people think, huh, and choosing and so on, if it has some activities that are not in the body, right, that are not performed to the body organ, then its existence is not tied to the body, huh? And of course, you can see that, right? A thing must exist before it can do something, right? And, but we know what it does before we know the kind of existence it has. So if the soul had existence only in the body, it would only have operation or doing in the body. But the fact that our soul has an operation not in the body, as Aristotle showed, and we'll see it again in Thomas here, understanding, right, shows its existence is not just in the body. You see that? If you look at the fatal there, the last argument that Socrates gives, it's not quite perfect yet, and it has a lot of difficulties in it, but he's trying to approach what Aristotle eventually will do. And of course, what's interesting is that Sebes is pushing Socrates to come up with a necessary argument for the immortality of the soul. And he's starting to, you know, approach that, but it doesn't quite get there, huh? But you see, you see the very second road in our knowledge there, huh? The road from reasonable guesses towards reasoned-out knowledge, right? And Socrates is moving in that direction, right? Under the prodding, so to speak, of Sebes, right? The ones, a reason for saying the soul necessarily does survive, the human soul, survive death, huh? So those first two articles, in a way, will bring out those two, what, parts of the truth that are hidden in those two other opinions, huh? Okay? And you see, the Platonists thought that even the souls of the other animals were subsistent, huh? Right. And of course, the third article was going to be excluding that, right? Okay? Because the animals don't have anything higher than sensing, and sensing is always in a bodily organ. So they have no activity that's not in the body, and therefore the existence must be tied to the body. Now, once you see that the soul of man is something that has existence in its own right, and not just in the body, right, then you might tend to go to this other mistake and think that what? Well, the soul is man, okay? Now, there is, I forget the name of it, but there is an early dialogue of Plato, right? There's some question about authenticity, but I think it is authentic, where Socrates asked explicitly the question, is man a soul or a body, or something composed of the two? And Socrates reasons that man is just a soul. And in the Fado, you get sometimes an impression of that being his opinion there, right? As he's presented in the Fado anyway. His friend, Crito, says to him, he's going to die, he says, where shall we bury you, Socrates? And Socrates smiled and said, you have to catch me first. Socrates is just the soul, it's going to be hard to catch him and bury him, right? But you see, it's really a matter of inward experience, which is the way we know the soul, that the one who, what, feels pain in his body, right? and who's thinking about how to relieve that pain is one and the same. I think we all have the experience of feeling pain somewhere in our body, right? And thinking how we can relieve that pain or that discomfort, right? And there's any doubt in your inward experience that the one who's thinking about this is the one who's feeling the pain. The body is part of us, right? As well as the soul, right? Sarvi's arm is kind of, I remember, right? He's kind of weak in a sense. If you use something, right, are you and the one you use the same? No. Okay? Now, we use our body, don't we? Sometimes we use our body to do good things. Sometimes we use our body to do bad things, right? We use our body, right? Well, if the user and the used are not the same, then the body is not me, right? I think that's one of the arguments he uses there, right? And it's kind of interesting argument, right? But, you know, a little bit weak, you know? But you say, well, what's wrong with the argument, do you know? A lot of people are kind of easy about these arguments, but they have a hard time answering what's wrong with the argument. Sure, right. Because it makes some sense to say that the user and the used are different, right? And we always talk about how you should use your body or not use your body, right? So we use our body for good or for bad, right? Right. Well, then we must be something other than the body, right? What about the tactic of, well, we use our soul to think, so... Yeah, yeah. There are problems about this, right? So, yeah. There's a distinction between am I using my hand to do something and am I using, you know, the knife to do something, right? There's a difference between a tool that is, what, joined to be an immediate part of me and a tool that is, what, extrinsic, right? Right. It's kind of interesting in philosophy, there used to be a debate sometimes that Albert mentions among the, in the beginning of logic. Is logic a part of philosophy or a tool of philosophy, right? And, of course, Boethius, I think, had touched on this, too. And Albert, I think, is following Boethius, you know. Well, a tool, some tools could be a part of, right? You see? Mm-hmm. So, my hand, you know, we call it the tool of tools, but my hand is a tool that is a part of me, right? But my knife or fork or something is a tool that is not a part of me, right? Yeah, yeah. That's a very important distinction, huh? And Thomas comes back to that when he talks about the Incarnation, huh? Because the divine nature of Christ, excuse me, the human nature of Christ, right, is a tool of his divinity, huh? And because the tool is divinity, it's more efficacious than any human nature could ever be. It has a power, right, and a universality of causality because it's the tool and the, as Thomas says, the joint tool, right, of God himself. Because the human nature is joined to the divine person there, see? It's very striking, huh? It's a very important distinction there between the joint tool and the intrinsic tool, yeah. So, I mean, but there's some truth to what Socrates is saying, right? So there's one kind of tool that is not, what, a part of the one who uses it, right? But, you know, it might just be this other kind of tool, huh? Okay. So you can see how these articles, in a way, are arranged, right? The, after you see that second article, well, there's two maybe confusions here. You might go and think that all souls, or at least the souls of the animals, are what? Subsistent too, and he excludes that error, right? Well, then you see how it's unique to man, and you might be getting into this way of thinking of Socrates or somebody, right? That the soul is the whole man, huh? And there, Thomas is going to, of course, obviously show us that man is something composed of soul and body, right? Of course, that goes back to what we were saying before, that you consider the angels, right? Which are a complete substance, right? But wholly spiritual, wholly immaterial. And then you have these bodies that are complete substances, but rather material, right? And then you have man, who's composed of soul and body, right? Right, huh? You're making that explicit there, huh? Okay. Now, the fifth one may be a little bit strange there, but you have this kind of a strange opinion that runs through some of the earlier writers in the Christian tradition too. You know, they'll think of the souls being made out of some kind of spiritual matter, right? They get rid of matter. So he's going to exclude that kind of famous mistake there, huh? Now, the sixth article, of course, will follow from the fact that the human soul is, what? Subsistent, right, huh? That it's incorruptible, right? The human soul. But then when you get through and finally realize that the human soul is something subsistent, it has existence not only in the body, it's incorruptible. Gee, it's just like an angel, right? Right. Well, no. See, an angel is a complete what? Substance. Substance, yeah. And the human soul is not, right? And if the human soul were a complete substance, well, then there'd be no sense in the resurrection, would there? Well, you know what I'm saying? See, resurrection is necessary that the whole man might be there, right? And, you know, one time they, one thing they say, too, about the resurrection there, that the body has some share in our good deeds and, unfortunately, in our bad deeds, too. And, therefore, it's got to share, to some extent, in the reward of the soul or in the punishment of the soul, right? Even though the soul is the primary culprit, huh? Or the primary thing, huh? And, so. I remember when my little cousin died, you know, just a little girl, you know, sweetest little thing, you know. And my aunt, you know, of course, very, very upset about this, huh? It was her fourth child, but, fourth one. But, you know, saying to the priest there, you know, in the confession, you know, well, now she's an angel, you know, and the priest was kind of sober, yeah. Now she's an angel now. Now, well, I don't want to disturb the poor woman. Yeah, right. And she's something like an angel. And, of course, Christ himself says, you look like the angels, right? When they ask him, you know, you know, the guy who, woman who married seven brothers, right? He says, no, you'd be like the angels, but never, you'd be like the angels. But you won't, what? You won't be an angel, huh? You'll still be a soul that is incomplete without the body, right? You know, okay? So when we pray, you know, St. Peter, pray for us, right? Thomas always explains that as a, what, synecdoche, huh? You're giving the name of the whole to the part, right? Rather than say, soul of St. Peter, pray for us, we call the soul of St. Peter, St. Peter, right? But so there's something kind of unique there about Christ, of course, who rose from the dead, right? So it's not synecdoche when I say Christ, or when I pray to him, right? Or when I say, you know, Holy Mary, pray for us sinners, and so on. That's not synecdoche because of the, what? Assumption. Assumption, yeah, yeah. So it's very significant about that, huh? See, Sarah? The kind of, I guess, when the, before the definition there of the assumption, right, it was around 1950, was it? Yeah, I think, yeah. With Pius XII, you know, but among other things, you know, certain theologians had an audience with Pius XII, and I've been told that Deconic was one of those who had an audience with the Pope, right? So he gave, you know, the Popes a very drastic argument in favor of the assumption, right, huh? Which are said to have impressed Pius XII. Sometimes you hear, like I heard, it wasn't too long ago, someone saying, like, oh, well, I'm an Augustinian, and I don't believe in this kind of silliness about, you know, the soul's an incomplete person, and running up in heaven. Is that actually what? Well, no, that's going to get you to a lot of trouble when you get talking about the resurrection, right? You know, about our resurrection, and so on, right? I believe in what? We need a saying, it's the resurrection of the body, life everlasting. That's an article of faith, you know? Of course, you know, with the Manichaeans, there's a tendency, with the Manichaeans, and to some extent with the Platonists, right, to regard matter as evil, right? Yeah, right. So, you know, with the Manichaeans, there's a tendency, with the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and the Manichaeans, and And therefore, the separation of the soul from the body is a separation from evil, right? And therefore, they would tend to be opposed to the idea of reincarnation or of the soul being joined to the body again, right? This would be a sign that the soul was not yet perfect or not purged, yeah. And this would be the triumph of evil again, you know, being united. So that's even more of an impediment, right, to the mystery of the resurrection, right, which is an article of the faith, not only Christ's resurrection, but ours, right? You know, the famous text there in St. Paul, you know, he's talking about some who say that resurrection is understood in some spiritual way, right? And St. Paul is very clear that they'll make our faith in vain, huh? But I mean, included in that is also the idea of our resurrection. But, so if you think that the soul is the whole man, the resurrection doesn't make much sense. In A. 4th theory, if you think that the body is something evil, right, which is what the Manichaeans thought and the others said. And did St. Augustine really have a home of that understanding that the soul is the complete man? Do you know? No, Augustine, I think, knew that the soul and the body, sure. I'm sure he knew that both of them, yeah. So it would even be wrong to have an excuse to say, no, I'm not a student. It's even a false excuse, yeah. Yeah. Okay, so, you see kind of a little bit of the order there, the seven articles, huh? Yeah, good. But that last article, again, would, you know, if you made the mistake of thinking the soul was of the same species as an angel, it's because of the likeness, right? Likeness is a cause of what? Deception, yeah. It's a slippery thing, as Plato says. And, but at the same time, you know, you can see why Thomas says, you know, I study the body so I can study the soul. I study the soul so I can study the angels, huh? And I study the angels so I can study God. And the angels are more like God than the soul is. And the soul is much more like God than the, what, body is, huh? So let's look here now at the first article, huh? Whether the soul is a body, right? Now what Thomas does in the Summa, you know, it's kind of like an abbreviation of what they call the questionis disputate. And they say this is the way it was done. I don't know if it was always observed exactly this way, but I think it makes some sense. On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of this week, I will lecture. Now, in my lecture, there will be many things covered, right? And some things are more controversial than others, right? Some things, and other writers, and down through time, have been disputed about more than others, right? And you know what we're going to do on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday? We're going to pull out those more difficult questions. And you might call them questionis, what, disputate, huh? Questions about which famous thinkers, right, have thought opposite things about, right? And so, we're going to divide the class up here, you know? And you ten guys are going to argue an affirmative. And you ten guys are going to argue on the negative, right? Okay? Now, whether they had some help from the teacher, even that, we, no. Okay? Then, it was the duty of the magister, the master, to solve the question, right? See? And if he came down the affirmative side, he'd have to go back to all the arguments, the negative side, and answer every one of them. Sure. And vice versa, right? Okay? But if he thought that there was an element of truth on both sides, and both sides had some defect in them, right? Mm-hmm. Then, he would have to answer the questions or the objections on both sides, right? Okay? Now, the best question is disputate are the ones that have come down to us from, what? Thomas, right? Mm-hmm. So, yeah, the question is disputate di veritati. Oh. And I said bonitati. Mm-hmm. Okay? About truth. And the question is disputate di malo, right? Univo, right? You have the question is disputate di anima, right? Oh. There's a whole series of these questions disputate. And in them, you will have as many as 15 or 20 objections sometimes on the false side, and maybe even 10 or 15 on the, what, other side, right? And then, in the body, of the articles, it's called, Thomas will determine what the truth is, right? And then, if the whole truth was on one side, you'll answer all the objections on that opposite side, right? Sure. If the whole truth involved elements of both, you'll answer both sets of objections, right? Mm-hmm. When I said the Summa Theologia is written for, you know, beginners, and what Thomas does is to cut that down to some of the chief objections, right? And usually just about three, occasionally there's four or five, but usually only about three objections, right? But they're usually, you know, very important ones, huh? And then the opposite side usually is very short, just like I said, contra, right? See? So it's kind of an abbreviation of the question disputata, right? But appropriate for a beginning, like a lot of 25 objections, you know, and so on. And so you have, therefore, the objections against what he's going to determine is the truth in the body of the article, right? But you have just a set contra, you know, somebody using authority, right? Make you stop and wonder, right? And then the body of the article, Thomas, will solve the question, answer the question, and so on. And then you reply to the objections on the other side, right? Now, really, the ideal way to read an article would be to read the objections and the set contra, and then see no more for a while, right? And then just sit back and say, now, how would I, what would I think about that, right? And try to kind of anticipate, because, you know, think a little bit on your own. And how would I answer these objections, too, if I think they're wrong, right? And then read Thomas, right? When I was teaching the, yeah? The corpus or the odd responses? Well, I do all three separately, right? Let's see. In other words, you would get a piece of paper with just the objections and the set contra on it, and, you know, think about that for a while. And then, later on, we're going to give you the body of the article, right? And, once you absorb the body of the article, then see if you could answer the particular objections, right? And then, finally, you go to Thomas, right? I don't want to prolong this too much, because you make you a little bit frustrated with your own deficiencies, right? That's kind of the way to do it, you know? I know when I was teaching the Love and Friendship course, right? Kind of at the end of that, I thought I'd say a little bit about charity, right? And Thomas has an article on whether charity is a form of friendship, huh? Well, of course, they didn't have the text with them, I was going to reproduce it for them, right? The English translation of the text, right? So, I put on a separate piece of paper the objections and the set contra. Now, if you studied the Tweet of Friendship in the eighth book there of Aristotle's Nicomagic Ethics, right? Then, you can understand the objections against saying charity is friendship, huh? And they're very interesting objections. And, like one objection will say, you know, that friendship is what? Mutual love, right? And, you know, if I love you, you'll love me in return, we're not friends, see? Okay? Well, then, the objection says, but by charity, you're supposed to love your enemies, those who don't love you, right? So, how can it be friendship when friendship is what? Mutual love, see? Well, they've already understood that friendship is mutual love. So, how can charity be this if you're loving your enemies, huh? And then, they also saw the different kinds of what? Friendship. Aristotle, you know, speaks of friendship, of useful friends, which is the lowest kind, you know? And, we're mutually useful, but we don't really, okay? And then, the friendship of pleasure, right? We enjoy each other's company, right? And then, the highest friendship, which is based on virtue, right? Okay? Well, of course, another objection will say, well, if charity is friendship, it's got to be the highest kind of friendship. And, that's the friendship between the virtuous, right? But, we're told to love sinners. Therefore, it can't be friendship, right? See? So, I mean... It's a very good objection, you see, but I gave him those one day, you know, and I left them kind of, you know, sinking in and realized they wouldn't probably be active enough to go look up the text, you know. And then he'd come back, you know, and solve it, you know. And it's kind of marvelous the way Thomas kind of solves it, right, because he sees the distinction there between the primary object of friendship, right, and the secondary object of friendship. And it's a distinction you can make in philosophy, though it's not usually made there, but because of this difficulty, right, see. So if I'm a friend of some man who's married, right, and has children, right, if I become a friend of that man, if they were both philosophers or something like that, I take a certain interest in his, what, children and their welfare and so on, right. I just had a, had a email the other day there from a friend, you know, and he wants me to do something for his son, right, okay. But I love his friend, I mean his son, rather, because I love him. He's the primary object of my friendship, right, see. But a very amusing scene there, and you read Boswell's Life with Johnson. Well, Johnson goes up to visit Boswell there in Scotland. This is the most famous biography, right, in the English language, Boswell's Life with Johnson. Well, Johnson goes up to visit Boswell in Scotland, right, and because of his somewhat sloppy habits around the house and so on, he becomes a kind of persona non grata to Mrs. Boswell. So you have, he's trying to placate here, you know, and making, you know, references to the fact that you make the best impression upon Mrs. Boswell, right, in the letters back and forth between him and Boswell, right, and they're very amusing, you know, I think she finally got to like him so much, you know. But the immediate reaction, I mean, he's a guy who would, you know, spill his ashes wherever he's on the floor and needle messes around and other things that don't endear you to the wife of the household and so on, right. And so, but nevertheless, he makes an attempt to get along with Mrs. Boswell, right, and to reconcile with her and so on. Something he wouldn't do if he wasn't, what, attached to the same thing, okay. Well, then Thomas makes the similar distinction there, right, that friendship is primarily between the saints and God, but because of that, then it extends to everything in the image and likeness of God and so on, right. It's kind of like a secondary thing, right. So, I mean, he makes the proper distinctions, but one may not think of that, right. And everybody still doesn't talk about that, but coming back upon it, you realize from your own experience, your friendship, you know. I mean, I have people who are friends of mine, and they are really very good friends, and they want to be friends with my brothers and so on, right, you know. But that's because of what? Because of you. Yeah, yeah. Well, I have friends, you know, who are the godparents, you know, or godfather of one of my sons or something, right, huh, okay. But it's not because of any direct connection between my son and this man, but because he's a son of me, who is a friend of this man, right. So he has a certain concern for my son, right, and that's how I make him a godfather, you know. So, but, you know, it's kind of funny the way these texts are written, see, because in the old days, the sumo, they print the, kind of the answer there in bold print there. You see, people can look at it right away through the answer. But, I mean, you kind of, kind of got to guide yourself from doing that, right, huh, you know. You know, sometimes, you know, I used to do it with the Summa Cantu Gentiles, you know, I'd say what the title of the chapter was, and I'd try to think out some arguments in favor of what Tom was going to show there, right. And even after I heard his arguments, and I haven't been away from the text for a while, you forget the arguments, you know, and I'd come back and I'd say, now, see, you've got seven arguments in there to show something, right. Let's see how many I can think of those seven, right. Maybe I can think of four or five of them or something, right, but I missed two of them, right. And then when I read the text again, I'm struck by the argument that I had missed, right, you know, and you kind of, you know, kind of say that argument because it's something that you had not been able to remember, right. Yeah. So let's look at the objections here, right. The first, that's what we see, it seems that the soul is a body, right. Now, this is the argument on the other side, right, huh. Now, he says the soul is the, what, mover of the body, huh, motor. Corporis, huh. But it is not a, what, a mover that is not moved itself, right. For, first, because it seems that nothing is able to move another unless it itself be moved, huh. Okay. Now, of course, this is going back to our senses, right, huh. If my hand is going to move this glass, my hand has to be also moving, right, okay. If I'm using, what, this book here to move that book, this book has to be moving too, right, to move that, huh. So it's, to move something else, you've got to be moved yourself, it seems, right, okay. And it gives a reason there, even though, because nothing gives to another what it doesn't have. So how can I give motion to this glass, how can my hand give motion to this glass if my hand was not itself in motion? Quite reasonable, right. Here's an example from another kind of motion or change, huh. Just as what is not hot does not heat something, right. Then also because if something is a mover that is not moved, right, it causes an eternal motion and one that has itself in the same way as is proved in the 8th book of the physics. I know when Aristotle was showing this in the 8th book of the physics, which does not appear in the motion of the animal, which seems kind of irregular, right. It's not always moving and moving in the same way, right, huh. Therefore the soul is a moved, what, mover, huh. But every mover that is moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body, right. Now, if you know the first book, which we didn't go through, the first book about the soul, huh, the first album. You have a premium that I think we looked at. But then the rest of book one after the premium is, as I mentioned before, who are recounting what his predecessors said about the soul, right, and also why they said this about the soul, right. And then Aristotle, you know, it is some kind of a critique about the sufficiency of what they're saying about the soul, huh. But, as Aristotle points out in that particular part of book one, he says that they investigated the soul through two things. Through the idea that the soul is moving the body, right. And, of course, this is our first idea of life, that it means, what, self-motion, right. So, they investigated the nature of the soul through the fact that it moves the body. But, as Thomas explained in the body article there, they didn't see how it could move the body unless it itself were in motion. And, of course, it's a body that is in motion, right. So, they thought of the soul as being some kind of a body that's very mobile, huh. And so, the atomists, like Demarchus, would think of the soul as atoms, right. And the atoms, you know, are some kind of body that seem to be constantly in motion. You see a stream of light coming in, you see these little particles that always seem to be moving in the air. Well, that's what the atoms are like, right. So, you need some kind of a body that's always in motion to be causing, what, our own body to be moved, right. Right. So, that's one way to investigate it. Now, connected with that, as Thomas will say, and you meet this in what Aristotle's discussing in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, the fourth book of the physics. He's discussing place, right. He takes up place. He quotes the common opinion of the Greek philosophers that whatever is must be somewhere. And if it isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist. And that's what they're thinking. They're thinking that whatever is must be in some place. Right. And if it isn't in some place, it doesn't exist. Now, if you went down and asked the man on Main Street, you'd probably agree with that. Yeah. You see? But to be in some...