De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 79: The Unity of the Soul and Spirit versus Soul in Scripture

Transcript
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Those would leave you groggy, I guess, the next day sometimes. They had him in the hospital one time for a few weeks there, experimenting with ways to help his sleep. So, I thought the conic they'd say would go for two or three days without sleep. I mean, I'll go one night without sleep, at least I didn't know how to call out. It wouldn't go on, you know. But the old story was that Aristotle would sit there with a brass ball in his hands, you know, in a basin underneath, and if he started to fall asleep, he'd fall out of his hands. That's obviously, you know, fictitious, I think, you know. But, I mean, it shows, you know, kind of the intensity of the man, see. It's going to be the conic, especially when he was younger. He would go for a day or two, you know, without sleep, thinking and thinking about something. So, that's a good sign, then, that the soul, these are all powers in one soul rather than powers in distinct individual souls. Thus, therefore, he concludes, it should be said that the same in number is the soul, the sensing soul in man, and the understanding soul, and the feeding soul, right? Yes. But in what way this happens is easily considered if one pays attention to the differences of species and forms. For the species and forms of things differ from each other according to perfect, more perfect, and less perfect. Just as in the order of things, animated or living things are more perfect than inanimate things and unliving things, and animals more perfect than plants, and men than what? Rude animals, huh? In each of these, there are diverse grades of genera. And therefore, Aristotle, following Plato, in the Eighth Book of Metaphysics, likens the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of, what? Unity, huh? Remember how I would point that out with Shakespeare's agitation to use reason? You know? Shakespeare says, What is a man, if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? A beast no more. Notice he says, a beast no more. Yeah. See? As if the difference is like numbers, huh? More or less, huh? Yeah. So, you add to one, and you get two. And you add one to two, and you get, what? Three. And you add one to three, and you get four, huh? Yeah. So you add to body, life, and you have a, what? Plant, right? And you add to the plant, sensation, and you have a, what? Animal, right? And you add to animal reason, and you have a, what? Man. Man, right? You see? Take away reason for a man, you have nothing but an animal, right? Mm-hmm. Take away the sensation of animal, you have nothing but a plant, right? And that's how we spontaneously do that, children. People are dying sometimes, and they've lost their, what? Use of their reason, right? And lost their use of their senses, even, right? You see, they're vegetable, right? Okay. Oh, yeah. But because the higher up things don't appear there, right? So I kind of paraphrase before us to shake his argument, I say, what is a three if it be half a four? Say that again. What is a three if it be half a four? Two and no more. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So what is a man, right? Right. If his chief good is no more than the chief good of the beast, then he's no more than a what? A beast. A beast, yeah. Yeah. That's in a way, he's worse than a beast, right? Because a beast is as much as he can be, right? Yeah, yeah. That's what he says. This man is less than he is, shouldn't he? And this is very interesting when you try to understand how God knows too, but I'll get an allusion to that when he gets on here. And in the second book about the soul, Aristotle compares the diverse souls to the species of what? figures of which one contains another as the pentagon contains the quadrilateral and exceeds it, right? Or the way we have in a parallelogram, you have two triangles, right, huh? So one includes the other, right? What's that? In a parallelogram, right? Yeah. You have two triangles. Oh, yeah, okay. Okay. Thus, therefore, the understanding soul contains in its power whatever the sensing soul the brutes have and the feeding soul the plants. Just, therefore, as the species which has the figure, the pentagon figure, is not to another figure a tetragon, it's another pentagon because the tetragon figure would be, well, superfluous, right, from the fact that it's contained in the pentagon. What is the tetragon, a multi? The tetragon would be four-sided. Well, if I say, you know, you could say that in the square there's, what, contained two triangles, right, huh? Okay. So the higher contains what the lower does, but something more, right, huh? Yeah, something like that in the times of friendship, huh? Uh-huh. The higher style distinguishes the friendships. He distinguishes the friendship of usefulness, right? Uh-huh. But we're friends simply because we are useful to each other. Uh-huh. And then the friendship of pleasure, where we find each other's company pleasant. Then the friendship based upon, what, human virtue, right? Uh-huh. Okay? But the higher style says, if your friend has human virtue, he will also be more useful to you. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Then somebody doesn't possess human virtues. Mm-hmm. And he's going to really be more pleasant to be with. Pleasant, because you don't have to guard your wallet. Yeah, yeah. I mean, you have two people who are bad, right? They might enjoy each other's company because they're similar in character, right? Mm-hmm. But they're similar in something that is not actually pleasing. So if you and I are two cowards, you know, we get along because we're both cowards. But we aren't really being proud of being a coward, are we? See? But you and I are both courageous men, right, huh? Well, then we like each other not only because we're alike, but because you're liking something that is, what, actually pleasing, right? Mm-hmm. So Hamlet and Horatio, right, have a friendship based there on virtue, right? And so they're truly more useful to each other than two bad men can be to each other, right? And they really have more reason to enjoy each other's company. So two saints, right, have more reason to enjoy each other's company than two sinners. Two sinners enjoy each other's company because they're alike. But two saints are alike, too. But the two saints are alike in things that are naturally pleasing. And the two sinners are not. Something that is naturally repulsive. So the higher has what the lower has it, but it has in a, what, fuller way, or perfect way, huh? You know, Christian Bach, you know, he's been described as Mozart with something missing. Mm-hmm. You know, Christian Bach, you know, the youngest son there of Johann Sebastian. Mozart, you know, there's sin, you know, likeness of music of J.C. Bach to Mozart, huh? And Mozart's a young person, you know, sat on J.C. Bach's lap, right? Mm-hmm. And played and so on. But J.C. Bach has been described as Mozart with something missing. Mm-hmm. And Dryden, you know, the poet laureate of England there, you know, the famous poet. When he was a young man, there was, you know, two plays of Fletcher and performed for every one of Shakespeare. Now you hardly ever see a play of Fletcher, right? Mm-hmm. In fact, I could never see a play of Fletcher on the stage, did you? No, right. But there was a time where two of his plays were being performed for every one of Shakespeare. Mm-hmm. As he started to hear these plays more, he realized how superior Shakespeare was. And he finally described it by saying that Fletcher was but a limb of Shakespeare. It's like an arm of our leg of Shakespeare, right? It's something of Shakespeare, but not the whole of what Shakespeare had, huh? So the higher has what the lower has. But something, what? More. More. So you see this in the poet there when they describe, you know, the ideal woman there, right? You know, like when Shakespeare's farewell to the stage there, you know. Ferdinand meets Miranda, right? Right. He's like this thing about that woman and that thing about that woman and something else about that woman. But Miranda, she got everything, right? And, but that's kind of a common place among the poets on this big, you know, the woman is combining, right? All these tendencies that are divided in the other ones. So the higher has what the lower has, but a superior way. That's the way the angels are, huh? The higher the angels are, the fewer ideas they have. But the more they understand and the better they understand by what they have. So they understand more and better with fewer ideas. Take it to God who understands everything with one thought. Who said that? Thomas will explain that. Yeah. Brevity is a soul of wit. You read my little poem there, right? God the Father said it all in one word. No wonder when that word became a man, he spoke in words so few and said so much. He was the brevity and soul of wit. Like the source of that. Brevity is a soul of wit. You see, Shakespeare puts it in the mouth of a man who's very tedious and long-winded. Like me, see? But it's very true. Brevity is a soul of wit. And the wiser a man is, the more he says with what? Fewer words. Fewer words, yeah. The way the fool multiplies his words, as the Sapiential books say. So just like in the Pentagon, there's the Tetragon, right? So likewise, through the same soul. So likewise, neither through another soul, right? As Socrates is a man. And through another soul, an animal. But through one in the, what? Same, right? Now, I'm just going to apply to the first objection. Which, if you recall, they were saying that the understanding soul is incorruptible. But the other souls are, what? Corruptible, right? Thomas says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the sensing soul, of man even, does not have incorruptibility from the fact that it is sensing. But from this, that it is, what? Understanding, right? That's when incorruptibility is owed to it, huh? It's because the soul has an operation that is not in the body, right, huh? That we see that it must have an existence that's not entirely in the body. But the sensing soul, right? Its operation is all in the body. When, therefore, the soul is a sensing soul only, and not an understanding soul, it is corruptible, right? Because if the animal is destroyed, it's destroyed. But when it has with the sensing, understanding is incorruptible. Although the sensing doesn't give it incorruption, right? Nevertheless, this incorruption cannot be taken away from the understanding soul. See what he's reasoning there? I don't know how he's responding to it. The first objection is saying corruptible and incorruptible are not of one substance, right? And he's saying the understanding soul is incorruptible, but the sensing soul is not, right? And Thomas is replying by saying that the sensing soul that is also an understanding soul is incorruptible. But the sensing soul that is just a sensing soul is not, right? Okay. Now, the second objection kind of comes back and tries to argue that from the premise in the 10th book of the Metaphysics, that the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus, right? But man and dog are both animal in the same sense. But Thomas replies, huh? That forms are not placed in the genus or in a species, but the composed thing, huh? It's man that's put in the genus of what? Substance. It's a species of substance. And man is corruptible just as the other animals are. Whence the difference according to corruptible and incorruptible, which is on the side of the form, does not make man to be another genus from differing from other animals, huh? And that's something, again, you learn in logic, right, huh? Man is only, what? The soul of man is only a part of what? Of man, right, huh? If you take the whole man, he's an animal and he's corruptible. It's like Lucy is corruptible, being an animal. So they are both in the genus of the corruptible, right? Man and Lucy, or Socrates and Lucy. But the soul is not, strictly speaking, what? A species of a genus, right? But it's a form of some species. So it's led back to the genus of substance, but it's not in there as a species of substance. They're the same. They're saying that it's man and, let's say, dog and cat and so on. These are species, particular kinds of what? Animal, right? Okay. Like Gabriel and Raphael and Michael, right? Particular kinds of what? Angels, right? Okay. Well, these differ as the what? Incorruptible from the what? Corruptible. Okay? Now, there's a good reason why Aristotle would say that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus. Because genus is originally taken from what? The things we know from matter, right? Yeah. And matter is the reason why these things are corruptible. Yeah. And these are incorruptible because they don't have matter. They don't really have the same genus. So the incorruptible and the corruptible differ in genus. Now, the argument is saying, you know, well, man's soul is incorruptible. That's true. But man's soul is not a species of animal. The human soul is not an animal. Okay? It may be part of an animal, right? The human animal, right? But by itself, it's not a what? Part of an animal. It's not an animal. Okay? And it's animal that is corruptible, right? And the whole man is corruptible, as you'll find out. It happens every day. Right? So man and dog and cat are all corruptible. Greg, Michael, and so on. Raphael, Gabriel, are all what? In corruptible. But notice, if we consider our soul just by itself, then our soul, in that sense, is more in common with the angels, being corruptible than with the what? Dog and the what? Captain. And if you consider the body of man, his body, right? Angel doesn't have a body. If you consider man and his body, he seems to have more in common with the dog and cat, right? With Gabriel and Michael. Which is more me, my body or my soul? I say to the students, you know, don't you hear when somebody dies, they say he's gone? She's gone? I heard that in the hospital, you know? I hear nurses say that, right? He's gone. Haven't you heard that? What do you mean he's gone? The body's still there. But he spontaneously says he's gone when the soul is left, right? He's gone when the soul is left. As if that's more he or she than the body. It's not the entire he or she. But we see that, right? Yeah. Or the other way I show it is, you know... He's gone when the soul is left. He's gone when the soul is left. He's gone when the soul is left. Other things being equal, which do you judge more severely? Premeditated murder or murder of passion? Premeditated. Premeditated. Yeah. Why? You seem to have done it more, right? Because your reason was more involved, huh? Yeah. And you had time to think this over. Hotter. So that's a sign that we think that reason is more us than our emotions. Joe, they control yourself. But when the emotions are in control of Joe, Joe is not in control of himself. If the reason is in control, then Joe is in control, right? Because if Joe is more reason, then it's emotions. So even those ways, that's just a crazy philosopher is to think they're more soul or reason than emotion, right? Well, we all in some way recognize that. So when you first ask a student, you know, they say, which is more you, your reason or your emotions? Especially a woman who will say their emotions. I saw someone in a client agree with that. But then when you ask them these questions, right? Which would you, you know, judge more severely, premeditated murder or murder of passion, right? Yeah. And when your friend there is, you know, when people get angry and they say nasty things and they come back and apologize. I wasn't my selfish today, right? I lost control of myself. Well, something was in control of you. I flew out the hand. Yeah. But it was anger. It was emotions in control. And when that's in control, you're not in control. So therefore, you're thinking you're less anger than something. It's commitment, an emotion, or a choice. Yeah. I tell them you get married, not by emotion. Emotion doesn't marry you. The priest doesn't say, now, do you have wonderful feelings about so-and-so? No, but you take so-and-so, your husband, your wife, you're asking them to express, what, outwardly their choice, right? It's if the things I've chosen is more me. Or I take the example of Alcoholics Anonymous, right? When is a man true to himself, the alcoholic? When he's true to the choice he made to give up drinking, right? Or when he's true to his desire to drink. The choice. Yeah. Then he's being true to himself. It's if the choice, which is in the soul, right, is more him, right, than the bodily urge. And the third objection was dealing with the order of generation that Aristotle talks about. And Aristotle speaks of how the embryo first has a soul, which is, what, feeding only, right? Then later on, there's a soul that is sensing and find it has the understanding, what, soul, huh? But these other ones are not, what, they're replaced by a more perfect soul, okay? And so it's not as if in the original one there remains, and then it's something on the way to the generation of a full man, right? And so it's replaced by later one, huh? Just like if I have a friendship of usefulness, you and I are in business, right? And you're useful to me, okay? And so you have a friendship of utility, you and I. But then we get to know each other, we get to like each other, right? Now our friendship of usefulness has been replaced by a higher friendship, right? Yeah. And if finally we realize they're both good men, and trustworthy because they're both virtuous, then our friendship of pleasure will be replaced by the highest kind of friendship. Now I have three friendships towards you, you know? But I might first have this imperfect friendship, huh? My father became the friend of the man who sold him paint. My father used a lot of paint. So the friendship of usefulness, right? This man wanted to sell my father paint. My father needed paint for his farm weekends, right? But then they got to know each other, they go out to the ball games together or something, right? So it's now a friendship of pleasure, right? And it could go into a higher friendship, right? It seems like with the saints there, right? There was a young man that came courting St. Rose of Lima because she had a beautiful girl, right? Of course, she has no attention getting married, right? And she eventually converted the man, right? He became somewhat of a saint himself, huh? So you have examples of that, right, huh? A person is interested in the friendship of pleasure with a woman, and then he's, what, transformed, right? By a saint, huh? And acquires a friendship of a much higher kind, which replaces the friendship of pleasure that he... Why don't you ever thought he had? Does this one go against the church? Does there's no wrong on this one? I don't know if the church, you know, has made that explicit, when the human soul, when the understanding soul is actually, what? Infused, right? There might be some probable opinions about that, right? I thought that those resolve the immaculate conception. Could be, but I don't know if the teachers formally decide that. You know? Implicitly. Yeah. Yeah. I thought it was like a conception, basically. Yeah. Yeah. That was my understanding, but these others, it seems dormant, like the intellectual. Yeah. If it's dormant. Anyway, that's our point here now to try to solve that, maybe. Okay. But he's applying to an objection taken from Aristotle, right? Aristotle would speak of it first as having a kind of nourishing soul, right? Feeding soul. Then a sensing soul and finding the, you know? But it's not as if the earlier ones you made, right? But when you get to a new state of development, the old soul is replaced by a new one that carries on the functions of the earlier soul, plus has these new powers, right? Mm-hmm. And then eventually the plant's soul will be replaced, right? Okay. Now the fourth one there is taken from the idea that the genus is taken from matter and the difference from form, right, huh? And therefore there's what? Man is a rational animal, right, huh? Okay. So rational there is the genus, I mean the difference, animal and the genus, huh? Okay, it says, the objector says animal comes from a sensing soul, right? Rational from an understanding soul. So just as rational animal are two different parts of the definition here of man, right? So that whereby he's rational, whereby he's an animal, is something different, huh? So you have the understanding soul over here, and the sensing soul over here. And Thomas says, well, you're confusing logic with reality here. Because when you distinguish between rational and animal, what are you doing? You're understanding, right, man and dog and cat, when you say animal, in a more, what? General way, right? Okay. And so it's a separation in your thinking, but not in reality. Okay. I'm not both rational and animal, like I'm healthy and white, okay? Lucy is not both a cat and an animal, right? But animal is understanding what a cat is in a more general, confused way. So he says it is necessary according to diverse rationes, huh? It is not necessary, he says, according to diverse thoughts or logical intentions, which follow upon the way of understanding, to take diversity in natural things. Because reason is able to understand one and the same thing in diverse ways. Because, therefore, as has been said, the understanding soul and power contains what the sensing soul has, and even more, it can be reason is able to consider by itself what pertains to the sensing power as something imperfect and material. And because it finds this thing common to man and other animals, it forms the definition of the genus, or the thought of the genus. But that in which the understanding soul exceeds the sensing soul, it takes as formal and completive of it. And from this it forms the difference of man. That's true in all these things, right? What's a triangle? Three-sided figure. It's also a rectilineal plane figure, right? Now, is it a rectilineal plane figure by some size other than these three sides? Just take this up as an example. Euclid will define figure before he defines plane figure. And then he'll define rectilineal plane figure. What's a rectilineal plane figure? Well, it's a plane figure contained by straight lines, right? And then we subdivide these into this by three or four or five or some other number, right? The quadrilateral and the pentagon and so on. Now, are the three lines by which this is a triangle, are those other than the line by which this is a rectilineal plane figure? What's this again now? This is a triangle in particular, right? By having three sides, right? Right, right. It's a rectilineal plane figure by having sides that are straight lines. Straight lines. Now, are the straight lines in which it's rectilineal plane figure other than the line in which it is a triangle? No. No. Okay. Okay. And why, in my being a geometer, in my being, let's say, healthy, right? You know? It's not by the same thing that I'm healthy and that I'm a geometer. And I could be healthy without being a geometer and vice versa, right? But it's by the same lines that this is a triangle as rectilineal plane figure. Yeah. And it's by the same lines that this is a quadrilateral as rectilineal plane figure. Mm-hmm. Right? Why is this a quadrilateral? Because it's bound by four sides, right? Yeah. Why is it a rectilineal plane figure? Because it's bound by straight lines, right? Yeah. But it's the same straight lines that make it to be a, what, quadrilateral and make it to be a rectilineal plane figure. But I can understand, right, those lines more distinctly as four or three or five or six and so on, the hexagon, right? Yeah. Well, I can understand them in a more general way, right? It's simply what? Rectilineal. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So I shouldn't say that it's by different lines that one is a quadrilateral and one is a rectilineal plane figure. Same ones. Yeah. Yeah. But I understood, right, precisely in danger, right? The same way in man, right? When you say man is an animal, he's an animal by some soul, right? When you say man is a man, he's a man by some soul too. He's a different soul by which he's both? No. But that soul is understood more distinctly and precisely when you say it's a soul by which he is a, what? A man, right, huh? But that understanding soul was also a sensing soul, right? So you see the kind of mistake that the fourth objection is making, right? It's because the thought is different here, rectilineal plane figure and quadrilateral, right? Yeah. That the sides by which it is one and the other must be different. No. What's different here is your understanding of one and the same thing. You understand it more precisely and understanding more what? Generally. Yeah. Are you a man or a woman, right? Well, you're a man, right? Right. Okay. Someone else is a woman, right? Right. If I compare you and I say, well, you're both a human being, okay? Now, is it by something, one thing that you're a man and by something else that you're a human being? Or in the case of the woman, is it by one thing that she's a woman and by something else she's a human being? Or is that what a woman is? To be a woman is to be a human being. Right. To be a man is to be a human being, right? Right. I'm not saying really two different things of you, am I? I'm saying, I'm understanding what you are more precisely when I say you're a man. When I say you're a human being, I'm understanding what you are in a more, what? General way, right? If I say you're an animal, I'd still say what you are. But in an even more general way, right? You're a living body, that's what you are. But I'm understanding one and the same thing in a more precise way or in a more vague way, in a more distinct way or more confused way, in a more particular way or in a more general way. So you consider that the human soul, the understanding soul, also gives us the ability to sense, right? And you just consider that, right? Then you can say man is an animal. He has a sensing soul. Right? Just like in the number five, I can consider what? Four, right? There's a four in five, isn't there? If I want to, I can consider the four in five. Does that mean now that a number of five, there's five ones, there's also four ones, and they're not the same ones? No. No. But I'm considering the ones in five more distinctly or more completely, right? So you're confusing the way things are with the way we think, which is the most, goes back to the common problem of philosophy. I'll take a little break and then I'll show you these scriptural texts that are kind of relevant to this. Now this is at the end of the first epistle to the Thessalonians in the last chapter. And as he sometimes does, St. Paul gives a little prayer, right? And he says, What chapter is this again? This is chapter five of the first epistle to the Thessalonians. Mm-hmm. And it's first, did you have it there, your text? Mm-hmm. Okay, 23 is the verse. Okay? Okay. So I get to kind of the Greek here and I don't know if I'm English. He says, Outas de Hotheos, huh? God himself, right? Hotheos, God, Outas. Teis Erenes, the God of peace, right? May he what? Haziasai, may he sanctify, right? You, huh? Holoteles, huh? Complete or perfect, right? And Holocleron, entire. Humon, may he sanctify what? And now he says three things. To Pnuma, the spirit of you, Kaihe Tsuke, the soul of you, and the what? The body. To Soma. Blamelessly, right? Until the presence of the Lord, our Lord Jesus Christ, may it all be kept, huh? Okay? Now Thomas comes down and says, What's he saying there? Pnuma, the spirit, and the soul, and the body, right? What's the difference in particular between the spirit and the soul, right? Okay? Now we raised that question before there with the Magnificat, right? Because the original says, My soul magnifies the Lord, right? And my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior, right? Okay? We have that same thing here. Now, let's read a little of Thomas' commentary when he comes to talk about that. And the reason why it kind of struck me was because he's talking about the same error that he's refuting in that article. Okay? It's not an error that St. Paul is making, but an error in the interpretation of what St. Paul is saying. Okay. He says, on the occasion of these words, right, some people said that in man other is the spirit to us, right? And other is the soul, right? Okay? Two souls. Yeah. Placing two souls in men, right? Yeah. See? Let me get started by Latin here. Ocasio Ocasio On the occasion of these words of St. Paul, right? Dixeret, they say, right? Quidam, some people say this. Quad in homine, in man. Alio des spiritus, right? And alio des anima. Other is the spirit and other is the soul. Ponentes, placing, right? Propositing. Duas in homine animas. Is it? Two souls, right? And he says, and heapsut reprobata, these are disproved in that both Ecclesiastes is the same one that was referred to here. Interesting, too, I wanted to mention, I forgot, but in the volume that I just had here, as a footnote on that, I mentioned that that was condemned by the Eighth Council of Constantinople, Ben has two souls. Yeah. But it is mentioned. Yeah, okay, that's good. Did you look it up? Church. Okay. Okay. Quence, it should be known, and I was just going to crack it there, right? Uh-huh. That these do not differ, secundum essentium, they don't differ in their substance or nature, but secundum potentium, according to their power, right? For in our soul there are some powers which are acts of bodily organs, as are, for example, the powers of the sensing part. That means the reason and the act of the will, and these are called spirituals, huh? As it were, as it were, immaterial, right? And separate in some way from the body, insofar as they are not the acts of the body, right? And sometimes they're also called men's. I used to say that in Augustine a lot, men's for that part of the soul. But insofar as it animat, meaning animat a body, it animates a body, it is called a soul, because this is proper to it, right? So, in other words, man's soul, insofar as it has powers, right, that are not in the body, is called a spirit sometimes. And it shares understanding and will, in a way, with the angels of God, who are also called spirits, right? But insofar as it's the form of the body, it animates the body, it's called a soul, right? Yeah. But it's really the same thing, which you're thinking now of the fact of it has some powers that are only in the body, others are. And Paul speaks here properly, Thomas says. And lo peter hick, Paul is propriae. And for, he's talking about, you know, avoiding sin here. For three things run together in sinning. Reason, sensuality, right, meaning the rituals, and then the body carrying out these things, right? Okay. Wait, what is this? These three things are like? Nam ad pekandu, right? To sinning. Tria, con cruat, right? Three things run together. Grazio, he says, which is, he's got to have a spirit, right? Sensualitas, he's tied up with the, what, anima, because this, he's talking about the emotions, the passions, right? And then the executio corporis, the body carrying it out, right? Okay. He wishes, therefore, Paul, right, in his prayer for them, that there be no, that in none of these be any sin. Right. Not in reason, right? Whence he says, put spirit to us. I don't know if he has spirit. That is mens vestra, your mind, servetur integer, be preserved whole, complete. For he says, in every sin, and Aristotle already pointed this out, in Socrates, in every sin, reason is corrupted. In every sin. Yeah. According to the way in which everyone who is bad is ignorant, right? He's mistaken. Also, not in sensuality. Whence he says anima, because that's a power in the body, right? Also, not in the body, meaning carrying the body, carrying the salad. And Jeffrey says, et corpus, in the body. I mean, this is a text, huh? Yeah. Do you see that, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, that's right. Now, a little different way of speaking here. Well, let's take the minificat first. The minificat, I think, is found only in Luke, right? Okay? Again, you have the same words. Psukke and what? Arima. Pinuma. Spirituosa. Which depends on anima and spirituosa. She says, my soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior. Now, why does she use the word soul first, and then the word spirit later on? Yeah. See? Well, there's two ways you can understand the words of Our Lady. At least two ways. My soul magnifies the Lord, right? And one, I think, is more subtle than the other. The more obvious one would be that through her body she praises the Lord, right? Okay? When she genuflects, when she, what, sings the psalms and so on, right? She's giving glory to God. She's magnifying God through her body, right? And therefore, through her soul, insofar as it's the, what, form of the body, right? Anima in the body, yeah? But it seems to me there's a much more subtle thing, a much more subtle interpretation of those words of Mary, right? And that is that our Lord, I mean God, rather, God, I think, is called Lord, most strictly speaking, because he made us. Okay? Kurios, huh? Okay. We belong to the Lord, right? He's our Lord because he made us. And it's said very often in Scripture, right? The Lord's of the earth. Okay? Now, the things that God makes, you know, manifest as excellence, right? They magnify him in some way. But what is the greatest thing that God made? Man, Jesus. Yeah, the word made flesh. Okay. Okay? And Thomas is very clear about this, huh? You know, in the Summa Carta Gentiles, he divides, you know, theology according to the consideration of God himself. You know, God is the maker, and then God is the end, and the provident, right? When he gets to the third part, then he's very clear. The incarnation is the greatest thing that God has made. Okay? But Mary is what? Secondary. She's cooperating, right? In the greatest thing God has made, because the word is made flesh, taking her flesh, right? Yes. And her blood, and later on her milk, I guess, right? So, insofar as she has a body, right, with flesh that Christ can take, right, and blood, and milk, and so on, then she's what? Cooperating with the greatest thing that God has made. The word made flesh, huh? Okay? And it fits together with the use of the word Lord there, right? Kurios, I think, is a Greek word, huh? But most strictly speaking, kurios is a name applied to God because he made us. And we belong to him. He's our Lord. That's why. See? So she's magnifying the Lord. He's magnifying the maker, right? By cooperating with him in the making of the greatest thing he's made. It's magnificent to see that. My soul, right? See? But she does that through her body, right? Okay? But then, when she rejoices in the Lord, I mean, she rejoices in God, huh? And there, just to make sure I'm not misquoting it, the word is not... Yeah, see? The first part of the word is megalune, magnifies, he psuke, that's a really good psychology, huh? Psuke, he psukemu, my soul, tonkuria, right? Lord, right? Excuse me. So you've taken it in a strict sense. Krayon is naming God, right? Because he made us and we belong to him. He's our Lord. Then she's magnifying God as all his works do, but most of all, the greatest work he made, the most wonderful work he made, the word made flesh. And then she says, and egaliasin, the exalts, right? Topiuma. My spirit, topiuma mu. Epi tothil, which is the word God, right? So it's rejoicing in God as he is in himself, right? And only the spirit can do that. It's only insofar as the soul has what? Powers that are not in the body, right? Maybe the reason and the will that God in himself can be an object for the soul. He can rejoice in God in himself. So that fits the difference between the two, huh? And my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior. Now, I think in the Hail Mary, you have two parts there in the first part, huh? We say, Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee, right? And what does that refer to? She never was with sin because she was full of grace. Okay. But it refers more to her pneuma, her spirit, right? Than her soul, right? Because grace is what? In that part of the soul that transcends the body, right? Yeah. Okay? And that's why you have theological virtues in reason and in the will, but not in the senses. In my emotion, right? You might have infused moral virtues, but you don't have theological virtues, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, that's what the angel says to her before she has agreed to the Incarnation, right? Okay. Hail, Holy Queen. No, no. It's not right now. Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee, right? Okay? And then the next words are the words that Elizabeth gives here, really, huh? Now, a little bit later on. Elizabeth said, a little bit before that, and it came to pass that when Elizabeth heard the sanitation of Mary, the babe leaped in her womb, right? That's John the Baptist being purged of original sin. Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit, right? And she spoke with a loud voice and said, Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, right? Well, she's thinking of the bodily aspect there, right? That Mary is, what, among women, huh? She's, you know, the only woman that's both virgin and mother, right? And blessed is the fruit of thy womb. Well, that's referring to the incarnation, right? And something that she cooperates with in her, what? In her body, right, huh? In her soul. As far as it animates her body, huh? You've probably heard of Gustin, and he often says, you know, Mary would profit nothing from conceiving Christ in her body if she had not first conceived him in her, what? In her soul, yeah. In her spirit, right? In her spirit, right? Of course, there you have the same order, not the same order, the same distinction, but the first order from which you have the Magnificat, right? You start with the words of the angel, you know, the words of Elizabeth, right? It's beautiful to see that, right? Yeah. But the soul of Mary and the spirit of Mary are not two different things, right? But it's called a soul, especially insofar as it animates the body, right? Yeah. And therefore provides the flesh and blood, and it's kind of amazing to think that, you know, it gets the blood from your mother, it circulates through your body, and then back into your mother, doesn't it? Yeah. Yeah, so it's kind of amazing to think this is happening with Mary, and Christ is sharing her blood, really, huh? And then, you know, I'm sure he was breastfed, too, right, for some time, right? Yeah. So, well, this is all her body that she's doing this, right? It's her soul insofar as it animates the body, right? But insofar as her soul has powers like everybody's soul has that transcend the body, right? And if it can know God in himself, then she rejoices in the Lord, huh? Now, look at the other text there, you know, the one where our Lord is in the Garden of Gethsemane, and everybody knows the words, huh? The spirit is willing, right? But the flesh is weak, right? Now, I just find that in Matthew and Mark, I don't know if that's in Luke or John, those words. Do you see Luke or John? But there's Matthew and Mark, there's no difference, but in both cases you have the context between the spirit, right, and the flesh, right? Well, there you're thinking of that part of the soul, right? The spirit, right? That has these powers that are material and can, you know, would be more, not be corrupted by his body so much, right? And then the soul, insofar as it's got sensuality, like you said there, right? You know? He doesn't use the word soul there, but he does use the word flesh, right? But that refers to the soul insofar as it's had made in the body, huh? So you're kind of divided against yourself there, you know, when you're being tempted there. Your body is, you know, there's a conflict between your reason and your emotions, which are wildly, huh? Yeah. Compassion, your fear, whatever it is, you could be said. Yeah. The other text I was thinking of is the one just where Christ is talking to the Samaritan woman, and she's talking about why don't you worship what we worship here up in the mountain, right? And that's where he says, you know, that what? In spirit, yeah. Spirit and truth, right? And you don't have to worship, you know, we won't worship on this mountain or the other mountain in particular, but, you know, and, but there you see, what's interesting about that text is he's talking about us worshiping in what? In spirit and truth and God wants that kind of a worship, right? Because God himself is what? Spirit and truth. Yeah, he's a spirit himself, yeah. Of course, we use the word spirit for, for the, the angel, I mean, for the angels as well as for the, God, right, huh? The immaterial substance, right? So insofar as the soul is, has these immaterial powers, it's also called a, what? Spirit, right? Yeah. And it's that part of the soul that, yeah, let me see here, here, sir. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. But the hour cometh and now is when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth, right? So in Greek it says, hoi alethinoi, the true proskuneitai, the true worshipers, right? And then the verb form of that same thing, proskuneisusen, topatri, to the Father, in pnumatia, in spirit, right? And he goes on and says, and the Father seeks such ones, huh? Ah, to worship him, huh? For God is a, what? Pnuma. God is spirit, right? And those worshiping, and it moves us to worship him, those worshiping him, to worship him in the spirit and in, what? Truth, right? Yeah. I just mentioned that text because it's a very clear text, the way you use the word spirit to us to name something, what? In material, right? Yeah. Originally it comes in the word for breath or air, right? Mm-hmm. But, and it's carried over and applied to an entirely material substance, right? So the angels are said to be spirits and God himself is said to be a spirit. But also the soul of man, right? The souls of the other animals are not said to be spirits. So it's very striking, I mean, if you got one text that I'm very familiar with, you know, where you have that contrast, but this one here, it's kind of interesting, that St. Paul should use that same distinction, right? Mm-hmm. He wants them to, and Paul speaks here, he says properly. For at the condom, sinning, three things run together. Reason, sensuality, and the executionio corporis, right? But just take the first two there, ratio and sensualitas, Mm-hmm. Ratio is this immaterial power that we have, and sensuality is this passions, emotions, which is something bodily, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.