De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 81: Being Simply and Being in Some Way: The Fundamental Distinction

Transcript
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See? Juliet, little Julie, or Juliet, see? I know a woman named Annette, right, huh? And as she got older, more mature, she was sensitive to this diminishing force and she announced she didn't want to be called Annette anymore. Ann. Just to be called Ann, so we all called her Ann from then on, right? It was his call of Ann today, huh? One of my wife's cousins, right? He's named Charlie, Sir Charles, and his father was named Charles, right? So, of course, when he was young, they called him Charlie Boy, huh? To distinguish him from his father. But even to this day, he's married and has children, he's known as Charlie Boy. It's stuck, you know. Maybe it fits him with some extent, I don't know. So, you know, to say that you've come to be and you have to add something, right? It's a diminished sense of coming to be, right, huh? I've come to be a geometry, right? I've come to be healthy. I've come to be in this room, right? I've come to be clothed, right, huh? I've come to be, you know, hot or something, right, huh? Okay? And likewise, to cease to be in one of these ways, I have to add something, huh? Now, I might just, as a footnote there, remark that when you study being in wisdom, and there's a number of meanings of the word being, but, and there are actually groups of meanings, and one, of course, group that's very important is substance and accident, right? Substance, quantity, quality. Being, according to the figures of predication. But only substantial being is being simplicitare, being simply speaking. And all these kinds of being, quantity, quality, and so on, they are being in some, what, way, right? In some qualified way. To be 5 foot 10, right? When I came to be 5 foot 10, I didn't come to be. See? I came to be 5 foot 10, right? And when I ceased to be 5 foot tall, I didn't cease to be. I ceased to be 5 foot tall, right? Do you see that? Now, the other main division of being is in to act and ability, right? And which is being simply. Yeah, yeah. Now, again, you can see, in the very way we speak, if I was to say, now, are there chairs in this room? What would you say? Yeah, there are chairs in this room. Now, are there chairs in the trees out there? What would you say? No potential. No. Now, if you wanted to say there are chairs in the trees out there in some way, right? That there are chairs in the trees in ability. There's something in the tree, namely wood, that is able to be a chair, right? So there's a chair in ability out there. But you'd have to add that qualification, wouldn't you? There's a chair in ability, right? And again, you know, if I say about something you haven't studied, do you know this? You'd say what? I know it. Yeah. But then you'd be angry, right? But to say, I know it, period, would mean to say you actually know it, right? See? Okay? The science people don't make that distinction, huh? And, you know, sometimes when the ability is close to the act, they don't see the difference, huh? So, you know, if you say to the practical man, right, the man doesn't bother with these distinctions too much, you know, if you know the length and the width of a rectangle, do you know the area of it? He'd probably say what? Yeah. Because you're very close to actually knowing it, huh? But strictly speaking, to know the length and width of a rectangle is not to actually know the area. It's to be able to know it, right, huh? Yeah, yeah. But because the ability, in this case, is so close, right? It seems like actually knowing, but strictly speaking, it isn't, huh? And this is the problem, the similar problem in the Mino, right? Because the slave boy comes to see how to double a square out of his own answers. And Socrates says, well, he's just recalling on something he already knew. But that isn't true. He's recalling things through which he is able to know how to double a square, right? But he's recalling them and putting them together for the first time. And so he's actually, in the conversation with Socrates, coming to know for the first time how to double a square. And when Socrates first asked him, you know, he gave a wrong answer. He said, you double the side, right? So, I just mentioned that because this distinction between simply and in some way is found in both of the major divisions of being, right? Being an act is being some fidgetary, Thomas would say, right? Being an ability is being, say, couldn't have quit in some limited qualified way, right? Substantial being is being simply, right? Accidental being is being in some, what? Being, say, couldn't have quit in some way, some limited way, right? Diminished way, huh? Okay? Those are the two main ways of dividing out being? Yeah, being according to fixed predication, substance, quantity, quality, you know, and the categories, and then being in to act and ability, right? But in both of them, you can, you know, see a distinction between being simply and being in some way, huh? Some limited, qualified, diminished way, huh? And I see, as you mentioned before, that also is involved in the second kind of mistake outside of speech. It's called the fallacy of some fidgetary and secundum quid, where you mix up these two, huh? Yeah. And, um, uh, you know how Mino is arguing that you can't, what, investigate what you don't know? Hmm. You can't direct your thinking to what you don't know. How can you do something you don't know, right? But, you know, the solution to that is that what you don't know, you can know in some way. Hmm. And therefore, it's not a contradiction to say the unknown, haplos, in Greeks, fidgetary, is known in some way. Okay? A lot of times, and I, you know, illustrate this fallacy in a beginning way, you know, I'll always pick on a girl in the class, and I'll say to her, I say, do you know my brother Mark? And she'll always answer, what? No. No. And I said, no. Do you know what a man is? And she'll say, yeah. I said, that's who my brother Mark is. See? So in some way, in some qualified way, she does know my brother Mark and every man in the world, right? Because she knows what a man is, she knows what a brother is, right? And my brother Mark is a man, and he's a brother. You see? See what I mean? But she hasn't really contradicted herself, has she? Because if she said she doesn't know my brother Mark, she meant simply. But in some way, in knowing what a man is, she'll know every man in the world. Now, another one that's very simple but helps you to understand this, you know, take the door over there, right? You can't see through the door, okay? Do you know who's knocking at the door? It's Rosie. Yeah. And you say, I don't know who's knocking at the door, right? Okay? You open the door and it's your mother or somebody, right? You don't even know your own mother, huh? It's wrong with you, right? See? So, in some way, you don't know your mother, right? You don't know your mother as the person knocking at the door, right? So, in some way, you don't know your mother, right? Even though haplos, a fidgetary, you do know your mother, right? I hope you know your mother. Ha ha ha. Okay? You see? See, even if the... You know, when the brother's here, or the abbot or something, right? Knocking the door, right? No one's knocking the door? No. I don't know who it is. But maybe some of you know, right? So in some way you don't know who you know. But the contradiction would come if simply, without qualification, you didn't know what you didn't know. Simply or other, right? But that you know in one way, right? What you don't know, and vice versa, right? That's no contradiction, huh? It's kind of amusing, you know, exchanger between Hegel and Kant, right? Kant says we can't know the world around us, right? The world in itself is unknown, right? And Hegel said, well, how are you talking about that if you don't know that? That's pretty good. Yeah. But again, somebody said that's statistical on Hegel's part, right? I mean, Kant's got his own problem, not to be able to know who it will, right? I mean, but as far as you can, to some extent, know what you don't know, right? See? Yeah. And when you ask a question, right, do you know what you're asking for? You see? Well, somebody said, well, if you know what you're asking for, why you bother to ask it, right? Right. If you don't know what you're asking for, I can't help you, we can help you. You know what you're asking for yourself. So don't bother with your questions. You see? But, you know, people do sometimes ask intelligent questions, right? And they, in some sense, know what they don't know, right? Right. And that's good that they know what they don't know. And Socrates is famous, right? For knowing what he didn't know. And Einstein said he admired Sir Isaac Newton more for knowing what he didn't know and what he didn't know, right? Some might say, well, how can you know what you don't know? Yeah, yeah. In some way, yeah. You see, you're forced, therefore, to make the distinction, right? Yeah. Yeah. Just like I, in some way, am not. I am not a sociologist or something, right? I am not a Russian, right? I'm not a, you know? So in some way, the one who is, is not, right? Well, it's not really a contradiction, right? Mm-hmm. Because, as Yoristov points out, a real contradiction is to say that something both is and is not at the same time and in the same way, right? Mm-hmm. But to be simply and not be in some way, that's not our diction. That's a very common mistake in, what? Thinking, huh? Mm-hmm. And it lies, as I mentioned, you know, when Aristotle, if you look sometime at the ninth book of wisdom there, Aristotle shows that, in some way, ability is before act. Because the thing that goes from ability to act is an ability before it's an act. But then he points out that it goes from ability to act because it's something already in act. So, subhichitere, simply, act is before ability. And therefore, he's going to conclude in the twelfth book that the first cause is pure act, right? Mm-hmm. But those who say that matter or something that is an ability comes first. They're saying that what is before, in some way, is before period, simply. They're making the mistake of simply and in some way, simply and not simply, about the ultimate question. What is the first cause? And they're thinking the first cause is matter or something like that rather than God, right? Because. They're saying, they're confusing, what is before in some way with what is before simply. Dr. Secundum Quid, how does that translate? Well, you can translate it in some way. We usually translate it, right? Right. In some respect, huh? Okay, but it's in a qualified and diminished sense, huh? Okay. Some people, there's a work that they're not sure whether it's by Thomas or not. It might be his very first work, huh? Oh. And it's the work on the fallacy, so. Mm-hmm. And some people thought he wrote it when he, you know, was interrupted from his Dominican ways, right? You know, by his family, you know? Mm-hmm. But it's De Flaccis, it's called, right? Ad custom nobiles artistas, huh? Which, in the, you said some noble young men, right? About the fallacy. But anyway, it's very interesting work. But when he talks about this particular mistake, right? Yeah. And how it's so common, right? What's tied up with something very common in the fifth book of the metaphysics, namely, perfect and imperfect. Complete and incomplete, huh? Mm-hmm. And this comes up when you talk about infinity, right? You know, is to be infinite a, um, a, um, unique to God? Is God alone infinite? See? Well, God is infinite, we'd say, simpliciter. See? But man, his intellect, is infinite secundum quid. Now, if you look at that perverse little work by, um, Feuerbach, huh, called The Essence of Christianity, huh? I think I told you about that book before, right? But, you know, Karl Marx and Engels, you know, those young men who read this, you know, and are very impressed with it, right? And for Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity is a perversion of Christianity, really. Instead of man, I mean, God becoming man, right? He says the real meaning is that man himself is God, right? That's just a way of poetically saying that man is God, huh? Wow. But when he tries to syllogize that man is God, he does through, uh, the infinite, right? Man's mind is infinite. Right. And then he quotes the theologians. The theologians say the infinite is God, therefore man's mind is God, right? Yeah. Well, in some way, huh, man's mind is what? God. Yeah, in some way it's infinite, right? Mm-hmm. But not simply, right? Right. And it's like when Aristotle talks about wisdom, right? And you may recall, we did the premium, or some of you anyway. And the first attribute he gives of the wise man is that he knows all things. Right. And, but he says, in some way. See? Because in knowing the most universal, what is said of all, you in some way know all things, right? Yeah. Just like in knowing what a man is, in some way you know, my brother Mark and all men, right? But simply speaking, you don't know everything to get. You know? And sometimes the students will be amused, and I'd say, you know, do you know everything? Mm-hmm. Huh? In some way you know everything. Mm-hmm. You know what everything means, don't you? Mm-hmm. Yeah. So you do know everything, don't you? Mm-hmm. And everyone is like, I'll go home and tell my dad that I know everything. I don't know how, you know, how this gets back to the parents, what's more. You never know what you say, how to go back, you know. Mm-hmm. But you can say, man knows everything in some way, right? See? You know, it's a common thought among you, which you can't get something out of nothing, right? Mm-hmm. And we kind of understand that something is not nothing, right? But something is so universal that everything is something, right? So knowing what something is as opposed to nothing, in some way you know everything, don't you? But that's an extremely imperfect way of knowing everything, isn't it? You know? No. What's this? Oh, it's something. What's that? You know? What's something, you know? What's this? Something, you know? They're all something, right? So in a sense, I know everything when I know what something is. Right. See? But is that to know everything simply without qualification? No. Is that to fully know everything? No. No. It's to know everything in a most imperfect way, huh? See? So man is wise, what? Secundum quid. Huh? In some way, man is wise, but not simply. It's interesting, huh? When Aristotle distinguishes the meanings of the word perfect there in the Fifth Book of Wisdom, huh? He points out that the way in which creatures can be called perfect, right? And you could call that as being perfect in your kind, to be lacking nothing of your kind, right? Right. So Homer is a perfect poet. Right. He lacks nothing that a poet should have. But then Aristotle says there's another sense of perfect, something that is lacking in nothing. He's a perfect poet. He's a perfect poet. He's a perfect poet. He's a perfect poet. it says that's referring to god okay so um in one sense only god is perfect and since uh to be perfect is to be good then god alone is what good right he alone is perfect without qualification he's lacking in nothing yeah yeah yeah so it's very important to see that distinction between uh it comes up all the time between simply and in some way huh you can't do any part of philosophy without that okay but the reason why it's so universal is that everything is perfect or imperfect and so you got a basis there everywhere for this distinction so this is all kind of um coming back to this first distinction that he's making here between a substantial form an accidental form and that um the substantial form is being what simply without qualification right an accidental form is being only what in some way right okay and he gives an example there that to be that heat doesn't make a body or subject to be but to be hot and therefore when an accidental form comes to something it is not said something is not said to come to be or to be generated simply right but to become such right or in some way huh to have itself right and likewise when the accidental form receives or disappears something is not said to be corrupted simply without qualification but in some way right in some limited qualified way huh the substantial form however gives being simply and therefore through its uh coming something is said to be generated simply and through its uh recess is said to be simply without qualification corrupted now an account of this he says the ancient natural philosophers who laid down that the first matter was some kind of being an act and they didn't understand that the first matter was being only an ability huh like we learned in the first book of the physics right but they laid down that the first matter was some being an act as example fire or air or water or all of these or something of this sort they said that nothing was generated or corrupted simply but that every coming to be was only a what alteration right as is said in the first book of natural hearing first book of the physics if therefore it was that besides the understanding soul there pre-existed some other substantial form and matter through which the subject of the soul was a being an act it would foul that the soul did not give being simply right and consequently that it was not a substantial form and that through the coming of the soul there was not a generation simply nor through its uh uh removal a corruption simply but only in some respect huh and of course all these things he says are manifestly false huh whence it ought to be said that no other substantial form is in man except the understanding soul and that the understanding soul in itself contains in its power the sensing soul and the feeding soul right um that just as it does that so also in its power it contains all the lower forms huh that give the mixed body or the um body aspect and it makes whatever alone it makes whatever the more perfect forms make another and so something likely should also be said about the sensing soul in the brutes right that it gives what the feeding soul gives and what the uh lower forms give huh and the same thing can be said about the feeding soul in the plants right and generally speaking universally speaking about all more perfect forms with respect to the what imperfect ones huh so that's why aristotle makes that comparison huh in the eighth book of wisdom of forms to what numbers right huh and uh because in a way three is two plus one right it contains what two has plus something more and four contains what three has but something more right five contains four and three and two and one in some way right so the higher form contains and does what the lower form does but something more huh okay uh now i gave you an example of something like that in the case of friendship right huh okay um but could you have other examples of that huh where a better or more perfect thing can do what a lower one does and yet what do something more right yeah i think that's some other kind of example of something others friendship souls uh yeah yeah yeah yeah well we notice how how with even with our tools you know like computers and so on right huh yeah you know the new one comes out and you can do what the other one did but you can do other things you couldn't do with the other one huh you see that's true so you have something like that huh usually yeah yeah if you're smart enough to do the old thing on the new one right but um uh yeah but yeah so um now they say that the water and oxygen is virtually in or the hydrogen and oxygen is virtually in the water right but that's maybe it doesn't do everything water does yeah yeah but something of the power of the elements remains in there right okay so you want to take a break before you do the reply to the objections or yeah that sounds great yeah take a little break here and do our exercises you know which as you recall was based on the definition of the soul in the second book about the soul huh and there the soul was defined as the act or the first act right of a natural body right composed of tools right having life and potency huh and here that seems to be saying that the soul is one thing and the body is something else right and so if you think of the soul as one thing and the body is something else and the soul is coming to a body that body to be a body has got to have already a substantial form or a body is a body right but Thomas says you're misunderstanding the way that he's defining this huh to the first therefore it should be said that Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of the body only but that it is an act of a natural body composed of tools right organic having life and potency and that such potency does not what exclude the soul right huh in other words um it's not a body that is not yet alive but a body that is in potency to the operations of life huh it's a living thing whence it is manifest that that in which or of which the soul is said to be the act the soul is also included okay in that way of speaking in which it is it could be said that heat is the act of the what? Of the hot, huh? And light is the act of the lucid, right? Okay. Not that there is a part from light or without light by itself, the lucid, right? But because it is lucid, right? Through light, huh? And likewise, it is said that the soul is the act of a body, etc., because through the soul it is a body and it is organic and it is having life in potency. But the first act is said to be in potency with respect to the second act, which is operation. And such a potency is not of GCN, that is to say not excluding the soul. Now, notice, in that way of understanding the definition of the soul, you're saying that the soul is the what? Substantial form of this composite, right? Which is a living body, which is a body, what? That's organic, right? Having the operations of life in potency, huh? Okay. Now, that is a way that you might understand the definition of the soul, right? Now, it's like if I was to say, health is the act of the what? Healthy body, right? Or act is the, health is the act of the form of the healthy, right? Well, healthy includes health, right? Sure. Okay. Now, why would we define the soul in that way? By saying, which part is it, right? Of this composite of soul and body, right? Which is more known to us, the simple or the composed? I said, the composed? What? Composed. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, suppose one defined a point as the end of a what? Line. Finite line. Okay? Now, a finite line is a line that has what? An end, right? So a finite line is a line that has a point. Okay? Okay. So when I say that the point is the end or limit of a finite or limited line, when I say limited line, I include the point, don't I? Sure. See? Okay. But when I say that the point is a limit of such a thing, right? Right. I'm distinguishing what the point is from the rest of it, right? Right. You see what I mean? Yes. So he said, in that sense, Aristotle is defining the soul if by body you understand what? The body we see, right? Okay? You understand, you know, the living body, right? The body that is alive, right? You know it may not be digesting food at this moment, right? But the body is alive, right? But the body that is alive has a soul already, right? And I'm saying, what is it in the living body that is a soul? Well, it's not the matter, but it's the what? The form, the act that is a soul, right? You see that? Just like if I I was to say that existence is the act of the existent. Existence is the act of what exists. Okay. Yeah. Now what exists is the composite, right, of the substance of what it is, and it's existence, right? And I say that existence is the act of the existent. Now you might want to understand the soul in that way because we understand the composed, or we know the composed before we know the what? Simple part, right? You see that? Or if you said the soul is the substantial form of a living body, right? A living body is the composite, right? Some substantial form in matter, right? Well, what is the soul? It's the substantial form in such a thing, right? So a living body is not a living body by something other than a substantial form, which you're pointing out what that is, right? Or if I say the point is the limit of a limited line, okay? Or you can say finite, but finite is a Latin word for limited, right? Well, a limited line is not a line without limit, right? It's a line that already has a point, right? And you're pointing out that the point is not the continuous line, but it's the limit of that continuous line, right? Okay? So that's one way of understanding the definition, right? See? Because the objecture is understanding the definition of body, right? In there, right? As a living body, right? As an actual substance, right? And therefore, he's pointing out which part of that composite is the soul. Okay? Is this analogous to what you were talking about, the sanctifying grace being in the soul and in the operations of sanctifying grace being the second act, almost, so to say? The gifts, the virtues? Well, if you said that, if you took the abstract word and said holiness, right? Holiness is the grace of the sanctified soul. But the sanctified soul includes grace, right? You see? But you're saying that the, what? The holiness is the grace of such a, what? Soul, right, huh? Would you say the first act? Like you're saying? In a sense, yeah, yeah. But, but, but it's, you're, you've got a composite, which is more known to us, right? Than the simple components of it, right? And so you're making known which part of that composite it is, right? More of a logical distinction? No, it's not logical. I mean, it's logical, but I mean, it's a distinction in the thing, right? Mm-hmm. Is it a real distinction? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because it can be at rest. It cannot be, the operation cannot be performing in the operation? No, I'm saying, I'm saying that in general, the composed is more known to us than the simple. Mm-hmm. See? Now, you see this even in mathematics, right? Because we define a body in mathematics, the three-dimensional thing, as length, width, and depth, right? Yeah. Mm-hmm. And then we go to surface, and we say the surface is length and width without depth, right? Yeah. Mm-hmm. So there's negation there, right? Yeah. Yeah. And then the line is length. Yeah. Without width, huh? Mm-hmm. And then finally, Euclid says the point has no parts, right? Yeah. It has neither length nor width nor depth, but position only, right? Mm-hmm. So notice, as you go from the body to the surface to the line to the point, you're going from the composed to the simple, right? Mm-hmm. But you keep on negating as you go along, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Okay? So... The reason why we negate there is because the composed is what we first know. So what we first know, as we learned in the Dhyanima, was that what it is is something sensed or imagined. And something sensed or imagined is always composed. And so when we try to know something simple, we tend to negate, in part, something of the composed. So it's not surprising, though, when we try to know God, it's altogether simple, right? That we know God negatively, right? Because even the point is known negatively. If you look at Duclid there, the point defines how she has no part, right? But you could add it has position, but no parts. You see? So in general, it's not strange that the composed is known by us before the simple, and the simple in some ways is known to the composed. So in this way of understanding the definition of the soul, right, you're defining the soul by, through the living body, right? The body that is alive, right? You're saying it's the, what, first act of the substantial form of such a body, right? But when you say living body, you already have a composite that includes the soul. And even the expression substantial form means, in a way, the form of a substance, right? A form within the genus is substance, huh? So you're thinking of the composite, you think of the substance, right? And the substantial form is one of the components of the substance, of the material substance, anyway. And the matter is another one, huh? It's interesting how, in a more universal way, we talk about act and ability, right? And the things that we know best of all are the things that are a condescendant of act and ability. And when you try to go to know God as pure act, right? Or know the first matter, which is pure ability, you use a negation, don't you? See, when you say God is pure act, what does pure mean, right? It's a negation of ability, right? There's no passive ability there, right? No ability to be actualized. So it's act without any ability to be actualized, right? But the other extreme, we talk about first matter, and we say that's pure ability, right? It's nothing, well then pure is a negation of what? Act, right? So, what do we know first? Pure act or pure ability, or something that has both act and ability in it? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And sometimes I compare it, you know, to a little bit to the definitions of beginning, middle, and end in the book on the poetic art, you know? Erstala defines the middle, right, as what has something before it and something after it. He defines the beginning as what has something after it, but nothing before it. He defines the end as what is after something, but not before something, right? So, which is defined, in a sense, by negation of part of something else? Well, the beginning, the end, right? One is defined by the negation of before, and the other by the negation of what? After, yeah, yeah. Appetizer, before, but not after anything, right? Dessert, it's after, but not before anything, right? The main chorus is after the appetizer, right? But before the other, right? You see? That's kind of interesting, right? And notice how when we speak of time, right? If time has a beginning, or if time has an end, you'd have to use negation, in a sense, huh? In other words, the now, which is the beginning of time, is not after any now, is it? And the now, which is the end of time, is not before anything, right? But every other now is before something and after something, right? So that's the middle, right? You know, sometimes people think that they can show by reason, you know, that the universe always was. They think, well, every now is it now before and now after, right? So time must have always been, right? But if there's a first now, and that's what's referred to in the Bible, in the beginning, right? That's the now that is before nows, but not after any nows, right? Okay? It has no now before, right? So you have to use a negation there, right? Well, in a sense, God is the beginning, you know, the highest thing and the lowest thing is first matter, right? That's why Thomas says, you know, when he discusses the opinion of David Dinant, who said that God is the first matter, Thomas says he most stupidly taught. Now, Thomas is not, you know, just using rough language there, right? But you couldn't take anything further away. If you said God is a stone, you'd be closer to the truth than to say he's the first matter, right? Because he's pure act. And first matter is pure ability. So Aristotle can say that form is something God-like because it's an act, right? Like we saw in the first book of natural philosophy there. The profound common understanding of Plato and Aristotle, that form is something God-like, right? But form is said to be God-like more than matter because form is an act and God is pure act. Why matter is only ability. So, um, what's more known to us is the things that are a composite of act and ability, huh? And here you have a particular case of that in a sense, right? The living body is a composite of act and ability, right? Of form and matter. And what is the soul? What's the form in there? It's not the matter, right? Okay? So you see the way you understand the definition, right? There might be another way of understanding it, too, but, but, but, uh, this one is sufficient for resolving, right? The objection. Now the second one is, huh? Again, the person's misunderstanding, he hasn't studied the third book on the soul there, where Aristotle points out how the soul moves the body, right? Well, you're moved, what? If you recall from our study there, huh, um, you have three things there, right? You have the good, which is known and desired, right? And then you have the knowing power, which can be the reason or the imagination, right? And the, what, uh, desiring power, which can be the will or the emotions, right? Okay. And they're like the mood mover, right? And then you have an organ of the body, right, huh, which is moved by desire, right? And then that moves the other parts of the body, right? So it's not like the soul in its very existence is moving the rest of the body, right? But the soul through this one power is moving the other parts, right? So there you already have the bodily aspect due to the souls as a form, giving the body aspect as well as higher ones. So he says, to the second, it should be said that the soul does not move the body through its being, right? By which it is united to the body as a form, but it moves the body through the, what, motive power, right? Whose act presupposes already the body, uh, effectually an act through the soul. So you've got to already have the different parts of the body, right? Actually informed by the soul before the soul can, what, use one part of the body to move another part of the body, huh? It's not as if the soul all by itself, right, huh, is moving the body, right, huh? But the soul is moving the body through a power that is already, what, in a body, right, huh? And if you already have a body there, so that you can have motion, huh? Um, you've found it. Do you find the objection there? I've got to think about that a little bit. What's the beginning of this motive power in your soul? I'd like to see maybe... You see, the soul is the source of many powers, right? Yeah, I agree. But it's the source of most powers in some part of the body, right? Okay, so the power of digesting, right? The power of growing, the power of reproducing. These powers are all in some part of my body, right? Which is soul and forms, right? Okay? But it's also the source of some powers, like the understanding of the will, as we saw, that are not parts of the body, right? But the motive power, again, is like the digestive power and so on. It's a, what? Body, or part of the body, right? Okay? Oh, okay. Okay, so does the disembodied soul have the motive power, or does this mean that it wouldn't? It wouldn't have that, no. The root of it, you could say, is there, right? But the actual power is not there, because that power can exist only in a body. Only with the body. Yeah, yeah. So the separated soul doesn't have senses, actually, right? Yeah, okay. Except it isn't a root, huh? So it's a joint in the body, again, it's going to give rise to those powers again, right? Okay. Okay? Now, the third objection was based on the, if the soul is responsible for the body being a body, right, then it's the lowest form of all, right? That's right. And it says, to the third, it should be said that in matter there are considered diverse grades of perfection, as to be, to live, to sense, and to understand. And those are arranged in a certain order there, right? Mm-hmm. But always, according to the, what? But always the one that's coming to the one that went before is more perfect. For the form, therefore, which gives only the first greater perfection of matter is most imperfect. But the form which gives the first, the second, the third, and so on is most perfect. And nevertheless, it is, what? Immediate to matter, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So we talked about that a little bit before, huh? That solution to that thing. Well, what is St. Paul says, there was a famous passage there, where he says, what? Charity does all these things, you know, it believes, it hopes, it does all these things. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's doing what the lower, what? Oh, yeah. Virtues are doing, right? Uh-huh. Okay. Yeah. Okay. But there, you know, you can still have the lower virtues, right? Because they don't give being, what? Simply, right? See? I say charity, in a sense, is commanding the other virtues, right? Right. It's not replacing them, right? See? So it's not exactly like this, is it, huh? Understood, yeah. Yeah, yeah. See? Although it's giving a certain perfection to all of them, right, huh? That they wouldn't have otherwise, right? And you don't have charity without... Yeah, yeah. But Thomas will say, you know, the man who has charity, his hope is perfected, right? Right. Because we hope to receive good things from our friends. And charity is a friendship with God, right? So once you have that charity with God, that friendship with God, you have much stronger hope that he's going to give you, right? Than you do when you don't have so much friendship with God, or don't have it at all with God, right? Okay? Yeah. It's pretty clear, I think, in St. Gertrude, you know. I was reading St. Gertrude over my trip out there a little bit. And I was looking, my daughter had a copy of St. Catherine there, the dialogue, you know? Mm-hmm. And I guess you've got to be kind of careful of the dialogue because the traditional divisions of the dialogue are not really in St. Catherine, right? Oh, yeah. They don't really fit the text, I mean. Mm-hmm. And... But anyway, she had kind of a more authoritative text there, you know, where you kind of figure out the way that things are constructed, actually, you know? Right. But anyway, that's another problem. But you get this sense, you know, very much of friendship with God, huh? Mm-hmm. You know, another self, you know, the idea, you know? A friend's another self, right? You know, it's the old Greek proverb, huh? Mm-hmm. When I first studied Greek, you know, they give the Greek proverbs in the Greek, Ophilos estenalis autos, a friend is another self, right? But you see very much this idea of friendship, you know, of Catherine with our Lord, right? And therefore, her hope is stronger than those who don't have so much, what, friendship with God, right, huh? So in that sense, you're perfecting hope, right, and giving it a perfection it wouldn't have on its own, right? But charity doesn't replace friendship, it doesn't replace hope, right? See? So why can you have hope when you have charity? Well, because they're not substantial forms, are they? See? In a substantial form, then charity would have to, what, replace hope, right, you see? Rather than commanding hope, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Incidentally, in that New Catechism, you know, it does repeat what Thomas says on that charity is the form of all the virtues, right? Yeah, right. Okay? But it's not a substantial form, right, huh? And so you've got to understand what he's meaning when he says that, right? See? It's not replacing that, huh? Okay? That's an interesting thing. I'll come back to that a little bit later on if we talk about it. I guess I'll talk about it a little bit. Okay? Now, to the fourth, it should be said, huh? That Avicenna, mistakenly, of course, Thomas is doing that thing, laid down that the substantial forms of the elements, of earth, air, fire, and water, remain as a whole in the mixed body, right? That mixture comes about according as the contrary qualities of the elements are reduced to a middle. But this is impossible, Thomas says, huh? Because the diverse forms of the elements are not able to be except in diverse parts of matter, to which diversity is necessary to understand dimensions, without which matter is not able to be divisible. But matter subject to dimension is not found except in body. But diverse bodies are not able to be in the same place. Whence it follows that the elements in the mixed body would be distinct according to their, what? Place, huh? And thus it would not be a true mixture, which is according to the whole, but to the senses, huh? Which would be according to, what? Minima ixta se posita. That's what I was comparing to the, my daughter's, what, cinnamon and sugar combination there, right? For the kids to put on their toast, right, huh? What does that mean, Doctor? Well, you've got very small pieces of cinnamon and sugar, right, alongside each other. But we don't have something one from those two, right? And it's still two things juxtaposed. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, Thomas is using the word mixture there for something that is really a new, what, thing, right, huh? Yeah. Okay. Now, Vera was, huh? His commentary in the third book on the university, De Celo de Mundo, in Aristotle, says that the forms of the elements, and incidentally, you know, that word, that work of Aristotle is usually called in English, De Celo de Mundo, right? But notice here, he just calls it De Celo, right? Well, in the Greek, the Greek word can mean celum, in Latin, or it can mean the universe as a whole. And you really should understand the title of that work of Aristotle as about the universe. But they translated it by the wrong word, De Celo, and since Aristotle talks only about the heavens, but about the earth in there, then they figured they got to call it De Celo de Mundo. I don't see that here. Do you guys see that anywhere else in English? Aver was out to impose it in three De Celo. On the heavens, what did they say? I'm lost. I don't know. It's right after this. He discussed what Avicenna said and rejected that, and then he takes Aver was. Yeah, did you give the reference to where Aver was, says this? I'm sorry, I just went over here. But in Thomas, he says that Aver was maintained. Yeah. That the forms of elements, by reason of the end of...