De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 63: The Soul is Not a Body but Its Form

Transcript
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To be contained, that is to say in some place, right, is really a property of bodies. So they're thinking that all of it is, is bodies. And part of the reason why they think this is because we don't think about anything without imagining. And we don't imagine without the continuous, and that's what a body is, something that's length and width and depth. So it seems impossible that there be anything other than bodies or what is in bodies. And a body seems to move another body only by being moved itself. So they look for some kind of a, you know, body that's certain. Now there are other opinions that are more abstruse, you know, like the Pythagoreans, you know, we thought everything was explained by numbers. But you make the straight opinion that the soul is a self-moving number. But this is a more probable opinion, right, that it's a body, right, that's moving enough. Yeah, sure. And of course, as I mentioned earlier, you know, people, they imagine soul to be kind of an air-like, what, body, really. Sure. A very fine, you know, ghost-like body with a different body, just linked with the depth of this being this, huh? That's a very probable opinion, right? Now, the other way they investigated life was from the, from knowing. And of course, they didn't distinguish really clearly between understanding and sensing, you know, and sensing is more known. So the second objection is taken from what? The second way they approach the soul through the fact that it, what, knows in some way, right? Now, I think Aristotle was right, because life of the plants is kind of hidden, right? And it's not so clear when a plant is alive or dead, right? Yeah. And, but if you take all of these metaphors and so on in Shakespeare and in the other poets too, Homer and so on, sleep, thou ape of death. But in sleep, what part of the soul is inactive? The reason, the reason, yeah. Now, the senses, right? You're not sensing your surroundings, and you're not moving around from one place to another when you sleep, right? But you're digesting your food, right? Right. You see? But that's kind of hidden, right? Yeah. See? And so, we even use the expression of dead sleep, you know, like I was meeting in a kind of hard to wake him up, you know? And a lot of times you wake up right away, you know, when something comes in or something like that. But a dead sleep, you know, you're asleep where you resemble death, right? There's all kinds of allusions there in the poets, you know? I see it in Shakespeare all the time, huh? But death is the opposite of what? Life, right? So, they speak of sleep as being a kind of death, or being like death, a resembling death. I remember that terrible scene there in The Tempest, you know, where the one brother is urging the other brother to kill his brother and take his throne over. And Chris, he's laying on the ground to sleep, you know? He's almost like a dead person anyway, you know? And just turn him into what he resembles already. You know, kind of a... But the point is that if you think of sleep as being like death, and sleep is the, what, absence of sensing, right? And the absence of moving around, then you're thinking of life as being exactly those two things that come up in these first two, what, objections, right? Now, the second objection, and this is, you're thinking here very much of the opinion of, what, the great Empedocles, right? And Empedocles, if you remember from our study of his fragments, Empedocles saw that the thing known must be in the knower, in order to be what? Known. Remember that? Yeah. So, there seems to be truth to that, right? Mm-hmm. I mean, how do you recognize people that you know in life, huh? Well, haven't you got their shape and their color and so on inside of you, right? Mm-hmm. Certainly. See? Mm-hmm. How do I recognize you again? I mean, how come you're not a complete stranger every time I come up here? Mm-hmm. See? Right? Well, I have your shape, huh, your color inside my head, don't I? Mm-hmm. If I didn't have them in me, I wouldn't know you, would I? Mm-hmm. Okay? Say, who are you? So, but the mistake that Empedocles made was that he thought that, what? It was materially in you. Yeah. It was actually in you, right? So, he thought that, you know, earth, air, fire, and water, and love and hate, because you're composed of these things, right? So, the second objection has fallen on those lines, huh? Thomas is a student of Aristotle, right? Mm-hmm. He's a student of Plato. He says, all knowledge is through some, what? Likeness, right? But there cannot be a likeness of a body to a, what? In corporea, or an unbodily thing, right? If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not know, what? Bodily things, huh? Okay? Now, the third one goes back again to the first way that they investigated the soul, through its being a mover, right? Moreover, there must be some contact between the mover and the moved, right? But contact is only a body, huh? Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul is a body, right? Okay? So, the first and the third arguments are based upon one of the two ways that they always investigated what the soul was, through the fact that it moves the body, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And the second one, through the fact that it knows bodies, right? Now, against this is what Augustine says, huh? In the sixth book about the Trinity. That the soul is said to be simple with respect to the body, right? Because it is not, what? It's not diffused, right? Through the space of place, huh? Okay? It's of their magnitude. Okay? Okay, let's look now at the... Is that mole? Yeah. Mole? Yeah. What is that sense? How do they translate mole there? I got the... In English, how do they translate that? Quote. What? What's the quote? Bulk? Space? Yeah, bulk, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Another text where Thomas often quotes Augustine, you know, that what is not great in mole, in size or bulk, right? Yeah. It's great in the sense of being better. Okay. Yeah. Mole? Yeah. Oh, yeah. It's the same thing, yeah. That's good, yeah. Yeah. The little body, yeah. Yeah. Now we should, you know, think of this, you know? Mm-hmm. Kind of make it discreet, right? Okay. Yeah. So with us nowadays, we're completely, what, distracted from one thing to another all the time. We're always going from one thing to another. I just got through reading that biography of Solzhenitsyn there by Pierce. Oh, yeah. And Solzhenitsyn sees that very well. This is a defect in our age, right? Oh, mm-hmm. We're always jumping from one thing to another and we never really, what, think very much about anything. Huh. We're completely superficial. Wow. Too much. Yeah, yeah. And, uh, I mean, uh, I remember when there was one philosopher I knew who was, took me some kind of a speed reading course and I almost laughed in his face. Yeah, right, right. What kind of speed reading for this? Yeah, right. You gotta slow down. And I always use your finger again like you're right. Yeah, right. But you kind of, you know, you know, think about what you said and so on. Okay. You can see how those objections there fit in very well at the first book on the Dianima. I told you the famous dinner they had in honor of Charles de Connick and Jacques de Molion at Laval one time. You know, then Tommy Hughes had been there 25 years or 30 years, whatever the occasion was, right? And, uh, so, so a lot of laudatory things said and so on. And then finally de Connick and de Molion had to respond to it, huh? Mm-hmm. So de Molion responded first and he thanked them and so on. A very polite man. He says, you shouldn't have been praising me, you should have been praising Thomas Aquinas. All this praise wasted on me, right? So then DeConnick had to get up and say something, because he had to tap the morning alms. But you should have been praising Aristotle, right? Because that's where Thomas got these ideas. But DeConnick used to say it very humbly, though, you know, just here, you know, to show you how to, what, read Thomas, you know? And then you can go out on your own, right, pursue your education, huh? Okay? Two more minutes, sir. Want to take a little break, you said? It's made out of things that can be found in the non-living world. And a sign of this is that when the living body dies, right? Now you've got a non-living body, right? But you've got, apparently, the same materials that you had before, right? But they've lost their, what? Harmony, their organization, their coordination, and so on, right? Okay? So the difference between the living and the non-living is in terms of some kind of, what? Form, meaning by form, not just shape, but order, arrangement of the matter, right? Okay. So ready to begin again here now? Okay. Okay, he says, I answer that. It ought to be said, huh? Get used to this grammar over and over again. Respondio. De cendam quad, huh? Sometimes he'll say, cendam est. It ought to be known, huh? I was trying to get a friend into Latin quickly, and now reading Thomas, and with, except you respondio, for the most part, you're using the third person, right? So you don't have to know all the persons. Very, very simple as Latin, huh? Even I can read it. Okay. So I answer, it ought to be said, that to investigating, to inquiring about the nature of the soul, huh? It's much better to use the word nature of the soul than the essence of the soul, right? The economists always make fun of that word essence, huh? Oh. Because in French, it means gasoline, right? Oh. Okay. To inquiring about the nature of the soul, in order to do that, is necessary to presuppose that the soul is said to be, and this is like the, what? Meaning of the word, right? The first beginning of life in those things which among us live, right? Being these living bodies around us, right? Okay. Now, you always have to, when you teach the Dianima, say of Aristotle, you always have to explain that this is what is meant by the word soul, which is used to translate the word, what, psuche in Greek, right? You get the word psychology, or the Latin word anima, right? Because what strikes you when you look at the first book about the soul, after the premium, and Aristotle recounts what his predecessors thought about the soul, there is no doubt that no disagreement that we have a soul, or even that a dog has a soul, right? But, there's all kinds of disagreement as to what the soul is, huh? Now, if you look at discussions about, in modern times, or in recent times, people, you know, wonder whether they have a soul, right? As if that was a question, do I have a soul? And for the Greeks, there's no question there, do I have a soul? But the question is, what is that soul, right? Now, I think the confusion comes in that when we hear the word soul, we probably think, you know, something, second, third, fourth, fifth, end, we've heard maybe from the priests, right? We're thinking of some kind of a, kind of spiritual substance, right? Right? And, it's not obvious that we have that, see? Okay? But when the Greeks asked, what is the soul, they were thinking of the first beginning, right? Primum patipium, the first beginning, or the first cause of life in what? Living bodies, right? Okay? Now, that's important to see, because you're not saying anything about the nature of that cause, huh? You say the soul is the first beginning, or first cause of life within living bodies, huh? Okay? Now, everybody knows that some bodies are alive, and some are not. So, the child playing with his dog, his pet dog, in the backyard, has no difficulty in realizing that the dog is alive, and the stones are not alive. Okay? Secondly, we all have the idea that something is alive because it has self-motion. It moves itself, right? Not just that it moves, but that it seems to move itself, like the dog does. So, if we're walking through the woods there, the wood path, and we kick a stone as we go along, and the stone rolls, we don't say it's alive, do we? But if we step on something without, what, kicking it or pushing it, and all of a sudden it just goes, huh, it's alive, we say, right? You know? Because it seems to be moving itself, right? Right. Okay? I had this grandaunt, you know, that we didn't know anything about, but we were told she's kind of a mysterious woman, you know? Mm-hmm. And one time she came and visited us at the house, right? And we were just little boys at the time, and she sat down in the living room there, took out a handkerchief, right? And she wrapped it up, so it looked like a little mouse. Oh, yeah. And then she put it on her arm and wrapped the arm. How she did that, I don't know. Well, we just sat there, you know, in her eyes. That's going to be a lie, right? I don't know how she did it. They say she was on some kind of shows at one time, too. Oh, yeah? I don't know what her background was. Very mysterious woman. But it seems to be a lie, you know? But no, self-motion, the very words themselves, imply that the cause of the motion is within, right? Yeah. So if it's obvious that some bodies are alive, that they have self-motion, right? Then that there is a cause within them of their motion of their life, therefore, that there is such a thing as obvious, huh? And I think the problem for us is that we have already, through particular, a meaning or understanding of what the soul is that we've heard secondhand from the priest or something else or from our environment, and that's not obviously existing, right? Yeah. But if you take soul in this sense, then even the modern biologist who would never use the word soul or talk about the soul of a dog, he has an opinion about the soul, even though he doesn't use the word. But his opinion about the soul in this sense, huh? Now, as you mentioned before, the sign of this is the common word animal, which the philosophers did not invent, huh? But the animal is named from the Latin word for what? Soul. And the reason why the animal is named from this rather than the plant is that life in the plant is hidden, right? But the life in the dog is manifest, right? Because the dog moves from one place to another, and because the dog senses, right? The plant doesn't do any of those things, right? It's kind of hard to tell, right? And if you have any experience in gardening or in your yard or something like that, you know, sometimes a plant dies and you don't know right away that it's died, right? Because it doesn't move around from place to place, but no, it doesn't do that, right? And you can't really, it doesn't sense, right? So you can't stick it in and know whether that's alive or not, right? I mentioned how, you know, you find this reflected, too, in the words there of Beatrice there in Much Ado About Nothing, right? And her cousin is... been falsely accused right and she knows her cousin is innocent right and she wants benedict to challenge the man right who uh is accusing her and uh benedict uh asks her you know are you sure you know about another innocence and she says i'm as sure that i have a soul see well the great expression indicates that that uh everyone took for granted yeah it was obvious that they had a soul right i feel like if i was to say they sure that is that two plus two is four right we waste a way of speaking you know say for sure about it so um it's what the word suke meant in greek right and suke was translated in latin by anima and uh by soul in english right but unfortunately as they say uh we don't begin where we should begin right we begin with a um something we've heard maybe in a cardboard version but heard about the human soul in particular right and that it's really not obvious and is need to be shown and investigated right okay so thomas is going back to where you have to begin that's why the greeks they say there's no question that there is a soul the question is what is it is it is it some other body right that's the first thing right now again he's using what aristotle has pointed out in the first book about the soul that life is most of all made manifest by two operations right that of knowing right and of motion meaning by motion from what one place to another right as i mentioned before in the first book about the soul when aristotle recounts the opinion of his predecessors he shows that they what arrived at their opinions by investigating the cause of the motion of the body from one place to another right or the cause of its what knowing right okay but notice you're investigating the soul here through its operations like i mentioned before right okay now he says the beginning or cause of these things the ancient philosophers not being able to transcend the imagination they posited this cause to be somewhat body right okay i mentioned that before when i said that um uh it's a common opinion among the greeks and among maybe men in our day too that whatever he is must be somewhere it isn't somewhere it doesn't what exist right i was kind of amused by the time you know when the communists were still in power in moscow and they sent uh some astronaut up into the sky there right and he you know spoke back to earth right there's no god up here see this is like the the final reputation of a religion right there's no god up there not even zeus but no no sound how the poet you know thought of zeus and the other gods big up on top of what mount olympus right out there where the clouds are or something like that huh um but the gods had what bodies right zeus has a body right a mortal body maybe but still has a body yeah so when they say that nothing whatever it is must be somewhere if it isn't somewhere doesn't exist they're thinking of the what what is to be always a body right or something in a body they can't transcend therefore the imagination because imagination never what imagines without the continuous and that's length width and depth right that's what you mean by a body in a way what is length and width and depth right so because of our thinking being tied to the imagination there we can't uh now when thomas aquinas uh is commenting there on the uh way there's a day trinitati i think i mentioned this before when you're doing book six the day trinitati you know i mean waiters is talking about the need to transcend the imagination right when you think about god you imagine and you have to therefore what learn to negate what you imagine but when you negate what you imagine you're nevertheless imagining i remember a conversation one time between my cousin donald and and who's a philosopher and his mother right who was a good good catholic right and they're talking about god and my cousin donald was trying to explain to his mother that god in his divine nature has no body and she just couldn't couldn't imagine that of course you can't imagine that but she just couldn't imagine it right and he's trying to show her this you know and and uh she's getting more more frustrated trying to understand it and finally uh she says what difference does it make anyway she says what do they say what difference i mean i mean i mean i just mentioned this because he was a pious you know believer right but even with belief they have a hard time what transcending the what imagination uh they've been digging up you know sir isaac newton apparently wrote a lot of works in uh in theology much more than in science but uh you know he speaks of space as a sensorium of god what's the sensorium well the the sense organ of god is the word sense organ okay yeah sensorium yeah yeah yeah but i mean he's kind of imagining what uh god's ability to know things as being what spread out like it yeah you know he's immense yeah yeah yeah he's immense yeah and um a lot go down you know you know the uh god is kind of a light diffused through space you know that's what god is you know yeah but they tend to imagine yeah because they can't transcend the imagination but they have that difficulty even in what logic and there's a passage that i've used in a number of my articles there from the dialogue called the parmenides of plato in the dialogue called the parmenides parmenides and his pupil zeno come to athens and they talk to a young man named socrates and they ask him what he thinks and they examine him and what he thinks just like the same socrates does when he gets older with other men and uh nobody knows whether there's any a historical basis for this right um in terms of you know even time wise you're not sure the dates of these people but could at least not of parmenides but could parmenides actually have come to athens and talked to socrates nobody knows that right i don't think that's what's important i think what's important um is the fact that parmenides emphasize what the socratic method is based on uh parmenides is the first man to very explicitly say that something can't both be and not be and only a two-headed mortal he said could think that it'd be a monster to think that and um socrates method of examining people is based upon seeing whether what they say uh fits together right and people don't usually kind of reach themselves directly and say something is and is not but they'll say that something is and then other things they say will lead to the conclusion that it is not and then they got a contradiction right and socrates will what point that out see and that's always a sign that there's something false in what you're saying um and even perry mason examines the what the witness on the stands there and the witness contradicts himself right he's in trouble isn't he right see um with with uh judges these days you know they're in contradiction though because if um i hit a pregnant woman and caused the death of the baby within her then i can be charged with homicide i've killed a human being but then if the mother herself doesn't want the baby and the abortionist can kill it and it's not homicide so it is and is not huh you can't have your cake and eat it huh it's a contradiction huh and uh so socrates would go around and examine people like the judges and make enemies by showing that their thinking was what not in harmony right or as aristotle says in the nicomachean ethics there with the truth all things harmonized they all fit together right but if you're saying something false like a jigsaw puzzle has got the wrong piece for it it won't fit in there um but anyway Going back to the reason I brought it up here. In there, Socrates is trying to understand what we call the universal. And he imagines universal to be what? Like a tent or something. Cloth spread over all of those, right? So man, for example, is spread over all of us here. Well, he starts getting into contradictions, right? Because if man, which is said of all of us, was over all of us like a big cloth, right? If it's real, fit under. Only part of what a man would be on top of me, right? Another part of what man is would be on top of you, right? And yet, you know, the whole of what is meant by man is found in you. You are an animal with reason, right? That's just a part. One of us is an animal, the other is reason. No, every man is an animal with reason. He has the whole of what is meant by man, huh? So Socrates is trying to imagine universal as what? Something continuous, huh? That's covering all of us, huh? And so he can't transcend his imagination. Well, as I mentioned, I think, with John Locke, huh? You know, in the essay on Human Understanding, John Locke is trying to understand the general idea of triangle. And he's trying to, what? Imagine a triangle, right? It's neither equilateral nor isosaceous nor scalene. But he can imagine a triangle that isn't one of these. So he's so confused, he says, it's all and none of these. But again, he's trying to imagine something, the universal, that he cannot, what? Imagine, huh? So, as Monsignor Dianne pointed out there, right? Logic, in a way, disposes for theology, huh? Because in logic, you have to learn to transcend your imagination. So, and this is what we speak of, you know, false imagination is the main cause of deception on the side of our knowing powers. And false imagination means imagining things other than they are, right? Now, we can imagine things that can be imagined other than they are, right? Okay? You know, before you meet somebody famous or something like that, you sometimes imagine how tall they are, what they look like. And you're kind of surprised by the fact that they're short, you know. And the... But if it's your, you try to imagine something that cannot be imagined, right? Well, then necessarily you're false, right? If you follow that image that you have of the thing, huh? And so people, as they say, they always seem to imagine, you know, I think the average person does anyway, like the poets do. They do imagine the soul to be a kind of what? A very body. Yeah, an airline body, right? They can't transcend the imagination, right? Well, what a career isn't that, you know? When you take away, you know, length and width and depth, you've got nothing left. You've got nothing left to imagine, right? Yeah. So they're tied to that, huh? Now, Thomas says, The falsity of this opinion, although it can be shown, huh, in many ways, right? Nevertheless, you're going to use one, right? Which is what? More common, right? And more certain, huh? That the soul is not a body, right? Or by which it can be seen that. Okay? So he's proportioning himself to us beginners, right? Okay. Now, he says, It is manifest that not just any principle of a living operation is a soul. Because then the eye, for example, would be a soul, since it is in some way a cause of what? Vision, right, huh? And the same would be said about the other tools of the soul, right? Instruments, huh? But we say that the soul is the first beginning of life, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. So, these tools are a beginning or a cause of life, but not the very first, huh? Now, he says, Although some body is able to be a beginning of life, as the heart, for example, is the beginning of life in the animal, right? Nevertheless, it's not able to be the, what? First beginning of life in some body, right? So that's why you've got to be very careful, as I was saying. Again, the soul is the first beginning, the first cause of life, right? In my Latin text, they tell us, I'm sure Thomas is going to tell us, but the emphasis is there upon being first, right? To separate the soul from the heart or from the eye or something, right? Because the heart is obviously a body, right? And the heart in some way is a source and cause of life. Your heart stops pumping, you're going to die, right? Okay? And your eye is a source of, in some way, a scene, right? And your ear is a hearing and so on, right? But the soul is the very first beginning or cause of life, huh? Now, I was going to show that it's not this. For he says, It is manifest that to be a beginning of life or a cause of life or living does not belong to a body from the fact that it is a, what? Body, right? Now, how does he know that? Because it belongs to a body because it is a body, then everybody would be living or be a principle of life, right? Okay? It belongs, therefore, to some body that it be living or a cause of life, huh? Through this that it is, what? Such a body, right? Tali is a Latin word there. Do you have that translated such? Such a body. Yeah. Yeah. But what is in act such, it has this from some principle or cause that is called its, what? Act, huh? Now, notice, now, if you went back to what we learned when we studied change, right? And a living body is a changing thing, right? And living bodies die and so on, right? We say that in every changing thing there is matter and what? Form, right, huh? Okay. And which is the soul, then? The matter or the form? See? Well, the matter as such is not alive, right? Okay. Therefore, it must be the other, right? The act of the form. The soul, therefore, which is the first beginning of life, is not a body, but the act of a body. And notice he compares it now to an accidental form, right? You see? Because the emphasis here is upon the soul being a form, right? And that being true about the soul, right? He's not, at this point, bringing it out so explicitly that it is a, what? Substantial form, right? But that will become clearer in the next article when you see that the soul is something subsisting, right, huh? That's not an accident, all right? Just as heat, which is the cause of heating, is not a body, but a certain, what? Act of a body, huh? Okay? And that's the way he's proceeding there, right? Go back to what we learned about the changing thing here, right? Suppose we said you've got a wooden chair, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. Now, is a wooden chair a chair because it's wooden? The first reason why it's a chair is because it's wooden. See? No. Because the wooden table, then, would be a, what? Chair. Chair. And the wooden house would be a chair, right? Mm-hmm. So, why is the wooden chair a chair, then? Yeah. Because of the form, the act of it, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, this is an example of an accidental form, right? The shape of the chair. The chair is, the wood is more like a substance, right? But the shape of the chair is like an accident, right? Okay? But nevertheless, that shape of the chair is to the wood as form is to, what? Matter, right? As act is to ability. So, it's an act of that thing, right? Okay? Just like if I say, you take act, act, enact, for example there, right? Okay? What is this first, the word cat? Was it first the word cat through these letters? No. Well, this word act has the very same letters, right? So it's not through the matter, you might say, the letters out of which it is made, that is first the word cat. It first gets to be the word cat when those letters are in this order, right? Well, the order of the letters is to the letters as what? Form is to matter, right? Matter is ability, right? And it's able to be what? Arranged in this order, or in this order, or in some other order, right? So the order is as an act, right? Whereby the ability is made what? For us to be this word or that word is made actual, right? So you could say those three letters that end the word cat or act, they're able to be the word cat, they're able to be the word act, right? But they're actually one or another through this or that order, right? So it's the order that first makes it to be the word cat. Well, the same way as the living and unliving, right? They're made out of the same, what, matter, huh? They're both a body and so on. So that one is alive and the other is not alive, it's due to something that is as an act or a form rather than as matter, right? So notice, in this body, this article, you're getting two conclusions, huh? One affirmative and one negative, right? The negative conclusion is that the soul is not a body, right? The affirmative conclusion is that it's an act or form of the living body, right? Okay? And of course, the living body, as Aristotle pointed out in the Dhyanima there, is a body composed of what? Tools, right, huh? So it's the act or form of a what? An actual body composed of tools, right? We're almost back to the definition of the soul there, right? That we had in the Dhyanima. But you still have to bring out more explicitly the fact that it's a substantial form rather than a what? Accidental form, right? Yeah. And we might, you know, ask ourselves, what is the difference between a substantial form and accidental form, huh? What do they have in common, right? And how do they, what, differ, right? Okay? Dr. Burp, what else is a substantial form besides the human soul? Is there another example of that? Well, that's the one that's most known to us, right? Yeah. You see, substantial forms are not sensible, right, or imaginable, right? So, if you're asking for a sensible example, right, huh? I guess I am. Yeah, yeah. But the animal would have a substantial form, too, in the plant, right? Unless you were to say that the dog is simply a, what, a combination of different substances, right? But then we wouldn't have any substantial unity, huh? But instead, you've got to begin with us, because we're most convinced that we're one substance, right? And then next, that the dog is one substance, right? The tree is not as clear, right? And the stone, least clear, you know, where the stone is just an amalgam of several things, right? Okay? This is why he has to use accidental form as an example here. Yeah, yeah. But he's emphasizing the fact that the soul is not a body, but a form of the body at this point, right? Okay. There's a substantial form that will come up in the next article, and especially to see in the case of the human soul, because it's subsisting, right? Okay. Okay? But we'll see how he reasons that, huh? Okay. Herman Vail has got a very interesting passage there I had one time. He's a famous physicist, mathematician, huh? To a lot, you know, explaining relativity theory and so on, right? But when he talks about life, he has an interesting point, right? He's comparing life as known from inward experience and life known through outward experience, right? Now, it's easier to examine a plant outwardly, right? Yeah. Than an animal, right? Because if you start to take apart an animal, he very quickly dies in you and so on and corrupts, right? While a plant is not as, what, delicate, right? And you can act upon it and so on and cut into it, you know, without screaming on you and going into shock and so on, right? Like, like, and white man is extremely, but... To hook up the study. Yeah, yeah. We always joke about, you know, in teaching, you know, it's a common thing said that you want to see how somebody performs in the classroom, right, huh? When you've got people in there to evaluate him, right? He gets kind of nervous, you see. Yeah. And so you don't see him the way he would be normally, right? Right. See. And we notice this thing, you know, with things as simple as taking pictures of somebody, huh? Oh, yeah. A lot of people, you know, they don't take a good picture and they don't like their pictures because somehow they can't relax in front of a camera. Sure, yeah. And it's just even the little children, right? They'll make these funny grimaces or something, you know. Well, don't do that, you know. I'm saying, you know, smile naturally and so on. And the cat really got some kind of a crazy look on their face. And I have a lot of experience, you know, you know, pictures in the family and so on. And we often remark how the cat or somebody, you know, the cat we'd have would steal all these pictures, right? Because they don't seem to be aware of the fact that they're just being taken. So they, you know. But human beings are all screwed up because they're camera shy, so to speak, of this, huh? And the animals don't have any camera shy. But he says as far as inward experience is concerned, we know ourselves best, right? And then a little bit of what it would be like to be a dog or a cat because he has something in common with us, right? What it would be to be a tree, you know, is very good, right? And I'm more aware inwardly of me, my sensing nature, right? My emotional nature, right? That my digesting powers, right? I'm more aware within me of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, being angry or being sad or being joyful, right? Than I am about my digesting my food, you know? Or that I've been growing or something, you know? You see? Are you aware of your growing as you go up? I grew. I don't know. But you are aware of the fact that you're seeing and hearing and smelling and tasting and touching. So, what we know from inward experience is just a reverse, in a sense, of how we know from outward experience, huh? That's very true about knowing the substantial form, right? The substantial form that we know about, most of all, is the human soul, right? And then the animal soul next. And then the plant soul, right? Let's go down to the London world. Substantial form is even more, in a sense, hidden, right? Okay. Now, let's look at the reply to the first objection, right? The first, therefore, it ought to be said, that since everything that is in motion is moved by another, and this could not go on, what? Yeah. It's necessary to say that there is, that not every mover is itself, what? Moved, right? Okay. Now, we went into that a little bit there when we looked at the Summa Congenitiles, right? What Aristotle does in the seventh and the eighth books of the so-called physics, he shows that whatever is in motion is moved by another, right? And then since the movers that we know best of all are mood movers, right? He asks whether every mover is a mood mover or whether there is a, what, unmoved mover, right? And he shows in the seventh and in the eighth books that not every mover can be, what, moved, right? Okay. I don't know if you want to go back into that or not right now, right? But I could show that again, right? Okay. You know, something that I show is something very simple, right? If you take the example of the train, right? The engine there is not pulled by anything else, is it? But all the wagons that are attached to the engine, right, are pulled, right, by the engine, or they're pulled by the wagon in front of them, right? And the wagon in front of them is a pulled puller. A moved mover, right? Okay. Now, could you get any motion if every mover was a pulled puller? No. Because no matter how long you make that series of pulled pullers, they're like one grand pulled puller with nothing to pull them. And as Aristotle points out, it makes no difference whether you have one or many, and if many, a limited number or an infinite number. You're not going to get any motion if the whole is composed only of pulled pullers. It's like one huge thing to be pulled. It's like the puller. You see? So, it was Aristotle who realized, contrary to the philosophers before him, that not every mover is moved, right? That there must be an unmoved mover, right? But the men before him thought that every mover had to be itself, what? In motion, right? And it's a body that is in motion, so every mover has to be a body. So, if the soul moves a body, it must be a body itself, too, moving this other body. You see? Just like when you play with puppets, right? You had one body moving another body. Okay. Since to be moved is to go forth from ability to act, the mover gives what it has to the mobile insofar as it makes it to be in, what? Act, huh? But just as is shown in the Eighth Book of the Physics, Peristadal, there is a certain mover entirely immobile, who is neither moved per se nor, what? Accidentally, yeah. And such a mover is able to move a motion that is always, what? Uniform, right? I can see it like the motion of the sky around us was always uniform, right? Okay. But a moved mover was always being changed itself, so it can't do the same thing all the time, right? But there's another mover that is not moved per se, but is moved per accident. And account of this, it does not move a motion that is always uniform. And such a mover is the, what? Soul, right, huh? The soul is said to be moved per accident because it's moved when the body, which it is, is moved, right? Oh. Okay? So it's not moved directly, right, or by itself, but because it's in something that is moved, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But there's other reasons, too, why its motion is not uniform, because we saw in the Dianima there, it has to sense a desire, and there's going to be different sensations at different times, right? And desires will be different, like before and after dinner and so on, okay? But there's another mover that is per se moved, right? Namely the, what? Body, right, huh? And because the ancient natural scientists thought there was nothing but bodies, right, then they laid down that every mover must be moved, right? Because everything is a body, right? And a body moves only by being moved itself. So every mover must be moved. And therefore that the soul is moved as such, huh, per se. Just like any other body, right? So the soul must be a body, right? Okay? So he's explaining why they thought the way they did, right, huh? They thought there were only bodies, huh? It's assuming that there are only bodies, and that a body can move another body only by being moved itself, right? Then every, what? Mover must be a moved mover, right? As bodies that are moved as such, so every mover must be a body. So if the soul moves the body, it must be a, what? A body, okay? Moving a body. Now the second objection is saying that the knower has within himself the known, right? So if the soul knows the material world, it must have within itself all these material things, right? Well, to the second he says, it should be said that it is not necessary that the likeness of the thing known be an act in the nature of the knower, but if there be something that before is knowing in ability and afterwards in act, is necessary that the likeness of the thing known not be an act in the nature of the knower, but in ability only, right? As color is not an act in the pupil of the eye, but in ability, what? Only, right? Or my tongue is not, what? Actually sweet, right? But it's able to receive, right? In some way, that thing, huh? And this is the main thing we learn there, the fundamental thing we learn there about the senses and later on about reason, that sensing and understanding are kind of undergoing, right? And both the senses and reason, they're able to know before they actually know, right? And so they come to actually know by receiving something, right? So to begin with, they have nothing of the, what, nature or color or sensible quality of the thing that they know, huh? Okay? And therefore, they're not composed of these things. But because the ancient philosophers, or ancient naturalists, rather, did not know how to distinguish between act and ability, they laid down or posited that the soul was a body in order that it might, what? Know a body, right? And in order that it might know all bodies, that it was composed from the principles of all bodies. So DeMarco, or not DeMarco, DeMarco simpeticly said that by earth we know earth, and by water, water, and by air, air, and by fire, fire, and by love, love, and by hate, hate, right? As if because our soul was composed of all these material things, it knows them all, right? Okay? Well, if the soul were composed of all these things, then the soul would be a, what? Body, right, huh? But if it's not composed of these things, it's only able to receive them, right? It's not actually composed of them, right? And if it re-sees them in an immaterial way, huh? As he saw in our study of the senses and reason, then they're not necessarily a body. Yeah. So no, so those first two objections come right out of, in a sense, the first book on the Dianima. Yeah. Okay? Now in the third objection, he goes back to the first way they investigated the soul. He says there is a two-fold contact you can speak of, huh? I can touch you in two ways, huh? In the first way, a body is not touched except by a body. In the second way, a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing which moves the body, huh? Thomas, you know, he goes into this more in other texts sometimes. He'll say, you know, I can reach over here and touch you, right, huh? Okay? But sometimes I'm said to touch you for some money, huh? Or I touch you in the sense that, what? You feel sorry for me, right? See? There's another way in which we say to touch something, right? Without coming into, what? Contact between our two bodies on the surface, huh? Okay?