De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 90: The Fallacy of the Accident and Per Se Distinctions

Transcript
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Right? But red, white, and blue don't. Or to go back to something before that, to go back to rectilineal plane figure. Plane figure contained by straight lines. Well, it can be contained by three straight lines, or it can be contained by four straight lines, it can be quadrilateral, pentagon, hexagon, and so on, right? But you don't, what, divide it again into red, white, and blue, do you? That's accidental, right? I thought it was easy to see clearly what's accidental and what isn't, right? And there is a fallacy in logic called the fallacy of the accident. And the father of logic there, the philosopher, says that this deceives even the wise. And it did deceive his master Plato, right? One time, huh? That'd be the same thing as the exception, accident exception? No, no, it's not accidental in that sense, huh? It's something that, um, uh, it's the opposite here of as such, right? Let me give you a simple example of an argument from the accidental here. Um, Socrates is a man, right? Man is something, what, universal, right? Therefore, Socrates is a universal. Socrates is a man, man is a universal. Therefore, Socrates is universal. Seems to be a syllogism, doesn't it, huh? Because Socrates is a man, that's true, right? And man is something universal, isn't it? Socrates is a man, so Socrates is a universal. But it's breaking one of them rules of a ballad of syllogism, isn't it? What's wrong with it, though, see? It's a little hard for people to say what's wrong with it, huh? Well, the point is that the reason why man is said as Socrates is not because man is universal, but because man signifies, what, an animal with reason, and Socrates is an animal with reason, huh? But the universality that animal with reason has in the mind, that's accidental, right, to man insofar as it's said of Socrates, huh? But I think the thing that deceives us is when the accidental is, what, always, huh, there. Like in this case, right? Because nothing is ever said of something like that without being universal, see? But it's not said of it by reason of its being universal. Very subtle thing, huh? But, you know, you found that, in a sense, when you're studying motion and we said, Hercules says, day and night are the same thing, because day becomes night and night becomes day, huh? Or the sick and the healthy are the same thing, because the sick become healthy, right? Everybody says that, don't they? The young become old. Now, you are what you become, right? Therefore, the young are old. And if you're young and not young and old and not old, what's wrong with that, see? They're not taking into account the subject, which is the thing that remains. Yeah, yeah. Constant. But is it the sick as such that become healthy? Or is it the body that has sickness that as such becomes healthy? Does the sickness itself become healthy? No. No. No, see? When, you know, someone has converted, when the bad become good, let's say, right? Does badness now become good? No. No. But that to which badness happened, that which happened to be bad, right, has become good, right? But the badness has not become good. They love the sinner, but not the sin, right? Okay. I saw this beautiful thing there about this pro-life woman down in, where is it, Peru? And a couple of her sayings that they gave, I don't know if you've heard these or not, but I guess she was selected to bring up the gifts there when the Pope came down there for his Mass. And you know what she said to the Pope? Kind of interesting, huh? You know how the Pope is sometimes called the, what, servant of the servants of God? Kind of a humble title. She said to the Pope, I am the servant of the servant of the servants of God. That was very well said, right? But anyway, she has some of these terribly, you know, anti-life people, right? You know, people really dillish, right? And she says, I know our Lord said, you know, we've got to love your enemies, she says, huh? But he didn't say you had to love the devil. Some people just seem to be, you know, always like dillish in their devotion to killing the little ones. So, okay. So, you're being deceived there by the accidental, aren't you? And sometimes we say, you know, that the ugly want to be beautiful, and the poor want to be rich, you know? But do the ugly, as such, want to be beautiful? No, because then the ugly would no longer exist, would they? Exist to be. Some people want its own disappearance, huh? Do the sick want to be healthy? It's not the sick as such, is it? Yeah. It's something else, right? It's the body that wants to be healthy, huh? So you're saying in a certain sense, something that is something, sick can't be something else, whereas a person who is sick isn't sick in and of himself, so therefore he has the ability to move away from being sick. Yeah, the body, my body can become healthy. Right. But the sickness can never be healthy, see? Right. So the accidental is kind of a strange thing, you know, how the ancients thought that, well, I was in the airport in London there, you know, they had these things there, you know, little doodabs for sale, right? Well, they had this anti-malaria kit there. Oh! I was pulling it out to my wife there. And it had pills to take, you know, to prevent you from getting malaria, I guess. And it had kind of a mosquito absorber or something you could use, right? And I suppose people are going from London down to these places where malaria is prevalent, huh? Okay. But anyway, the ancients thought that malaria was what? Caused by the swamp air. And it's actually not caused by the swamp air. That's a mistake. But people didn't get malaria unless they were in the swamp air. And so they thought that swamp air was unhealthy in the air. But it's really, what, the mosquitoes in the swamp air that caused the malaria. So if you slept in the swamp air but had the netting around you, you would separate out what was accidental. But maybe even the mosquito is not causing it either, huh? Right. But something that happens to the mosquito, right? So the mosquito as such is not the cause, right? But you could make the mistake, you know, of thinking that this swamp air is the cause of this disease. It's unhealthy air that corrupts the body, you see? Because in your experience, no one ever had malaria who didn't go into that swampy air. I think there's a, in Holland, well, back in the 18th century, I was reading a book about John Adams, being an ambassador over there during, you know, the Independence War, he said that there was this sickness called, this dense sickness from the stench of the canals. And, of course, at that time, they thought that it was from the smell. And you didn't realize that they touched something and then it got into them. So basically, I think that what might have happened is the Europeans took this smell of the air that they equated with the Holland dikes in the winter that just made everybody get deathly sick. A lot of them got deathly sick with the same thing now. Maybe, I don't know. It's possible. When I was a little boy, I used to hear my mother say sometimes, put on your thinking cap. I don't know if you ever heard that from your parents or grandparents, something like that. But they say this goes back to the Middle Ages where the professors, you know, talking to the university, they wear this gown, see? And so the common man there, he never saw anybody lecture without having one of these hats on. So he thought, well, if I could get one of those hats, you know, I could go around and lecture nobly at these things, see? But that's really accidental, I think, to your teaching, huh? So he says, but nevertheless, it should be considered that those things that those things that you can do which are parachidens, right, by happening, do not diversify a species. For since colored happens to animal, the species of animal are not diversified by the difference of color, but by the difference of that which per se happens to animal, right, through the difference of the sensing soul, which sometimes is found with reason, signed without reason. I've given this already a bit, just repeating it. So, once rational or rational are differences divisive of animal, constituting diverse species, huh? I remember when I was studying fiction and drama and so on, huh? Now, usually we divide drama at least into tragedy and, what, comedy, right? Okay. But now, what about a drama in English and a drama in, let's say, French or Spanish or something? Is that going to give you different species of drama? Hmm, no. It's a different way. See? You say, that's in a way, more or less, it seems, somewhat in a way, accidental to what a play is, huh? Right. Why, as a representation, you know, of something laughable or a representation of something serious and so on, right? Traged and comedy seem to be per se differences, huh? See? But whether you're writing it in French or in English or Spanish, right? They seem to be kind of, what, accidental, huh? See? And, of course, my brother Mark, I've used to got a, he would joke, you know, my brother Mark especially about, when you're in a regular college there, and you have a French teacher or a Spanish teacher, right? And as if their formal object was qua French, right? Well, you could be reading in a French class, you could be doing grammar, let's say, with the first-year students, and other people you read doing literature. Literature, history. And then, maybe they aren't, you might be reading something in history, or maybe you might be reading a philosopher, or who knows what in French, right? Sure. And they're all put under, what, French. Sure. But what kind of a unity is that? Accidental. It's really accidental, huh? You see? Because whether you're reasoning in French or reasoning in English, you're going to be following the same rules of reasoning, huh? Sure. And if you're reading a drama in English or reading a drama in French, you're going to say, well, now, is the plot got a beginning, middle, and end, or are the characters, you know, interesting, and so on, right? Sure. It's not really going to be different principles by which you judge these things. But it's kind of an accidental unity there. Hmm. But notice that there is a practical reason, maybe, why the same person would teach French grammar and French literature. Sure. But really, French literature and English literature belong to the same study, the poetic science. And French grammar and English grammar are both parts of kind of universal grammar, huh? Yeah. See? But in practice, you've got to know French grammar if you're going to teach French literature. You've got to know the language, in a sense, huh? So it makes some sense, the same person teaches both, but they're really quite different sciences. In A.F.S. You have to get to be a philosopher in French or something like that. Sometimes they try to talk me into teaching a philosophy course in French, right? So that French students get even more exposed to French, right? My French is not good enough to get a philosophy course in French, but... So we can do that. It's interesting to know things French, qua French. It might be philosophy, it might be history, it might be literature, it might be grammar, but it's French. But it's kind of accidental. Thus, therefore, not just any diversity of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, right? But a difference of that to which, what? The ability looks per se, huh? Okay? That's a little bit hard to say. What does that mean concretely? Just a sense as such regards a, what? This is the third species of quality there. I'll talk about it in the categories, huh? This undergoing quality, huh? Which, per se, is divided into color, sound, and as of the sort, huh? So, color and sound act upon things in different ways, huh? And therefore, there's another sensing power of color, namely sight, another of sound, namely hearing. But to a passable quality, an undergoing quality, as the colored, it happens to be musical or grammatical, right? Or even large or small, or a man, or a stone, right? Okay? And therefore, according to differences of this sort, the powers or ability of the soul are not, what? Distinguished, huh? Okay? So, when you get later on, and especially in the beginning of the next question, when you start to distinguish the five genera of powers, like your astrology and the anima, right? Then you have to descend, right? Down to seeing, in each case, what's per se, what is procedence, huh? So, notice, if I was dividing animal as such, I might divide animal into dog and cat and horse and elephant, right? But would those be differences of color as such? No, see? But red and green and yellow would be, right? And more generally, are there differences of sensible as such? See? Is a dog and a cat sensible in a different way? No. And the dog and the cat might both be brown, right? Or both black or something, right? See? Okay, now, the first objection was saying that act is, what? After ability, huh? In being, right? And Thomas admits that. To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that act, although it is after being, after ability and being, and it doesn't mean absolutely speaking, because in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, of course, you find out that act is altogether, simply speaking, prior to ability, huh? But we'll leave that to my Ninth Book of Wisdom here. But if you're talking about the abilities of the soul and the acts, which they're ability, you might have the ability before you have the act, huh? In fact, you would, right? Okay? So, although the ability of the soul is after, I mean the act, rather, is after the ability and being, is nevertheless before in, what? Intention, right? Because the ability, he means, is what? It's for the sake of the act, right? Okay? And according to definition, just as the, what? End is said to be before the agent, huh? So, the carpenter, let's say, is building a house before the house exists, right? But he's intending a house, right? And that explains why he's doing everything he's doing, right? And so, the definition of what he's doing is what? Not making a cake, but building a house, right? So, you couldn't explain what he's doing without bringing a house in, could you? Even though the house is going to exist after he gets through building, right? But because his building is ordered to that, you can't understand what his building is unless you see what it's ordered to. And you couldn't define it, right? And distinguish it from your mother making an apple pie, right? Where everything is ordered to the apple pie, huh? So, the carpenter is getting wood and bricks and so on, and your mother is getting dough and apples and so on, right? And so, the intention is quite different, huh? But it's ordered to, huh? So, baking a pie and making, building a house differ, right? Because a pie is something quite different from a house. You philosophers talk about such obvious things, right? Now, the objection to the object was that the object could be extrinsic. He says the object, although it is extrinsic, is nevertheless either the beginning or the end of the action. And to the beginning and the end are proportioned those things which are, what? Intrinsic to the thing, huh? So, my eye is proportioned to, what? Color out there, right? To receiving color, right? And my ear to receiving, what? Sound, huh? So, even though the sound might be outside my ear to begin with, huh? My ear is, what? Adapted. ...adapted to receiving that, huh? Not receiving color, right? So what is intrinsic is different because it's adapted to something extrinsic that is different. Just like you have a nut on a bolt, right? The bolt is what? And the nut could be extrinsic to the bolt, right? But the bolt is what? Adapted to fit this nut, huh? You see? And the same way my ear is adapted to what? Fitting that, right? And so the way the size and so on of the bolt has to fit that extrinsic thing, the nut is going to be screwed into, right? And so my ear has to be different from my eye because it's going to receive sound rather than, what, light or color. So that's the replies he has to those first two objections. And the second objection was saying, hey, if objects distinguish powers, aren't contraries what are furthest apart? But notice the full definition of contraries are what are furthest apart in the same, what? Species. Species that are furthest apart, yeah, in the same genus, right? Right. So in the genus of color, black and white are furthest apart, huh? In the genus of taste, sweet, and let's say bitter, right? Okay. So the object is the genus, right? And so it's going to include both, what? Contraries. To the second it should be said that if some power per se regarded one of two contraries as its object, right, it would be necessary that the contrary pertain to another, what? Power ability, right? See? But a power ability of the soul does not as such regard the proper notion of contrary, but the common definition, the common genus of both contraries. Just as the object of sight, as such is not, what? The white, but the, what? Color, right? Which includes both contraries. And this because one of the two contraries is in some way the, what? Definition of the other. Since one has itself as perfect and the other as, what? Imperfect, huh? This is a common saying among Plato and Aristotle that there's the same knowledge of, what? Contraries, huh? If you read Plato's dialogue, the symposium, you know that dialogue? Symposium means, what? Drinking together, huh? And these men have come together to celebrate the victory of Agathon, the tragic poet. His tragedy has won the top prize this year. And someone proposes that they give a speech on love, huh? And so there are six speeches, huh? Given on love. And the last one is given by, what? Socrates, huh? And Socrates, of course, he has a chance to speak, he says, I seem to have misunderstood the purpose of this, huh? When you said that we should try to speak well of love, I thought you meant speak, what? Truly about love. He's punning or playing on two meanings of speaking well, huh? Because everybody else just about has been speaking well of love in the sense of praising it, huh? Oh, uh-huh. See? Now, you know, when you say in daily speech sometimes, you know, he spoke well of you. Uh-huh. What does that mean? Praised you. He praised you, yeah. You see? Uh-huh. But as you know, praise is sometimes flattery, huh? Uh-huh. See? So if I say to one of my students, you know, you're another Einstein. Uh-huh. See? I speak well of him, don't I? But do I speak truly of him? Uh-huh. But if you read Plato's Dialogues, you see that in the Apology, too, right? The word speaking well or the word good speaker, Socrates likes to point out that these phrases are equivocal. Now, in the Apology, Socrates is going to defend himself and he alludes to the fact that his prosecutors have said, now, they said to the jury, now watch out for Socrates, huh? He's a good speaker. Don't let him pull the wall of your eyes. And Socrates says, I don't know what they mean by saying I'm a good speaker, huh? I'm sure you're not a good speaker in the way they are, huh? If by a good speaker you mean someone who just says the truth, well, then I suppose I'm a good speaker, right? I don't know. See? Well, notice the difference here is between speaking well in the sense of speaking persuasively, the way a rhetorician speaks, and speaking truly, which is the way the philosophers are trying to speak. That's two different meanings, right? And usually in daily life when you speak of a good speaker, we mean he speaks persuasively. He can get up before a crowd or a large group of people and kind of sway them, huh? You see? But he may not, what? Sway them by the truth at all, huh? You see? He may project a certain image of himself, huh? Or he may move their emotions in a certain way, huh? And the way he says things cleverly and so on. Sugared words, as Shakespeare says. But, um... So actually, what they call the trivium, huh? Grammar, rhetoric, and logic, they're all, to some extent, about speaking well, but in a different sense. And grammar, speaking well, means speaking according to the rules of some language, huh? But rhetoric, the usual meaning we have in mind, it means speaking persuasively. But in logic, it means speaking, what? Truly. So I often say to students, you know, if I say, a man is a stone, grammarian would say, correct, nothing wrong with that. Man and an animal, wrong. From the point of view of grammar, man is a stone is better than man and an animal, right? Man and an animal is incorrect English, isn't it? Man is a stone, nothing wrong with that as far as English is concerned, English grammar, right? Right. Magician would look at that and he'd say, man is a stone, oh my gosh, that's false. Man and an animal, may not be said too well, but that's true, man and an animal, right? I say this to them sometimes, you know, I is your professor, right? Wasn't I? Wasn't I your professor? That's what the dishes would say, right? Marians say, no. But if you say, you know, I am a chair, right? Fine, fine, that's fine, right? I is your professor, that's wrong. That could be rhetoric if you're trying to teach ghetto kids and connect them with them. Yeah, do so, yeah, yeah. Rhetoric is based upon something often called likelihood, huh? Likelihood is a very strange thing. Aristotle in the book on the poetic arts says that a likely impossibility is better in drama than an unlikely possibility. It tells you how far outside of reason it is, huh? And, you can see that when you read Homer or something like that, you know, the gods and gods, it doesn't bother me at all when I read it, you know, because it makes it so likely, huh? And, you know, how there's a disagreement between Zeus and Hera, his wife, about the Trojan War, you know, because one's on one side on the other side, and somebody's asking Zeus to do something and you realize it's going to produce friction with Hera, it's going to be difficult living with the woman. It's ridiculous to have the gods, you know, like us, you know, but it seems so likely, huh? And, you know, they give an example there, was it Cicero there where Cicero was narrating something about the man he's defending and he seems to be sticking in irrelevant things, you know, like the man was late because his wife wasn't quite ready yet, you know, and, oh yeah, people think, oh yeah, it all seems very, you know, very real, huh? You see? My old professor, Kisarek, and Deconic, Kisarek had got up to Laval as an older man, older than most students, so he'd become kind of friendly with Deconic in a way that people more of the same age could be, and so they were used to kidding each other a lot, see? And so when I went to Laval, Kisarek gave me a little bit of advice, see, that Deconic might just out of habit make some, you know, smart remark about Kisarek, huh? You know, like if I were I stayed in class, you know, that I was a student of Kisrik, you know. Well, then you must not know anything or something. He said some kind of, you know, he said I wouldn't get, you know, shook up by this thing, see. And I remember one day at Laval there, it was April Fool's Day, see. And I didn't realize it was April Fool's Day, see. And so Father Stromberg, who's actually from my hometown there, the College of St. Thomas, but Father Stromberg was a student up there at the time. And he came to me and he said, DeConnick's just heard that Kisrik was going to Russia, you know, one of these tours or something like that. And DeConnick's first remark was, well, I hope he keeps his mouth shut over there more than he does here. He'll never get back, right? And that's just, you know. And then when I walked away, you know, I suddenly realized it was April Fool's Day, see. And I thought that Father Stromberg had kind of pulled a thing on me, you know, like you do on April Fool's Day, to get me to believe that Kisrik was going to Russia, see. Now, as a matter of fact, he really was going to Russia. But he actually took pictures of the CIA, which is extremely dangerous, huh. He took pictures of the CIA? Yeah, he asked him to take pictures of certain things, you know. His wife was scared stiff, you know, and she couldn't relax until he got back to Vienna and called all the existing things out of Russia, you know. But anyway, I thought that Father Stromberg had tried to, you know, to see me, right, on April Fool's Day. And he made it sound so real because I thought he invented the thing, you know, about Deconic. Because that's exactly what Deconic would say if he heard that, right? So it seems so plausible, huh? Well, that's what persuasion is, huh? You tell a, like the poets say, you know, tell a believable story, right, or a likely story. And there's certain ways, you know. So, you know, the kid coming home late, huh, and he's been somewhere where he shouldn't be, you know. He's got to try to make up a story that his parents will believe, right? And some kids are better at this than others, right? And they're better natural rhetoricians than other ones are, right? And sometimes the truth doesn't seem very, what, lengthy. And, you know, things that have happened sometimes to you or others in your lifetime that people would tend not to believe, huh, because they're so, what? Unlikely, huh? Given human, way human beings usually behave, huh? Okay? So, Socrates and I might distinguish these senses of speaking well, huh? But in the symposium he distinguishes between speaking well in the sense of, what? Praising something, right? And speaking well in the sense of speaking truly, huh? In the apology between speaking well in the sense of speaking persuasively in a way that's going to convince the jury, right? And speaking well in the sense of speaking, what, truly again, huh? Okay? Now, where did I get into that, huh? Something started setting up in that. Something in rejection to... Oh, yeah, no, I kept talking about the symposium, right? Oh, yeah, yeah. And the symposium, where Socrates makes that distinction, right? But anyway, at the end of the symposium, two of the speakers, the last two speakers before Socrates, are still sober. Everybody else has kind of fallen underneath the table, so to speak. And Socrates is talking to Aristophanes, the comic poet, and Agathon, the one who won the prize for his tragedy, right? And the last bit of conversation is Socrates is saying, if you guys knew what you were doing, you could both write both, what, tragedy and comedy, huh? Aristophanes apparently could write only comedy, and Agathon maybe only tragedy, huh? But Socrates is hinting there that there's the same knowledge of what? Contraries or opposites. So the doctor knows both health and what? Sickness, right? And nobody would know better than a doctor how to make you or me sick if you wanted to do so, right? There's knowledge that lends us to that, huh? And logic is the art of correct reasoning, but also of what? Incorrect reasoning, huh? And so from logic I know how to teach, but I know also how to deceive. In Aristotle, in the fifth book of the politics, he teaches us how to preserve a government and how to overthrow it. Same knowledge, huh? Of contraries, huh? So I mention that because Thomas is saying here, it's not something unheard of that contraries belong to the same what? In ethics, we study virtue and what? Vice, right? And Aristotle teaches us how to become virtuous, but you also could understand from that how to become what? Vicious, huh? I told you about this kind of a wag when I was first teaching philosophy in California, St. Mary's College. And there's one student I thought was a pretty good statement because he had some understanding of this. He said, you guys shouldn't be teaching ethics. And we said, why not? He says, well, in ethics you learn not only about virtue, but also about what? Vice, huh? If you learn how to be good and how to be what? Bad, right? And most people, he says, are inclined to be bad. So you're corrupting them by teaching them ethics. Pretty good argument, right? What? Is that St. Mary's of Moraga? Yeah. Right on the empty side there. Have a nice Spanish mission, you know, style, the way it was. You put a couple of courtyards to get from their office to class and so on. Very nice. So, it's commonplace, huh? That there's the same knowledge of contours or opposites. And they stand out against each other, don't they? Contours or opposites. So white against blacks, the stars against the black sky, they kind of stand out. So this is the answer Thomas gives, right? That if you had an ability that was an ability as such to see white, then there would have to be a different ability to see black, right? But if this is an ability to see color as such, right? Then it's going to include both, what? White and black under it, huh? Okay? See that? Now the third one is a more subtle thing, huh? To the third it should be said that nothing prevents that which is the same in subject to be diverse in its, what? Definition, huh? And therefore is possible to pertain to the diverse powers of the soul. Now let's go back to the third objection there. Remember he takes the example there of the very same object being known by something, right? And being, what? Desired, right, huh? Okay? But is it an object of the knowing power and object of the desiring power in the same way, huh? You have the same thing when you talk about the will and reason, huh? And Thomas will talk sometimes like, um, the will knows, I mean the reason knows the truth about the will. Something anyway, right? What the will is and what its object is and so on, right? But the will wills sometimes the good of the, what? Reason, right? Okay? So the same thing could be the object of what? The reason and the will, right? But not in the same way, right? Insofar as it's true or knowable, it's the object of the reason. Insofar as it's good or lovable, it's the object of the, what? The will or the heart. Just as the eye and the, what? Sense of touch, know, surface and shape in a different way, don't they? The one knows it through color and the other knows it through hardness. The resistance of the thing, huh? So that's a kind of, of a subtle distinction there, isn't it? So you can know food and what? Desire food, right? Desire food, right? Desire food, right? Desire food, right? Desire food, right? Desire food, right? Desire food, right? Is it the same object that is known and loved? In some way it is, right? But not in the same way, right? So you can have that kind of a subtle difference in object and have a difference in powers corresponding to it. So the food, insofar as it is sensible, it's an object of the senses, right? Insofar as it's desirable, it's an object of the emotions or the feelings. So it's very subtle to find out exactly what distinction of objects gives you a distinction of what powers. You notice that same thing comes up with the virtues then later on. When you talk about, for example, the theological virtues, what the three theological virtues have in common is that their object is in some way God himself, right? Right. Okay? But why is faith and charity different, huh? Well, God is the object of what? Faith, insofar as he is the, what, first truth, huh? Okay. I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? Insofar as he's the first truth, he's the object of faith, huh? I believe God who can neither deceive nor be deceived, right? But what way is God the object of what? Of charity. As good. As good, yeah, yeah. It's goodness itself, right? Okay? That's a good example of that. Yeah. How about hope? Well, that's not as easy to see, right? But to some extent, hope relies upon the power of God, but also his mercy, huh? Okay? That's the object of charity because he is. Good, good, yeah. Now, the goodness of God and the truth of God are not something different in God, like God has two different parts, right? See? But God is not in the same way the object of faith and of, what, charity, huh? So there's a kind of formal difference there, but... It's a little bit like, you know, a woman is a wife and she's a what? A mother, right, huh? The same woman who's a wife and a mother? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. See? But the love of a wife and the love of a mother, I think, are quite different, aren't they? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. You see? So the love that a man has for his mother and the love that he has for his wife are not exactly the same kind of love, aren't they, huh? Okay? But the children might be loving the woman as their mother, and the husband is loving her as his, what, wife, huh? Okay? The same woman, isn't it? Right? See? But she's the object of two different kinds of, what? Love, right? See? Okay? Or if you have a sister, right, huh? See? You might love this woman as your sister, right? But her father loves her as a, what? Daughter, right? And the love of a sister, love of a daughter, are not the same kind of love, are they? And you say, well, what distinguishes these two loves? Well, loves have to differ by their objects, right? Huh? Yeah, but it's the same woman that you're loving, right? See? But I'm loving her as my daughter. My daughter is Maria. I love Maria as my daughter, right? You see? But my sons love her as their, what, sister, right? And it's a different kind of love, huh? Okay? Or, you know, I love my son Paul as a son, but my son Marcus would love him, or my daughter Maria would love him as a, what? As a brother, right? It's different, right? I love my brothers Marcus and Richard. I love them as a brother, right? My father or my mother didn't love them as a brother, you know? But as a son, right? It's not the same love, I don't think, is it? See? It really is a different love, isn't it? Okay, but if it's a different love, it's got to have, what, one love difference from another, not by being loved, but by what it is that you're loving, right? See? So this is the kind of difference that Thomas was talking about. It's a very more subtle thing, right? You see? You see what I mean? That's kind of a subtle thing, isn't it? Yeah. See? Okay. So, but the difference is greater there between, let's say, faith and charity. I'm loving God as what? As the first, I mean, I'm believing Him as the first truth, right? God is the first truth. God as the first truth is the object of faith. God as goodness itself is the object of love. That's subtle, right? The food is the object of my, what, sense of smell, taste, right? Insofar as it's what? Sensible, tasteable, smellable, right? But the object of my hunger, insofar as it's good, right? Nourishing. It's different, isn't it? It's kind of subtle, isn't it? So that's what Thomas is pointing out there in his reply to that objection, this is the reply to the objection. Nothing prevents that which is the same in subject, this is a common way of speaking, including back to Aristotle, to be diverse according to its, what, ratio, right, huh? But not the way, you know, especially in English, a little more appropriate English, we could say, what? My wife, right? Or, you know, this woman as wife is the object of the husband's love, right? This woman as mother is the object of the son or daughter's love, right? This woman as sister, right, huh? Is the object, right? Of the brother's love, right? This woman as daughter is the object of the father's love, huh? So Ophelia is the, what? She's loved by her brother, right? The Aertes, huh? And she's loved by her father, Polonius, huh? Okay? But the love is not the same exactly, right? And she's loved by, what? Hamlet, right? But the love of each is different, huh? You know the famous scene there where you jump down to the grave there, right, huh? The burial of Ophelia, right? Whose love is greater, right? You know? Hamlet's love of her, right? Or the brother's love, huh? It was a different kind of love. Romeo's love of Juliet and her father's love and mother's love, right? Juliet's quite different, huh? Different kind of love. Well, there's a distinction of acts by their objects break down here now, you see. Is the love of Juliet's father for her and the love of Romeo for her are those loves not distinguished by object because the object in this case is the same, right? Well, he says, what? We would say, following Thomas here, although it's the same in subject, right? It's the same woman, in other words, you're talking about, right? It differs the kundum rationum, right? According to the definition, you see. She's loved by Romeo as wife, huh? But she's loved by the father as, what? Daughter, right, huh? And they both think she's dead. And she's not dead, right? And they both have sorrow, but it's a somewhat different kind of sorrow, huh? Okay? So again, you see their sorrow and their sadness has the same object, right? The dead one now, but not in the same way, right? It's like a dead daughter, right? It's your only daughter. Terrible thing, right? And this is, you know, with Romeo, it's like, you know, the only thing, you know, it's his only happiness, right? Now, huh? And so on. Okay? Now, the fourth objection was saying, objects that distinguish, it seems, some powers don't distinguish, what? Other powers, huh? Now, this is a very common thing that you meet many times in Thomas, that a higher power has a more, what? Universal object, right? So in this particular example, the common sense has as its object the, what? Sensible as such. And so it extends to the objects of all the senses, huh? The eye's object is not as sensible as such. That's accidental. It's color as such, huh? And the ear is sound as such, huh? And when you study the angels, you see, the angels only have one knowing power, huh? But by that knowing power, they know both the universal and the, what? Singular. But we know directly the singular by our senses, like I know you directly by my senses. But I know what a man is by my, what? Reason, right? But what I know by diverse powers, the angel knows by just, what? One power, huh? So the higher the power is, huh? The more you, what? Know, right? As you go up the scale of the angels, you have few and fewer ideas, but ideas that comprehend more. Until you get to God, who, what? In one word, said it all. So that Thomas begins, to the fourth it should be said that the superior or higher power, as such, regards the more universal definition of an object than the lower power, huh? Because the higher a power is, the more things to which it extends itself, huh? And of course you see that even more so if you compare the reason to the senses, right? Because my reason can think about color and what color is and what light is like we did in modern science a lot, right? But we also think about what sound is, right? I was seeing a book on the, it came to the mail today, or I mean, advertising for a book on taste, you know, and so on, right? So reason, you know, can think about the objects of all of the, what, senses, can't it? And it can think about many other things besides that, huh? So its object is much more universal. And you see something like that in the desiring powers, because the senses know the good only as agreeable to the senses. So if something's agreeable to your senses, your emotions are drawn to it, huh? You see? But the will can love not only what is agreeable to our faculties, but many other things, huh? Besides that, because it falls upon reason, huh? And reason has many other criteria, better criteria for what is good than whether it agrees with our senses or not. Okay? And things, you know, like philosophy that aren't sensible, reason can see the goodness of them, right? So with my will, I can desire not only candy, but I can desire wisdom, huh? Okay? So the object of the will is good in a much more universal way than the senses. And Thomas points out, as you go up the scale of the angels, these higher things, their love of the common good is much greater than ours. But the senses, as such, don't know the common good, huh? What's agreeable to my senses, in a way, is my private good, huh? So by my sense love, directly I have only, what, sense love of my private good, really, huh? Very limited to my love, huh? But by my will, I can love the common good of my country, huh? Like the soldier might do who's fighting for his country. And even love the common good of the whole universe, which is God, right? So it's much more extensive in that sense, huh? The higher power has a more universal object. And therefore, many things come together in one ratio of object, which the higher power regards, huh? Which nevertheless differ according to the reasons which the lower power is at such to regard, huh? And you'll see that later on when you study the appetitive powers, huh? That there's one will, but in the emotional powers there's two different ones. The concubiscible one, they'll call it, concubiscible appetite, and the irascible appetite, huh? Two different powers, huh? The first one is the ability to what? To like something pleasant to the senses, to want it, right? To enjoy it, right? And the other is the ability to what? Get angry with what is getting in the way of your pleasure. Or to feel fear for what is going to maybe, what? Cause pain, right? And so on, huh? So there's going to be, you know, two desiring powers, huh? In Greek, they call them epithumia and thumas, right? But in Latin, they call them the concubiscible appetite, the irascible appetite, huh? But the will is just one, huh? So it's a more universal object, huh? The concubiscible appetite knows only what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses as such. But sometimes animals, what? They flee something, not because it's disagreeable to the senses, but by a kind of instinct, huh? So the, you know, they notice how these little animals sometimes that are the food for some of these big birds, right? Even they're very little, and when these big birds fly over, right, they crouch down, right? Not because the color of that bird is disagreeable, right? But because their instinct tells them that is, what, dangerous for them, huh? I know one time my friend Royman rode there, he found a little kitten there in the tree and he brought it in the house and put the little kitten in the drawer. The kitten liked to go in the drawer. They're kind of funny, the cats that way. And so I came over to visit, and he knows that cats, we preach out the kitten, we're playing with this little kitten. And we had some, you know, belts, you know, and the cat was jumping at them, you know, the cat does. And then my friend Roy took a belt and it was kind of a styrated, you know, patterned belt, and the cat suddenly was afraid of that belt. You couldn't even hold them, you know, when that belt was coming towards him, you know? You know? And it looked to me a little bit like, what, snake pattern, you know? And I kind of thought it must be the instinct of the cat. Because she was, you know, the captain was playing with all the belts, you know, they're having a lot of fun with us and we're having fun with it. And all of a sudden it's afraid of this one particular belt, but the looks of that belt, you know, the kind of fool young kitten. Maybe not a cat would be fooled by that kind of a belt. See? But the kitten would, huh? See? No? But it's resisting it not because it's hurting itself, you know, it's not like a flame or something, right? See? The concubal appetite is limited to what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, huh? That's the only way that it reacts to the good or the bad. But the irascible is something closer to reason. Of course, you see that in human beings, that the angry man, you know, he's going to get even because of this, right? And he doesn't measure himself very well, right? In many cases, in most cases. But he has a reason for why he's angry, right? And this is very important in representation of tragedy and comedy, huh? Because the tragic characters are supposed to be, you know, better than us, right? But the tragic characters are more characterized by anger, huh? If they have a fault, huh? While the comic characters are more characterized by their, what? Concupiscence. Concupiscence, huh? You see? Yeah. Like St. Francis of Sales, he had a real struggle with anger, but he actually was a doctor of the church.