De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 74: The Soul as Form of the Body: Thomas's Demonstration

Transcript
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After the first book of the soul, Aristotle, and after the premium and so on, Aristotle goes into the opinions of his predecessors about the soul, right? There are all kinds of strange opinions, right? Some more probable, I think, than others. But there's all kinds of disagreement as to what the soul is, but absolutely no disagreement as to the existence of the soul. Yeah, very easily. And I mentioned how, if you use the word soul today in contemporary society, you might have not only disagreement as to what the soul is, but disagreement as to whether we have a soul, right? Yeah, see? And something strange there when you see, you know, in Shakespeare's play there, like I mentioned in the What You Do About Nothing, where Beatrice says, you know, I'm as sure that the hero is innocent as I am that I have a soul. But she didn't even use that when he speaks, you know, speaking as. He's speaking like the Greeks, right? Mm-hmm. Well, and when you see it, the word animal, right? Animal is like, there's a soul. That's where we're getting it from. You know? The existence of the soul is obvious that there are animals around, right? Right. You see? And you say, well, what's the problem here, right? Well, it's a problem with the word, right? See? And when we hear the word soul today, we think of it usually in the context we've heard about it, in church or something like that, right? Mm-hmm. Where they're talking about this immortal human soul, you know, the spiritual soul. And there you've got a very particular understanding of what the soul is, right? Mm-hmm. And they know that there are some bodies that are alive and some are not. Right. There may be some ambiguous cases, but... Yeah. The dog and the cat here that we met here today, I was obviously alive, right? And your body and my body is alive, right? Mm-hmm. It moves itself in some way, right? Okay? So it has the source of its life within itself. So whatever that first beginning is, that's what we're calling the soul, right? In that sense, the existence of the soul is what? Obvious, right? Okay? The comic used to take kind of a joke there in one of the Moliere's comedies there, Mr. Jourdan, huh? And Mr. Jourdan, you know, is told by somebody that he's speaking prose and not poetry, right? And he may have been speaking prose all my life, but I never knew it. Well, the point is, he's what? He doesn't, what? Vert to it, what? He never, he would have to know the name for it, right? Yeah. But, you know, he knew the thing all along, right? Okay. So it's a problem just in the name, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? Yeah, okay. Yeah. So, this is almost like what you mean by the word soul. The soul is that by which we first live, sense, move, and understand, huh? And we're all aware of the fact that we have these operations, right? That we do these things, right? Sure. And we do so by reason as something within us, right? Okay? Okay. And that by which we do these things within us, that by which we first do these things within us, is what we mean by the word soul. Okay? Okay? Then if you understand that something does something by reason of its form, right? Mm-hmm. You can now supply the major premise, right? That by which we, being a body, right, we first live, sense, move, and understand, is the, what, form of the body, right? Okay. Yeah. So, that's the soul just in the first figure, huh? And this here is the middle term, right? Uniting form with the soul, right? Okay. Just like if I was to argue in this way, and they'd say, health is that by which the body is, what? Healthy. And that by which the body is healthy is the, what? Form of the body, right, huh? Okay? It's not the body itself, is it? I said the shape of the ball is that by which it first is a ball, right? And that by which it first is a ball is its form, right? Okay. It's not the rubber that's first of all, is it? No. No. Okay. Okay? And notice, you know, if you can kill a living body, right, huh, and the matter of which it is made, right, can become something non-living, right? It's not through the matter that's first of life, is it? Or let me take my other favorite example here, right? This is the word cap, right, huh? Now, is it first the word cap for the letters C, A, and T? No. Because you have the same letters over here, right? Yeah. So, by the letters C and A and T, it's the word cap only in ability. It is first the word cap when it, what? Yeah. In this case, the form would be the order, right? Right. Okay? So it's not the matter of which it's first the word cap, is it? Okay. Is this a chair or a table here that would be better? Okay. Now, is it first a table by what? By being what? No. Because by being what, it's only a table in ability, right? Mm-hmm. So it's first a table by its what? Form, huh? Okay. Make sense? Mm-hmm. No. No. And does a bowling ball roll because it's... What's a bowling ball made out of anyway? I don't know. But whatever the material of the bowling ball is made of, does it roll because it's plastic or if it is made out of? No. Mm-hmm. It first rolls because of its what? Form, right? Form. Yeah. As an apparition, right? A little bit late there. Yeah. I know. You and so. Okay. So that's a demonstration of Aristotle in the second book of the soul, right? Okay. Now, he's going to proportion himself a little more to you here, right? After giving Aristotle's demonstration again. If someone wishes or wants to say that the understanding soul is not the form of the body, right? It would be necessary that he find a way in which this action, right, which is to understand, is the action or activity of this man, right? Yeah. Why? Because everyone, you and me, experiences within himself that he himself is the one who understands, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? What you experience within yourself that you understand? Yes. That you're the one who understands? Yes. Now I understand. I know. You know? Now I understand. Don't you say it? You know, you're trying to understand something. Now I understand, right? Mm-hmm. You know, you experience within yourself that you understand, okay? I think there's a little division here. An action is attributed to something in three ways, as is clear through the, or by the philosopher in the fifth book of the physics. There's something said to move something or to act, either by itself as a whole, as the doctor heals, or by a part, as a man sees through the eye, or, or by accident, right, by happening, as we say that the white builds, right? We say that the musician builds, right? Because it happens to the builder to be white, to be a musician or something else, huh? When, therefore, we say that Socrates... or Plato, understands. It is clear that we do not attribute this to him, for Archidense, right? Because it's attributed to him insofar as he is a what? A man, huh? And this is essentially predicated of him, huh? Either, therefore, it's necessary to say that Socrates understands by himself as a whole, as Plato posited, right? Saying that man is the understanding soul, right? And in the Marietta edition here, they give you the reference there to the Alcibiades. There's two Alcibiades, huh? This is the first Alcibiades. But that's the one I mentioned before where Socrates says, am I a soul or am I a body or am I something composed of soul and body? And he concludes that he's just a soul. And if I remember the argument there, kind of weak in some ways, but if I use something, right, I'm different from what I use, right? So if I use a hammer or a saw, am I a hammer or a saw? I'm not what I use, right? But you can use your body for good or for bad, right? So the user and the used are not the same. And you use your body for good or for bad, and you're not your body, right? You're just your soul. Interesting, huh? Argument, huh? Okay. Or, so either, you know, that's all we are is an understanding soul, or just a story that the understanding be some part of Socrates, right? Okay. And the first, he says, it cannot stand. Ah, he says, right? This has been shown above. And this is exactly how Concretanus is. On account of this, right? That's the very same man who perceives himself to what? Both understand and dissents, huh? See? And you've heard me say it before, right? See? When your body's in pain, especially, right? You know? And you're thinking about how you can get rid of that headache or get rid of that stomach pain or whatever it is, right? It's a part of your experience that the one who's feeling pain is the one who's thinking about what to do about it. Yes. You see? It's the same thing. And since we sense only in the body, right, huh? Yeah. The one who understands must also be, what? Bodily, right, huh? Feeling pain in his body, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? See? Without trying to sound too selfish, right? It's one thing, you know, to be standing over somebody else who's in pain, right? Or you're concerned about them, right? Mm-hmm. But there's an urgency when you're the one in pain, right? Yes. You know how the patient is, you know, yelling at the nurse or somebody, you know? Somebody to come to relieve his pain and pressing his... Beeper. Beeper, nobody's coming, you know? They're out there talking there, you know? And think you're just, you know, bothering them, you know? And you're in considerable pain and there, you know, it's beeping your thing, okay? But wouldn't you are in pain, right? You're very much aware of the fact that you're trying to relieve that pain, huh? Whence is necessary that the body be some part of man, huh? So that's really the argument, again, saying that man is just the, what? Just a soul, right, huh? Okay? Be soul and body and soul. It remains, therefore, that the, again, intellectus there is used for the, what? Yeah, or else, it could be used also for the understanding there. But the understanding which man understands is some part of Socrates, right? I think he's using it more in the sense of the understanding soul here, right? Okay? As he did previously, right? Okay? Intellectus Sivianima Intellectiva. It remains, therefore, that the understanding soul by which Socrates understands is some part of Socrates, right? Thus, that the understanding soul is in some way united to the body of Socrates, right? Okay? Does that make sense? Yes. Okay? Why? So what you're saying here is that the soul that understands, huh? The soul by which you understand is united to my body, right, huh? Because it's me feeling pain in my body, right? It's me sensing, right, huh? Do you see that? Okay? It's me reading, and I hope understanding what I'm reading, right? Right? It's not the computer reading for me and me understanding, right? No, it's me reading my eyes, right? My eyes are getting tired reading or not, right? But, you know, it's me reading and understanding what I'm reading, right? Or not understanding what I'm reading but it's the same me. Okay? Now, it goes into a discussion here of some of the future attempts to understand this union, right? Some misunderstandings of it, right, huh? And he says, this union, the commentator, now the commentator is again an example of what? What figure of speech? Antonomasia. Yeah, Antonomasia, right? And Avera was, he's not got the nickname or he's not got the name commentator because he commented in all of Avera's works, apparently. Okay? So he stood out and now he's called the commentator, right? Because he's the one who commented everything. But I think he's unjustly called the commentator now, right? Thomas should be called the commentator. But in Thomas' time, Avera was known as the commentator. Okay? The commentator has some misunderstandings there in the third book about the soul, right? And this is that strange opinion, you know, that the commentator had the idea that the understanding is like an angelic substance, right, separate from us, right? He's got to figure some way in which the separated substance, understanding, can enable us to understand, right? Right. And the way he tried to tie him up was through the fact that we have these images, right? And the separated substance is understanding of what it is of what we're imagining. So if we're imagining this, we're tied up with this separated substance and that's how we understand. But as Thomas points out, if that's the only connection we have with the one who understands, is the way of the images that this separated substance understands, that we don't understand, but we're understood. Or our images are understood. Okay? This union, the commentator in the third book about the soul, says, is through the understandable what? Form, right? The form by which the separated substance understands. Which form has a two-fold subject? One, the possible understanding, the one that is able to understand, the ability to understand, and the other is the, what, images or phantasms which are in the body organs. And thus, through the understandable form, the understanding, the possible understanding, the one that's as opposed to the act of understanding, is continued to the body of this or that man. But this continuation or union, Thomas says, does not suffice that the action of understanding be the action of Socrates. And of course, he first shows this through the proportion of Aristotle. And what is the proportion of Aristotle? Well, he said that the images, right, the images are to the understanding like the exterior sensible is to the senses. Okay? So, as you are out there to my eye, right, so the images are to my understanding, to my reason. Now, what's the justice of that proportion? Well, when I look towards you, I see the blackness of your clothing, right? Okay? So I'm seeing the color of something outside of me, right? Okay? But, is the color black in your vestments there? Is that seen? No. It's seen. Right. Yeah. But the seeing is in my... not in your clothing, right? Okay. And likewise, when I imagine a triangle, I understand what it is of a triangle, what it is to be a triangle, right? I understand what it is is something imagined, right? But is the image what? The understanding? No. But you're understanding something of what you imagine, right? Okay, just as I see something of what's out there. So, the fact that the image is in us in no way would make us be actually understanding, right? Any more than because there's black in your investments, right? It's being seen, does your clothing see? Sure. That's only a reason for saying it's seen. Now, some of the more fuller discussions that Thomas has of this, and maybe you'll see them later on here in the Summa too, but Thomas will say that he's deceived by the fallacy of the, what, accident, right? Which, as Aristotle pointed out in the book on Sister Refutations, is the first of the fallacies he speaks of outside of speech, right? And he says the one that deceives even the wise. Not the wise, maybe in the fullest sense, but it's a very strong way of saying how difficult it is to avoid this, huh? And Plato, we saw, made that mistake, huh? When he confused matter with lack of form, he was deceived by the accidental, huh? Well, Avera was deceived by the accident, huh? Because insofar as the, what a triangle is, is in the image, right? It's not in the understanding. It's in the image singular, right? Right. Here. And it's in the understanding, but in a universal way, right? So insofar as it's in one, it's not in the other. So he's being deceived by the, what? The accidental, huh? Okay. And what's the accidental there? Insofar as it's one with the image and one with us, it's not the same. Okay? But there's some kind of continuity there, right? Yeah. So the act of understanding has separated, right, what a triangle is from the triangles that you imagined, huh? And it's actually understood insofar as it's separated. Insofar as it's still in the image, it's not actually understood. It's understood only in ability, huh? Okay. So even the greater Avera was deceived by, like Plato, huh? Before him, by the accidental. But Thomas here is being, you know, for beginners here, he's taking this much more easy to see here that he, using this proportion that Aristotle did, right? It obviously, just as the exterior is sensible, it doesn't sense. Well, the image doesn't, what? Understand, right? And just as what has the blackness out there, like your clothing, doesn't have sensation, so what has the image doesn't have understanding, right? So the fact that we have images doesn't mean that we're able to understand. So this way doesn't work, huh? And this clearly says the likeness, and it's a likeness of ratios here, in the sense for which Aristotle proceeds to considering those things you have the understanding. For as images have themselves to the understanding, as it's said in the third book about the soul, so colors, meaning the exterior color, right, to sight, huh? Just, therefore, as the form of the colors are in sight, so the species, or the form of the images, are in the possible understanding. But it's clear from this, the colors are in the, what, wall, right? Whose likenesses are in sight. It's clear that from this, one doesn't say that the action of seeing is going to be attributed to the wall, right? Okay, or the action of seeing is going to be attributed to your vestments, because, okay? We do not say that the wall sees, but more that it is seen, right, huh? I wouldn't say that your clothing sees, but it is, what, seen, right? From this, therefore, that the species or form of the images are in the understanding, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the images, understands, but that he himself or his images are understood. Okay? So, he dismisses that way of trying to understand the union, right? Now, some others try to understand it in a way that's even weaker, right? Some, however, wish to understand that the understanding is, meaning, again, I think, the understanding soul, is united to the body as a mover, right? And thus, from the understanding of the body, there comes to be one thing, so that the action of the understanding can be attributed to the whole, right? But this is multi-picture of Adam. Now, I think, if you come to think about it, this is the way Descartes tries to do it, huh? Because Descartes has two things, huh? The res extensa, right, which is body, the extended thing, right? And then the res cogita, the thinking thing, right, huh? Okay? And they're two quite different things, right? But now he's got a problem with man, right? So apparently, you know, in his study of anatomy and so on in the brain, they found some little organ up there, the pineal gland or something it's called. And it's through this that the res cogita, right, is in contact and can move through the brain, right, the whole body, right, huh? Okay? So in a sense, he's seen the union there, is one of mover and what? Moved, right, huh? Is it? Okay? And, you know, sometimes, you know, we have someone who's very adept at using some instrument, huh? Like a sword or a pen or something, right? Or violin, and he seems to be one with his instrument almost, right? Sure. You know? But that's not enough to explain really what? The unity, right, huh? Right. See? When the violin gets out of tune, you know, it's not the same thing as when your body gets sick, right? It might be upset that your violin's out of tune, but it's out of tune, but it's not the same thing as your body being sick and out of tune, right? But this is in many ways vain, huh? First, because the understanding does not move the body except through desire, huh? Whose motion presupposes the operation of the understanding, huh? It's not therefore, Socrates is not therefore moved. It's not therefore because Socrates is moved by the intellect that he understands, right? But rather because, what? He understands, huh? That Socrates is moved by the understanding. And we saw that somewhat in the third book on the soul there, when he got to talk about the moving power, right? And how we saw that desire and then either imagination or reason, right, are the movers, right? And they're united in the good desired, right? And understood, huh? Secondly, that since Socrates is a certain individual in nature whose essence is one composed from matter and form, if the understanding or the understanding soul was not his form, it would follow that it's apart from his essence what he is. And thus the understanding soul would be compared to the old Socrates as a mover to the moved, huh? But to understand is an action remaining in the one doing it. It's not one that passes over to another as heeding does. Therefore, to understand could not be attributed to Socrates on account of this, that he was moved by a, what? Something that understands, huh? Third, because the action of the mover is never attributed to the moved except as to an instrument, as the action of the carpenter to the, what's that, the saw, I guess? The saw, yeah. If therefore to understand is attributed to Socrates because as the action of his mover, it would follow that it would be attributed to him as to an instrument or tool, which is against what the philosopher, right, who showed that to understand is not through a bodily, what, instrument, right? So the fact that man, if man was just a body, didn't have an understanding soul, you couldn't say that this body understands because it's moved by something that understands. Could you say that? Sorry, can you say that again? Could you say that your ballpoint pen there understands because it's writing very understandable words, isn't it? It's moved. No. No. No. No. No. No. Fourth, because although the action of the part is attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye to man, never, however, is attributed to another part, except perhaps by accident. For we do not say that the hand sees, right? On account of this, that the eye sees. If, therefore, from the understanding soul, and Socrates, in the four-said way, there comes about something one, the action of understanding, the activity of understanding, the act of understanding, could not be able to be attributed to Socrates. If Socrates is the whole that is composed from the union of the understanding soul to the rest, which are Socrates, and nevertheless the understanding is not united to the others, which are Socrates, except as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one simply. He'd be like a man in his bike, in a sense, right? And consequently not a being simply. For something is a being, in the same way that it's one. It remains, therefore, that the only way, which is the one that Aristotle posits on, that this man understands, because the understanding beginning is his form. Thus, therefore, from the operation of understanding, it appears, and the fact that man himself knows he understands, that the understanding principle is united to the bodies of form. Now he's going to manifest this in another one. You notice what he's done here now. The first thing he did was to repeat the demonstration of Aristotle, right? In the second book, on the soul. And then he showed, what? That the other ways of, what? Uniting the two don't work, right? And so he concludes that the only way he can be united is his form and matter, right? And now he's going to do it in a third way, huh? This is able also to be made manifest by reason of the human species, huh? For the nature of each thing is shown from its, what? Operation, huh? But the proper operation of man, insofar as he is man, is to understand, huh? For through this he transcends all the other animals, huh? You should know that from your study of Shakespeare's, what? Exhutation to use reason, right? Quent, also Aristotle, in the book of Nicomache Ethics, in this operation, as in the one that is private to man, constitutes his ultimate, what? Felicitata, right? That's the word I was mentioning before, right? Mm-hmm. It's necessary, therefore, that man, according to that species, that man, according to that, obtains his species, right? Which is the principle of this operation. But each thing acquires its own species through its own, what? Form. In fact, that's why species is taken from the word form, right? And difference which completes the species is taken from form. It remains, therefore, that the understanding principle, or beginning, is the man's own form, huh? But now, in these last two paragraphs, it's going to be bringing out what's necessary to answer these objections, right? This is very important to see what it's going to bring out here now. But it should be considered that, as a form is more noble, so more it dominates, what? Bodily matter, huh? And less is it, what? Immersed, right, huh? In it, huh? And more, by its operation or its power, it exceeds matter. Whence we see that the form of a mixed body, huh? Has some operation which is not caused from the elementary qualities of earth, air, fire, and water, huh? And as one precedes the nobility of forms, so the power of the form is seen more, or found more to exceed elementary matter, as the feeding soul, the vegetable soul, right? More than the form of a metal. And the sensing soul, more than the, what? Feeding soul, right, huh? Of course, you see that in the case of sensing, and it seems to be already something almost immaterial, right? For example, I recognize all these things around the room, you know? Right. By their shape, right? So I have the shape of the cat, and the dog, and the man, and the table. Well, they're all in my head, right? Right. Because there's some piece of matter in my head that has that shape. Right. So even then, it seems to be kind of, what? Arising above the limitation of what? Matter. Of matter, right, huh? Right. I don't have a bunch of old bony statues of everybody that I know, right? Right. Is that the way it is? So even the animal or sensing soul rises more above matter than the plant. Soul does, huh? But the human soul is the last word, right? In the nobility of forms. Whence, to such an extent, by its power, it exceeds bodily matter. That it has some operation and power in which in no way the bodily matter communicates, right? And this is the power called the, what? Understanding. I think he's using intellect as for the power of understanding, right? Okay. And the same thing could be said about the ability to, what? To choose, right, huh? It should be noted, however, that if someone lays down that the soul is composed from matter and form, that opinion he was arguing against, in no way could the soul be said to be the form of the body. For since the form is act, but matter is being and potency only, in no way could that which is from matter and form composed be itself the form of another by itself, right? If something of or by something of itself is form, that which is form we call the soul. And that of which it is the form is called the first thing that is animated or alive. Now let's look at the replies here to the objections, which can be seen. To the first, therefore, it should be said, as the philosopher says in the second book of the physics, the last of natural forms to which is terminated the consideration of natural philosophy is the human soul. That's interesting, huh? Because what defines, in a sense, of the object or the subject of natural philosophy always got to involve matter in some way, right? So the human soul, being a form that is the form of a body, can be considered an actual philosophy, but insofar as it can be without the body, right? And be, therefore, you might say, just within the immaterial world, it seems to, what? Belong to metaphysics or wisdom you talk about, huh? Immaterial things. So it's kind of the consideration of the human soul, like the consideration of the unmoved mover, right? Is the limit. It's the end of natural philosophy and the beginning of, what? Wisdom, right? Because Aristotle says in the sixth book of wisdom, if there was nothing apart from material things, natural philosophy would be wisdom. And so when we study the human soul, and when we study the dependence of motion upon a mover, and the moved movers upon an unmoved mover, and we can syllogize that the unmoved mover cannot be a body, it's there at the end of natural philosophy, and the beginning of the science of immaterial things. But nevertheless, yeah, okay, this is the last of natural forms to which is terminated the consideration of the natural philosopher, or natural philosophy, namely the human soul. It's separated, right? But nevertheless, in matter, which he proves from this, because man generates man from matter and the sun, huh? The sun has something to do with our generation. That's a quote from Aristotle? Yep. Is that what he's saying? Okay. It is separated by its understanding power, because the understanding power, the power to understand, the ability to understand, is not the power of some, what, bodily organ, right? As the seeing power is the act of the eye, right? Right, right, right, right, right, right? But to understand is an act which cannot be exercised through a body organ, as seeing is exercised. But it is in matter, insofar as the soul, of which it is a power, is a form of the body, and the end of human generation. And thus the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, that the intellectus, and now he's using the word intellectus here to mean the power of understanding, is separated, right? Because it's not the power of some body organ. And to this is clear the response to the second and the third one. It suffices for this, that man is able to understand all things through his understanding, and to this, that the understanding understands things that are material and universal, that the power to understand is not the act of the body, right? That's kind of an amazing thing, to think that the human soul is what? The form of the body, right? But that it has a what? An ability that's not in the body, huh? How can that be, right? Well, it's because the existence of the soul is shared by the body, but when you say shared, we mean it doesn't fully attain to the existence of the soul. Another way he expresses that is to say that the soul was not entirely, what, immersed in the body, huh? Right. Okay? Like that body floating in the ocean, right? It's partly in the water, but partly above it, huh? So it's like... I remember the scene there where, I mean, at the end of her life there, St. Therese of the Sioux there, she had, what, not pneumonia, but she had tuberculosis. Tuberculosis, yeah. So she has difficulty breathing, right? She could hardly breathe anymore in this world, she was saying, right? And not yet able to breathe in the next world, right? It was like a man, you know, who's partly above the water, right? That's right. To breathe in another world, and he can't no longer breathe in this world down here, right? It's kind of interesting, huh? No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no He's the man who hired me at Assumption there, but then he himself won't talk later on at BC, you know Okay, now the fourth objection here is very important To the fourth it should be said that the human soul is not a form immersed, right, in bodily matter, right? That's when we hear this speaking of it Or by it totally what? Yeah, comprehended, huh? Surrounded, so to speak, entirely by it And that's an account of the perfection of the soul, right, huh? And therefore nothing prevents some power of it, right, not to be the, what, act of the body, right? Although the soul, by its essence, is a form of the, what, body, huh? And notice, that's something very unusual And Sarastal says in the beginning of the study of the soul, you know That this is one of the best studies that there is, right? Because it's about, what? It's a very wonderful thing, right, huh? And this truth about the human soul is something that we would only come to Once we realize that we're soul and body, right? And yet that we do understand, not in the body And that we do choose, not in the body, huh? And therefore we realize, huh? From that effect, right? That the soul itself cannot be, what? Entirely immersed in the body, huh? Or comprehended by the body, huh? And that it has an existence which the body shares in, but not, what? Fully, right? If the existence of the soul was shared fully by the body, right? If the soul was completely immersed in the body or comprehended by the body Then it would have no activity except in the body and through the body But as we show when we take up understanding there in the third book on the soul We'll take it up here again later on, too Understanding is not in the body, huh? I was mentioning, you know, how Baba O'Gro was telling me, you know, about The Canadian brain scientist there, huh? Who concluded, you know, from a study of the brain That there's no part of the brain responsible for choosing And that's by, you know, estimating various parts of the brain, right? Yeah Interaction and things So that the ability to choose is not in the brain and not in the body at all It's kind of interesting, huh? Coming to that conclusion, a scientist But that, you know, the ability to choose, of course, falls upon the fact that you have understanding Like Shakespeare says there, Hammond said Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice And could have been distinguished, right? Her election has sealed thee for itself And he goes on to give the reasons why he chose her way she was his friend, right? But notice how precise Shakespeare's words are Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice He could, you know, judge men and compare them and so on, right? There's a reason, huh? But the soul, really, huh? Is what has the ability to, what? Choose, huh? Yeah, he precisely is, huh? See? But also he notes, you know When was the soul able to choose? When it could, what? Distinguish, right? We were saying earlier about the planned parenthood people there, you know They don't want the pregnant woman to see what the baby looks like in the womb there, right? That's right And they resist, you know, legally, right? To attempt to make this a part of the law, right? You know So they don't want an informed choice, right? You see? So they don't want you to know what you're doing, right? And it shows their bad faith, because they know what they're doing Sure But they don't want the woman to know what they're doing But you have to be able to, you know To not know that the baby in the womb there is a human being You have to either be, you know You see, it's not a human being You're either dishonest or you're very ignorant, you know You know, not being able to judge these things, huh? Now the fifth Reply to the fifth one To the fifth it should be said that that soul The soul That being in which it itself subsists, right? It is being by itself, right? It communicates that to material body, right? Okay? From which In the understanding soul There comes to be one thing, huh? Okay? Thus that that being Which is of the whole composite Is also of the soul itself Which does not happen in other forms What we call material forms Which are not what's subsistent, right? So other forms and other souls You could say The soul of the animal And the soul of the plant Is only that by which The animal is, right? It's not An existence that the soul has by itself at all In the case of the human soul The existence which it has by itself Is shared in by the body, right? But not shared in completely, huh? An account of this The human soul remains in its being When the body is destroyed But the other forms Not, huh? So you can see that the soul Of orange What do you think? That cat around here, right? That soul Is that by which This is a cat, right? Right But that soul Has no existence by itself, right? Okay It's only that by which Orange is, right? But my soul Your soul Is not only that by which You, the composite are, right? But it has existence What? By itself, right? And how do we know that, say? Because that is an operation By itself, huh? If it had existence only in the body Like, like Orange is soul Has existence only in his In his He's or her body In her Her Then it would have, like Lucy, no operation except in the body and through the body. See? But as a matter of fact, it has understanding and choice, not in the body. So it has existence in itself and not only in the body and with the body. But poor Lucy's soul has existence only in and with the body. But we know that, you know, through its operations, right? See? We have to reason, as a great Sherlock Holmes says, backwards, right? To know the soul, huh? When your soul is separated from your body, as he'll explain later on in this treatise, then the soul will know itself through itself, huh? Like an angel knows itself through itself, huh? So that the words of the seven wise men, know thyself, will no longer be need to be addressed to man. So to say that the human body shares in the existence that the soul has, but the cat's body, you wouldn't say it shares in existence. It's completely absorbed, you might say, or comprehended by the body, right? But you could say that the soul of Lucy is that by which Lucy is, right? It's a composite, huh? It's not an existence that the soul has anyway by itself, huh? It has an existence by itself. It has some operation without the body, right? It's not in the body, but it doesn't have such an operation, because even sensing is in the body, huh? You can see that even in Plato's mistake, you know, if Plato thought that the souls of the beasts were immortal too, right? It's because he misunderstood sensing or imagining, right? And thought that these activities were not in the, what, body, right? That's where Aristotle is very correcting there of Plato, but very careful there to distinguish the central sense, right, from the outward senses, right? And yet not confuse the central sense with reason itself. Okay. To the sixth it should be said, that it belongs to the soul, secundum se, by itself, to be united to the body, just as it belongs, secundum se, by itself, to a light body, to be what? United. To be above. Oh, I'm sorry. And just as a light body remains light, right, when it's separated from its proper body, right, nevertheless has an aptitude and inclination, right, to its own place, so the human soul remains in its own being when it was separated from the body, but has an aptitude and natural inclination to union with the body, huh? And that's why it's so reasonable to believe in the, what, resurrection, right, huh? The man that's necessary, right? For Plato or for some, for Manichaean, right? You know, the resurrection, they'd have to reject the resurrection, right? Because, yeah, you're being reunited, it's, you know, being imprisoned again, or back with evil, you know, itself, incarnate evil. And that's why, you know, they deny that the word is made flesh, right, that it's an appearance, right, you know? So you get into all kinds of heresies because of a bad philosophy, huh? Dr. Brookless? Yeah. All right. I'm so confused about, because I guess I wasn't here for at least part of this, all the way back to Aristotle saying that the soul is the first act of a natural body, and I know this isn't the case, but that formulation of the soul as the first act of a natural body makes it sound like you have to have a body first before you can have a soul, and then as if, you know, as if the soul is derived from the body, or... But it has to be defined, though, in reference to the body because the body and the soul, like matter and form in general, are in a way relative to each other, yeah. Portional. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, it's a bit like, you know, talk about father and son, right, huh? Okay. You know, you have to kind of define father and son reference to each other, huh? So they have a relation... Yeah, like you say in the last, we've had the last objection here, right? The soul, even when it exists in separation from the body, Right. It's still, as such, right, the form of a body, right, huh? So there's an inclination, an attitude for that. Inclination, okay. Right, right, right. Yeah. It's united with that. So, I don't know, you've got to go now, I guess, but I was going to show you that little text here for the moment. Oh, good. Sure. Now it's too much. All right. Damn it. I'm not going in. Just forms of mystical prayer, huh? And St. Francis de Sales, huh? Did not hesitate to say that women have a special capacity for it, huh? Okay. Now, it seems to be saying women have a certain capacity maybe that a man doesn't have, right? A mystical prayer, right? Now, if you ask a simple question here, do we love God through knowing Him or do we know God through loving Him? What would you say to that? Both, yeah. And you have to say that in some way we'd have to know God before we could love Him, right? Right. And that's why we say that faith, in the order of generation, right, comes before and can be without charity but not vice versa, right? Okay? Right. But after you love God, right, then through loving God, you can, what? Know God, right? Through the impression, right, that God is made upon your, what? Heart, right, huh? Okay? Now, if you go to the, in the Prima Parsia, if you go to the question there on whether theology is wisdom, right, huh? Thomas makes this interesting distinction here. It's in question one, article six, the reply to the third objection, huh? And the wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is attached to what? Charity, right? Oh, yeah. If you look at the secundi secundi, right? Okay? Now, Thomas makes a distinction here, and a very beautiful mani d'Axio he has here. Let's look at the reply to the third objection there in question six. See, notice the objection, first of all. He's asking whether this doctrine, the summa theologiae, is wisdom, right? And the third objection there says, this doctrine is acquired through study, like we were doing, right? Okay? But wisdom is had by infusion, by being poured in. Whence it is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, right? Okay? I mentioned, as I say, that the gift of the Holy Spirit that's called wisdom will be taken up with charity in secundi secundi, right? Okay. Now, notice the distinction that Thomas sees here, which is a very important distinction to see. Okay? This is Article 6, question one. Odd three now. To the third, it should be said that judgment pertains to the wise, right? That's why it's savory knowledge, right? Taste, huh? But according to a two-fold way, and you get the word motive again, two ways of judging, wisdom is taken in two ways, right? There's two kinds of wisdom corresponding to two kinds of judging, right? For it belongs for someone to judge in one way, by way of inclination. And he has a beautiful mind that's you now, for what you want to see here. As the one who has the habit of moral virtue, right? Rightly judges about those things which ought to be done according to virtue, insofar as he's inclined to that, right? Yeah. So someone who has the virtue of chastity is going to reject, you know, certain things as being wrong, right? Simply because of the inclination of their virtue. Mm-hmm. Whence in the 10th book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says, right, that the virtuous person is the measure and the rule of human acts. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.