De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 88: Powers of the Soul: Essence, Accidents, and Natural Properties

Transcript
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But it seems to be, in a way, you've got something like the reply to the second objection, because you have now an ability that is in the genus of what? Quality. And that ability, right, is for the act, that is also in that genus, huh? Yeah, okay. But notice in a sense of proportion there. He's saying in a sense that just as through the substantial form you have existence, in a substantial way, so likewise through the, what, accidental form that follows upon the substantial form, you have some kind of, what, operation, right, through the ability to understand, huh? Now the fourth objection was based upon what we saw in the Deanima, that the soul was said to be that by which we first sense and live, sense, understand, and so on. Now Thomas is going to solve that simply by saying he's got the immediate principle, right, and the remote one. To the fourth it should be said, huh, that the accidental form, this very thing, that the accidental form is a principle of action, it has in the substantial form, okay? That's why later on you get down to that, what is it, the sixth article, he'll be talking about how the powers of the soul flow from the, what, essence of the soul, huh? And therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action, but not the, what, proximate one. And according to this, the philosopher says that that by which, and actually in my text here now, when he quotes the thing again, he leaves out the word first, but it should be in there, right? The philosopher says that the soul is that by which we first sense and understand, huh? Yeah. Okay? But not whereby we sense and understand in an immediate way, huh? That's by the ability to see, and the ability to understand, huh? Yeah, okay? So do I understand by my reason, or do I understand by my, what, soul? Well, you could say both, right, huh? Yeah. Yeah. I understand because, first of all, because I have a soul, right, huh? But in an immediate sense, because the soul has the ability to, what, understand, right? You see that? Mm-hmm. The first reason why I have the ability to understand is because I have a human soul. If I had a dog soul or a tree soul, I wouldn't have that ability, right? Okay? But in an immediate sense, I do this because of my, what? Reason. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay? Yeah, that's not an impossible distinction to understand, is it, huh? Yeah, that makes sense. Suppose I teach geometry, right? When I teach geometry, take a little different example right now. By my reason, or by the art of geometry in my reason, what would I teach you geometry by? Well, it's both. Yeah. And you could say, what? By teaching you geometry, it's more approximate to it, the knowledge of geometry that I have in my reason, right? Yeah. But you could also say it's by my reason that I would teach you, right? Mm-hmm. See? The one would be more approximate, huh? You see that? Mm-hmm. Yeah. So it's likewise by my soul that I understand. Mm-hmm. My understanding soul, as Shakespeare calls it, huh? But in an approximate sense, I understand by that ability that the soul has to understand, huh? Yeah. There was Shakespeare there when Hamlet is saying why he chose Horatius as a friend, huh? Since my dear soul, he says, was Mr. Suffer's choice, huh? And could have been distinguished, huh? Her election has sealed thee for herself, huh? So he's chosen Horatius as his friend by his, what? Will, right? Right. Now, he's very precise there when he says that, Shakespeare, because the will is not in the body, okay? So it's by your soul that you actually make a choice, but it's also by your will that you make a choice, huh? But the will would be the, what? Proximate source, huh? So my soul, by its reason, understands, and by its will, it chooses, since my dear soul was Mr. Suffer's choice. Now, the fifth argument here, again, it has one of these strange quotes of Augustine. First, everything that is not of the essence of the thing is an accident. If, therefore, the power of the soul is apart from its essence, it would follow that it's an accident, which is against Augustine, the ninth book about the Trinity, where he says that the fourth, said, are not in the soul as in a subject, as color or figure in the body or any other quality or quantity, because whatever is such does not exceed the subject which it is, but the mind does exceed the subject in which it is, because it can love other things and, what? Know them, right? It reminds you a little bit of what Aristotle said after he got through with the sensing and understanding and understanding in the Danima. He says the soul is in some way, what? All things, right, huh? Because it can, what? Sense all things and sensible things and understand all things to some extent, huh? And so it has them all in them. That's not the way Augustine is speaking here, in a sense, huh? But Thomas makes an interesting distinction here. And if you recall, there's some logic, huh? To the fifth, it ought to be said that if accident is divided according, is taken, rather, the word accident, according as it's divided against substance, then nothing can be a middle between substance and accident. Why? Because they are divided or distinguished by affirmation and negation. Because a substance is a thing that exists, right? Not in another, as in a subject, right? An accident is something that exists in a subject. So you've got to be one or the other, right? Either you exist in a subject, right? Or you don't, okay? And in this way, since a power of the soul is not its essence, it's necessary that it be an accident, right? And thus it is in the second species of quality. If you go back to Aristotle's categories, huh? The first species of quality was habit or disposition. Like health is the quality of the body, right? Or virtue of the soul, and so on. The second species of quality was inborn power, right? Beauty. Third species of quality was the sense qualities, like red and yellow, hot and cold. And the fourth species of quality was, what, figure or shape, right? Thomas in the primus ecunda there, he explains the order of those four, right? Okay. Anyway, it's in the second species of quality. If, however, one takes accident according as it is laid down to be one of the five universals. Now he's going back to porphyry, right? Genus, species, difference, property, and accident. And accident has a different meaning there. See? Because a property, as porphyry uses the word property, could be an accident, huh? In the first sense, huh? Now remember the Father Henri de Lac, who taught logic there, went to Laval, huh? He taught logic, huh? He and his friend there, Father Baumgartner, I don't know if you know of Baumgartner, he was rector of the seminary there. But they both went to Laval, right? And they both wrote their doctoral theses in logic, right? And so Father de Lac used to teach the logic course, and he says, you know, after he teaches so many years, you know, he'd despair after a while that students would ever see the difference between those two meanings of accident. There's some things, you know, I mean, you could talk to your blue in the face, and the students are just not going to get it, you know? Or most of them won't get it either, right? And, uh, uh, okay? If R1 takes accident according as it is, what? Laid down one of the five universals. Thus there is something in between substance and accident. Now you see, when you make the distinction there between genus and difference in species on the one hand, and property and accident, right? The first three are signifying something inside the nature of a thing, what it is, inside its essence or substance, right? Property and accident are both signifying something outside the nature of the thing, outside of what it is. But the difference between them, right, is that the accident has no connection with the nature, while the property is connected with the nature and follows upon the nature, it's like an effect to the nature. Okay? Remember that? Yeah. So when porphyry defines accident there, it's something that can be present or absent, right, with the same nature of the thing. While property, in the strictest sense, is something that belongs to only one species, to every member of that species, and always. So it can't just be present or absent. Okay? So in that sense, there's something in between substance and accident. Because to the substance pertains whatever is essential to the thing, whatever pertains to what it is. But not everything, right, which is outside the essence, can be said in this way to be an accident, but only that which is not caused from the essential principles of the species. The proprium, which we translate in English as a property, is not of the essence of the thing, but it is caused, right, from the essential principles of the species. Whence it is a middle between the essence and accident, as said in the way of porphyry saying it. And in this way, the powers of the soul can be said to be in between its substance and accident, as if they are, what, natural properties of the soul. Okay? So notice, if I say the triangle is green, does green signify anything in the nature of a triangle? No. It's outside the nature of a triangle, right? Does it have any connection with the nature of a triangle? No. No. So you can never reason out or think out that a triangle is green. If a triangle was green, you'd know it only by sensation. Mm-hmm. But you wouldn't see, by knowing the nature of a triangle, it's a three-sided plane figure, you wouldn't see any connection between that and being green, huh? But not to say the triangle has interior angles, huh? Equal to two right angles. Is that what a triangle is? No. No. It's something outside of the nature of what a triangle is, but it's something that follows upon, right? Right. A triangle. That it has, what? Three angles equal to two right angles, huh? And you can actually, if you've studied, you know, Euclid, you can actually prove, right? You can reason for what a triangle is to it's having this, what? Property, right? Euclid, what? He says, you extend the side of a triangle and then you draw a line parallel to the opposite one, right? Then by the parallel theorems, you know these two angles are what? Excuse me. These two are equal, right? And then the alternate angles are equal. These two. Hmm. And the third angle has up to red angles, right? Or sometimes if they do it separately, the series shows exterior angles with two opposite ones. So like that, huh? Those are equal, and then these two are equal. The third one makes two right angles. So you can actually reason out what a triangle is, that the interior angle is equal to right angles. Okay? But you can never reason out that it's green, huh? Okay? So if the triangle is green, would that be an accident? Yeah, this is what we call a critical accident, right? Accident now not as opposed to substance, but accident as opposed to what? Property. This would be a property, huh? Okay? Now the property doesn't have to be in the same genus, huh? And probably will not be, right? Let's take a very simple example of a property here. Two is half of four. Now is half of four signifies something inside the nature of two? Well, stop and think, huh? Two is a number, isn't it? Okay? The number is in the category of what? Quantity, huh? The second genus. Half of four, half is what? Is that a number? It's half a number? It's a, what'd you call it, relation? It's a relation, yeah. It's towards something, right? Yeah, okay. Okay? It's a relation. A relation is not a number, isn't it? See? So these are going to be in different categories, huh? Okay. Two is in the second category of quantity, and half of four would be in the, what? Fourth category, right? Which is, Aristotle calls it posti, towards something, right? Ad adequate, though, translated into Latin, huh? Towards something, right? But sometimes you use the abstract word relation, huh? Okay? I mentioned how in the Gospel of St. John, the word is actually, the Greek said, to be, what? Towards the Father. Towards God, huh? Which fits in very well with the distinction of the Trinity there on the basis of the relations. But notice here, you have a little bit like what you have here in the case of the soul and its powers, right? You know, if I, if Socrates asked me, what is two? And I said, two is half of four. Well, Socrates would ask me the same question he asked you before. Is it two because it's half of four? Or is it half of four because it is two? Half of four because it is two. Yeah. This is really a cause of that, right? Yeah. And you can see it would be arbitrary to say two is two because it's half of four. Why isn't it two because it's a third of what? Six. Or, because it's a fourth of eight. Or a fifth of ten, right? Well, those are relations that belong to two and that follow upon what two is. What makes two to be two is that second what? One, huh? You add one to one and you got what? Two, right? Okay. And there's a relation that follows upon that. So, the powers of the soul, will they be like to the soul like green is the triangle or like as at right angle seems to right angle so it's the triangle? Or just take these super examples here. Will the soul's powers be to the soul as green is the triangle or like half of four is the two? Yeah, yeah. It would be something in another genus, right? but it follows upon the first, right? In this case, two is in the genus of quantity and in the species of number, right? Discrete quantity. Half of four is in the category of what? Relation, right? And now in the case of the soul, let's say the ability to choose will be to understand. The soul is in the genus not of quantity but in the soul in the genus of what? Substance. It's a substantial form. The ability to understand is in the genus of what? Quality, right? So in this case here, you have a quality following upon a substance. In this case here, you have a relation following upon a number or generally speaking a quantity, right? So you have things in different genre and therefore they can't what's in another genus can't signify something. It's by the nature of the thing it's in no genius get it no so a relation cannot signify what a quantity is and a quality cannot signify what a substance is but it can follow upon that as an effect falls upon a cause follow upon the nature of it that's what he said we're flows from right now you make it to flows from two to be half a four thirty six and the other such things what augustine says over that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject should be understood in the for said way going back to the what response to the first objection insofar as he's comparing them right to the soul not as to the one loving and knowing because then they'd be in the soul as a what subject right but insofar as they compare it to it as the loved and the what known right and in this way his proof proceeds because if love were in the soul loved as in a subject right then it would follow that the accident transcended its subject right why because there are other things that are loved by the soul too such as god or your neighbor or something that's all right you see that well i mean again the way of speaking is a little bit confused but but um if you're talking about what um knowledge and love in comparison to the soul well how is is knowledge and love related to the soul right see well you can say that the soul knows and loves right and then you see the knowledge and the love is being in the soul as a subject right okay and they're in the soul and only in the soul right they're not in god they're not in your neighbor are they right okay but you can also look at knowledge and love and say well i have another relation to the soul the soul can be known and the soul can be what loved but here it's not limited to the soul is it because i can love god i can love my guardian angel i can love my neighbor right i guess my guardian angel is my neighbor maybe but you see what i mean i can know and love something else notice that distinction we made before this is a little different uh context here but remember that amphiboli we have you know these amphibolies i'm fond of you know i teach a course called the philosophy of nature but uh i kind of like august i mean uh shakespeare's name to the philosophy of nature he calls it the wisdom of nature right and i kind of like that when i'm accustomed to the wisdom of nature you know shakespeare because you could say that this phrase wisdom of nature has two meanings it could refer to the philosophy of nature right it could also refer to what the philosophy of nature is about so the wisdom of nature in one sense is about the wisdom of nature in another sense the wisdom of nature in the sense of the philosophy of nature right is about the wisdom that nature shows and what it does which is really due to god's wisdom huh okay when air styles in the biological works right and he's studying the way animals are put together and the way their parts are arranged huh and he speaks of what appreciating the mind that designed these things right so he's appreciating the divine mind through what seeing the marvelous order of the things the divine mind is what made huh you see why i might have admired shakespeare's mind or mozart's mind or thomas's mind for the book or the play or the piece of music that they wrote huh okay now another one of my favorites as you know is is the phrase word of god huh okay the word of god is more than one meaning huh and you can make a sophisticated argument by mixing up the two meanings huh I could say what uh uh the son of god is the word of god and the word of god is the bible therefore the son of god is the bible what's wrong with the argument you made a jump there isn't that correct well no but i mean i made a mistake in my thinking there huh you can say truly that the son of god is the word of god right okay we're in there in saint john huh we're also told in other places that the word of god is the bible right that's why the uh constitution there in the vatican too is called the word of god right okay so i have two different meanings here of word of god right in one case the word of god uh means the son of god in other cases it means the bible right but there's actually a connection between the two because the word of god in one sense meaning the bible is chiefly about the word of god huh in the other sense huh and it's very beautiful the way the vatican too develops that right because they'll go to the fact that the son of god word of god in that sense became flesh right and the word of god in the sense of the bible becomes flesh it takes out human language and expresses things in a kind of human way right and so it fits in a sense what it's about and it's a beautiful analogy that they have there in vatican too huh so you could say that the word of god in one sense is about the word of god in another sense the wisdom of nature in one sense is about The sixth one is simply a misunderstanding of the text. And Thomas points it out. The soul, although it is not composed from matter and form, nevertheless has something of potentiality had mixed in it, as has been said above. Now that's even true of the substance of an angel. The substance of an angel is not its existence. Only in God is the substance the existence of it. So if the substance is not the existence of the thing, the substance is to the existence, something as potency as to what? Act. So that's why Thomas, when he talks about the angels, he'll say that although they're not composed of matter and form, they're not pure act. And so he says, since it's not, therefore pure act, it can be the subject of an accident. But the proposition that was induced there, if you know the text of Boethius, has a place in God, who is pure act, right? In which matter, Boethius introduces that statement. He's a great mind, Boethius. I think he's the greatest mind there between Augustine and Thomas. Now the seventh objection was saying that we use these as differences. But Thomas points out, rational and sensible, insofar as there are differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensing soul and the rational soul. But, because substantial forms, which by themselves are unknown to us, and you people can certainly testify to that, the difficulty of understanding the soul, right? They become known through their, what? Accidents, right? Accidents known as sense of properties. Nothing prevents sometimes accidents being laid down in place of substantial differences. Now, let me just give one aspect of that. It's kind of difficult, but it takes about it anyway. When Euclid, not Euclid, when Porphyry defines the difference, he follows Aristotle, right? And the definition of difference is this. It's a name said with one meaning of many things, other in kind, signifying how they are what they are. The very definition of difference is the idea that it's not said of just one, what? Species. And Aristotle, when he talks about the unity of things and their differences, seemed to contradict this, right? There should be one difference, right, that enables you to say what makes this to be one particular kind of thing. Well, Thomas raises that question in the commentary on the popular lyrics. He says that the essential differences of things are hidden to us, huh? And that's why we need a combination of differences to what? Express it, huh? So, if you wanted to take an example, then, of this, it would be bad to take as an example rational animal down through, I can show you all these old popular logic books, right? And the common example of a definition, right, with genus and difference is rational animal. Where you seem to have one difference, right, that completes what man is and separates it from everything else. And rational is said only of one kind of thing, namely man, right? And that's contrary to the very definition given by Porphyry and Baristatio even before that, of difference, huh? What's going on here, say? Well, Porphyry does define what? Property, huh? And property in the strict sense is what belongs to only one species, to every member of it, and what? Always, right? So, if you had a property in that strict sense, one property would separate the thing, right, from everything else, huh? Like half of four separates two from everything else, right? Without being the difference. That makes it to be two. You see that? But, if you don't have a property like that, and you're giving differences, you would tend to, in fact, use a combination of differences that fit only on one thing. Because if you lack one, the one essential difference, it makes it to be the one thing it is. And, therefore, I was taking a standing example in class, the definition of square, it's an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. Well, quadrilateral is the genus, right? Equilateral doesn't fit just square, does it? The rhombus is also equilateral. Right-angle doesn't fit just square. The oblong is also that, right? But the combination of those two fits just this one thing, huh? And that, certainly for the most part, is the kind of differences you're going to find all the way through philosophy. When Aristotle is taking up, let's say, the great forms of fiction there, and he's going to talk about tragedy, right? He's going to talk about the epic. He's going to talk about comedy. Okay? He takes, you know, a great or famous writer of each, huh? He takes Homer, the great writer of epics, right? And he takes Sophothes, the greatest writer of tragedies. He takes Aristophanes, the most famous of the Greek comic poets, huh? And he says, now, if you compare these three, right? Sophocles and Homer are alike in representing men who are greater than us. But Sophocles and what? Aristophanes are alike in representing men with this acted out in front of us on the stage, yeah? So, he has one difference, right? That separates Sophocles and Homer from Aristophanes, right? Another difference that separates what? Aristophanes and Sophocles from Homer. Yeah, yeah. And you need both to really separate tragedy entirely from what? Epic and comedy, huh? So when Aristotle defines tragedy, it's the likeness of an action that is, what? Serious, you know, some magnitude, right? And so on, huh? But it's the idea of a serious action, right? But then he'll add later on acted out and so on, huh? You see? So he has one difference that's common to tragedy and comedy acted out and one that's common to tragedy and epic that's representing serious things and, you see? So, for the most part you'll have that, huh? But not knowing the essential difference, you might also use a property in place of the essential difference. Then you might have something that is convertible to think. Like to have reason is convertible to think. And then you could say, what? Man is a rational animal, huh? But rational there, the name is taken from the ability which is in the genus of quality, right? But you're trying to designate whatever it is in the nature of man whence it follows upon him to have, what? Reason, right? You see? It's kind of a circumlocution in a sense, right? Because the essential differences of things are hidden to us, huh? I think I've quoted the essential thinker there, huh? Heraclitus, huh? And he says, nature loves to hide, huh? You see? Nature loves to hide. I think I struck a, I suppose I was in the bookstore, you know, and looking at the science books there, and there's one called nature loves to hide. He didn't remember that. Excellent, guys. He's good. Acknowledge that he's told him this phrase from the central thinker, but that's true, you see. The natures of things are very much hidden from us, and so we tend to know the natures of things through their accidents, which are closer to our senses. So that's the solution Thomas is giving here, right? When you say that man has an understanding soul and the cats around here have a sensing soul and the tree has got a feeding soul, a reproducing soul, right? You're really naming the kind of soul they have, which is the genus of substance, from a property, right? From a power that they have, the ultimate power that they have in their kind. And that power follows upon the nature, and therefore can be used in place of the essential difference, but it's still that. And so sometimes when you use a property, you have a name that is convertible to the thing being defined. But when Aristotle defines a difference, he defines it in this way, because usually what you have is a what? A combination, huh? You'll see that, you go through the sciences, huh? Did you ever study the definition of what it is to believe in theology, in the theological virtue of belief? But Thomas follows the definition of what? St. Augustine, right? You see? And Augustine has a couple ways of defining it, but that's the best way is he says that to believe is to assent while thinking about it. You see? To firmly assent while thinking about it. And Thomas says, if you read Thomas' explanation of that magnificent definition of Augustine, it's really beautiful definition, to assent firmly to something, we find elsewhere, right? Like, for example, I assent firmly to the statement that two is half of four, right? I assent firmly to the statement that no odd number is even, right? Right? I'm not thinking about it because it's obvious to me. You see? But in the case of faith there, huh? What I assent to firmly is not obvious to me, huh? Okay? Now, other times, right, we think about something before we assent. So we don't assent while thinking about it, but we assent after thinking about it. But that's not what faith is. It's to assent firmly, right, while thinking about it. So you're saying that you would assent meaning live it out some way, and not just think about it? No, no, your mind would firmly agree to it, huh? Mm-hmm. See? And in philosophy, right, in natural reason, right, you don't assent firmly to something until you've, what, thought it out, right? Okay? And some things you assent to without having to rethink them out because they're obvious, right? Other things you assent to after thinking them out, right? Okay? After thinking about it. But here you assent to something that will not be obvious until you see God as he is, face to face. Then it could be obvious that God is this, huh? And that's why you continue to, what, think about it, huh? That kind of contains and see the definition of theology of St. Ansel. Belief, seeking understanding. Right? It's already implicit when you say you're assenting while thinking about it, huh? So, you can't define to believe with just assent, because that wouldn't separate to believe from my thinking that a whole was more than a part. Right? It's not by theological virtue of faith that I think that a whole was more than a part. It's not by that that I think that no odd number is even, right? It's not by that that I think the interior angles of a triangle equal to right angles, huh? Okay? But that a whole was more than a part, I assent to that without having to reason it out, right? That the triangle has interior angles equal to right angles, I have to reason it out, think it out. And then I assent to it, huh? Ah, now I see it must be so, right? See? But neither one of those is true of faith. So I don't assent without thinking about it. I don't assent after thinking about it. I assent to it while thinking about it. That's why there can be this thing that, you know, they always quote from St. Anselm. You know, the theology is faith seeking understanding, huh? Because you assented to something you don't fully understand, and will never fully understand in this life anyway, huh? Then your mind naturally remains, what? It wonders about this, huh? You see? That's one of the names of Christ there in Isaiah. It says he's wonderful, huh? See? It will be against the nature of your mind not to think about what you assent to. It's not obvious to you, right, huh? You don't understand it, huh? Your mind should be, what? It's fascinating, right? Why there being three persons in God. How can this be? What does this mean, right? Does he have parts? I mean, I don't understand this, right? I assent to it, because God has revealed this, right? But I think about it because I don't understand it, and see why it should be so, right? And then theology is kind of... Now, you've got to be very careful with theology, because you don't get a reason in theology that would show you that it must be so, right? Because then that would, you know, eliminate faith. But you get a reason that Thomas says there's a consolation to you, you see? And kind of a consolation until you get to the vision of God as he is, face to face. So I just gave you an example, you know, of something where, what? You define faith, right, by two things, neither of which belongs only to faith. And that's in the definition here of difference, right? Instead of many things, other in kind. That's in fact what we do. So at least for the most part, differences are of that sort. You don't have one difference that fits only to the thing you're defining, unless you're using a property in a sense, as he said. But you have need of a combination of differences that will, what? Fit only that one thing you're defining. So let's take a little break here, and then we'll look at the second article here, which is a little bit shorter, okay? Did we forget seven, by the way? What? You see Aristotle's so modest there in the... We didn't do seven, not seven. What? We didn't do odd seven. That's what I'm just talking about. What you just had on the Lord who said that? That's what you said. I mean, that's originally Aristotle's definition of difference, but it's also repeated in porphyry, right? Yeah. I think I said go get it. Two articles these days. Okay. To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that there are not many powers of the soul. For the understanding soul most of all approaches, what? The divine likeness, huh? But in God there is one and a simple power, which is his very essence, right? Therefore also in the, what? Understanding soul, huh? Moreover, the more superior a power is, the more united it is. But the understanding soul excels other forms in its power. Therefore it most of all ought to have just one, what? Power. Moreover, to operate is of something existing in act. But through the same essence of the soul, man has being according to the diverse grades of perfection, as was had above, huh? There's only one soul in man, huh? Whereby he has a perfection of a plant, right? You know, can nourish himself and reproduce, but also perfection of an animal, right? Whereby he can sense, but then also the perfection of understanding. Therefore, through the same power of the soul, it operates different, the operations of different grades. But against this is what the philosopher, and that's Aristotle, of course, in the second book about the soul, lays down many powers of the, what? Soul. I answered that it ought to be said that it is necessary to lay down that there are many powers of the soul. And for the evidence of this, not to consider, as a philosopher says in the second book, De Celo, or these you call them, De Celo et what? Window, right? That things which are lowest in things cannot, what? Obtain a perfect goodness, huh? But they obtain something imperfect by few, what? Motions, huh? But the superior things achieve a perfect goodness by many motions. But superior to those are things that attain perfect goodness by few motions. This is a very subtle thing that Aristotle is saying, right? He's distinguishing three levels, right? Something that reaches great perfection with very few means, huh? Something that, at the other end, lowest down, that reaches not a very high perfection, right? But also by few means. And then you have something in between that gets a higher perfection than that lowest thing does, but has to use many means unlike the highest things, huh? Okay? And Aristotle is a beautiful comparison here, huh? Just as that is lowest, huh? Disposed towards health. Who cannot, what? Get a perfect health, right? But they can get some little bit of health, right? With a few remedies or aids, right? But better disposed is the one who can get perfect health, but he needs many, what? Remedies to do this, huh? And still yet, one who, what? Can get perfect health with few remedies, huh? But best of all, who without any remedy has perfect health, right? Right? That's a very interesting thing that Aristotle is pointing out there. A little bit like you might say that a computer has a lot more perfection than what? Yeah. Or a ballpoint pin or something, right? A ballpoint pin has only a few parts, huh? But you can't do much with a ballpoint pin compared to the computer, huh? The computer has all these, what? Complicated parts there in order to, what? To do much more, right, huh? Okay. But if you could do much more with, what? A few parts, you'd really have a good machine, huh? Sure. You see? And to some extent, you see that in the watches, right? Because these watches here have a much better, what? Time keeping, but they're much simpler than the, what? The old wind-up watches, huh? You see? Remember the old wind-up watches? I have, well, good ones that my wife gave me when we got married, huh? And you wind it up and so on. But then after a few months, it gets, not keeping time properly, you have to take it to an expert, right? He takes it apart and oils it and cleans it and all this other stuff. And then you put it all together again, right? What do I get tired of that? Because it's expensive, you know, to have the thing cleaned and so on. And you can buy a Timex or something, right? For $15, $20. And you get better time than this big, you know, clock with all the complicated parts, right? See? It's the best of our style seeing there, right? Something else might not be able to keep time hardy at all, but it doesn't have much in the way of parts, right? Something else can keep good time, but it needs all kinds of parts to do this with, right? Something else can tell time as well, if not better, but with, what, just a few parts, right? So what he's pointing out is that something above you and below you might have fewer, what, parts or fewer means, but the one below you gets much less perfection than you do with those few means. The one above you, a much greater perfection with its few means, huh? Kind of strange, huh? It should be said, therefore, that the things which are below man achieve some particular goods, and therefore they have, what, few and determined operations and powers, huh? Now, if you compare, say, a plant with a, what, animal, right? The plant is much simpler than the animal, isn't it? But the animal can do many more things than the plant can do. In order to do it, it's got to have many more, what, parts and so on, huh? Yeah. Okay. Man, however, is able to, what, achieve a universal and perfect goodness, huh? Something infinite about man, because he can attain, what, the attitude, right? But he is nevertheless in the lowest, what, great, according to nature, of those things to which beatitude can belong. A man is much below the angels, huh? And therefore the human soul needs many and diverse operations and, what, powers, right, huh? To get something like the angels have, but not even as good as they have it, right? Mm-hmm. Now, the animal, and if it's already the plant, they don't get as much as man, but they don't have to have as many things, right? And the plant less than the, what, animal, right? So it's much easier, you know, to experiment with plants than with an animal. Mm-hmm. Because the animal can easily interfere with the animal, huh? Mm-hmm. Because it's the variety. I kind of imagine this cat around the house there, you know, sleeps and feeds and doesn't have much variety in the food and so on, right? Mm-hmm. See? All we do is open a can of that food and give it to her, and that's about it, and some water, and that's about it. Once in a while, I'll hand out from the table, you know, but we humans, we acquire all this variety of things, you know, and tools and pots and pans and things to make these things like to make my tea and it's like to make my, you know, toast in and something like that, right? But Muppet doesn't need a toaster or a frying pan or a tea kettle or anything like this at all, right? Just a can of that. But for this, you know, high life, I need all these things. Okay. Crooks, good. Not to throw a wrench into this, but I remember watching something on a dolphin and how they say that when they put a mirror in front of a dolphin and put a little mark on its body, it actually noticed the difference, self-recognition in a sense, you know, self-awareness. And I was just kind of wondering, is that exactly the way, you know, our kind of recognition, self-awareness? Does that mean that dolphins maybe are not, strictly speaking, just animals? Is there a possibility that they might be a different category or maybe even, I don't know. No, I don't think that they would be a reason as Shakespeare defines it, you know. But they might be one of the more intelligent of the animals, huh? But to the angels, right, there is a less diversity of powers, huh? But in God, there is no, what, power or action apart from his essence, huh? That's why God is said to have one verbo, right, one thought, huh? The word of God, huh? But as you go down through the angels, they require more and more thoughts, huh? But the higher angels know more with less thoughts all the way down. Take it to man who seems to need a separate thought for everything he wants to think about in particular. That's an interesting reason that he gives, then, huh? That goes back to what Aristotle was showing there in the Decelo there. Now, he gives another reason here, the last paragraph, huh? There is another reason wherefore the human soul abounds in a diversity of powers. And that's because, as the Greek, the Arab commentators say, man is on the horizon, right, of the spiritual and the, what, bodily world, huh? He's in the border between the spiritual and the, what, bodily creatures, huh? And therefore, there runs together in him the powers of both kinds of creatures. So we have in common with the angels understanding and will. We have in common with the dog, huh? Sensation and emotion. And we have in common with the tree, nourishment and reproduction, huh? So because man is, what, kind of brings together both worlds, huh? He's going to have to have a more... Or what? Diversity of powers, huh? Other things. Makes sense, huh? It's very interesting the way Scripture speaks of these things, you know, when you look at these hymns in praise of God and so on. Praising God from creatures, you know, praise the Lord, all your works of the Lord. They'll go through the higher things, like the angels first, and they'll go down to the material things, and then they end up with what? Man, huh? And this is the same order Thomas follows the Summa, right? He talks about the angels first, and then about the, especially the non-living world, the material world, and then he talks about man, who's kind of what? Composed of both, right? And when they come to the last part of the Summa, you're talking about the Trinity, and they say, well, could God the Father have become man? Yes. Could God the Holy Spirit have become man? Yes. Or was it more appropriate for God the Son to become man, right? And so on. But when they talk about the appropriateness of taking on human nature, it's to take back, in a way, the whole of creation to God, huh? He's the beginning of the end of all things, right? And man is the creature that is, what? Involved both the bodily world, right? And the immaterial world, huh? So taking on human nature, he seems to be taking on, what? The whole of creation in some way. So, but that fits in with this thing here, huh? That the human soul is sort of, as the Arab commentators say, on the horizon, right? On the material and the immaterial world. So man is kind of a split thing almost there. Now, in what way now, going back to the first objection, does man exceed more to God? Well, now, you see, there's a little problem there. Because God is altogether, what? Simple, right? Right? If you look in the summa there, after you show the existence of God in question two of the summa, in the same part, then question three, the first question on the substance of God, is the simplicity of God, huh? And Thomas goes through and shows that none of the kinds of composition we know are found in God. And then he shows that there can't be any composition in God. So God is altogether simple, huh? And I remember St. Francis of Avila saying in one place that God is altogether simple, and the closer we become to God, the simpler we become, huh? Okay? So there's truth in that, right? There's a way in which you could say St. Francis of Sissy is simpler than we are, right? The great saints here, or even more than three saints here. There's some simplicity about these people, huh? That's marvelous. But here the objection is saying, well, man is made in the image and likeness of God. Man is what? More like God, right? Than the dog is. In a fortiori, man is more like God than the tree is, right? But God is altogether simple, and the tree is what? Simple than man, you see? So there's kind of a paradox there, right? Man approaches more the perfection of God. I can't imagine our Lord saying to the tree, be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect. You mean to the dog, right? You can say that to us, right? We approach more the perfection of God, but at the same time, we don't seem to have the simplicity that a stone has, let's say, right? But that's why he added the body of the text there when Aristotle saw that the highest things, yeah, will reach a great perfection and also a what? A great simplicity of the things. So the angels are what? They're more perfect than we are, by nature, and they're simpler than we are. They're both more perfect and simpler. We are more perfect in our life than the animal and a fortiori than the plant, and much more so than the rock, right? But we're not so what? Simpler than them, are we? So we're more complicated than them, right? And because of the fall? Well, no. Aristotle, you know, saw something about that when he made that distinction there, right? There's some people who can, what? Who seem to enjoy good health without taking any medicine or without doing any of these things, right? Other people can enjoy good health, but they have to take, you know, some medicines, right? Others can enjoy good health, but they've got a whole list of medicines, right? Other people can't attain good health at all, and they can keep going, you know, in some pretty way by just a few things that they do, right? Well, it's better to be able to attain perfect health with the, what, medicines, right? Than to not be able to have perfect health even if they don't have to take all these medicines, huh? Okay? The doctor despairs in making you healthy, right? We'll keep you going for a while. Well, if you think you have to do, you know. And so on. So that's going to be in the reply here now. In this, the understanding soul approaches more to a likeness of God than inferior creatures that is able to, what? Achieve a perfect goodness, right? Although through many and diverse things in which it falls short of the superior things, meaning the, what? Angels, right? Okay? So the angels are simpler than us, and certainly in terms of our body, the grass is simpler than us, right? But we can, what? Obtain a perfection that the grass cannot. A perfection that resembles that of the angels, but only through many and diverse means, huh? Yeah. It's interesting that when Thomas takes up the first two questions there in the substance of God there, the first one he takes up is the, what? Simplicity of God, huh? And then he takes up the, what? Perfection of God. And he takes them up next to each other because he says, in creatures that are known to us, material creatures, the more perfect things are not as, what? Simple, right? Simple, yeah. And the more simple things are not so perfect, right? So the, the, um, I've always thought I'd rather study botany in some ways than zoology because the plants are much simpler, right? And not so much complications, see? Not so messy and smelly, either. But, uh, uh, they're simpler, but the plant animals are more perfect, right? And man is, man's life is more complicated than the, the cat's, right? They sometimes envy the cat's, uh, simplicity of their life, right? Stipping away from your life. Mm-hmm. But you have to put up with some complication for this, what? Perfection, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? And sometimes you see, too, you know, that people who lead a little, uh, more perfect life, um, they require more things than someone who leads a very simple life, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? So the farmer might just, you know, the old days, right? He doesn't have to have all these things that we need, right? Like a stereo play Mozart, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Books and so on, huh? Into this sort. Mm-hmm. So Thomas takes those up together because in God they are joined, huh? Simplicity and perfection. Now, sometimes, huh? Uh, going back to take the example from the poetics of Aristotle there. Uh, he speaks of how the effect of the epics of Homer on our emotions, huh? Is like the effect of Sophocles' tragedies on our emotions. But then he takes up the question, which is a higher form of fiction, tragedy, or what? Epic, huh? And he reasons that tragedy reaches the same effect as epic, but with what? Fewer, shorter, huh? See? Interesting, huh? See? Well, there, he puts higher, the simpler, right? Mm-hmm. But you find it, as I say, in sometimes the things we make, huh? The first things we make, I was talking to an old guy years ago, and he was talking about the first radio, and it filled a whole room like this. And they're trying to listen to the National Plingual Convention. You could barely hear it, huh? Mm-hmm. Now we can have a little tiny thing, you know, that picks up very clearly. So you get something that in a way is simpler, but what? Better, huh? But for the most part, the material world, perfection. perfection. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. Perfect.