De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 93: The Soul's Powers: Substance, Form, and Natural Emanation

Transcript
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and therefore would be something candidate for immortality, huh? You see the idea? And you can see it very clearly in the great dialogue of Plato called the, what, the Phaedo, huh? Because in the Phaedo, the two main opinions in the Phaedo about the human soul and immortality, although one of them is not developed that much, but the opinion that Simeon brings in would conclude that the soul neither existed before nor after the body. And Socrates would defend the position that the human soul existed before the body and it would exist after the body. Now, what is the truth? No, neither one of them is true. The truth is that the human soul did not exist before the body, but it would exist after the body, right? But Socrates is defending the position that existed before and after the body. And Simeon is bringing in the other probable opinion that the soul existed neither before nor after the body. And, of course, Simeon sees the soul as merely being the form of the body, right? And having nothing that is not in the body, huh? But Socrates seems to see the soul as if there's some kind of thing kind of entrapped in the body, like a man in a prison or something, right? But not really one with the body. Using the scripture, how would you reconcile the saying, God saying, I knew you before I formed you, in the sense that the soul, in the sense, seems to be existing before the body's formed? No, that's saying that God's knowledge is not in time, right? And it's interesting, if you read the fifth book of the Consolation of Philosophy, I don't know if you were here when we were talking about the distinction or difference between Aristotle and Plato about knowing the central question of philosophy. We talked about the difference between natural philosophy and mathematics. Some of you were here. Okay, let me just touch upon that a bit. I call this the central question of philosophy because, like the center of a circle, everything meets here, huh? Now, what is the central question of philosophy? Well, it's going to involve the end of philosophy to know the truth, right? And everything the philosopher talks about. Okay? Now, if you hang around philosophers like me, a lot of us, right, you'll find out that there's only two things we talk about. We talk about the way things are, and you talk about the way we know. Okay? That's the other things I talk about. Now, in natural philosophy, for example, the emphasis would be upon the way natural things are, right? In political philosophy, the emphasis would be upon the way political things are, huh? In wisdom, the emphasis would be upon the way all things are, okay? But in logic, the emphasis would be upon what? The way we know, right? Okay? Now, what brings together everything the philosopher talks about and is in their goal? Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are? Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are? It's going to influence everything, huh? As I say to the students, there's two possible answers to this question. And they're scratching their heads. Sometimes, looking at something in the students, I say, there's two possible answers. What are the two possible answers? Yes or no. Yes or no. Now, the chief philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, seem to answer differently. Plato seems to answer yes. Aristotle answers no. Now, I could go down the whole history of philosophy and show you who follows in Plato's footsteps, right? And who follows in Aristotle's footsteps. But if you took, you know, the famous names in the history of philosophy, you'd find many more following Plato. Okay? I don't mean that they learned it from Plato, right? But that they adopt the same position that Plato had, huh? Aristotle would have few and far between, huh? Now, that suggests a reason, right? Why is it that most people would tend to, right, agree at first, at least, with Plato? Because you want to control, explain, determine something. And the yes, I guess, would allow you to kind of meet that goal. Whereas the no, just keep you still in limbo, I guess. Yeah, yeah. But it's something to do with the idea of what we commonly mean by truth. Yeah. When we think of truth, I think everybody has, to some extent, the idea that truth is a conformity of the mind with things. It's an agreement, you see? So if you say, for example, that Berkwist is standing now, he's speaking truly, huh? If you say Berkwist is sitting or he's not standing, your mind is not in agreement with things, right? So having kind of a hazy notion, at least, about what truth is, that it's conformity of the mind with things, you might think that it requires that the way we know be the way things are. Okay? Aristotle answers no, right? And the place where it comes up first in natural philosophy is when Aristotle was distinguishing between pure mathematics and natural philosophy. And he says, there are a number of things in the natural world, right? And the pure mathematician talks about number, right? So is he talking about the numbers of natural things, or what is he talking about? And he talks about sphere and cubes, right? And there are more or less spheres and cubes in the world around us, right? Is he talking about the sphere and cube? Aristotle says no. What he's doing is considering number in separation from all sensible bodies. He's considering sphere, right, in separation from all sensible bodies. And that's why in the definition of sphere and geometry, there's no matter at all. Okay? And then Aristotle has a kind of footnote there, he says, and there's nothing false in his doing that either. He can consider in separation things that don't exist in separation. Now, Plato was convinced of the truth of mathematics too. But he knew that mathematics was considering spheres and cubes that had no matter. Therefore, he said, there must be a mathematical world corresponding to what? Pure mathematics. Aristotle says no. It's our mind that considers these things and separates them, huh? Now, can you know in separation, can you truly know in separation, things that don't exist in separation? Well, take a very simple example. Take white sugar, okay? White sugar is white and sweet, huh? Now, is the eye false in knowing the whiteness of the sugar without the sweetness? No. You can say its knowledge of the sugar is incomplete, right? But is it false? Isn't the whiteness knowable without the sweetness? And vice versa, my tongue, right, my sense of taste, can know the sweetness of the sugar without its whiteness. Now, is it false in knowing the sweetness without the white? You could say its knowledge is incomplete, but is that false? Now, if... If I said that this sweet thing is not white, or this white thing is not sweet, then I'd be false, right? But I can know its whiteness without its sweetness, and vice versa, right? Because one is knowable without the other. Do you see that? For example, I use in class a lot, huh? You know me to be a philosopher, right? Okay? Maybe you didn't know I'm a grandfather, huh? Okay? But when I was in the hospital there, my daughter was having one of her babies, and my wife and I were going to kind of take care of the ones already around there. But the nurse was not going to let us take care of them until my daughter's husband came down and identified us as grandparents, right? I'll just let anybody take care of the kids, right? Yeah. So the nurses know me to be a grandfather, knowing nothing about my being a philosopher. Some of my students might know me to be a philosopher, knowing nothing about my being a grandfather. But in reality, I'm both a philosopher and a grandfather, right? But isn't one of those knowable without the other? See? Now, if you said, this philosopher is not a grandfather, then you'd be false, right? Or if you said, this grandfather is not a philosopher, then you'd be false, right? But your mind is not false in knowing one without the other, because one is really knowable without the other. See? Do you see that? Okay? Now, you couldn't know I'm a grandfather without knowing I'm a man, right? Because man is in the understanding of what a grandfather is. I told you I was in church some time there with my wife and my daughter and a whole bunch of the grandchildren, right? And this guy I used to work with years ago, he sees all these grandchildren and he says, you know, he says, you're responsible for all this. So, notice, grandfather is not knowable without knowing what a man is, right? Although the reverse is possible, right? You can know I'm a man without knowing I'm a grandfather, right? But you couldn't know I'm a grandfather without being a man, huh? Do you see? So, the mind is not false in knowing me to be a grandfather without knowing me to be a philosopher or vice versa. Your mind is not false in knowing me to be a man without knowing me to be a grandfather. Do you see that? Okay? Then, what about order, right? My stock example in class is to take the first sense of order there. And I say, now, I know you students before I know your parents. But now, in reality, who came before? You? Parents. Yeah. Now, is my knowledge of you false because I know you before I know your parents? No. See? Notice, in this respect, if I know you, and then, through you, I meet your parents, right? The order in my knowing is the reverse of the order in reality. And more generally than that example, we tend to know, usually, the effect before the cause. Like the great Sherlock Holmes says to his friend Watson there. We're going to have to reason backwards. And Holmes, or Watson says, what do you mean? We've got to reason, he says, from the effect back to the cause. Now, is my mind false in knowing the effect before the cause? But in reality, the cause comes before the effect. So, the order in which we know, it's just the reverse of the order in reality. God, who's the beginning of all things, is the last thing we know in philosophy, huh? It's in the twelfth book of Wisdom that Aristotle finally arises in the knowledge of God, huh? Everything else is in order to that ultimate knowledge, huh? So, the fruit shall be last, and the last shall be first, right? What's first in reality is the last in our knowledge, huh? You see the idea? So, we can know things in separation that don't exist in separation, right? We can know things in an order that's even contrary to the order in which they come. And Aristotle says, there's no mistake, provided you don't attribute one to the other. If I say, because I know you before I know your parents, therefore, in reality, you came before your parents. Then I'd have Paulson, right? Then I'd be attributing the order in which I know you and your parents to the order in reality in which you and your parents came. Do you see the idea? Yes. So, so far is, yes, from being what? Ah, requiring that, is that if you do require that, you're going to end up with all kinds of falsehood. And the supreme example of that is Spinoza and Hengel, huh? So, Spinoza says, this etica mori, geometrical demonstrata, that the order in our ideas and the order in things is the same. And so, Hengel following Spinoza, he identifies the most confused idea in our mind, which is the first idea in our mind, this very confused idea of being, right? With what scripture says, I am who am. He makes the first thought in our mind correspond to what? God, huh? What is the first thought again? This confused idea of being is something else, huh? Now, Thomas, of course, in the first book of the Sumacan Gentilis, there's a whole capitulate in there, a whole chapter, to show that the being which is said of all things is not the being that is God. See? So, Hengel is identifying what's first in our mind and what's first in what? Reality. Very gross mistake, in a sense. Yeah. Now, it's interesting, when you read The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius, there are five books of The Consolation of Philosophy. And he did a very great work, huh? And there are poems and there's prose, right? Poems and prose, huh? They're very thoughtful poems, you might say, if you have a verse. But Boethius is perhaps one of the greatest minds we need in the Church, huh? Between, say, St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, being Boethius is the greatest mind, huh? But he's seeing a very great mind. But in the beginning of The Consolation of Philosophy that is written in the form of a dialogue between Boethius and Lady Wisdom has come down to console him in prison. He says he's a member of the Academy, the School of Plato. But then when he gets to the fifth book, the very thing you were touching upon there, right? He's trying to understand the way God knows. Now, God's knowledge is not in time. God's knowledge is God himself. and God is eternal. There's no before and after in God. There's no time in God. There's no change. And yet God truly knows everything in time. So he knows time in a, what? Nontemporal way. He knows the past, the present, the future, and his eternal now. Now. Okay? So, in order to understand the divine knowledge and the truthfulness of it, he has to follow Aristotle instead of, what? Plato. Although he said he's a member of the Academy. What's interesting, he doesn't say he's going to do that, but at the beginning of Book 5, Lady Wisdom says, she introduces Aristotle, the true follower. So, Goetheus is following Aristotle there in opposition to Plato. And, of course, Thomas is the second great mind, right? That's following Aristotle, right? But he has the benefit of Goetheus before him, right? Take another very simple example of this. You ever get together with somebody and you talk about old times, huh? You know, you and I were in high school together or something, right? Or you and I were in college or something. Now, you're talking about the past, you're thinking about the past now, aren't you? Mm-hmm. You're remembering the past now. Are you false, remembering the past now? Mm-hmm. Can you remember the last class you had here? Maybe a little bit? You're remembering something last week. You're remembering something last week. What you're remembering is now, this week, today, right now, here, right? I can remember the beginning of this class, can't you? That's in the past now, isn't it? The beginning of this class. So is my mind false remembering the past now? Knowing the past now? Well, if I thought that the past was present, then I'd be false, right? But in my present knowledge, I know not the present, but the past. You see? The way we know, not the way things are, right? There's no falsity there, is there? No. The falsity would come and say that because I remember the past now, the past must be now, right? And then I really got a problem. You guys got battle shock or something, right? Okay. So let's look at the reply here to the place. We're going to take a little break before we do the second one. He said the opinion of Plato was that to sense is an operation proper or private to the soul just as to understand, right? So he's adding, you might say, to the what? Truth, right? Those who say that understanding is in the brain, they're subtracting to the truth, right? But he's adding to the truth, right? Now he says, in many things which pertain to philosophy, Augustine uses the opinions of Plato, not asserting them, but what? Simply reciting them, right? Okay. That's the first thing he says, right? He says, Augustine doesn't really mean this. He just... Okay. Now the second one, he tries to give kind of an abstruse explanation of how this could be said, right? Nevertheless, as far as it pertains to the present, this which is said that the soul senses some things with the body and some without the body, this can be understood in two ways, huh? In one way that this which I say, with the body or without the body, determines the act of sensing according as it goes forth from the one sensing. And thus nothing senses without the body, right? Because the action of sensing cannot proceed from the soul except through a bodily, what? Organ. In another way this could be understood, that the four said determines the act of sensing on the part of the object that is sensed, huh? And thus some things it senses with the body, that is existing in the body, as when it senses a, what? Wound, huh? Vulness. Or something of this sort, huh? Some things it senses without the body, that is not existing in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul. Just as when it senses itself to be, what? Sad or to rejoice about something that it's heard, right? Okay? So, if you stick a knife at me, oh, oh, I sense that, right? It's in my body, right? What I'm sensing, right? Okay? But then maybe you bring me some good news or some bad news, huh? Right? Your mother's died, or your father's sick or something, right? Or you won the sweepstakes or something, right? See? And now I have, what? Joy or sadness, right? I'm aware of this, but it's not about something in my body, is it? Okay? But that's on the side of the object, right? I'm sad or joyful because of the news, the good news or bad news that you've just given me, right? Okay? So, he's saying either that Augustine is saying something false, right? Not as asserting that he himself thinks it, but this is what Plato says, right? Or he has this other strange way of speaking, right? But he's still not saying something false, right? Okay? You see that? Yeah. I was reading the treatise on the Trinity there today a little bit, and sometimes, you know, the Greek fathers, right, are a little bit sloppy in the use of words, huh? And Thomas will say, you know, well, he's using the word in a loose sense, you know, like that. So he doesn't want a tribute to the Greek father, especially something like Basil or somebody, you know, something. I think the Greeks say, you know, that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son, huh? And Thomas says, well, this is never said in Scripture, okay? And he's talking about this name of the Son, the Immigodee, huh? And why it's really the proper name for the Son. But all that Basil means is that the Holy Spirit is like the Father and the Son, huh? But not that he proceeds as an image of the thing, huh? So sometimes he'll say, too, you know, that when there's a way of speaking that's not too good, he'll say, when they say this, it should be piously expounded, right? But one shouldn't continue that way of speaking, huh? Another example was where Waitius uses the word fate, right? For the, what, order in things, you know, that divine providence, you know, establishes, huh? And Thomas says, well, if that's what you mean, you know, your opinion is correct, right? But the word fate is also used by people who have this idea of, you know, the stars determining everything down here and so on. And so we should avoid that word, not use that word, right? Because use a word that people commonly, you know, use to signify something false and you seem to, you know, okay? And it's just like, you know, if I was to say, you know, well, Mary was the mother of Christ, huh? So I've got to be kind of careful with that, right? Because Nestorius said that because he wanted to deny that he was, what, God, right? You see, and therefore she's only the mother of the man and not the mother of the person who is God, right? According to his human nature, huh? So, you've got to kind of be careful with those words, huh? That's why, you know, sometimes I see, you know, even people document sometimes, they use the word value, you know, rather than the word good, huh? Now, they tell me sometimes that when you look at the Latin text or the official text, you have the word good, and they translate it as value, right? You see? But there's a tendency to use that word, because everybody uses that word nowadays, huh? But most people who talk about value theory, it's something completely, what, subjective, as we say, right? Something just in the person who's... Situation. Yeah, yeah, someone who's extrinsically, right, bestowing value upon something, right? Rather than being something good in the thing, right? So, I like to avoid those words, because they're commonly, what, misunderstood, you know? And, because, you know, I remember when I first read some of the Greek fathers there, and, you know, they say, the father is the cause of the son. Well, that's kind of a misuse of the word, huh? See? You can say that the son proceeds from the father, so the father is like a beginning, right? But not a cause, huh? Every cause is a beginning, but not every beginning is a cause, huh? See? But basal really means, you know, not the cause in the strict sense, huh? But that the son proceeds from the father, huh? So, sometimes you don't use the word exactly right, huh? Even though the understanding is not heretical, huh? Right. So, you know, so you've got to, you know, explain that text, right? Piously expound it, right? What the man means, but then not adopt that way of speaking, because it could be, what? Misleading, huh? Let's see, Dianne, a bit interesting remark, too, about, he says, Greek is a better language for philosophy and theology than Latin, huh? But in the formulation of the Articles of the Faith and so on, the careful and nuanced way of speaking of these things was perfected in Latin before in Greek, even though the Greek is a better language for this. And Monsignor Dianne attributed this to the fact that the Latin language was tied with the papacy, right? Rome, right, huh? You see? And so, that's part of the thing that happened with the Greeks, right? They weren't as close to papacy, right? And so there's certain supernatural help, we'd say, huh? In the papacy, which led to, what? A more clear statement of the Articles of Faith, choice of words, etc., right? In Latin before in Greek, even though Greek is a language that lends itself, huh? to philosophy and theology more. Is that because it's broader vocabulary-wise? Well, for many reasons, yeah. It's more concrete. Latin is more abstract. And what's Indian used to say, you know, a sign of the great excellence of Thomas Aquinas was that he could think so well in Latin. Aristotle was thinking in a much better language for philosophy. Greek, huh? And, but Thomas, because of the excellence of his mind, right, you see? And so, you know, I kind of, you know, as years go by, I'd hear Monsignan and Fr. Goulet, whose native language was both French, right? But two very good teachers I had. But they both would say that English was much better than French for philosophy. It's much better than French for poetry, too. Oh, really? Yeah. And I'd go up to Monsignan sometimes, you know, when I was first teaching Assumption. And I'd talk a little about the way I was saying things in class, you know, and something like that. And I noticed he'd stop and say, you know, this is a very good way I had of speaking, he says, but in French you can't speak that way, you know? You know, you could see, you know, you'd see it so clear to him, you know, how much better it was the way I could express myself in English. I was talking about, you know, the phrase to think out, to reason out, and the very sense of in and out, and how you can... And he said this was very good that I was speaking that way, but he said we can't speak that way in French, you see? So I kind of pay him the, you know, the compliment that he paid Thomas. A sign of the excellence of Monsignan's mind was he could think so well... In French! I mean, I can think of English as superior language, you see? Yeah. I just kind of thought that, you know, if a language was more concrete, it would be better for philosophy, but therefore a language that was less concrete, therefore more flowery, might be better for poetry, because I always thought that, you know, philosophy and poetry were, you know, kind of had different aims, you know? Yeah, yeah. One being more specific, one being more... No, actually it's the same language that's better for both, huh? Yeah, that's what I think so well. Yeah, yeah. Monsignan Dian used to use the proportion there that French is to English like Latin is to Greek, huh? French is much more abstract, especially since Descartes got very abstract, huh? But they used to use the preface by André Gide, you know, sort of a master of French prose. André Gide has a preface to the play-out edition of Shakespeare, the edition of Shakespeare in French. Oh, yeah. And André Gide, in the prologue there, he talks about the difficulty of translating, you know, one poet into another language, right? Sure. But the peculiar difficulty of translating it into French, from English, right? Oh. You know? And he speaks of the French language, the words he used were presca-antipoetic, huh? Almost antipoetic, the French language, huh? Okay. Okay. And so, you know, when Sr. Dian, sometimes when he'd talk about the word and so on, he would sometimes go into English and sometimes maybe into Greek, you know? But sometimes the word for one thing is better than one language than another one, huh? Oh. I think the word understanding, for example, in English, is better than the Greek word knowing or the Latin word intelligere. Okay. Yeah. And it really leads you to see all kinds of things, that word understanding, about what it is. It's a much better word. And I remember when Sr. Dian was talking about the argument called example, and going to English, you know, the word example and sample, you know? So, but sometimes the Latin word is very good. I think that the Latin word sapientia, if, you know, which Thomas kind of says sapida scientia, savory knowledge, right? That's a nice concrete thing, see? And why wisdom is not that concrete in English, huh? So there's something in the Latin word, huh? And I mentioned how Shakespeare, right, in Romeo is comparing himself to a foolish sea captain, you know, is going to dash his ship upon the rocks. He's going to take his life there at the tomb of Juliet, whom he thinks is dead, and he says, come, bitter conduct, huh? Come, unsavory guide, huh? And he just, just, just, it's amazing how he does that, right? Mm-hmm. Right? Unsavory for the fool, right? Foolish guy, huh? And the opposite of that, of course, would be savory, right? Sapida scientia. Let's take a little break here, then we'll go, try to do Article 6. Whether the powers of the soul flow from its what? Essence, from its very nature. To six, one proceeds thus. It seems that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. And the first objection is based on the idea that nature is determined as something one, right? So the objection is, from one simple thing, there does not naturally proceed diverse things. But the essence or nature of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and diverse, they cannot proceed from the very nature of the soul. Mori says, that from which something proceeds is a cause of it. But the essence or nature of the soul cannot be called a cause of the powers, as is clear to one going through each of the kinds of cause. Therefore, the powers of the soul do not flow from its what? Essence or nature. Now you can have shown the apply of the objection, the kind of causes that are involved there. Moreover, emanation or flowing from, names a certain motion. But nothing is moved by itself, as is clear in the seventh book of natural hearing in the physics. Except, perhaps, for reason of the part. As an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one of its part is moving, and the other is moved. Nor is the soul itself moved, as is proved in the first book about the soul. Therefore, the soul does not cause in itself its powers. But now, against all of this is the idea that the powers of the soul are like certain natural properties of it. But the subject is the cause of its own accidents. Once it is put into the definition of the accident, as is clear in the seventh book of the metaphysics. Therefore, the powers of the soul proceed from its nature, essence, as a cause. They're like properties of the soul, right? Just like if you make two, you made something, what? Half of four, right? Half of four is a property that follows upon being, what? Two, right? And being a third of six and a fourth of eight, right? All these relations follow upon being two, right? So the idea that it follows upon what the soul is, that it has certain, what? Powers, because of its very nature. Now, Thomas, in the reply here, he makes, I think I've gone over this with some of you before, he makes a very nice, this is a very nice text for many reasons, but anytime you want to distinguish between a substantial form and accidental form, it's a good text to come back to, right? Because remember, the soul is a substantial form. And I might mention again, going back to the great dialogue of the Phaedo, Socrates is defending this position about the soul. He's looking upon the soul as a, what? Complete substance. The soul is an accidental form. Okay? Now, is any one of those opinions the truth, the whole truth, is nothing but the truth about the soul? Is a soul a complete substance? No. Socrates thinks, huh? In fact, you have a little early dialogue, a little dialogue where Socrates asks, Am I a soul, or am I a body, or am I something composed of a soul and body, right? And he reasons that he's just a soul. So, this is not true, and this is not true, right? But there's an element of truth in both, right? Because the soul is actually a substantial form. So, to see it as something substantial, as Phaedo did, is to see part of the truth about it, right? But it's not a complete substance, huh? To see it as a form, there's some elements of truth, right? An accidental form. But it's not an accidental form. It's actually a substantial form. And these are the two most probable opinions about the soul. Once you discover that the soul, or at least the soul best known to us, the human soul, once you discover that the human soul has an operation that's not in the body, right? And therefore, in existence, it's not in the body, right? You could easily jump to the conclusion that it's therefore a substance quite distinct from the body and just temporarily in prison of the body, right? Okay? But vice versa, if you saw the formal aspect of the soul, right, and how the body has to be disposed of the soul, you might jump and think it's an accidental form. But the truth is, that's a bit of both, huh? If you think of the unity of soul and body, right, then you think of the soul as being some kind of a form. And so the accidental form idea arises here. But actually, it's a substantial form. So he says, substantial form and accidental form partly agree and partly differ. Now, they come together in this. There's two things. That both substantial form and accidental form are an act, as opposed to a potency. And by each of them, or both of them, something is in some way an act. But they differ in two things. First, because the substantial form makes something to be, what, simply. Now notice there, huh? When I was born, or maybe before that, when I was conceived, right, I came to be, right? That's being simply, right? When I studied Euclid, did I come to be? Only in a certain sense. Yeah, I came to be a geometry. I didn't come to be then, did I? See the difference, right? So through accidental form, one has being only in some qualified sense. Okay? I take my medicine, and it restores my health, right? Is that my coming to be then? No. That's when I come to be healthy, see? When I was conceived or generated, then I came to be. That's when I got my soul. So the substantial form causes, or makes, being simply. And its subject is a being that exists only in, what? Potency. That's the first matter. But the accidental form does not cause being simply, but being such, or so much, or in some way having itself, right? So when I generated a son, did I come to be? Not you. I came to be a father. You see? Okay, I've got to qualify, right? I came to be in some way, right? Okay? And the subject, this is the second difference, the subject of accidental form is an actual being, a being, an act, huh? Okay? So when I came to be a geometer, right? I didn't come to be simply, did I? I came to be a geometer. And geometry came to me, an actual man, right? Okay? Now, from those two difference, huh? He says, whence it is clear that actuality, per prios, huh? Before, is found in the substantial form, before in its, what? Subject. Because the subject is only matter, in the first sense of matter, being in potency. And because the first is a cause in each genus, the substantial form causes being an act to its subject. But to reverse, with the case of the accidental form. Actuality is found in its subject, in the subject of accidental form, before it's found in the accidental form. Whence the actuality of an accidental form can be caused from the actuality of its, what? Subject, eh? Thus that the subject, insofar as it is in potency or ability, is able to receive an accidental form, but insofar as it's something in act, is productive of that accidental form. And I say this about the proper and per se accident, what in logic we call the property, right? For with respect to an extrinsic accident, the subject is what? Receptive only, right? Okay? Like if you stab me with your sword, right? And give me a shape I didn't have before, right? Okay? I'm only receiving that, right? I'm not giving that shape to myself, right? But what is productive of such an accident would be an extrinsic accident. Now the second thing in which the substantial form and the accidental form differ is because the less principal, the less chief thing, is an account of the more chief thing. So matter is for the sake of substantial form, but in the case of accidental form, it's reverse. Accidental form is for the sake of the completion of the, what? Subject, right? Okay? So notice how we're very different from God, right? God in his nature has every perfection, huh? We in our nature are lacking any perfection, so we need to acquire, what? Geometry and all these other arts and sciences and virtues and so on to complete ourselves, right? So all those things I acquire, like geometry, is for the sake of completing Dwayne Berkwist. I'm more complete when I have geometry and courage and justice and all these other virtues and habits, huh? Now he says, it is manifest to the things that have been said before that the subject of the powers of the soul is either the soul alone, right? Which is able to be a subject of accident according as it has something of potentiality, as has been said above, or it's the composite of soul and body, right? But the composite of soul and body is an act of the soul. So, once it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether the subject of them is the soul alone or the composite of soul and body, they flow from the, what? Nature of the soul is from a principle or a source or cause, huh? Because, as has already been said, an accident is caused by the subject according as it is an act and is received in it insofar as it is in, what? Pultancy, huh? So, though the soul is defined as an act, it's not pure act like God, huh? There's some potency there. Now, the first objection says, how can there be many and diverse things following from one nature, right? One simple nature, huh? Okay? Now, Thomas says something very important here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that from one simple thing, many things are able to proceed naturally in a certain, what? Order, right? And in a second way. And also, on account of the diversity of the, what? Receptors, huh? Thus, therefore, from the one essence or nature of the soul there proceed many and diverse powers, both on account of the order of the powers and also because of the diversity of the bodily, what? Organs, huh? Okay? Now, notice, huh? In a way, you see that even in the Trinity, don't you, huh? Because from the Father proceeds naturally, what? The Son. The Son, right? And then from the Father and the Son as one principle proceeds naturally, the, what? The Holy Spirit, right? See, there's a certain order there, right? Which Augustine calls the order of nature, right? The order of origin, one from another, huh? You see? So that's one way you can get multiplicity, right? Many from one, huh? See? But even the Trinity don't get many from one without some order there, right? See? You don't have from the Father proceeding the Son and the Holy Spirit as we're ex-equal, right? But the Son proceeds from the Father and then from the Father and the Son together proceeds the, what? Son, huh? The Holy Spirit. Yeah, yeah, the Holy Spirit, yeah. Excuse me. Okay? And there you can see something reflected of what's going to be in us because the will maybe will proceed from the fact that we have reason, huh? Understanding, huh? And of course, the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love and the Son by way of, what? Understanding, huh? And the second objection was saying what kind of causes are involved here were there any causes that didn't show that no causes were it just asserted that they weren't there. He said, to the second it should be said that the subject is a cause of its own proper accident in many ways, huh? It's a cause in the sense of the end or purpose of it, huh? And in some way it's an active cause a little bit like a mover or a maker. It's also like a material cause insofar as it is receptive of the accident. And from this one can take that the nature of the soul is a cause of all the powers as an end, right? That's one of the four kinds of causes and as an active principle like a mover or a maker, right? And as some of them namely of the understanding and the will it's also, what? A cause in the sense that it receives these as their subject, huh? So it's a cause in more than one way, huh? So the soul is in some way the end or purpose of all its powers. They're there for the sake of the perfection of the soul, huh? Okay? And it gives rise to them like an active principle almost like a mover or a maker but not really in a strict sense of mover or a maker. And it's also responsible for the existence of some of them because it's the subject of some of them, right? But others the body is, huh? Now the third objection was going back to what we learned in natural philosophy that nothing moves itself, right? What is the flowing you might say of the powers of the soul from the soul is that a kind of change of the soul by the soul? Well, he's not saying that, right? He says the flowing of proper accidents from a subject is not through some change, transmutation but it's through some natural, what? Resulting, huh? Just as from one natural thing results as from light there actually results what? Color, right, huh? What is this emanation? Well, it actually means literally they originally flow from, right, huh? Okay? Now, notice I'll go back to something simpler to this. We usually exemplify the geometry first, right? Okay. Let's take a very simple theorem in geometry. When straight lines intersect, right? What's the theorem about straight lines intersecting? That the, uh, what do we call them? The opposite angles are equal. Yeah, yeah. Opposite angles. If these two angles will be equal that means that matter too, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, how is that proven in geometry? Do you remember? I don't know. I don't care. Well, it goes back to a couple of things, right? Here, what is the definition of right angle? Yeah. Now, most students don't know what the definition of right angle is. They think the definition of right angle is 90 degrees. 90 degrees. And I tell the students they say, now, you're saying it's 90 out of here and 60 parts of the circle, right? Mm-hmm. Why don't you just say it's a fourth of a circle? Mm-hmm. Wouldn't it be simpler? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. That's the first little thing I see there, right? Sure, right. Okay? Isn't it easier to divide the circle into four parts and divide it into 60 equal parts? Mm-hmm. So why divide it into 360 parts and you can divide it just into four parts? Right? Mm-hmm. Oh, okay, okay. Now, how do you divide a circle into four equal parts? Well, you take the center of the circle and you draw a straight line through the opposite side, right? And then you draw another straight line at what? Right angles, right? Yeah. To that same, the right angles to this line, to that. Well, then you've got a little problem, right? Because you've got to know what a right angle is before you know what a right angle is. Yeah. So, you have to know how to draw a straight line at right angles to another line before you can, what? Divide a circle with the four equal parts. So, they're out of order to the mind, right? The modern mind is out of order in all kinds of ways. Now, what is the definition of right angle? Well, when a straight line meets a straight line, it makes equal angles. We call those angles right angles. That's the definition of right angle. See? And you could show that it's possible to draw a straight line to meet another straight line to make, what? Equal angles, huh? Okay? Now, it's not too hard to see that if a straight line meets a straight line, it's either going to make two right angles, or it's going to make angles equal to right angles. Yeah. So, that if you divide these two right angles, don't just subdivide this, but subdivide this one, you've got these three parts, right? And you can divide this angle and this angle into the same three parts, so they're obviously equal, right? All that's got to be known before you come to this theorem, right? Well, now, let's give you a letter. If this is a straight line, meaning a straight line, then A plus X must be the two right angles, or equal to two right angles, right? Yes. So, A plus X equals two right angles, and since this is a straight line, meaning a straight line, for the same reason, B plus X must be the two right angles, right? Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, it's just a question of the axioms, right? Yeah. Quantities equal to the same are equal to each other. Sure. So, A plus X must be equal to B plus X. Right. Now, you may not have considered the fact that, in a way here, you're going from cause to effect, aren't you? Because the intersection of these lines, right, is the cause of there being angles, right? And the straightness of these lines is the cause of this down here. Yeah. And therefore of there being what? Equal. Equal. Equal. Okay? Now, notice, if you ask me, what is this? I would define it as intersecting straight lines. Mm-hmm. Okay? I don't put angles into the definition of intersecting straight lines. Okay. Let alone the equality of those angles, right? But the natural result of straight lines intersecting, right, is that equal angles are formed there, and also here for that matter, right? Okay. It naturally follows from the lines being straight at those angles that are formed will be what? Equal, right? So this is said to be a property of intersecting straight lines. To have opposite angles equal, huh? Yeah. The same way later on, we take up the triangle to show that, what, if you make a triangle, the interior angles will be equal to what? Two right angles, huh? That's a property that follows upon, that flows from, right? Okay? Well, this is even a simpler theorem here, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Well, now, it's something like that in the case of the soul, right? We're saying, given the nature of the soul, there is some natural result of that, and that's the powers of the soul, right? Okay? Okay? Okay? Just like given the nature of the triangle, it follows upon it that there will be angles equal to right angles. Okay? Now, an extrinsic accident would be green or yellow or red. Does that follow upon being a triangle? No. No. That would be due to something other than the nature of the triangle, right? Mm-hmm. And the cause of the triangle being green would not be its nature as a triangle, would it? But it is a result of its nature as a triangle, and it has three angles equal to two right angles. You see that? Okay? Now, obviously, the powers of the soul are not to the soul, like green is to the triangle, is it? Because then you wouldn't have, you know, any regularity as to what powers you have, right? Sure. So, the powers of the soul are to the soul, like the equality of these angles, two right angles, are to triangle. It's a natural result of it, huh? Okay? Okay? And notice, huh, when I draw these straight lines, once you have the nature of intersecting straight lines, you naturally have equal angles formed, huh? You don't have to take these straight lines now, and now transform them so that they have these angles equal. That naturally results from their intersecting straight lines, that you have equal angles formed, huh? So, you see, it's a natural result of what the soul is, that it has these, what? Powers, right? Okay? Now, notice, we know the soul through its powers, right? But we know that the powers of the soul are not to the soul, like green is to triangle, but they go always with the soul, huh? So, if the powers of the soul are to the soul, like the equality of these three angles, the two right angles, is to the, what, triangle. Or the equality of these angles is to the intersecting straight lines, you see? Or like half of four is to two, right? If you make two, the natural result of making two is you have something half of four, a third of six, a fourth of eight, and so on. It naturally falls upon it, right? So, it's what they call a modular property as opposed to a pure accident, huh? Do you see what they call it? A modular property? They call it property as opposed to an accident, right? A property has a cause in the very nature of the thing, huh? And that's what he's saying in the reply to the third objection, right? It's not that the soul is, what, changing itself to have these powers, right? But to have these powers is a natural result of what the soul is. Just as one doesn't have to change those intersecting straight lines to make those lines, what, those angles equal, right? But it's a natural result of what intersecting straight lines are, that equal angles, equal opposite angles are being formed, huh? Do you see the idea? Okay. That's what this... Third objection. Flowing is as a result? Yeah, emanatio, yeah, the flowing from, yeah. Result. Yeah. You could say follows upon it, another way of saying it. Follows upon, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Gotcha. But you borrowed that word from flowing, just as from the stream actually flows the water, right? I was at Bath in England there, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And of course, you know, there's a tremendous amount of water being produced all the time there, right? It's flowing all the time, and it flows down into the Avon, the river that flows by Shakespeare's that front Avon, huh? You know, and you see that where the water's going, huh? Otherwise the pole place would be flooded. He said coming, right? You know? Uh-huh. Yeah. So it's a natural what? You know? Emanation or flowing from that underground thing, yeah? It's very, very strange. I forget what the number of gals is, but it's tremendous, right? How much water's coming there all the time. It's at a constant temperature, right? You know, warm, you can bathe in there, right? Yeah, sure. A very famous place, and they knew about it before the Romans came, but the Romans made the Roman baths, and they've been, you know, reconstructing them and excavating the vahs down below, huh? Uh-huh. A very interesting place to see. Um, there was a temple there and all kinds of things, you know, that they tell you about, huh? Um, there's all kinds of ideas about the powers of these waters. So I was going to ask the guy in there whether it flows into the Avon before the Avon goes to Shakespeare's place, right? Right. Because I'm explaining why Shakespeare's such a great... Hmm. You know, that's an old idea, though, you know. Achilles was dipped in the magic water, you know, and he became invincible except for his heel, because his mother held him by the heel. That's why the Achilles heel was the vulnerable part. Yeah. You got my joke, my mother dipped me, you know, but she held me by the nose, and that's why I have this bad nose. Yeah, right. You know, in general, I might have had pretty good health in life, you know, but I always