De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 68: Matter, Form, and the Immateriality of the Soul

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the form of another as its own and loses the form it had, right? But in the case of the soul, understanding one contrary helps it to understand the other. That's why we say there's the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right? So the doctor knows both health and sickness at the same time. And the moral philosopher knows virtue and vice at the same time and so on. So the way that the understanding we see is not the way in which matter we see. So you're being guilty here of the fallacy of what? Equivocation, right? You're mixing up different senses of the word receive. But nevertheless, you can see that this is a word that's equivocal not by what? Chance, right? But by reason, because there's a real likeness of these meanings. And so one is more deceived by a word that's equivocal by reason than a word that's equivocal by chance because there's some connection or likeness of the meanings and that could lead you astray, right? In the case of a purely equivocal word like the word bat instead of the flying mouse instead of the baseball bat, no one's going to mix those two up because they're too different, right? But one can mix up two different meanings of the word undergo, right? Or receive because it's a little more difficult to separate those. Further, those things which do not have matter do not have a cause of their being, as is said in the 8th book of the metaphysics. But the soul has a cause of its being because it's created by God. Therefore, the soul has matter, huh? Now, there you'd have to know more of the context of the 8th book of the metaphysics, huh? First of all, there's thinking about the fact that in material things, huh? Matter has existence through the form that it receives. And it receives a form through being, what? Acted upon by an agent. Well, if you had a form that was not in matter, and therefore it didn't come into existence, the transformation of matter, in that sense, the form would not depend upon, what? Another for its being, right? Okay? It might depend upon a creator, right? But not upon one who's transforming matter, right? In order to bring it in. Further, what does not have matter, but is form only, is pure act and infinite. This over is of God only, therefore the soul has, what? Matter, huh? Now, see, form, as we know from our study of the soul, form is an act, right? So, someone might think that if something is form only, like an angel or a soul, that it's in no way in, what? Potency, right? And therefore it would be God who's pure act, right? But as we find out later on, we study God and so on. In God, what he is and his existence are the same, right? But in the angels, who are forms only, and in the soul itself, the soul and its existence are not the same thing. And the soul is to its existence as, what? Ability is to act, huh? And so there's a composition of ability and act, even in the angels, huh? Because the substance of the angel and its existence are not the same thing. But that's kind of a hard thing to see, right? And so when someone sees that in the angels there's not this composition of matter and form, if you say the same thing about the soul itself, they think of the soul as being, what? Pure act, huh? Okay? When in comparison to us, they do seem to be pure act, because they're form only, right? But in comparison to God, they're not I am who am, right? And therefore they're in potency to existence, right? But that composition of substance and existence is not the same as the composition of matter and of, what, form, huh? And Thomas in the Summa Conscientilism, he takes it up, he has an old chapter just devoted to putting out the differences between those two, right? But that's involved in this objection. You can see how people can think that, huh? Well, it's a little bit like, you know, when I get to Anaxagoras, if you remember Anaxagoras? And sometimes I have a little footnote there, and I say, is this greater mind that Anaxagoras has arrived at, is this the divine mind? And most of my students will think, yeah, this is a divine mind. It's not our mind, right? So it must be the divine mind. I say, yeah. But look, huh? Anaxagoras sees this greater mind as moving matter and ordering it and so on, separating it. But he doesn't see this greater mind as responsible for the existence of matter. Now, what kind of a mind is it that can act upon matter, move it, but doesn't bring it into existence? That's angelic mind. So he's actually arrived at the angelic mind, right? Not the divine mind. But compared to us, it seems to us at first to be what? The divine mind. I see it as a student sometimes, you know, when you're talking about what a philosopher is. And I say, the legend about the origin of the word philosopher is that the friends of associates or companions, people who knew the great discoveries of Pythagoras, they wanted to call him a, what? Wise man, right? And Pythagoras, you know, described things like Pythagoras and Theorem and the other things, you know. He says, don't call me wise. God alone is wise. You know, what should we call you then? Well, you've got to call me something, call me a lover of wisdom, right? So he fused the title of being wise, right? Okay, now I say, what do the scientists call man? What do they call him? It's homo sapiens, right? Wise, huh? So, I say, are they in contradiction with Pythagoras, huh? What do you say? Same thing, huh? Well, that's not a, perhaps, an absolute sentence. I mean, yeah, yeah. I say, let's translate this Latin, right? You see? I tell them, you know, that the word homo, originally in Latin meant man, right? But the scientists are using it in a broader, what? Meaning, right? For a man-like thing, right? So, popularly, you could say ape. Okay? So I say the scientific name of man is the wise ape, right? Okay. Well, then I quote the fragment of Heraclitus, where it says, as an ape is to a man, so is a man to God. And there's another one like that. As a boy is to a man, so is a man to God, right? Well, if you compare the man to the ape, man seems wise, right? Yeah, okay. But if you compare man to God, man doesn't seem wise, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? So that's necessarily a contradiction, right? Okay. Because you're saying he's the wise ape in comparison to the other homonyms, as they call them, the ape-like, more or less two-footed erected things, you know? Mm-hmm. We're the wise one, right, huh? See? Mm-hmm. And likewise, to the little boy, daddy seems to know everything, huh? Therefore, he appears wise to the little boy, right? But in comparison to God, man seems to know practically nothing, right? That's it. So an angel compared to us seems godlike, huh? But compared to God, no. I mentioned there how my old teacher, Sir, he used to say, you know, when you're so separated from your body and you meet your guardian angel, you say, ah, this is God, you know? He said, no, no, no, no. Like St. Paul refuses to be treated by the Ephesians there like a God. You're all looking out. sacrifice to him the priests and so on from the pagan religion he tore his clothes you know i'm not a god the angels do something like that you know you know but he used to be so wonderful this must be god i mean how could it be anything as great as this you know that isn't god right you see you don't realize how excellent the the angel is huh you know that's why thomas thinks you know the satan uh with probability and nobody knows for sure that the that satan was the highest of the angels right because you know he couldn't be so enamored with himself he wasn't really a magnificent creature you know danger that huh so i'm saying that because compared to us the angel would seem to be just act right and we're what composed of matter and form right okay but likewise if you take the soul the human soul can subsist by itself huh it's form only right and therefore it seems to be act only and therefore it seems to be what but god is that's what god is it's your act right see so they're saying when that therefore you can't just be formed because then you'd be just act okay but against this is what augustine proves in the seventh book of his commentary on genesis to the letter i guess that's he got criticized was it by jerome for being a little sloppy in some of his things so he wrote a book upon genesis or about genesis to the letter right it's quite a work right his commentary on genesis to the letter that the soul is not made is not made either from uh corporeal matter nor from what some kind of spiritual matter either one okay let's look at thomas's reply here now but i think sometimes you have even in some of the church fathers this kind of an idea of spiritual matter but it's kind of they're they're searching for some way to express the what the fact that the soul is not pure act right and they don't know exactly how to express that right what thomas does i answer it ought to be said that the soul does not have matter right and this is able to be considered in two ways first from the definition of the soul in general this is true then about the soul of the animal yeah the sensing soul and even about the feeding and reproducing soul right that it's a form for it is of the definition of the soul that be the form of some what body right now either it is the form by itself as a whole or it's the form by some part of itself if by itself as a whole it'd be impossible that a part of it be matter right if matter is said to be some being in potency only because form insofar as it is a what act or excuse me form so far as it is a form is an act right of course notice aristotle when he defines it he often will use the form the word act instead right he'll say the soul is the first act right of a natural body composed of tools huh okay you could also say it's a substantial form though right of a natural body composed of tools but that which is in potency only is not able to be a part of act since potency is repugnant to act as being against act divided against that now the whole ninth book of wisdom by the way is about act and ability right so if we study wisdom sometime which we can after we study the soul right then we can get a much full understanding of ability and act but you first meet you know built in act in the study of what matter and form and in the study of motion like we did in natural philosophy if however it be formed by some part of itself it's that part that we would call the soul and thus the matter of which it is first the act we would say what is the first thing that is what animate huh could we go through that a little bit more there what are you saying how is this yeah and the way the argument procedure mean yeah yeah well he's just excluding the other possibility right yeah he's saying it is a form by itself as a whole right right or part of it is form and part of its matter but then if that was so we'd call the form of that composite the soul and not the matter and the matter would be what was first animated huh what was the living body i'm sorry what was the last thing you said you'd be saying that the uh if you say that the soul um is not a form by itself as a whole but just by part of itself and the other part is matter right well then that matter would be actually the subject of the soul right oh yeah that would be the animated and it would be the soul right okay yeah sure um you know you can point that out in a way about form in general because it's kind of interesting way that we kind of syllogize and talk about form um go back to my old simple example the word cat if you've heard before right okay and you say now the word cat is made out of the letters c-a-t all agreed right okay now so is the word act okay so there must be something the word cat besides the letters c-a-t right and that in this case would be the order of the letters right okay so you can make two different words right out of the same letters right by arranging the letters differently right okay now would you all agree that these two words are made out of the same letters not numerically the same but the same okay and you'll admit that there's two different orders right okay now are those two orders made out of those letters too and get around to a real problem if you say that the two orders right are made out of the same letters too because in so far as they're made of the same letters they don't differ so if you had two different orders made out of the same letters they have to be an order of the order right right a form of the form right yeah and then ask the same question about that is that made out of the same letters right and if it is so that doesn't explain their difference right so yeah so you're gonna go on forever yeah so you must stop at the beginning there and say that the order of the letters is not made out of the letters so that the matter of the word which is the letters is not a part of the order therefore it's the order the matter in which the soul is is not a part of the soul just as the letters in which the order is is not a part out of which or something out of which the order is the order is made rather something out of which the word is made right do you see that or take another example here right you could have a wooden table and a wooden chair or take even simple example you could have a a a clay ball and a clay what cube let's say right then okay and in this case the sphere and the cube are made out of the same material right clay well why is this a cube and this is sphere that they're both made out of clay well in this case the shape is different right and the shape would be the form and here it's the order right okay now is the shape of the clay ball made out of clay and the shape of the cube made out of clay well if the two shapes are made out of clay uh why would they differ well they have to have another what form of the form right and so on forever right so It's better to say in the beginning, right, that the shape, the two shapes of the sphere of clay and the cube of clay are not made out of clay. Now, science people saw that, but then it gets kind of carried away and thinks of the, what, the form then is something that just kind of comes to the matter, right? Right. Where Aristotle saw that the form came to be, came into existence when you, what, transform the matter, right? Yeah. Okay. Now, secondly, he says we can show this in a special way from the definition of the human soul insofar as it is understanding, huh? Like Shakespeare says, by understanding soul. To bring in a little bit of Shakespeare's words about the soul sometime for your enjoyment manifestation. Now, how is he going to reason here? He's going to reason a little bit differently than he did in the article where he showed that the soul is subsistent. He's going to give another argument, which Aristotle develops, incidentally, in the first book about the soul. Okay. For his manifest, he says, that whatever is received in something is received in it according to the, what, way of the receiver. So, as a teacher, you always try to remember that, right, huh? You know? And when they correct exams, teachers, you know, it says, well, I don't know where they got that. That's not what I said in class. But it's amazing, you know, I mean, how it would get distorted by the way it's received, right, huh? But, I mean, you can come into class and give a lecture to ten students, and some of them will, what? Grasp it, huh? Will understand much better than others, right, huh? So it's received according to the, what? Receiver, right, huh? Okay. For thus, each thing is known as its form is in the, what, knower, right? But the understanding soul knows something in its nature, and he says, absolutely, he means what? He's knowing it universally, right, as such, huh? He's knowing what a man is, right, or what a dog is, right? For example, he knows stone insofar as it is, what, a stone, huh? Therefore, he says, the form of stone, absolutely speaking, according to its formal definition, is in the understanding soul. The understanding soul, therefore, is a, what, soul that doesn't depend upon matter, absolute for matter, not something composed of matter and form. Now, how far is this follow? Well, he shows it in the form of a reduction to the absurd. If the understanding soul were composed of matter and form, the forms recedes in it would be what? Forms that would recedes in it, it's individual. Why? Because matter is a source of what? Individuation, right? So I put the shape of a sphere in this clay, and in this clay, and this other matter, right? It's what? Individual spheres, right? Okay? It is, what, individual, received here or there, and there was individual. And thus it would not know except the singular, just as happens in the sensing powers, which receive the forms of things in a body organ. For matter is the, what, principle of the individuation of forms. You could be more precise and say matter is, what, extended as continuous, right? It's a source of there being many individuals of the same sort. That's what I was saying, you know. Why can't you have many window panes exactly the same and kind over here, see? Because you have enough glass, right? Why can't you have many chairs that are exactly the same, right? Because you have enough metal, right? So it's matter as quantified that is the source of what? Individuation, huh? So if something's received and something's material, it's going to be received as, what, individual. But things are received in understanding is universal. Like Boethius says, not the thing is singular when sensed, but universal when understood. It remains, therefore, that the understanding soul, and for that matter, every understanding substance, right? Knowing forms absolutely without their individual matter, lacks the composition of what? Form and what? Matter, huh? So this is kind of a second way that Thomas is showing that the understanding, the ability to understand it, I have to say, is immaterial, right? That he sees the forms of things as it says absolutely, right, rather than singularly, huh? The other argument was the one that Aristotle first gave, right? That he sees all the, what? He understands all material things, right? And therefore, it has to be lacking, right, in the nature of any material thing to receive all their forms. Just as the senses must be lacking in the object that they are in potency to receiving. Okay, do you see that? Yeah. I was just thinking again why he asked this question to begin with, and I was wondering, wouldn't it just be excluded that from our first understanding that that soul is not a body, that therefore it cannot be of some matter? Yeah, but you'll find that there are some, even when the Church Fathers, you know, are kind of confused about this, right? Oh, that's what you're talking about. Yeah. Okay, yeah. Let's see. Go back to some of the earlier thinkers, you'll see that. You know, you don't realize how difficult it is to kind of rise above, what? Matter, huh? Yeah, and therefore our thinking, huh? Mm-hmm. You know, I always go back to the fourth book of natural hearing, the fourth book of Aristotle's physics, so-called, right? Where he quotes the common opinion of the philosophers, that whatever it is must be somewhere. I mean, somewhere it doesn't exist, right? And he says, if this is true, he says, then place would be the first of all things, right? Oh. And he quotes the poet, you know, Hesiod, you know, first of all, the yawning gap, you know, and then the broad bosom to earth, you know, and then love and so on. But he said, Hesiod seems to be saying you've got to have a place for things before you can be anything. Yeah. So, I mean, if this is true, place would be the first of all things, right? Right. Yeah. But people think that, right? Whatever it is must be somewhere. It means somewhere it doesn't exist, right? That's the opinion out on the street. And isn't that, Newton, doesn't he have an idea, like God is place or something like that? Well, I guess he speaks of space as the sensorium of God, as God is somehow spread out in space, you know. He's kind of confused there, you know. I guess someone's telling me, you know, I guess they're looking more at Newton's, you know, theological works, right? Oh. A lot of those things, you know. I guess he's an Aryan. He doesn't believe in the Trinity, yeah. He's an Aryan, so it's unfortunate. There's some suspicion, too, you know, the, what's his name, Milton is that, too, you know. Oh, wow. Yeah. So, you go astray there when you don't have Rome, you know. Yeah, right. Once he had an interesting observation one time, you know, of how the mysteries of the faith were first defined more carefully in Latin than in, what, Greek, right? Although Greek is a better language for this than Platte, and he attributed it to the presence of Rome, right? Oh. You know, because of the papacy and so on. It's kind of interesting. Uh-huh. And Saint-Diane, his native language was, was French, right, and he wasn't too good in English, but he, but he was firm that English was much better than French for philosophy and also for, for poetry. Wow. And Saint-Diane, his native language was French, too, you know. Uh-huh. He was firm of the opinion, too, that English was much better than French for philosophy in. Yeah. Yeah. And for poetry, for both of those. If I said that you'd say, well, Berkowitz is not that at home in French, you know, but here's people whose native language is French, you know, and when I go up to Monsignor D'Anne and I would talk to him about certain things that I was teaching in my classes and write down to some of the, you know, choice words that I thought were appropriate, you know, and he would approve of them, but then he'd, you know, say, you know, you can't speak that way in French, you know, and then he'd mark a house at Prager, English was, you know. And I had heard this movie, you know, that Monsignor D'Anne, when he first read Shakespeare, he read it in French, you know, like he might do, you know. And then De Connick, you know, copy in English, you know. And one time I was up in Monsignor's room there and we were talking about something and I was referring to some passing Shakespeare, so, you know, on the shelf and got a couple of Shakespeare's off the shelf and gave me one, you know. One was from De Connick, so maybe this is a true story, you know. Uh-huh, uh-huh. But you'll realize how, you know, Fr. Boulay used to use the André Gide, you know, he's a famous French writer, you know, but he writes the preface to the Pleiad edition of Shakespeare. You know, these Pleiad are these kind of standard French editions of classical works, you know, in different languages, but I mean, they're all kinds of into French, right? Right, right. It's kind of expensive now, the Pleiad. I have the Pleiad Descartes, for example, you know, and all these French things. But the Pleiad Shakespeare, of course, you know, Shakespeare's plays translated into French. Mm-hmm. And André Gide, you know, is talking, first in general, like Thomas does, about the difficulty of translating anybody from one language to another language. But especially a poet, right? Mm-hmm. And the poet adapts himself to his language. Mm-hmm. So, but then talking about the particular difficulty of translating Shakespeare, one of the greatest of poets, into French, right? Mm-hmm. And he speaks the French language as a language presca antipoetica, almost antipoetica. Wow. That's kind of strong. Yeah. And antipoetica is supposed to be a master of French prose, you know? Sure. And so, but, because in general you can't translate a poet. I mean, I always give as an example, you know, how would you translate alliteration, you know? Full fathom five thy father lies, and of his bones are quarrel made, right? But how would you translate that? Full fathom five thy father lies. Right. Right. Because obviously the words that would mean the same thing in French wouldn't, what, alliterate, right? Mm-hmm. So the words that rhyme in one language don't rhyme in another language. You know, you know how the dove is a symbol of love? Mm-hmm. Well, it happens in English that dove and love rhyme. Yeah, yeah. So the poets can make use of that, huh? Sure. You see? But the word for dove and the word for love in other languages would, what? Not, see? Right, see. You see, when you read Augustine, Augustine's, you know, he's a teacher of rhetoric, right? Mm-hmm. And so he has a more, you know, a rhetorical style than Thomas does, huh? Sure. Thomas can do that if he wants to, but he doesn't do the summa, right? Mm-hmm. If you see Thomas' dedication, you know, of the golden chain to Urban and the Fourth, the Latin's much, you know, very hard to read. It's very elegant, you know? You see? But Augustine is often writing that way, right? But, you know, he's saying that the soul is more where it, what, loves than where it animates, right? But in Latin, you see, the soul is more ubi amat, quam animat. It's going to be, what, rhyming, you know? Mm-hmm. So, I mean, you translate, you know, a more flowing style there, you know, that has some meter or has some, what, rhyming or something like that. You're going to lose that, right? Mm-hmm. Or if you try to do it, you have to change the words a little bit, the meaning, you know? Mm-hmm. So, that prayer of Thomas' is, you know, the adoro te devotee, right? Mm-hmm. Well, it's, which in quatrains and the first and the second line will rhyme and the third and the fourth will rhyme. And then there's a, I think there's a meter there too, you know? It seems to me to be trochaic in a lot of cases, huh? But if you translate that into English, exactly the meaning of the words, you're not going to be able to get it into the same, what? Mm-hmm. You know? Right. Isn't there some Italian proverb about that? I don't know if it's Italian, something like tradutore, tradutore? Yeah. Traitor, translators are traitor, I guess it means, yeah. Oh. Every translator is traitor. Yeah, yeah. But I mean, that happens even, you know, when they translate Aristotle, you know, from Greek, they do it bad, you know? Yeah. Which you have to admire of Merbeke, you know, when they look at Merbeke's translation of Aristotle into Latin, they say after they lost a Greek text, they could reconstruct it for the Latin, it's so exact, you know? Yeah. And that's the one that Thomas has, you know, with the commentaries, huh? Merbeke, he's very, but it's kind of amazing, once in a while Merbeke doesn't have exactly the right word, and Thomas understands it rightly, despite having, you know. Wow. And it's kind of amazing the way Thomas does there. Because Thomas probably didn't have any direct access at all to Plato, right? So, you know, Plato kind of secondhand, but he seems to have a very good understanding of Plato through Aristotle and through the great St. Augustine. Yeah. Yeah. So, let's look at the reply now to the first objection, which was saying that God is, what, pure act and everything that has any actuality gets it from partaking of God, therefore anything that has any, what, ability must, what, get it from what is pure ability. Yeah. And he phrased matter, right? Yeah. Okay. Now, Thomas here is going to solve in a different way than he would solve the Manichean heresy, right? The Manichean heresy, right, says that there's a bad itself, right? Mm-hmm. And apparently he had this kind of in the botanic dialogues a bit, right? Okay? We can see that. Aristotle refutes that in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, right? Mm-hmm. But Plato speaks as if in some places there might be a bad itself, right? Mm-hmm. Well, sometimes he kind of identifies the bad itself with matter, right? So there's kind of a Manichean tendency there, right? In the Platonists, you've got to watch out for that. Mm-hmm. But Aristotle saw his way through that, huh? But here he's going to solve in a different way because there really is a first matter that is ability, pure ability, right? Mm-hmm. But he's going to show what's wrong with that, what, proportion there, huh? Okay? Because he's saying pure act is to everything that has act, or vice versa. Pure ability is to everything that has some ability, as pure act is to whatever has some act, right? Now, if all you see is that likeness, you can be deceived by that likeness, huh? Okay? Notice what Thomas is going to say here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the first act, which is God, huh, is a universal principle, a universal cause of all acts, right? Because it is infinite, right? Because it is infinite, right? That's one of the attributes of God. Containing virtually, right, in his power, all things, huh? Mm-hmm. And he's quoting the words of Dionysius. Prehabins, huh? Having before, you might say in itself, all things, huh? Okay? Now, when you study God sometimes, you'll find out that God is universally perfect, right? He has perfection of all things, but in a simple way, huh? And this infinity of God, right, is referring to his, what, not lacking any perfection, right, huh? Whence he is partaken of by all things, not as a part of them, right, but according to the, what, pouring out of his procession, right, huh? Now, I know what that means, huh? You know how we use the word part sometimes, huh? When you say, you say, partake, you know, that means literally to take a part of, right, huh? Okay? But sometimes we use the word part in the sense of, what, partial, right? Meaning that you have something of something, but not, what, completely or perfectly, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? And so he's saying they all partake of God, not in the sense that they have, what, a part of God, or that God is a part of them, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But they have something like God, but in a very, what, deficient way, huh? Okay? Okay? Okay? Now, I think I was going to think of their time at the University of Perfect there. Thomas often, when he quotes, um... Thomas often, when he quotes, um... Thomas often, when he quotes, um... God they're talking to I think both Moses, one person and he says, you know, follow me and I will show you every good and Thomas says that is myself you know but that's the way of speaking, right God is said to be every good, not in the sense of he's a composite thing, right, he's simple but he has every good in a completely simple way, right so all things partake of God insofar as they're perfect in some way but they partake in a, what imperfect way, right, in a partial way, right, okay but they don't have a part of God nor is God a part of them right, but he says potency or ability since it is receptive of act, is necessary that it be, what, proportion to act, huh so that not just any act is received in, what, any potency and that's why the perfection of the eye is not the same as perfection of the, what ear and so on because what's receiving the perfection is not the same but he says the acts received which proceed from the first infinite act namely God and our certain partakings of it are, what, diverse whence there's not able to be one potency or one kind of ability, right that we seize all acts, right as there is one act namely God pouring into, you might say or pouring out all, what participating acts now why is it there's no ability to receive that is capable of receiving every act as a partaking of God because in a sense the objection is saying that, right the objection is saying that every act other than God is partaking of the actuality of God in an imperfect way, right and the objection is saying that everything that receives an act partaking of God's perfection, right is doing so because it partakes of this, what pure ability, right okay but Thomas says there's no one ability that is adequate to receiving every actuality that God could, what give and therefore you have different kinds of ability, right and the ability of matter to receive something like the perfection of God is other than the ability of, what the soul to receive a perfection of God it's interesting how Aristotle in the first book of Natural Hearing he speaks of form as something God-like right because it's a certain act right but as we said when matter receives one form it excludes another form right but when the soul receives one form in the understanding it's not prevented from receiving other forms it can receive the forms of all these things in the material world and therefore the soul is in some way all things, right so it has a different kind of an ability an ability to receive other forms okay just as we could say the eye is able to receive what color in the ear is able to receive sounds, right but they're all limited right they can't receive everything that can be received from God there's no ability to receive everything that can be received from God and it's interesting that even in us if we take our our reason and our will right my reason is able to receive let's say the perfection of faith right or my reason is able to receive the perfection of some of these gifts of the Holy Spirit understanding maybe or science or something like that right but my reason can't receive the perfection of hope or charity can it my reason cannot be the subject of charity my will can receive hope right my will can receive charity right the theological virtues of hope and charity are in my will they're received in my will my reason can't receive them my reason can be directed by them right can be formed in some way by them but we can't receive them as what a subject receiving them right why faith is received in reason itself why faith cannot be received in the will so you see that something of God's knowledge and something of God's love and these are perfections in God but they're one thing in God right but they are received in us by different what abilities right one being my reason the other being my heart or my will and it matters to receive other things right another way right see there's no one ability to receive everything God can give it's kind of interesting there in terms of men and women you know when Paul VI there when he made Teresa of Avala doctor the church right and it's very interesting if you have a chance to read his address in the time it's very interesting address and he quotes the doctor of divine love there St. Francis de Sales right with approval the St. Francis de Sales say that the woman's soul is more capable of love than the man's soul it's a very strong thing right and he contrasts you know the way in which Teresa of Avala is a doctor of the church and the way St. Augustine is a doctor of the church right and Augustine is a doctor of the church much more in this scholastic sense in this argumentative sense right and Teresa Al doesn't write that way right but woman has certain perfection in love right that's kind of interesting because that means that the man and the woman don't equally or exactly the same perfection perceive as much right you see so like in marriage and so on you know the man's love of the children is kind of what confirmed by the woman's love of the children I think but the woman's reason is confirmed by the man's reason you see it's just in yeah but it's the idea that you don't have the same what ability and interesting when Thomas Aristotle is reasoning there at the end of the treatise almost on friendship there he's reasoning about does friendship consist more in loving or being loved okay because both must be found in friendship right friendship involves mutual love right so if I love you and truly love you but you don't love me in return we're not friends see in order for there to be friendship between you and I I have to love you but you have to return my love right okay so love so both things are necessarily involved in friendship loving and being loved right okay and uh but Aristotle raises the question now which is more which is more and he gives the sign taken from the woman right and it's the case where the woman cannot feed her children right maybe she doesn't have milk or whatever it is right so she has to give the child to another woman to nurse right why because that's the only way for the child to to flourish right but she realizes in giving the baby to the other woman to nourish that baby is going to be attached to the other woman so she's seeking more to what love than be loved right see now Thomas Aristotle doesn't give the reason you know why friendship consists more on loving than being loved and then he brings in the reason there Thomas does because Aristotle says that's kind of obvious but we'll go into that but it's interesting but why does he take the sign from the woman right well it's because the woman has a certain what perfection of love and because very much there when you see when they talk about Mary Mary is called the mother of what yeah she's called the mother of mercy right she's never called the mother of justice but Christ is called the son of justice right and he says to apostles you know you're sitting in the 12 tribes judging you know 12 seats they're judging the 12 tribes right that is more an act of what reason right to see what is just But the woman is by nature more merciful. That's why Shakespeare puts into Horsha's mouth, right, the most beautiful words about mercy that we have in fiction, right? The ones from the scene there in Merchant of Venice there where she's pleading for the Merchant of Venice's life, right? And it follows the gentle rain from heaven, the mercy. They don't know those words. I've got to read Merchant of Venice there. But also, you know, the last plays of Shakespeare, these forgiveness plays, you know, these mercy plays, mercy romances, and it's a woman forgiving, you see. It's done very beautifully, you know. But you know, when Mary appears, you know, in some of these things, you know, she's like, I can no longer restrain my son, you know, like he's going to punish us for wickedness, you know. But you see, the mother is, but in some of the old medieval commentaries there on the Hail Mary, you know, they'll speak of Mary as a mother of mercy, you know. Neil Habermann, regular justitia, having nothing in the kingdom of justice. Made a little strong, but you see the merciful nature. That's the type of love, right? The merciful love of, so. So, but I mention that because it's kind of striking that this diversity even of man-woman there is not just on the physical level, but in the soul itself, right? And it's kind of strong the way Paul VI, I mean, I take him as my authority, he's making tweets of Avila there in St. Catherine Siena, right? Those who made the first two doctors of the church. But the quotes with authority, I mean, with approval, apparently, Francis de Sales, who said this before, right? Right. But if you go to Francis de Sales, you know, tweet us on love, right? You know, he's the most complete tweet as we have, perhaps, in some ways. But you take his examples from tweets of Avila and other of the female saints, more than from the male saints, right? You know, more than from Augustine or Thomas, anything like that, right? But it's an excellence there, you know, in terms of the will. But, you know, but apart from man-woman, right? In any of us, right, some of the perfection of God I receive in my reason, and some of the perfection of God I receive in my will, but it's not the same perfection I receive in both, right? See that? Can you say that again? Some of the perfection of God I receive in my will, like the love of God, right? Okay. Okay. Some of the perfection of God, the knowledge of God, I receive in my what? Yeah. And I can't receive that knowledge in my will, although my reason can influence my will, right? And I can't receive charity in my what? Reason. Reason, see? And the way reason and the will are perfected is different, huh? Like we mentioned before, huh? You know, reason, you've got to take things, huh? You've got to grasp them, right? See? By love, we think of it more in terms of what? Giving. Giving. Giving, you see? Right. You know, they have a popular song, love isn't love until it's given away, right? See? But, as I used to say in that, I gave a lecture one time there at TEC there, and on this contrariety in quotes, between love and knowledge, right? And I said, it's always bad to lose your mind. I said, it's not always bad to lose your heart. It depends upon whom you lose it to. You see? But why is that? Why is it always bad to lose your mind? But not always bad to lose your heart. See? Well, as Christ says, where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? So love is in the thing loved, huh? By knowing is more the reverse. Putting the thing, what? You want to know inside you, right? Father Boulet used to point that out, you know, how the will in some ways is more proportioned to God, right? Than reason. Because reason is trying to put God into reason. But the will is going out to God, right? So it's like the difference between trying to put the ocean inside of you, which would be like trying to understand it, and then jumping into the ocean, which would be like love again. You see? And so, even in faith, as Augustine and Thomas teach us, the church teaches us, no one believes unless they want to, right? They're moved by the will. So, but God moves reason through the will because the will is more proportioned to God, huh? And that's why we can truly love God in this world, right? More than we can truly know Him. We know more when He's not, you know? We don't really see Him as He is until we get the beatific vision, right? But we can love Him as He is, even in this world, huh? We're not always sure that we're loving Him that way, right? It's hard to know. We can have some probable signs that we're loving Him in this way. But we can't really know Him as He is in this life, huh? He's more proportioned to our will in some sense. Okay. So, so he says, continuing to apply the first objection, the received acts, right, which proceed from the first infinite act, namely God, and are certain partakings of Him, those acts are diverse, right? Like I was saying here, charity is a diverse thing from love, right? From knowledge, right? The love of God is quite different from the knowledge of God. Whence there cannot be one ability or power which receives, what? All acts, because they have to be proportioned to those particular acts. Okay. Notice, huh? What does Augustine say in the Confessions there? Too late have I come to know Thee. That was it called? Too late have I loved Thee. Ancient beauty, yeah. Know what he says? Too late have I loved Thee. Okay. Now, beauty in some way is partaken of all the way down to the senses, the higher senses, right? But the sense of sight and the sense of what? Hearing, right? So I can see a beautiful sunset, right? Beautiful mountains or beautiful waterfalls and so on. And I can hear the beautiful music of Mozart, right? See? But the beauty of nature or the beauty of the music there is a partaking, right? Of the beauty of God, right? Imperfect, right? You know? So sometimes you're like Pires the 12th and the thing on sacred music would talk about that, right? Sacred music should be what? Beautiful, huh? You know? It's like Shakespeare says that, you know, sacred music sung out of tune is worse than priests that lie. That's a strong thing, yeah. But anyway. But notice, huh? The beauty of the painting cannot be known by the ear. And the beauty of Mozart's music cannot be known by the, what? Eye, right? So the eye is able to receive the beauty of the sunset. Right. But it can't receive the beauty of Mozart's music. That's right. Or Palestina. And the ear can receive the beauty of Palestina or Mozart, but it can't receive the beauty of the sunset, right? So the different abilities are proportioned, as Thomas says, to different acts, huh? But all those acts are in some way partaking of the divine act, huh? But there's no one ability that could be an ability for all the acts that can partake of God's perfection. It's kind of really marvelous is this first objection and what Thomas points out in reply to it. Whence there cannot be one potency, right, that receives all of these acts, all these participating acts, right? As there is one act flowing out, right, or all these participating acts, right? Otherwise, he says, the potency, the receptive potency, would equal the, what? Active power of the first act, huh? Okay. So there is another potency receptive in the understanding soul from the potency that's receptive of first matter, as is clear from the diversity of the things we see. For first matter, we see as individual forms, right? But the understanding we see is forms. Thank you.