De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 80: The Soul as Substantial Form and the Unity of Man

Transcript
================================================================================

He wishes, therefore, that in none of these be there sin, none in reason, whence he says, with spiritus, that your spiritus might be served or conserved, integer, whole. And then he says, in every sin, reads in script and so on. And then, nec in sensualitate, not in sensuality either, whence he says, what? Anima. That's kind of marvelous, marvelous, didn't you? Did you see that? Yeah, okay, I was trying to figure it out. I can forward it up with you, it's a similarity. I think it was three we did last time, and four they were in the day. So we'll say I'll look there. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or the luminal images, and rouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. I was looking at a book there when I was out there. It was a little tan book. It was on angels and devils and so on. Really kind of little things in the lives of the saints and so on. There was one there with Padre Pio, right? I guess there was singing in the chapel, right? Of course, there's no monks or no brothers, no priests in the chapel, right? So one of the monks or brothers calls attention to this. He says, well, that's just the angels singing. You know, some soul has been released from purgatory after heaven, so that's the angels singing. So it's kind of an interesting anecdotally as the angels sing there, you know? So Shakespeare's not too far off, you know, when Heratio says, you know, now cracks the noble heart, good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest. I was quoting Shakespeare there, right? But Padre Pio is this other thing, yeah. And so in Article 4 here, Question 76, whether there is in man another form, meaning another substantial form, besides the understanding, what? Soul. Now to the fourth, he proceeds thus. It seems that in man there is another form besides the understanding soul. Notice this is somewhat like Article, what, 3, because Article 3 was asking whether there are other, what, souls in man besides the understanding soul. And in some sense, that's dealing with more particular substantial forms, huh? But here, you're kind of thinking of even a substantial form that's more fundamental than the souls, namely the one that would make something be a body, right? Okay? Now, you ask 3 and 4 here, and you say kind of, it's actually kind of strange, some of these positions sometimes, but why do men get into these positions? you say, they know, to some extent, that the understanding substance is an immaterial substance, and therefore the understanding substance seems to be just form, right? And these material substances can't understand, huh? And so, if the understanding soul was a form of a body, then it seems that it would have existence only in the body, right? And therefore, it would have no activity or operation except in the body. And you know, they can't understand this nature of the human soul, right? That it's a form of a body, right? And gives to a body what lesser forms give to the body. But in addition, its existence is not entirely immersed in the body. And so, it has certain abilities, like the ability to understand and the ability to choose and the ability to separate something understandable from the images. It has these abilities that are not in the body, right? And they can understand how that's possible, right? And it's a kind of a, what, strange, we are kind of a strange being, shall we say, right? And the Arab philosophers sometimes said that man is on the horizon, huh? Between the material world and the immaterial world. And so, he's got like one foot in the material world and one in the immaterial world. And they want to make something either entirely in the immaterial world or entirely in the material world. And if it's entirely in the immaterial world, it doesn't have a body, really, huh? And it's not tied up with the battery, really. Or else it's entirely in the material world, immersed in it, and it can't understand anything, huh? And yet man, obviously, and we know this from our own individual experience, he's in some way in the material world. He has a body, right? And I don't know if you've ever had a, you know, you've seen all your arms and legs and so on, but you've ever had a tooth pulled or anything like this, right? You have kind of a feeling of having lost something, right? And a fortiori, if you've had an arm or a leg or something like that amputated, right? This is not, you know, the living room share, you know, losing a leg. This is you losing part of yourself, huh? And so you're very much in the material world, huh? They're showing one of the old Ronald Reagan movies one time on TV, you know, where he loses a leg, you know? And of course, you know, you're sedated when they do this and then you wake up, right? And you describe you don't have a leg anymore, right? And Reagan, he's acting in the role, of course, but, you know, where's the rest of me? I mean, it's kind of a, terrible, it'd be a horrible thing to have that, huh? And so, I mean, that's very much a part of you, right? Okay? It may not be the best or the best part of you, but it's very much a part of you, huh? So there's no doubt that man is something material, right? On the other hand, we still have the experience of understanding and understanding universal. And if you stop and think about it, the form by which you understand something universal is not going to be a form in matter, a form in the continuous, because such a form would be, by that fact, tied to the singular. And so, but it's kind of hard to understand that, right? So they want to put the human soul either entirely in the immaterial world or else, you know, they want to put something else there in place in the human soul to form the body. So, I mean, you end up in a few strange positions, right? That the form by which I'm a body, like here, or the form by which I'm able to digest and grow and reproduce, or even the form by which I'm able to sense, see and hear and smell and taste, that this is something different than the form by which I understand. But then you see, as you read these articles, the greater difficulties that people get into, see, that they kind of, what, split up man, deny the unity of man, and so on. And so, when you see the difficulties that gets into, you're kind of forced back to the truth, which is that the soul by which man understands also has the perfection, right, or gives the perfections that the lower forms give, but something, what, more, okay? And it's a little bit like, you know, when I compare it to what Aristotle says about friendship, you know, he distinguishes the useful friend, right, and then the friendship of pleasure, and then finally the perfect and complete kind of friendship, which is based on virtue. But, you realize that if you have a friendship based on virtue, there's more reason to enjoy each other's company than that of those who are not virtuous, huh? You know, they say that you like somebody, I like you because you like me. Okay? So even if you and I We are both bad and alike in that we can get a certain pleasure in each other's company, right? We like the same delivery, so to speak. But that's a friendship and something that is not naturally pleasing, huh? So if you and I are cowards, and I like you because you're a coward, brothers and sisters fought together, but cowardice is not something that's naturally pleasing, huh? But if you and I are both courageous men, and we like each other because we see that courage in each other, then we have more reason to enjoy each other's company, because we're not only alike, but we're alike in something that is naturally pleasing, huh? But at the same time, if you possess the virtues, you are going to be more useful to me, right, than someone who doesn't possess the virtues, huh? So a courageous man is going to be more useful to me than a coward, especially in the time of battle, right? And a man who's wise or a man who has foresight and prudence and so on, he's going to be more useful to me in advice and so on, than a man who's ignorant and foolish and so on. And the old saying, you know, with friends like that, you don't need enemies, huh? So the highest kind of friendship gives you what the lower friendships give you, but much, what? Much more, right? So it's kind of hard, you know, to see that sometimes, but if you think of maybe things that are more known to us, like the friendship, you see that the higher form of friendship, the friendship that's based on virtue, not only gives you something unique, but it also gives you what the lower friendships give you, usefulness and pleasant to be with and so on. And this is the way the soul is, right? As Thomas says, all the higher forms, huh? The higher form gives what the lower form gives, the higher substantial form, plus it gives something, what? More. More, huh? Okay. And that's why they compare, in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, and Peter had already done this before, Aristotle, but they compare forms in some way to numbers, right? So, like, four contains what three contains, but something more. But it also contains what the three. And three also contains, what, two, but something more. And so the higher form contains what the lower form does, but something more, huh? Okay. So you can see kind of the background of where these difficulties get into, right? People couldn't understand how the human soul could give what other material forms give, that is to say, forms that exist only in matter, right? And whose existence is tied to matter, and whose activity or operations are only in the body and through the body, right? You couldn't understand how the human soul could give that to the body, right? And yet have something in common with the angels, huh? That to the human soul, I have something in common with the cat. The cat was around the table last night. We were having some ham there, and she wanted some of that ham, so my son was giving me a little tidbit to say, it's ham, and she was enjoying this, and he was heading down to pet her a bit after his finger. But it didn't hurt anything, you know, but just thought there's a more piece of ham there. So I was enjoying the ham, too, so I mean, I had something in common with the cat. I used to, when he had the other cat before that, he's dead now, I guess, but the other cat, I used to say, you know, we're going to have something nice like steak or something, and I said, we're going to have steak tonight, you're invited, too, you know? I used to kind of pretend to myself that the cat is too, but she seemed to understand in a way, you know, that this is going to be good night, you know? So I do have something in common with those cats, huh? Let me see. So the liking of meat, anyway. But they don't have it as diversified, you know. I do have something in common with them. I do enjoy that meat, and they seem to appreciate good meat, and they know it's something better than they're getting in the cat food. But then I have something in common with the angels, huh? I see. Understanding and willing. So I have what the lower has, but in a better way. I have emotions, but my emotions are somewhat more elevated than the cat's emotions. And I have understanding and will, but they're kind of depressed compared to the understanding of the angel, right? And the will. So I have the higher and the lower way and the lower and the higher way. That's kind of interesting, huh? But then you have to stop and think and understand that that is so, right? So let's look at the objections here. It seems that in man there's another form besides the understanding soul. Now the first objection is taken from the very definition of the soul. For as the philosopher says, That's Antonomasia, right? I told you that. I put that word on the board, right? Yeah. I had that hand on that. Yeah, yeah. So I can't see her. And Antonom. So we don't really have a real English word, you know, for it, huh? That's taken from the Greek. Antonomasia. And in very brief, that means again, it's... Well, you're giving a common name or the name of the general to the particular or vice versa. You can do it either way because that particular stands out, right? So if I say that Aristotle is the philosopher with a kind of a capital P, well, he's not the only philosopher, but among all philosophers, he stands out. And in the book on the poetic art, Aristotle calls Homer the poet. And I mentioned how in the Federalist papers there when they quote Shakespeare, they don't say, and as Shakespeare says, this is as the poet says, you know, a long farewell to all my greatness. But they're arguing, you know, that if we don't have this union, right, we're going to be picked off by the European powers and so on. And whatever claims to greatness we have, we're going to be lost, right? But they kind of, you know, quote, and as the poet says. Years later, I found this in Henry VIII, right? In Shakespeare's play, right? In the downfall there. The tragic downfall. A long farewell to all my greatness. But instead of, you know, saying as Shakespeare says, as Shakespeare says, you say as the poet says. Sure. And it's interesting, huh, that Peter and Paul are called apostles by Antonio Masia. So Thomas will often refer to St. Paul as the Apostle with a capital A. Sure. And I guess in the other letters that we have there, the other apostles don't call themselves apostles, but St. Paul often does in the address and the letters. So Peter and Paul are the apostles, huh? And I notice, you know, the phrase that our Holy Father uses sometimes, he'll call Peter and Paul the princes of the apostles, right? Oh. Okay? And, of course, Christ himself is named by Antonio Masia. The name Christ, huh? It means the anointed one, right? Oh, right. He's not the only one anointed. Sure. But among all those who are anointed, he is the anointed one. And the Bible itself is named from what? Oh, yeah, the book. Yeah, it means the book, right? See? Now, you can have Antonio Masia the other way around, though, too, where you give the particular name to the general. So we might say about somebody that he's a Romeo, or he's a Don Juan, or he's a Casanova, huh? Uh, we take some famous lover, right? Real or fictional, right? Instead of saying he's a lover, we say he's a Don Juan, or he's a Romeo, right? Uh, sometimes there's a tendency to call a man who is kind of hesitant to act to call him a Hamlet, huh? See? And, uh, so they take the name of a particular man who stands out for that, huh? Not calling somebody an Einstein or something like that because he has this excellent son in that area, right? But it's more common in reverse where you give the name of the general to the particular. Plato, in the symposium there, he speaks of how he gives two examples there. He doesn't use the term Antonia Messia. That comes from the rhetoricians, right? The name for this figure of speech. Because, you see, a lot of these names came from the rhetoricians. That's where they were first named. And if you see the use of these in a speech, I always remember Senator Everett Dirksen. He's the guy who nominated Senator Tapp for the presidency there in 1952. But he comes to the end of his speech. I give you Mr. Integrity, Mr. Republican, my friend Bob Taft. So Bob Taft was known as Mr. Republican, right? Well, he's not the only Republican, right? But he's Mr. Republican, right? You see? Like, he kind of stood out, you know, the position at the time there, right? But I call him, you know, some famous ball player, Mr. Baseball or something like that. So Thomas, it wasn't original Thomas. I mean, other people have been calling Aristotle the philosopher, right? But Thomas uses that in Tony Messiah a lot of times when he quotes Aristotle. How does the second form of Antoine Messiah, or by the particular man, by the general, how does that differ from synecdoche, where you might call, you know, isn't synecdoche similar to that second form? What is synecdoche? Park. It isn't, right, naming, um... Synecdoche... You know, the hole for the fire. Yeah, yeah. And also, the difference... The reason that the word became... Yeah. See, the difference between, in one case, you're dealing with the composed hole, right? Right, so that's the only difference. Yeah, yeah. And the other is universal hole, right? Universal hole. Yeah. So, um... But when I classify the figures of speech, I put those two next to each other, right? Because of their similarity, huh? Right. So you say, and the word was made flesh. They were giving the name of the, what? Part to the whole, right? Mm-hmm. See? You know, sometimes the heretics misunderstood those words, right? And said that he didn't have a human soul. But in place of the human soul was his divinity, right? The word was in place of it, huh? But actually, the word flesh there is used, like it's used elsewhere in Scripture sometimes, to you all flesh must come, right? But sometimes in Scripture, you know, they talk about how many souls perished, right? Meaning how many men perished, right? And there are reasons why you might, you know, have synecdoche from the better part, the soul, in some cases, right? And another from the lesser part, right? Because in St. Paul wants to, I mean, not St. Paul, but St. John wants to emphasize that Christ went all the way down, assuming even the, what? The lowest part of us, you might say, the flesh, right? Okay? But whatever the reason for emphasizing that part by naming the whole from that part, it's still an example of synecdoche, right? Yeah. Yeah, yeah. The French king says, the state, you know, it's me, you know. I am, huh? You know, I used to say, when the conic died, you know, half the faculty is gone, right? Oh. See? He is the faculty, so to speak, right? He is the on, right? You see? But again, that would be synecdoche, right? Where the part is said to be the whole, right? Or vice versa. See? He's a brain, huh? See? He's a brain, huh? Is it more rare in this instance to go vice versa the other way? Like it's more common this way for the part, as opposed to... Exposed in the case of the nycdoche, yeah. You're more up to... Just opposite of... Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So, it's good to understand those parts of, those figures of speech, both for reading, what, Scripture, right? And for reading fiction, right? But also, as I say, they're used in speeches, huh? Mm. Okay. You know, Pericles has a famous funeral oration where all the young men in Athens, you know, somebody had been killed. He sits as if spring had been taken out of the year, right? So, it's a beautiful metaphor, right? So, spring there is a metaphor for the young men, huh? For the city, huh? Okay. Where the old man might be called metaphorically winter. Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha So again, this objection is saying, if man is an animal, a self-moving thing, right, it's got to have one part that is a mover and one part that is moved. And the mover, of course, is the soul. What is moved must be a body. So the soul is one thing, the body is something else. And so the body must be what it is by a form other than the soul, right? You see the way the objection is proceeding? Therefore, it's necessary that in man and in every animal, okay, not just in man, but in every animal, right, that there be another substantial form through which or by which is constituted a, what, body. Now the third objection. Moreover, there is a order in forms to be noted according to their relation to the first matter. Before and after, right, are said in comparison to some, what, beginning, right? Incidentally, I think I mentioned before that in the fifth book of wisdom, Verestal takes up the words that are used in the axioms and used especially in wisdom and words that are used to some extent in every science because they're so common. The first word he takes up is the word principium, the word beginning, right? In Greek, it's archaeion. Then a little bit later on, when he's talking about the parts of one, he takes up the words prios, prios, and posterios, before and after, right? And of course, these two words are kind of closely related, because when he's first taking up the meanings of the word beginning, and he goes through the six basic meanings, then he gives kind of a common notion of beginning, that a beginning is what is first, he says, in being or in becoming or in knowing, okay? So he kind of defines beginning by first. Well, if you stop and think about it, first would be defined by before, because first is what is before everything else. But having given this common notion of beginning, when he gets down to before and after, he doesn't do what he does in the categories, right, where he just distinguishes the meanings of before and after, like we saw before, before, but he recalls the common notion of beginning, how beginning is what is first in being or becoming or in what? Being known, right? And then he distinguishes various senses of before and after, corresponding to different senses of beginning. And that's because of what Thomas says here, that before and after are set in comparison to some, what, beginning, huh? Okay? So when we arrange things and put them in order, we usually start with some beginning, and what is closer to that beginning we put next, and then what is not as close, after that, and right down the line, right? So at the beginning, in a sense, determines the before and after. You see it very much in the case of numbers, right? You start with one, and then you give them two, three, four, five, and so on, right? And if someone said two, three, five, four, you say, oh, no, no, no, four by five, five, because four is closer, okay? If, therefore, there was not in man another substantial form besides the rational soul, but the rational soul, the reasonable soul, adhered immediately to first matter, it would follow that it was in the order of the most imperfect forms, which immediately exist in matter. You see what he's saying there, right? It's a little bit like when we talk about, let's say, speech, right? And we say, well, beginning of speech is really letters, huh? Okay? And then we say, in a word, there is a, what? Arrangement of letters, right? And then in a sentence, there is an arrangement of what? Words. And then in a paragraph, there is an arrangement of sentences, and so on, huh? And that's the way he's kind of understanding these things, right? And if you try to put the arrangement of the sentence down there and say the arrangement of the sentence is something that exists in the letters, you don't have anything in between there. You'd be making it the lowest form. Okay? But again, Thomas is going to resolve that objection by pointing out that the soul, although it gives the lowest thing that a form can give to matter, namely to be a body, right? It gives all the higher things up until it's, okay? Yeah. So, but like, as I say, going back to the comparison of numbers, if you say that in five there is a two, then you're saying five comes right after one because two comes right after one, right? So it's the lowest number, right? Well, if five only had two, then it would be the lowest, right? But it has two and three and four in it, right? It has what two has, but something more. Namely, it has what three has, but something more. Even what four has, right? And something more that four doesn't have, right? So the soul, in that sense, is, what, higher in perfection, right? Because it gives to matter not only the perfection that the lowest form does, but all the higher perfections. Moreover, the human body is a mixed body, huh? Now, you've got to understand what they mean by mixture when they speak to us. It doesn't mean usually in Thomas or in Aristotle what we mean by mixture, huh? It doesn't mean you're just taking, you know, like my grandchildren, right? Having cinnamon sugar on their toast, right? So my dad there puts some butter on the bread, right? And then the sugar and cinnamon together, right? But the sugar and cinnamon, we didn't become one thing, are they? They're just very small pieces, the two, but juxtaposed, huh? They're put in, you know, into one common shaker, right? But in the strict sense of mixture in Aristotle and Thomas, the elements are not simply juxtaposed, but they've been replaced by something, huh? That is one. So he's going on saying, well, the human body is a mixed body, huh? It's not simply, what, earth or air or fire or water, one of the simple elements, huh? But it combines the elements, but, okay? But a mixture does not come about according to matter only, because then it would be, what, only a corruption. Well, if the elements that came together and reunited only in the fundamental first matter, right, then all the elements would be corrupted, right? So the objection is saying that the different elements, what, somehow remain together, right, huh? Okay? In the same way when we say today, when we say that hydrogen and oxygen come together and they, what, form water, right, huh? Well, we think that hydrogen and oxygen, or we speak of it a lot of times, as if they are both actually found in the water, right, huh? Okay? And that may or may not be true. So the fact that you can get Hydrogen and oxygen from water is a sign that in some way they're in there, right? But are they necessarily actually distinct in the water? That's maybe not altogether clear. And you read even the scientists, like Schrodinger, right? There's an author of the Schrodinger equation, but he's a very famous physicist. But he says, you know, talking about the elementary particles when they come together, and he says they become blurred, he says, right? And when I say blurred, he says, I don't mean in our knowledge. In reality, they become blurred, huh? And they lose their, what? Individuality, their distinction, right? So you've got to be kind of careful what's going on there. And, you know, when Shakespeare praises, huh, at the end of Julius Caesar, right, where, as Octavius Caesar there, he praises Buddhists, right? And how the elements are so mixed in him, right? That all the earth, you know, or nature might snap and say to all the world, this was a man, right? You know, the nice balance in the man. But that's, you know, said according to the ancient knowledge, right? That there's a mixture of earth, air, fire, and water in us, but, you know, in those of us who are better disposed to be human, the mixture is finer, right? And they're more balanced, huh? Some people might have, you know, a lot of fire in there, you're rascal, you know, they don't have control of their anger, and others might have a lot of water in, you know, a drop seed, and some might be melancholic, right? Got a lot of earth or something, huh, and so on. So, but in the thinking of Aristotle and Thomas, when the elements came together, you didn't simply have earth, air, fire, and water as distinct substances, right? But you had a new substance, right? That it's something of the power of the different elements, but was really, you know, had its own substantial form, huh? Okay? But this objection is not proceeding exactly the way Thomas and Aristotle would understand the mixture. And so he's saying the mixture does not come about according to matter only, that they're only in, what, united in first matter, because then the elements wouldn't remain at all. It's necessary, therefore, that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, right? Now, Thomas and Aristotle would deny that, see? Okay? Which are substantial forms. Therefore, in the human body, there are other substantial forms besides the, what, human, what, soul, right? Okay? And this is proceeding from a principle that Aristotle and Thomas would think is mistaken, right? But you'd see how modern would obviously think that, right? And it's interesting how when you read sometimes the moderns there and they think of your body or my body, we're a many-celled animal, right? And then there are these one-celled animals, right? Mm-hmm. Well, if you think, you know, that we're many-celled in the sense that we're composed of many of these one-celled things, we're not really one thing, right? It makes me kind of crawly to think of myself, you see? Like a big colony. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's a big colony of one-celled animals, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Trollings, yeah. And, you know, if you study some of the lower forms of life, there are ones where these one-celled come together and they seem to form kind of a colony, right? Oh. And it's kind of hard to say exactly, is this one thing now or is it just a colony of many one-celled things? Yeah. But when it comes to you and me, right, our cells don't really function as, what, complete individuals, huh? Yeah. They lose the individuality that the one-celled amoeba has, huh? Yeah. And if it didn't, we'd be really kind of a chaotic thing, huh? We'd be completely chaotic all the time, you see? Mm-hmm. And, again, you know, maybe something like that, you know, when you think about even the lower things, as I say, like water or something like this or what we call chemical compound, do the elements humane as distinct, you know, substances as they were before they came together, right? Mm-hmm. Or have they, in some sense, ceased to be and something one, unique, has taken their place, huh? You know, modern physics in the 20th century became much more subtle, you know, and much, I think, closer to the truth, huh? I don't understand it too well, but you hear things like the Pauli exclusion principle, right? And where only certain, let's say, energy levels can be occupied and other ones, if they're occupied, other ones can't occupy them. They don't act like independent individuals anymore, huh? Right. And they see more and more examples of this, huh? So, but, again, as I say, people can often get into the position, you know, of thinking that, you know, all these things are families of substances, right? And I used to, you know, sometimes use a simple example there. You know, talking to a college level, I'd say, you know, if a student, let's say, from Holy Cross, huh, comes over to Assumption College and beats up an Assumption College student, right? Well, now, would it be just for some Assumption College students to, you know, drive over to Holy Cross or the area around there and find some Holy Cross student and beat the heck out of him, right? Quid pro quo. Would that be just? Now, everybody would recognize that as unjust, see? And the same thing, you know, if a Palestinian comes over and shoots a Jew there, you know, does a Jew have a right to go over and shoot just any Palestinian? See? Now, we recognize that it's not just, right, to retaliate in those ways, huh, okay? But now, let's say, if you hit me, right, with your right fist, huh, then you might recognize that right to retaliate, right? But do I have to hit your right fist? See? I can hit you where you're vulnerable, you see? And could you, you know, claim, well, my right fist hit you, and you hit me in the chest, let's say, right? Well, the chest didn't hit you, that was unjust, huh? See? But if I was really a combination of, what, cellular substances, right, then to hit my chest because my right fist hit you in the jaw or something, right, would be like my going and beating up somebody from another school, you see? You know, you see these things sometimes, you know, it's horrible things like, you know, black and white, you know, people sometimes, and some terrible thing is done, let's say, by a white man to a black man or vice versa, and then the black men go out to look for some white man to do the same thing that's done to one of theirs or vice versa, right? And that's crazy for many reasons, but it's really unjust, right? I mean, this other guy is not, doesn't have that kind of unity whereby you can do this, huh? And so, you know, if a Jew kills a Palestinian, we say it's not just that the Palestinians take just any Jew and punish him for that, right? See? But if I do something bad, I go on and hit somebody or like that, and the state, you know, arrests me and so on, they don't have to punish the part of me that did the damage, right? They can punish me in some other part, right? They can give me twang lashes or something like that. My back didn't hit anybody, it was my fist, you know, but it's not unjust for them to punish me on my back for what my fist did, right? Because that's, I'm one thing, one substance, right? So you see, in the way we look at these things legally and morally, right? They recognize that we're one thing, right? In the way that Assumption College student body or the Jewish people or the white people or the black people, whatever it is, are not one substance, right? Let's look at this set. Contra here. But against this, of one thing, there is one substantial, what? Being, huh? Now, would you try to prove that first sentence, or would you say that's known to itself? To itself. Now, my accidental being can be many, right? Right. I can be healthy, I can be 5'10", I can be a geometer, I can be many things, right? But can my substantial being be many? No. See? Can I be a man and be a dog and be a cat and so on? No. But the substantial form gives the substantial, what? Being, right? Therefore, of one thing, there is only one substantial form. But the soul is a substantial form of the man. Therefore, it is impossible that in a man there be some other substantial form than the understanding soul, right? That's a very good objection, huh? Very good reply. Okay. Now we come to the respondio here, huh? I answer that it should be said, huh? That if one lays down that the human, that the understanding soul is not united to the body as a form, right? But only as a mover, as some of the Platonists laid down, huh? It would be necessary to say that in man there is, there would be another substantial form through which the body, right, that is movable by the soul would be constituted in its, what? Being or existence, huh? Notice that the soul only was the mover of the body, right? Okay? The way I'm the mover of this, what? Platts, right? The way I move the cat around or something like that. Then there would have to be, what? In the body a substantial form other than the soul, right? Right? This would have to be a substantial form in the cat, whereby it's a cat, right? But if the understanding soul is united to the body as a substantial form, as we have said or shown above, it is impossible, right, that there be another substantial form besides the one found in, what? In man, huh? Now, for the evidence of this statement, huh? It should be considered, right, that the substantial form differs in this way from the accidental form. Because the accidental form does not give being simply, right? But being in some way, such, just as heat does not make it subject to be simply, but to be what? Yeah. I know you say simpichitare, right, huh? We sometimes, you know, we'll use the word simpichitare to bring out the way we're speaking there, right? The way we're understanding that. But in language, you wouldn't use any word at all, huh? So, um, before I went out to, um, Omaha here, I was kind of sick. I got very stuffy, you know? I couldn't even breathe through my nose. And, uh, so, you know, I wake up in the night, and I got to breathe through the mouth, you know? And almost your tongue's almost sticking to your thing, you know? Oh, yeah. You get little fevers and so on. So I said, I don't go out to, you know, see the grandchildren in this condition, so I called the doctor, you know, and said, give me a little, some medication, right? Now, after taking medication for a number of days, I became, what, healthy, right? I was breathing through my nose and so on, okay? Uh, but no, so I would say I came to be healthy, right? I wouldn't say I came to be after taking medicine for a number of days, right? Okay? All right. So, I came to be, in some way, I came to be, I have to qualify it, though, huh? I came to be healthy, right? Okay? Now, when I graduated from college, huh, one day my old professor, Chris Rick, says, Duane, you should get a copy of Euclid's Elements and read it. And I said, why? He said, go get a copy and read it, he said. So, I got a copy, and I started reading it, because it's kind of interesting, right? Okay? Now, um, through studying Euclid, did I come to be? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. No. But I came to be a geometer, right? See? But when my parents generated me, right, then what? I came to be, right? Okay? Now, the other side of the coin, huh? If I leave this room, why cease to be? Cease to be here. Yeah. I'll cease to be in this room, right? Okay? If I should forget my geometry... Well, they used to always emphasize, you know, people go over these things, they get away from you, right? So, if I forget my geometry, I can no longer prove anything, right? Would I cease to be? No. I would cease to be a geometer, right? Mm-hmm. But I wouldn't cease to be, right? Mm-hmm. But if I died, right, then I would, what? Cease to be, right? Here. Well, I would cease to be, my soul would go on. Yeah. Yeah. Okay? But I'm not just a soul, see? Okay? So, you know, Thomas says sometimes, he's speaking, he says, St. Peter is not in heaven. The soul of St. Peter is in heaven, right? Right. Okay? But Mary and Christ are in heaven. Right. And not just the soul, right? Right. Mary's there. And this is part of the reason, you know, for the assumption, right? Sure. See? That if it was without the assumption, Mary would not be in heaven. This is part of the reason that they kind of gave, huh? Okay? For the assumption. So. Now notice, in daily life, we would recognize this, you see? And sometimes I use this example of the students, I say, suppose I say to the students, if you leave this room, you will cease to be, and you charge me with threatening the students, right? Okay? And so it comes up, purpose comes up, trial, right, for threatening the students. And I say to the judge, well, all I meant, Your Honor, when I said that Joe, or whoever it is, would cease to be if he left this room, all I meant was that he would cease to be in this room. Mr. Berkowitz, he says, nobody would understand what you said in that way, right? See? They would understand it to mean that you would, what, die, right? You'd be killed, huh? So when Stalin said to his chief investigator, you know, you get a conviction, or we'll shorten you by head, right? Oh, no, no, no. You're a terrible guy, Stalin, right? But you will cease to be, right? Okay. So this is the difference between a substantial form and a, what, accidental form. A substantial form, you're said to be simply without qualification, right? By an accidental form, you're only said to be in some qualified way, right? So you have to add that, right, huh? It's kind of interesting, too, how in speech, you know, adding something tends to diminish something. You know, if you say, for example, Annette, huh? Or Juliet. What does that E-T-T added on mean? Yeah. And that means literally, little Ann. Amen. Amen. Amen. Amen.