De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 84: The Soul's Union with the Body Without Intermediary

Transcript
================================================================================

Why do you rob banks? He says, well, that's what the money is. Is he in the problem? That's what the money is. So we're choosing something bad like robbing the bank because it's good in some way. We choose adultery, let's say, or fornication, because in some way it's good. It's pleasant. And vice versa, we don't do what is good like study for students because in some way it's bad that you're going to party that prevents you from uncomfortable in some way or something like that. Or you don't get up and go to mass there because you want to sleep longer. So we're always doing something bad because in some limited and perfect way it's good. Or we're not doing what is good because in some way it's, what, bad, huh? There's nothing in this world that is so good that doesn't prevent you from doing something else. It's also good, huh? So we're always making that mistake, right? And then when you read the great dialogue called the, what, Mino, huh? Well, in the Mino you have this physical objection of Mino where he says to Socrates, Socrates doesn't know what virtue is and Mino has been shown not to know either and Socrates says let's put our heads together and try to figure out what it is. And Mino says well how can you go looking for what you don't know? and well he's not seeing that the unknown some fidgeter can be known in some way. Now I always, you know you just read my example a very simple example I take in class I'm saying I'm going to make this girl contradict herself, huh? And so I always ask the question do you know my brother Marcus? and she says no. I say now you all heard what she said she doesn't know my brother Marcus? You all heard that? Okay. And I say now do you know what a man is? Yeah. Well that's where my brother Marcus. See you do know my brother Marcus. You know what a brother is don't you? Yeah. That's where my brother Marcus. See? Well did you really contradict yourself? Aristotle in the book on sophisticated refutations refutations is a contradiction but sophisticated as an apparent one he's saying no because some picture here my brother Mark is unknown to her but in some way my brother Mark and every man and every brother are known you know what a man is my brother is. Do you see? Okay. And the other you know very stock example is knock knock do you know who's at the door? No. And you say no. You open the door to your mother you know where your mother? Right? See? Well do you or do not know your mother? And you say yeah you know your mother but in some way your mother's unknown to you. She's unknown as a person knocking at the door. Somebody's coming to dinner tonight. Who? I won't tell you. But now do you know who's coming to dinner? Well you might know it might be some good friend of yours coming to dinner that'll surprise you but you don't know who's coming to dinner. Okay? Some of you don't know this person. So again the distinction comes up in wisdom when you're talking about the distinction between act and ability. Now if I say there's a wooden chair over there right? Okay? So is there a wooden chair in this room? We'd say so without qualification huh? Now is there a wooden chair in the tree out there? I wouldn't say so simply without qualification would I? You could say there's a chair in potency in ability out there but you couldn't say chair yeah see? So being an act is to be simply and to be in potency or ability is to be in some way. Now Socrates gets mixed up in that not with being but with knowing in the amino. The slave boy knows things by which he is able to know how to double a square. Does he know how to double a square in the beginning? Socrates has claimed he already knew but actually the slave boy cannot be said to know how to double a square because he's able to know it. I saw some hope as a teacher that my students will come to know something through my teaching. You know hope springs to eternal human rest. but I wouldn't say they know these things because they're able to know them. It would be nice if you could be said to know simplicity there which you're able to know but you know there isn't so on. And as you go through Euclid's theorems you can know the next one through the ones you already know. Does that mean you know the next one? No. That's a very important kind of distinction. Now it also comes up with substance an accident. You can say that substance substantial being is being simplicitare and accidental being is being in what? In some way but not simply. Well you've got to be before you can be in some way. And that's why substance is naturally before accident. And that's what these objections are what? Burning up against. So as they say he uses the word simplicitare in Latin which is usually contrast with sequindum quid in Latin. In English we used to say simply and in some way or in some respect but it's a little problem if you take a hell of it best translated. Aristotle if you read him he'll say he'll make the distinction between simply and not simply but in some way you know okay but Thomas usually uses the word absolute in contrast with relative yeah so he says to be an act it has through substantial form which causes to be or being existence simplicitare right okay once it is impossible that any accidental dispositions which would give existence only what in some way would pre-exist in matter for substantial form and since the soul is a substantial form consequently neither before the what soul to the first objection which is taken from the accidents that the body right that the soul is joined to has to the first therefore it should be said from the foreset that the more perfect form in its power contains whatever there is of the lower forms and therefore existing one and the same it perfects matter according to diverse grades of perfection for through one it is one and the same form in its essence as to what it is by which man is a being an act and by which he is a body and by which he is living and by which he is an animal and by which he is a man rather than four or five substantial forms there is manifest or clear that each genus follows what that each genus is followed by its own what accidents they are like properties if thus therefore matter understood as perfect in being before what understanding its being bodily right and so on about the others huh Thus there are pre-understood accidents which are proper to being before, what? Bodiliness, huh? And thus there are fore-understood dispositions in matter before form, not as regards all its effect, but as regards the, what? Posterior, huh? What he's saying is that the higher form gives what the lower form does, right? So you might understand it's giving what the lower form does before you understand it's giving what the, what, higher form does, huh? Okay? Just like you might understand in the number 4, 2 before 3 and 3 before 4, huh? But it's really just one number. It's not the number 2 plus the number 3 plus the number 4 because then it adds up to, what, 4, 3, 7, 9? Okay? To the second it should be said, that quantitative dimensions, this is the continuous quantities, are accidents falling upon bodiliness, right? Which belongs to all matter. Whence matter thus understood under bodiliness and dimensions is able to be understood as distinct in diverse parts, that it might thus take diverse forms according to further, what, grades of perfection. Although the same form, in essence, although it is the same form, right, in essence, which gives diverse grades of perfection to matter, huh? Nevertheless, according to consideration of reason, it, what, differs, huh? So we can consider, right, that the human soul is responsible for the body being a body, right, before we understand as being responsible for this diversity of organs that you have in different parts of the body, huh? Right. Okay? And maybe you understand the human soul as, what, being responsible for this diversity of parts you have in the body before you understand the soul as having, what, understanding, or having reason, huh? But that's according to consideration of reason, just like I can consider animal common to dog and cat and horse leaving aside the, what, differences among them, huh? Do something like that in geometry, don't we? You might say, let's say this is a square, right, huh? Okay. Okay. Now, four equal lines make this to be a square, right? Mm-hmm. We could also say that this is a quadrilateral. Mm-hmm. And is it a quadrilateral by another set of four lines besides the four ones that make it a square? No. No. No. It's the same four lines that make the square to be a square and make the square to be a quadrilateral. Mm-hmm. But when you consider those four lines as making the square to be a quadrilateral, we leave out the fact that the four lines are all equal. Yeah. And just keep the idea of the lower direction, you might say. Yeah. Now, is it a rectilineal plane figure? Just going up above now quadrilateral. That's the genius of that, right? Is it a rectilineal plane figure by straight lines other than these same four straight lines? No. Yeah. So you can say these four straight lines make it to be a rectilineal plane figure, they make it to be a quadrilateral, and they make it to be a square. Yeah. But it's kind of by consideration of reason that we separate out the more general from the, what, particular. And so we separate quadrilateral from the square and these other figures, rectilineal plane figure out from the square and triangle and pentagon and hexagon. See? That's not exactly the same, but there's a little light there you can see, huh? Mm-hmm. And so someone might say, well, you've got to have four sides before you can be a square. Well, it's not as if, what, you have four lines there before you have four equal lines. Now, you have four lines that are going to be either equal or unequal, and you're going to have, you know, one or the other right away. Now, to the third, it should be said, that's the one that says that the soul is joined to the body by spiritual contact, and that's through power. To the third, it should be said that a spiritual substance, an immaterial substance, which is united to a body only as a mover, is united to its power, right? But the understanding of the soul is united to a body as a form, right? And therefore, to its own, what? Existence, right? Which it shares with the matter. But you can say that it administers it and moves it to its power, okay? In virtue. Is it clear? Yeah, I guess, I'm not sure where I could say if I missed this, but in all through there, there's potentium et virtutem, and also potentium et virtutem at the end. Yeah, I know it's the way it says in the Latin here, see? It's united to, if the spiritual substance was united to a body only as a motor, a mover, right? It is united to it, and the Latin says, per potentium, vel virtutem, there he's taking them almost as synonymous. I don't have vel there, I don't know, I have et. Yeah, yeah. But then the next sentence says, but the understanding soul is united to the body as a form to its being. But it administers it and moves it through its potency, and then it says et, et virtutem, right? I have et in both places. Yeah. Now mine has vel first, and then et. Now, you've got to be careful talk about the virtues as opposed to the vices. Right. But you use this term sometimes even for things that don't have virtues in the moral sense. Okay. And so they're almost synonymous, but not quite. Yeah. You see? Right. And that's why Thomas has a little hesitation there. Yeah. And it was like what I mentioned with that definition of, was it Hope last week, where he speaks of the kingdom of heaven and eternal life. And they're somewhat the same thing. But if you wanted to make some distinction, you could say, well, eternal life, according to our Lord in chapter 17 of St. John, he says, this is eternal life, to know you, the Father, right? And him whom you have sent. So eternal life is to see God, really, as he is, to see God face to face. What's the kingdom of heaven? Well, the kingdom of heaven is, as Thomas defines it, the ordered society of those who see God, right? Yeah. So in a way, it includes eternal life and brings in this kind of community aspect of it, yeah. Now, there's one psalm there, 1, 3, 2. Behold how good it is and how pleasant for brethren dwell at one. There's been the precious appointment upon the head that one's done with the beer, the beer, the barren, and the Father's rule. Amen. Amen. Amen. is to do at that a hermit which comes down upon the mountain of the sun. For there the Lord has pronounced his blessing life forever. But notice, when the precious oil went upon the head, comes down on the beard, the beard of the air, and down upon the collar's robe. Well, that refers to the ordered, what? Society. And you could take it, you know, Christ is by the throne of Messiah, the anointed one, right? And then it flows down upon, let's say, the apostles, or upon the priests, upon the laity or something, you know. But there's an ordered society there. And it's beautiful if you look at Vatican II. Vatican II very much emphasizes the fact that Christ is king and priest and prophet, and that all the rest of us, but to different degrees, different kinds, share in those, huh? So you go to the document in Vatican II on bishops, right? And they'll talk about the bishop's share in the kingly and the priestly and the prophetic thing of Christ, huh? Right. Then you go to the priest, the document priest, and it'll talk about the priest's share in these same three things. We'll go down to the laity and talk about the laity's share in these three things, huh? Right. And although the priest of the laity is different in kind, huh? Yeah. From the priesthood that's tied to the sacred orders and so on, nevertheless, it's a sharing in the, what, threefold offices of Christ, huh? He's a king, priest, and prophet. It's corresponding to the first three Gospels, huh? Mm-hmm. Matthew's the size of the king and Mark, the prophetic, huh? And Luke, the priesthood, huh? That's why it mentioned, like, in Luke, you know, that the details of the passion are more explicit, that he's sweating blood, huh? And it got in there. And, as Thomas points out, it begins the temple. Right. And it ends the temple. Yeah. And it goes to the temple more often than the account than the other Gospels do, huh? Mm-hmm. The temple is the place of the priest, huh? Mm-hmm. Why, and, uh, why in Matthew you emphasize the, what, the kingship of Christ. Mm-hmm. And the, the adoration of the Magi is just in, in Matthew, and his descent from David, and so on. Mm-hmm. And, uh, at the end you have, you know, the king and the royal go for it, and teach all nations, make disciples of all nations. Mm-hmm. And so, um, so it's kind of a different way that the Gospels, the Gospels, uh, end. Mm-hmm. So that, that's, that's emphasized now. Mm-hmm. But, but it says, Behold, our good it is, and our pleasant were brethren, and dwelled one. Well, I said, I mean, just got, got a, got a heap or a pile there, right? Do the do upon, you know, and comes down, and, you know, it's also an argument against the, you know, priesthood. I mean, it comes down upon the beard, right? Mm-hmm. Unless you go back to the old circus world and they have a bearded lady, remember the old? Yeah. Yeah. And the bearded lady, you know. But, uh, the, uh, the, uh, someone asked me, Brother Mark, you know, people wear beards, we're often now even in, you know, in the, you know, around the world a little bit. What do you think about good marine beards? He said, well, it's fine. He said, they're a man enough to wear one. Oh. That's true, you know? So, uh, but there you see it. It's an ordered society, right? Mm-hmm. But when it says the dew like that of hermene comes down upon the mountain of the scion, there you don't emphasize so much the order, but the, the, what? The vision itself, huh? The beatific vision, huh? It's compared to dew, huh? Not sure I ought to get it out, you know, because of the metaphor there, but, but, uh, Shakespeare often helps you to understand it, huh? It helps you to understand metaphors, but he always speaks of the golden dew of slumber. See? He gets to his beloved in sleep, he'll be out, it says in that, in that psalm, Mm-hmm. In 26th, isn't it? Um, unless the Lord build the house, so they've been vain to build it, unless the Lord guard the city in vain, does the guard be vigil. He's vain for you to rise, so you'll put up your rest, you'll eat heart and bread. For he gives to his beloved in sleep, right? Mm-hmm. Well, that can mean what? It can mean in the sleep of, of death, right? Yeah. He gives the vision after death. Mm-hmm. He can also refer to his giving people something in, what? A vision of some sort, right? Mm-hmm. Miting them in the sleep of, what? Contemplation, huh? And he kind of is drawing from the senses there. Mm-hmm. So there are good senses of sleep, there are other, you know, bad senses of sleep, the scriptures say. Mm-hmm. So, uh, for he gives to his beloved in sleep, huh? So, you know, um, you have to, you know, contemplate, so to speak, God, and then you have something to give to others, right? You have to open yourself up to God, and then you receive something from God, and then you have something to give to others, huh? Mm-hmm. Um, so, as I say, when Shakespeare speaks of the golden duel of slumber, huh? Mm-hmm. It's kind of marvelous the way he says that, huh? Mm-hmm. A very, very interesting thing. And I, I, I, you know, I try to pin people down because I don't know the Hebrew there, but, you know, um, sometimes, um, the Lord said to my Lord, say to my right hand, I'll make your hand. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. And then you use the word do there, huh? Oh, yeah? Like the do I have begotten you, huh? Oh, yeah. See? Huh. Well, then that's very, that's very striking, huh? See? But, you know, I'm not sure I fully understand the metaphor. But it seems to me that part of the likeness is the fact that the do seems to come from, what, within rather than, than, than, like rain, huh? See? You know, so in the morning the, the do is right inside the flower, huh? See? And this is, this is a metaphor, maybe, for the, what, eternal generation of the sun, huh? Like the do I have begotten you, huh? Yours is princely power in the day of your birth. Like the do I have begotten you, huh? I think that's what it says there, but. So there, maybe, you're, you're, you're, you're, you're, I don't know how to understand fully, but maybe you're closer to talking about eternal life, huh? I mean, after all, water's always a symbol of life there, huh? And baptism and, and, uh, the first philosopher who said water's the beginning of all things. But he's influenced by living things, Aristotle says, huh? So water seems to be time with life. Yeah. So, do there is, with water is close to the idea of life, eternal life. Yeah. But this, but this, you know, I mean, coming down on the head and down here. Big idea of order, right? You know? Right. And, uh, the idea of an ordered kingdom, huh? Right. You know, the marinate liturgy, a common, uh, image that shows up as, um, Christ, um, at the last day will, will, um, pour forth or drop down, whatever, the dew of his mercy, um, upon the, the dead, so then it will rise up, this connection, and the dew, that will bring them back to life. Yeah. You know, I try to think about that. It's like a dew like that of Hermon, which comes down upon the mountains of Sion. Why don't Sion is, you know, you usually interpret it in terms of vision, isn't it? The word Sion, that's part of the, the, the hills there in Jerusalem, isn't it? That's kind of more of the, the contemplative part, you might say, of, of it, and, uh, so, I mean, I'm not sure exactly the particular significance of Hermon, you know, the mountain, you know, but it's an important mountain. Well, I got two articles, this time, huh? Hey, we're really, we're really going along there, huh? I'm going to try to do the, the next two articles, next time, huh? Next two. And then, yeah, then we can start to go into powers a little more proportion to us, the soul is so hard. You really know the soul too, its powers, right? Okay, in the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, through the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, that rouse us to consider more correctly, St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we start with article 7 today, huh? As with you, the soul is united to the body. So we start with article 7 today, so we start with article 7 today, of the animal, right, by means of some what? Body, huh? That's the way it stated there anyway. To the seventh, what proceeds thus? It seems that the soul is united to the body of the animal by some other body, right, as a kind of middle. There's no such a person who's thinking about something like the wooden chair over there, right? And one piece of the chair is united with another piece through a third body called glue, or maybe a screw or something, right, huh? Okay, so they're tending to think maybe of the soul of the body as being parts in the original sense of the word parts, huh? In the original sense of the word parts is quantitative parts. And of course, this is not the kind of parts that the soul of the body are. Let me give you a very simple example here to show the equivocation of the word part, huh? You take the written word, or the printed word there, cat, huh? What are the parts of the word cat? Three parts. Yeah, C, A, and T, huh? And that's the first meaning of the word part, huh? And you could actually separate those three parts and put the T here and the C there and the A there, right? Okay? And what are the parts of a chair? You might say the legs and the seat and the back, right? You could actually separate these parts and they could exist by themselves, huh? Zero-style says about the quantitative parts. It's divisible into parts that can exist by themselves. They're substantial. Okay? Now, if you stop and think about it, though, huh? What do you mean by a part? See? What do you mean by a part? Is a part something outside or within the thing which is a part? Within the thing which is a part. Yeah, yeah. And can anything that is said to be within a thing be said to be one of its parts? What do you think? Based on the last definition, yeah. It seems so, yeah. Yeah. Now, when you take another word like act, okay, you have exactly the same letters, don't you? But not the same word, huh? So there's something in the word cat besides the letters, isn't there? And what is that? Order. The order in this case, right? Now, suppose I say, instead of saying that C and A and T are the parts of the word cat, suppose I say that the letters and the order of the letters are the parts of the word cat, huh? The word cat, huh? You obviously are using the word part here in a different sense, aren't you? Now, the order of the letters and the letters themselves are not two parts in the way that C, A, and T are three parts, huh? But nevertheless, you can say that the order of the letters is inside the word, isn't it? Mm-hmm. And in a way, the word is put together from the letters and the order. Okay. Now, what are the parts of a Manhattan? Anybody know? Pardon? What's the parts of a Manhattan cocktail? Whiskey, sweet vermouth, and cherry, and I think... Okay. But just take the main ones, rye whiskey, and sweet vermouth, huh? Okay. But now, if you mix sweet vermouth and rye whiskey in just any ratio, do you really have a Manhattan? No. Well, the book will tell you two parts of rye whiskey to one of what? Sweet vermouth, huh? If the ratio is one to one, it'd be too sweet. It wouldn't be a good cocktail. So, what are the parts, huh, of a Manhattan? Rye whiskey and sweet vermouth, huh? You got the trick, woman. Okay. Basically, those two parts, huh? And there are parts of the way that C and A and T are what? Parts of the word cat. And the rye whiskey could exist by itself, right? And the what? Vermouth, huh? Might have a hard time separating them once I mix them, right? But you could in some way separate the two and put one here and one what? There, right? But isn't the ratio of two to one inside the Manhattan too? Haven't the parts there in the first sense been combined in that ratio? That sounds kind of strange to say that, doesn't it? That the parts of Manhattan are the ingredients, on the one hand, whiskey and vermouth, and this two to one ratio. But that is another sense, but not the original sense of the word, what? Part, huh? Do you see that? Yeah. Okay. Well, let's take a rubber ball, right? What would be the parts of a rubber ball? Like the letters and the order are the parts of a, the word cat. Or like the, the ingredients there, and the ratio of two to one are the parts of that. What would be the parts of a rubber ball? The rubber and the ball shape. Yeah, yeah. But again, you're using the word in a different sense of part, huh? Right. But certainly the shape of the ball is something inside the ball. It's not outside the ball, is it? And you might say, in a kind of different sense, that the rubber ball is put together from the rubber and the shape. You need both that rubber ball, right? Both have got to be in the rubber ball. Rubber. And that shape, huh? So, when we think of parts, huh? And there are other senses of parts besides the ones we mentioned here. In fact, there will be some more mentioned in the next reading. But the two common kinds of parts that we have in the world around us are the two I mentioned, huh? The quantitative parts, huh? And the, what? Matter and form. Which they sometimes call the essential parts, huh? It's essential to the word cat, huh? To that word being what it is. Both the letters and the order of the letters, huh? It's essential to what a Manhattan is. Not only sweet vermouth and rye whiskey, but the ratio of two to one. It's essential to what a rubber ball is. That you have rubber and that you have this spherical shape, right? It's essential to a tire out there that you have rubber and you have also this circular shape, huh? So, when you say that the soul and the body are the parts of man, that man is composed of body and soul, you could say body and soul are the parts of man, but to the parts of man in this second sense. I think you call them the essential parts as opposed to the quantitative parts. Do you see that? And notice, in the case of quantitative parts, sometimes you could actually, what? They're not different in kind like the letters are. I could take the straight line and this whole thing, what is it, a straight line? What's this here? Yeah, it's still a straight line, right? If the quantitative parts don't differ in kind, actually you might be able to divide a whole and the parts are as much what the visual is. But if you take the order of these letters out of the word cat, you'd love to have the word cat. So they're essential to what that is. You can't take the order out of there, or the letters out of there, either one, and still have the word cat, what the word is. In the same way, you can't take the shape out of the rubber ball, the circle shape instead of a rubber ball. Yeah. Yeah. They distinguish the parts over against the... Essential parts. Essential parts, yeah. And it sounded to me like in that, what in that distinction you were saying, where you take the quantitative parts. place them over against the letters and the order but aren't the letters really the material cause the quantitative parts and the order as the formal cause? yeah you can speak of that yeah so the order is to the letters as form is to matter the letters themselves would actually be the quantitative parts not so much the order the letters themselves would be by themselves yeah the quantitative parts the order would be yeah but see what's one reason why the quantitative parts easier to understand is that you can take apart the word cat I can take my scissors and cut the few letters out right? I can take apart the chair and put the legs here and the seat here and maybe some other parts somewhere else right? we do that when you cut up a chicken or something or turkey or something but I can't take the this table and put its shape over there and leave the wood over there can't do that can you? see so it's a little less easier for us to see them as distinct parts because what's most clear to us that things are distinct with what is here and what is there nothing's more clear than that in fact the word for difference in Greek and in Latin comes from to carry apart pharaoh in Latin is to carry you know you have the word difference in the Latin word the Greek word is diaphora kind of end the size of here phora that same root there to carry apart carry apart one here one there okay but it looks like you do when you get to something you have to assemble yourself what do you do you kind of lay out the parts separate one from the other maybe identify them with the charge you know things that see which bunch is the ones put together with which but you kind of lay them out carry them apart separate them but you can't do that with the rubber ball so you put the rubber over here and put the shape over here you can do that could you huh no okay so the quantitative parts are in many ways more known to us that's the original meaning and when we say that a whole is more than one of its parts we're usually thinking of the quantitative whole at first but now why do I mention this huh well because a lot of times the first cause of error at the sight of our of our going power is false imagination huh is at work here huh we imagine the parts in the sense of essential parts right to be like the parts that are more imaginable the quantitative parts if you think of it that way then you see them as two actual things which require a third thing to make something one out of them see I have two actually existing independent of each other pieces of wood and now I gotta make them one I need a third thing to make them one don't I right like the glue or the screw or something like that but you need a third thing to unite the shape of the rubber ball with the rubber huh well you can have an agent right a machine or somebody who shapes the rubber right but as far as the rubber and its shape is concerned there's nothing in between the two yeah and the shape or the form is nothing other than the act of an ability that the rubber has yeah the rubber is able to be a sphere a cube a cylinder right and it's actually one or the other through the form so the form is nothing other than the act and ability of the matter so that's why they're united immediately and so you have to bear in mind these injections huh that the injector in a sense is falsely imagining the kind of parts that soul and body are they're parts in the sense in which form and matter are parts what is called essential parts as opposed to quantitative parts so he says it seems if the soul is united to the body of the animal by means of some other body in between for Augustine says in the seventh book on Genesis to the letter right I guess that's supposed to be his reply to Jerome Jerome so he wasn't sticking close enough to the text so he says you know commentary on Genesis to the letter right down to the individual words that's what I refer to you I don't know that the soul through light right that is fire and air which are more like the spirit they administer the body but fire and air are bodies therefore the soul is united to the what human body by means of some other body okay so even the good Augustine has been brought in to object but as usual Thomas understands Augustine better than most people do now it's kind of interesting this word spiritus you have sometimes you see in Thomas but you see in Aristotle before and it's kind of a more indistinct ancient science but they had the idea of something very fine but material in nature that was involved in the movement of the body and you could compare it a bit to what we might speak of as electrical impulses brainways and things of that sort and very subtle matter which sometimes is called spirit because spirit is originally breath right which is something material but something very fine and so they kind of carry that word over to something that is material but very fine in its nature and I mentioned how you know Louis Dubreuil has this book called Matter and Light though the modern scientist thinks of light as being material sometimes they contrast matter and light because light seems to be such a fine and subtle thing right and of course Aristotle and Thomas didn't think of light as a what matter at all you mentioned that I think before when you look at the diagram so he says that which is taken away unties or dissolves the union of things united seems to be a middle between them but when the spirit fails right when the brainways stop the electrical impulses stop in the body right then the soul is separated from the body therefore the spirit which is a very subtle body is a middle in the union of the soul and the body so a lot of times you see people talking when is the man dead well so they say brain dead right well that means that the spirit right the electrical impulses are no longer functioning right you see and then the man seems to be dead and therefore the soul has left the body moreover those things which are very distant from each other are not united except through some middle but the understanding soul is at a great distance you might say for the body both because it is not a bodily thing itself and because it is what incorruptible therefore it seems you need some intermediary right therefore it seems it is united to the body with something else as an intermediary which would be an incorruptible body so you're thinking of kind of a very fine incorruptible body that is in between the soul which is incorruptible and this corruptible body that we have this sniffling here and getting old and other such things huh okay and then you know the kind of strange opinions going around at the time and this seems to be some celestial light right which conciliates the elements so they don't fight too much among each other and renders them something one now all this of course Thomas is going to reject but notice the quote here from Aristotle it's a very important quote but against this is what the philosopher says he calls Aristotle by Antonia the philosopher but against this is what the philosopher says in the second book about the soul that is not necessary to ask right if the soul and the body are one or what makes them one to make people full there just as neither wax and what the shape of the wax same example I was using the rubber ball and it's what the rubber and the shape right there's not a third thing between there okay but the figure is united to the wax with no body in between therefore also the soul to the body okay so Aristotle and and and and and and Comparing the union of the soul and the body, which is of a substantial form, right, to its subject, with that of an accidental form, right, to its subject, like the wax and its shape, but that's more known to us, the accidental form than the substantial form. It's more sensible. Substantial form isn't sensible. You have to understand it. You can't see or picture it. But if you understand that the union of soul and body is not like the union of two legs of the chair or the legs of the seat or something, but it's like the union of the wax and its shape, then one is the act of the other, right? Then you realize that there's not going to be anything in between. Lord Thomas says, I answered there not to be said that if the soul, according to the Platonists, was united to the body only as a mover, it would be suitable to say that between the soul of man and that of any animal and body, that some other bodies in between intervene. For it is suitable to the mover, who is moving something that is distant from it, that through many things in between it moves, just like the engine might move the caboose, but through many intermediaries, because it is at a distance from it, through many cars. You see, Plato found the soul as being in the body like a sailor in a boat, as they say, or like a man in his car. And so you move one thing through another, even in the car you do that. But all that collapses if you see that the soul is united to the body as a form. This has been said already. If that's true, then it's impossible that it be united to it by some other body in between. Now he starts to give the reason for this, huh? The reason is because thus something is said to be one in the same way that it is said to be what? A being, huh? This is something that's developed in wisdom if we ever get that far in our studies here. But when Aristotle is taking up the subject of wisdom and showing that it's being as being, then he goes on to show us also about the one and the many. And he shows how being and one go together. And you can see that in the things that are more known to us. Because the being of this chair, or the being of this table, will be had only so long as the parts are, what, united, huh? And if we break them up, that's the way we're going to what? Destroy it, right? And so a thing tries to hold on to its unity, in the same way it tries to hold on to its what? Being, right, huh? Okay? Divide and conquer, right, huh? You want to keep the army, what? If the army loses its unity, its chain of command, its order, huh? Then you have a rabble, a crowd or something, right? And no longer, what? Army, right? To be an army, you have to, what? Have a certain unity, a certain order, huh? A certain chain of command, and so on. So being in one go together, right? The form, however, through itself, makes the thing to be an act, huh? Since the form is, in its very nature, an act, huh? Nor does it give to be, existence, through some, what, middle, huh? Once, he says, the unity of a thing composed from matter and form is through the form itself, which, by itself, is united to the matter as its act. Nor is there anything uniting it, except the agent, right, that makes the matter to be an act, as is taught there in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, huh, about physics. So what is it that unites rubber and the spherical shape? Only the man who shapes the wood, right? The agent, right? But there's nothing in the rubber ball uniting the rubber and the shape, is there? But the man who reduces it, right? The ability of the rubber to be a sphere to actually being a sphere. He's the cause of the union of the two, huh? But nothing within the rubber ball is there between the, what, rubber itself and the shape, is there? No. And that's because the form is the act of that ability of matter. It's not like the form and the matter are two actual things that have to be united by some third thing. But one is actually the act of the other's, what, ability. Whencey says it is clear that those opinions are false, huh, who lay down that some bodies are in between the soul and the body of man. Of which some Platonists said, huh, that the understanding soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to itself. All these very imaginative positions, huh? From which it is never separated. And that, by that as intermediary, is united to the corruptible body of man, huh? Some say that it is united to the body by middle of a, what, spiritual body, meaning by spiritual body or corporeal spirit. A very fine or thin body, right? Okay. Notice the word spirit first means breath or air, huh? And then it's kind of extended to any very fine and, what, thin and subtle matter, huh? Then fine is carried over and applied to the angels and to God himself, as Craig says, right? God is a spirit, the Father is a spirit and must be worshipped in the spirit, huh? And then using the word spirit then to name something that's not material at all. But we borrow that word because air, to begin with, is hardly, what, visible, huh? Yeah. Highly sensible. And then we apply that name to something that is in no way sensible. Like an angel or like God and his divine nature. Others say that it is united to the body with light as a new meteorite, which they say to be a body of the nature of the fifth essence, huh? The old science, huh? So on the earth you had four elements, huh? Earth, air, fire, and water, huh? That's a standard theory in chemistry for 2,000 years almost. From Empedocles, huh? To Shakespeare. You read Boyle's The Skeptical Key Beast in the 16th century or 1600s. And he's doubting whether earth, air, fire, and water really are the basic elements. But that's no question, you know? But it's a very, it's the most long-lasting chemical theory in the world. But then they thought that the heavenly bodies were something different from earth, air, fire, and water. So that would be the fifth nature, huh? And somehow you have light from up there that becomes the intermediary between your soul and your body, huh? You guys really got, you know what Teacher Kasuric would say, an overactive imagination, huh? They come up with these unusual positions, huh? And even go into the details of the different souls. Thus that the feeding soul, the plant soul, is united to a body by means of light of the heaven of the stars. The sensible one by reason of even higher heaven, the light of the crystal heavens, huh? And the soul, the understanding soul, by reason of light from the highest heaven of all, the imperial heaven, huh? And what does Thomas say? Quod fictitium, fictitium, et derisible aperit, huh? This is fictitious, huh? Now it's a work of the imagination, huh? I don't have any reason to say these crazy things, huh? And derisible, worthy of laughter, huh? Thomas usually doesn't say those things, but I see it more often in his books. His teacher, Albert the Great, huh? Oh. Because Albert the Great, you know, when he takes up some questions that there are different opinions on. Uh-huh. And sometimes he'll take very seriously these opinions, and he'll discuss them, and if he has to refute them, refute them, right? Other times he'll mention them, he'll say, this is so ridiculous, we won't be able to refute it, you know. So asinine, you know. But, you know, he'll say, this should be more laughed at, he says, than what? Refute it. It's so stupid. Thomas is not going to quit this far, but it's sort of, huh? Right. But...