De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 102: Interior Senses and Animal Cognition

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put in colored liquid, right? You know, something with that same color in the same bottle, right? You might pour it into your glass, right? Not knowing what you're doing, huh? But you see, the common sensibles do affect us, huh? How big the object is, right? And its shape and so on. They do affect the senses as such. And whether it's at motion or at rest, huh? See? So they're kind of in between the two, huh? Now, you talk about the sensible prachidens. In the strict and fullest sense, a sensible prachidens is not perceived by any sense at all. It's known by some other power in man, by his mind or something, right? By his senses. But sometimes we also speak of the sensible prachidens that what is known by one sense is prachidens in another sense. See? So the sweetness of the sugar is not accidental to the sense of taste, but it's accidental to the eye. The eye is not affected by the sweetness of the sugar at all, is it? See? But you see, if you see the sugar, right? Meaning you see its color, right? Then you might think of it as being sweet, but that's not because the eye as such is knowing that, right? But something else is, huh? Yeah. Shakespeare has a sonnet there about the mistress, huh? And he says, I love to hear my mistress's voice, although I know that music hath a far more pleasant sound. See? So is he rejoicing in the sound of his mistress's voice as such? Huh? No, of course she is. Yeah, he's thinking maybe more of the wrong things, right? With the mistress. So he's thinking of something that appeals to another sense, right? When he hears her voice, right? Oh, no. So in that sense, it's not, he loves to hear her voice, although he knows that music hath a far more pleasant sound. Yeah. See? Yeah. What is not known by any of the senses as such, right? What's known by reason. That's the one where I was thinking of beauty. No. Because beauty, in a sense, is defined as what pleases the senses. I mean, pleases when seen. Or pleases when, what? Heard, right? And that's known in the mind. Well, yeah, but it's pleasing the senses, though, too, see? Okay. See? So my eye is pleased, huh? Sight for sore eyes we see. Okay, right? Okay. My ear is pleased hearing that, right? Okay. See? But then you have the sensible approach that ends just with respect to one sense, huh? Mm-hmm. So notice, when I hear the voice of a friend, I recognize, you know, the tone of the voice, right? I might rejoice, but not because my friend has the voice of Pavarotti or something, right? He has a beautiful voice. Yeah. But because I, what? Recognize the friend. Yeah, yeah. But the ear doesn't hear me being my friend, does he? The ear hears the sound, and right away I think of that, huh? Yeah. But that's not the way the common sensibles are, that they're not affecting the senses as such, huh? It's also that big barn, right, with the white surface, you know? Mm-hmm. It affects the eye more, huh? It can be almost blinding there in this bright summer afternoon, huh? I remember one time when my father's factory there, they had on the wood lot there, kind of a woodshed, you know, closed on three sides, but open on one side, right, huh? Mm-hmm. It has a roof over it. And I was given the enviable job of painting it one summer, right? It's got to be painted white, you know? So every half hour you've got to go in and get a drink of water. Wow. But I mean, you know, it's kind of, you know, getting blinded by the, you can imagine, you know, the bright sun is beating down, it's hot, but it's also blinding because it's such a large, what, surface, huh? Yeah. Okay. And so the senses as such are being affected by the size of that surface, huh? Mm-hmm. But to the color, right? Yeah. But the sugar as such is not influencing my sense of sight, huh? So the sugar and the salt, they might look just alike, they might have the same color, right? Mm-hmm. And therefore, as sugar is not affecting my eye, or as salt is not, but simply as white. And maybe how much there is too, right? But that's the common sensible. Okay. So let's look now to reply to the third and the fourth objections, which were talking about the sense of touch, huh? And he says, to the third it should be said, that as the philosopher seems to say in the second book about the soul, the sense of touch is one in genus, right? But divided into many senses according to species. And an account of this, it is of diverse contraries, right? So it might be when you distinguish the five senses, sight and hearing and smell and maybe taste are really, what? A lowest species, to speak in logical terms. But touch might not be a lowest species, but it might have, what? Species below it, right? Mm-hmm. One for hot and cold and one for wet and dry and so on, right? Which, nevertheless, are not separated from each other by organ, but they are, what? All through the body, right? And, therefore, their distinction does not appear like it does with sight and hearing and smell and taste, because everywhere in the body, right? But taste is perceptive of the sweet and the, what? Bitter, huh? Here's a goat there when you're reading Plato's dialogue there, and he's developing the proposition that everything is only one contrary, right? And one student says, well, doesn't sweet have two contraries, sweet and sour, and sweet and bitter, right? Right. But really, is sweet and sour the ones that are furthest apart? Right? I think it maybe really is sweet and, what, bitter are the contraries, huh? Yeah. And sour is not, what, you know, sweet and sour pork and so on. I mean, it's less opposed, right, than bitter is, huh? Okay. But taste, however, which is perceptive of sweet and bitter, follows touch in the tongue, right? Not through the whole body. And, therefore, it is easily distinguished by touch, right? So Thomas, in a sense, is not necessarily rejecting what the objection is saying, right? Right. And we saw before, when I was talking about, say, when you divide a triangle into equilateral isosceles and scalene, equilateral is a lowest species in the sense that all equilateral triangles have exactly the same shape, although one might be bigger than another or smaller than another. But not all isosceles triangles have the same shape, right? And so maybe, in the same division, right, you have a species that is the lowest species, right? And a species that is not a lowest species, but is a genus with respect to what is below it. And you may be other examples of that, huh? Like in ethics, when you divide, say, the first two virtues are courage and temperance, huh? But maybe courage is one virtue, but maybe temperance, you know, you have temperance about food, you have temperance about drink, temperance about sex, right? Maybe those are three different, what, particular virtues, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? So maybe temperance is not a lowest species, huh? Right? But it is a genus with respect to what is below it, huh? See? That corresponding vices, you know? Yeah, yeah. Gluttony or something. Yeah, and it seems that people have different, you know, feelings, and they may be, you know, somewhat connected, but they're somewhat distinct, right? The difficulty of fighting gluttony or, you know, people have difficulty, you know, fighting drink, right? It seems to be something different, right? Mm-hmm. And sex is, again, a different kind of temptation, right? Mm-hmm. See? So I think it's interesting to note, huh? You see, when we kind of think abstractly that we think of, you start with a genus and you divide it into species, some of which can be divided. You know, eventually you get down to individuals, right? So you might think that you get down to that lowest species. So you might think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that you're going to think that by division, all whose members are our lowest species. That doesn't seem to be so, huh? I say you can see it most clearly in geometry or something like that, right? Euclid will divide, let's say, quadrilateral into square, oblong, rhombus, rhomboid, right? Now all squares really have the same shape, don't they? Yeah. But do all oblongs have the same shape? Yeah. No. And so, although oblong is part of the same division of quadrilateral, it is not a lowest species, but square maybe is. And the same thing about triangles, you see? Equilateral may be a lowest species, but not the other. And when Aristotle divides the virtues, say, in ethics, like say the virtues of reason, the same thing, you have, it distinguishes five virtues of reason, art, foresight, wisdom, natural understanding, and episteme, right? But if you take those three that are the virtues of looking reason, wisdom is a lowest species. There aren't many kinds of wisdom, it's only one wisdom. Natural understanding, it's only one. But episteme, right? But episteme, right, reason that knowledge could be divided into geometry, arithmetic, natural philosophy, ethics, logic, right? So in the same division, right, one member is a lowest species, and another member is a, what? Genus. Again, art and foresight are genera, because, you know, Thomas would divide foresight into the foresight of the individual, the foresight of a father, the foresight of the general, and the foresight of the king. Each of them is a different foresight. And, of course, art is divided into the art of carpentry, and the art of metalworking, and the art of the tailor, and the art of the cook, and so on, right? So, of those five virtues of reason, two are lowest species, and three are gen with respect to what is below them. Okay? So maybe in this division of the senses into five, right, one of them, touch, right, might not be a lowest species, but, okay? Now, Thomas is a little bit careful about this, huh? He says, one can however say that all those contrarieties in each one of them come together in one proximate genus, right, and all in one common genus, which is the object of touch according to some common notion. But that common genus is unnamed, right? Just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed, huh? But Thomas is not altogether closing the door, right? That there might be... But he seems, at least in the first part here, following the philosopher, as he calls him, right, to be admitting that the sense of touch is not a lowest species, but it has maybe one sense for hot and cold, another one maybe for wet and dry, and who knows what else. Now, the fourth objection was based upon the sense of taste being said to be a kind of touch. Now, to the fourth, it should be said that the sense of taste, according to the dictum of the philosopher, is a certain species of touch, which is in the tongue only, is not already distinguished from touch in general, but from touch as regards those species which are, what, diffused throughout the whole body, huh? If our touch is one sense only, so he hasn't called out yet to close the door to that, right? On account of one common definition of its object, it should be said that there would be a, what, diverse, that according to a diverse way of being changed, one could still distinguish taste from touch, right? For touch is changed by a natural imitation, and not only a spiritual one, as regards its organ, according to the quality which is properly its object, huh? But the sense or organ of taste is not changed by necessity, by natural change, according to the quality which is properly wet, so that the tongue would have to become sweet or bitter, right? But according to that foregoing quality in which it's founded, namely the moisture which is the object of touch, huh? So maybe taste is a little more spiritual than touch, huh? It is interesting the way we do carry the word taste over, right, to higher things, huh? So we speak, you know, of taste that are on in what? In the fine arts, right? There's good taste in music, or good taste in literature, or good taste in architecture, something like that, right? Mm-hmm. Maybe even higher things, right? But they also say that about music, that he has a real nice touch with the violin. Yeah. It's interesting, you know, that in the fragments of the Greek philosophers, sometimes they single out the sense of sight and the sense of hearing among the five. Like Heraclitus says, the things that can be seen and heard and learned are what I prize most. But they're kind of the senses of learning from another, right? Yeah. The eye and the ear, especially, huh? But sometimes, like in the fragment of Empedocles, there's one where each thing goes out sight and hearing, but the other one, he singles out sight and touch, huh? What? And what's interesting about sight and touch is that they are the only senses that know the shape of an object. Mm-hmm. Oh, yeah. And how important is the shape or the form of an object in our thinking, huh? Mm-hmm. Very important, right? Mm-hmm. And we borrow the word for shape, the word form, right? Mm-hmm. And apply it to all these things. Like in logic, we speak of a species, right, as a form, right? Mm-hmm. We speak of democracy as a form of government, right? Right. Or I speak of, you know, tragedy and comedy as forms of the play or forms of fiction. Mm-hmm. And so, but then also the sense of touch as a certain excellence as far as what? Assertitude is concerned. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Of course, a stock example for the Christian is Thomas, right? He's going to, wants to put his finger in the nail holes, right? And in the side where the lance went in. Before you're going to believe, he says, right? Yeah. Right, right, right. And so, you know, the old expression, the touchstone is certitude, huh? Mm-hmm. But the touch is the most certain of the senses. And in some ways, the sense is the most basic of the senses. And Aristotle and Thomas will often say, the man's got a good sense of touch, I have a good mind. Oh, yeah, we saw that. Yeah. It's also going back to beauty, you know. Yeah. Those are the two things that most help you get in touch, well, in touch, to help you really experience the beauty is either the visual or the sense, the touch. Well, you know, the touch doesn't, we don't really speak of something as feeling beautiful. You see, it feels good, huh? Mm-hmm. See, it smells good, it tastes good, it feels good. Mm-hmm. As long as you get to those two highest senses, or most spiritual senses, you know, that we speak of something beautiful, right, that we hear or see, huh? We don't, you know, even the common person doesn't tend to do that, right, usually. He won't say, you know, well, this tastes beautiful. He won't say that, right? Mm, this tastes good, right? Mm, it smells good, right? That's a very common saying, right? I don't ever say in the kitchen, oh, Rosie, this smells beautiful. That smells good, right? Did you want to say a rose smells beautiful? Yeah. A beautiful smell. But even the, you're thinking, though, maybe, you know, you know, like you let's hear his mistress's voice, right? Yeah. It's because, you know, they're very closely associated, right, the beauty of the rose. The smell, the smell per se is not beautiful. Yeah, yeah. Because it's a rose. Right. Yeah. Okay. But it's got a good smell, right? Nice smell, yeah, see. The other thing I was wondering about, about taste, is that when holds one's nose and eats, one doesn't taste very much. Oh. And by and large, taste is the aromatic, vaporous, grass-food nation. Oh, yeah. The taste is mostly the smell anyway. It's interesting, too, you know, with the saints and the devils and so on, you know? When they have a purgation, you know, when they drive out a devil with somebody, right, you know, they tend to leave a bad smell in the room. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, you know, sometimes when they exhume, you know, the saints, you know, or somebody who's being considered, you know, when you get this, you know, smell of roses coming from the grave, right? What should be a revolting smell, you know, when you dig up a body, right? Sure. You know, but it's kind of a sign, God said. You know, you know, there's a lot of saints like that, you know, yeah, yeah, but you gotta, you gotta smell flowers or something like that, you know, and it's kind of a beautiful sign, you know, of the, I mean, in a sense, we tend to recognize corruption in food, we and the other animals by the sense of smell, right? So it's kind of appropriate, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So let's take a little break here and then we'll see if we can get through the fourth article. Okay, or outward senses, right? The ones that we see from things outside of us. And now he's going to talk about the interior or inward senses. And here he's going to be more complete than Aristotle is in the third book about the soul. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the, what, private, proper or private. Therefore, the common sense ought not to be enumerated among the interior sense powers apart from the, what, exterior ones that are proper. Now this is, you know, involving a confusion of, what, two different meanings of common, as Thomas will point out in his reply, right? Common in, what, predication, right? That would be like distinguishing, you know, we've got sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and sense. You wouldn't get that as one, would you? No. The sense is a set of each of those five, right, huh? But the, another sense of common is what we mean when we speak of a cause, right, that extends to all, like the common good, right? Okay? Okay? That way God is common, huh? And of course the common sense will be like a common origin of the outward senses, right? Or a common terminus that they come back to. In the way that the, what, center of a circle is common to all the, what, radii, huh? Okay? But the other end is not common, huh? To all the radii. But it's private or proper to each. Moreover, for that, for which the private and exterior sense suffices, is not necessary to lay down some inward grasping power or knowing power. But for judging about sensible things, the private senses suffice. The private and exterior senses suffice. For each sense judges about its own object, right? Similarly, it seems enough for this that they perceive their own acts, huh? Because the act of the sense is, in a sense, a middle between the power and the object. It seems that the eye is much more able than to know its own vision, as being more proximate to it, than it would know even color, and so on. Therefore, it's not necessary to posit an interior power, which is called the common sense, huh? That's one reason why people sometimes say there's a central sense, right? Something that knows the acts of the exterior senses, right? As if the eye knew color, but didn't know seeing, right? And the ear knew sound, but didn't know, what, hearing, right, huh? And this objection is saying that, well, isn't hearing closer to the ear than sound? So if it knows sound, we didn't know hearing, too? Moreover, according to the philosopher, fantastic woman, and that's taken from the Greek word, right? Imagination is the Latin word. And memorative of the memory are passions of the first sensitive power. But a passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore, memory and phantasm ought not to be laid down to be other powers apart from sense. Aristotle speaks of the, what, image as emotion caused by the sense in act, huh? Just like when I look at you, you know, and then I close my eyes, and I continue to see you, kind of, in a faded way, right? Well, that continuation, the sense of seeing you, is a result of my seeing with my eyes open, right? So why should I be another power there, huh? Moreover, the understanding depends less upon the sense than any sensitive, any power of the sensitive part does. But the understanding knows nothing without taking it in some way from the senses, as is said in the first book of the Apostle Analytics. Because to whom one sense is lacking, one science is failing. So if you don't have ears, you don't have the science of music. If you don't have eyes, you don't have the science of astronomy, or science of color. Therefore, much less ought there to be laid down one power, the sensitive part, for perceiving those intentions which are not perceived by the senses, which is called the estimative power. Now he's talking about how the animal is aware of its enemy, right? And is that through the sense qualities of its enemy? Are the sense qualities threatening? Yes, sir. Okay. It has to make a decision about what those, what do you say? It's something beyond the senses. Yeah, yeah. What he's thinking of there, the estimative power, is what we might call something like instinct in the animals, right? Yeah. But where when they see a certain color, a certain shape, they recognize this as friendly or an enemy. Yeah. It's not because the color or the shape as such is painful, or, you see? So, you know, these little birds that are, by nature, you might say, the victim of the bigger birds, right? Right. They see them after they're born, you know, when the big bird flies over, they crouch like they recognize an enemy, huh? Right. And the sheep might recognize the wolf or something, right, as an enemy, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? Even though they never experience, you know, being bitten by one or something, huh? Mm-hmm. They perceive something that is not a sense quality, huh? Moreover, the act of the cogitative power, huh, which is sometimes called the particular reason, which is to bring together and put together and divide, and the act of the reminiscent power, which is, which is the kind of syllogism to inquire, right? Okay. And I start to use the word syllogism in that book on memory and reminiscence, huh? But it's like you're trying to say, what were you doing last Thursday, or what were you doing last Friday, right? And you say, well, I can't remember what I was doing at 4 o'clock last Friday. Well, let's see now. I went to lunch with so-and-so, yeah? No, I came back, yeah? Mm-hmm. Then I went to the library, yeah? Yeah, yeah. And finally, you work your way back, right, to what you're doing at 4 o'clock. It's almost like reasoning, right? You see? And you can kind of do that, right? Mm-hmm. So you try to remember somebody's face or his name or something like that. Where do I know that guy, you know? All of a sudden you remember where you do it, huh? He says, those acts do not differ less from the act of the estimative power, the commemorative power, than the act of the estimative from the act of the image. Therefore, either the cogitative and the reminiscing powers ought to be laid down to be other powers apart from the estimating and the commemorative powers, or the latter ought not to be posited to be other powers apart from, what, phantasma. Moreover, Augustine, in the 12th book on Genesis, to the letter, lays down three genre visions. Bodily vision, which comes through the senses, spiritual, which comes through the imagination, or the phantasia, which is a Greek word for imagination, and the intellectual vision, which comes about through the intellect. It's interesting how sometimes they use the word eye, you know, kind of metaphorically, for the second and the third of these. So in Shakespeare's play, for example, right, in Hamlet, his friends who have been on guard duty have seen the ghost of Hamlet's father at nighttime, but they've seen it with their very eyes. And they've told Horatio about it, and he says, that's your imagination. But he goes, and he sees the ghost with his own eyes. That's the first kind of vision, right? Then they come, and they're about to tell Hamlet, about it. And Hammond says, I can see my father now. He's looking around for the ghost, right? He says, in my mind's eye. He means in that case, in his what, memory, right? Imagination. He can picture his father up here, right? But then you have Gregory the Great saying, anger disturbs the eye of the soul. And he's talking about reason. He's calling that metaphorically the eye of the soul, right? So you have three meanings of the word to see. I see with my eye. I see you in my memory or imagination. And I see in the sense of understand. Therefore he says there is only one, right? Interior power which is between sense and delight. Namely the imaginative power. So he's saying we should just distinguish three sights, huh? So sometimes we say that painting appeals to the eye, right? Fiction to the what? Imagination, right? And philosophy to the eye of the soul, to reason. But against all of this is what Avicenna, in his book about the soul, says. Avicenna is one of the great Arab philosophers, Muslim philosophers. Where he lays down five sense powers interior. Now Thomas is going to reduce these and say there's just four, right? But Avicenna has five, huh? I don't think Thomas will reply to that particularly in the body of the article, he will. You have the common sense. You have phantasm, right? Imaginative. As you say, those words are the same, one in Greek, one in Latin. But apparently in this translation they have a sense that they're being used to different things. The estimative, power, right? And the memory, right? Now these words are used sometimes by us a little differently, so you've got to see how Thomas is using them, huh? I answer, it should be said, that since nature does not fail in necessary things, It is necessary that there be so many actions of the sensing soul as are sufficient for the life of a perfect animal. And whichever of these actions cannot be reduced to one source require diverse powers. Since a power of the soul is nothing other than a proximate source of some operation of the soul. But it should be considered that for the life of a perfect animal, there is required that not only grasp a thing when it is present, but also in its, what? Absence, huh? Otherwise, since the motion of an animal and his action follows upon his apprehension or knowing or grasping, an animal would not be moved to inquire something, what? Absent, huh? So Tabitha would leave the house every morning, you know? She'd eat her breakfast, and then she'd demand her breakfast. And once she had her breakfast, she'd go right to the door and go out and go to this particular area in the neighborhood where there was some wooded area and birds to be hunted and so on, right? So she was going to an absent place, right? She couldn't sense. And you know, the cats, when they keep down the stairs, and they come right up the stairs, and they turn the corner, and right, right where the dish is, right? But they can't see the dish around the corner, I don't think. You know, I don't think. They need to have this, huh? And he says, the contrary to this, of course, appears in the perfect animals, huh? Which are moved by progressive motion, from one place to another. For they are moved to something absent, that they have, what? Apprehended, huh? It is necessary, therefore, that an animal, through the sensing soul, not only receive the species of sensible things, when they are at the same time, right? In the present, being moved by them. But also that it retain them and, what? Conserve them, right, huh? And how would an animal know its master, and those who are friendly to it, right, without this, huh? Now, this is the principle that Tom's going to use to distinguish some of these powers. To receive and to retain are reduced in corporeal things to diverse principles. And very simple physics or chemistry here. For the moist easily receive, right? But they retain badly. But the dry receive, what? With difficulty, but they, what? Retain well, huh? Maybe that's what Heraclitus means when he says, the dry soul is wisest and best, huh? If you've got a wet soul, if you're all wet, you don't retain anything, right? But the dry soul, right, huh? May seem to be a dumb ox in the beginning, right? But it's really, what? Getting these things firmly, right? I say, what are we deserts? There's nothing to say where to distract you. Yeah, yeah. Whence, since a sensing power is the act of a bodily organ, is necessary that there be another power which receives the species of sensible things, here and now, and another one which, what? Conserves it, huh? That's going to be one way of dividing these interior powers, huh? The one is going to be perceiving something in what? The presence of the object, right? The other is going to retain what was perceived, but now when it's no longer present, right? And there, the basis for that distinction is that in bodily things, what receives well and quickly doesn't retain, right? Okay? So because of the material nature of these things, you'd expect it to be a somewhat different power that receives here and now quickly, huh? At once. And the one that retains is this, huh? Okay? But then he's going to divide them another way, and it's going to end up with how many interior senses? Four, right? Again, it should be considered that if the animal were moved only by what are an account of, what is pleasing or what? Painful, right? Or stressful according to the senses, it would not be necessary to posit in the animal anything except the apprehension of forms which the sense perceives, in which it delights in or it is, what? Repelled by, right, huh? But it is necessary to an animal, especially the more perfect animals, that it seeks some things or flees some things, right? Not only because they please or displease, because they are suitable or unsuitable to the sensing, but also an account of other, what? Commodities, right? And utilities. Or even, what? So, no, harmful things. For the sheep, I guess, seeing the wolf coming, it flees, right? Not an account of the indecency, the disagreeable color or shape of it, right? But it flees it, as it were, as an enemy to its very nature, huh? And likewise, the bird collects the, what? Straw. Not because it delights the senses of the bird, right? But because it is useful for building a nest. It's necessary, therefore, that an animal perceive these intentions, huh? That this thing is harmful or it's useful, right? Apart from it being, what, agreeable or disagreeable to the senses and their sense qualities, which the exterior senses does not perceive. And of this perception, it's necessary that there be some kind of beginning or source, since the perception of sensible forms is from the immutation or changing of the sensible organa, or sensible, not over the perception of the force and intentions. Thus, therefore, he says, to the reception of sensible forms is ordered the private sense, the five we distinguished in the previous article three, right? And the common one, right? About whose distinction we'll speak in a moment, right? A little bit later, okay? To apply to the, what, first objections, huh? But to the retention or conservation of these forms is ordered, and here Thomas takes these as synonyms, phantasia, siviamaginatio, right? Which are the same. He's taking them. One is the Greek word, right? And the other is the, what, blackened word, right? It's time to get the word. Fancy from what? Phantasia. For the phantasia, or the imagination, is, as it were, the treasure, right, of the forms that have been received by the senses. So it's in the phantasia, it says, the imagination, that the colors and the tastes and so on of objects that I have sensed in the past are, what, retained, right? So I retained in me, in my imagination, the taste of liberation, the taste of chocolate, and the taste of carboné sauvignon, and the taste of orange juice, and the taste of steak, and the taste of chicken, and all these, you know, and the colors of all these different things, right, and so on. But to grasping these intentions, that's what he's using to describe what? But grasping the usefulness of something, right? Or it's harmfulness, right? And so on. Which are not known by the senses as such, right? There is ordered what they call the, what, estimative power, right? Which people might more call instinct, right? Something like that, I don't know. And to conserving such things is the vis, what? Memorativa, right? Okay? As I say, you've got to be careful with the words there, because I think we use memory sometimes of what he calls imagination here, right? Okay? But Thomas is saying that there's one power that retains what is perceived by the outward senses and the common sense. Right. That receives the colors and the sounds and the taste, you know? So I kind of recognize when I hear a violin or a piano, what musical instrument is being played, I retain those sounds in some way, you see, all those sense qualities. and then those things that are not perceived by the senses as such, like that something is useful or an enemy or something to be pursued or fled or whatever it might be, here and now, that's retained by this other power which he calls the, what, memory, right? Okay? Now, the names aren't important, but then I say there might be some different use of those, huh? I think we tend to use the memory for both of these, I think. And I think we tend to use the word imagination for our ability to, what, mix and combine images that are kept in the memory, right? And Thomas will explain that, of course, later on. Okay? A sign of which is that the beginning of memory comes about in animals from some intention that something is harmful or suitable. Okay? And that ratio of the past, which the memory notes is among or to be computed counted among these intentions, huh? Okay? That something is past that you don't perceive by the senses as such, do you? See? That's something that's not perceived by the senses as such. Okay, but now he's going to talk about a little difference here in these inward senses between man and the other animals. It should be considerable that as far as sensible forms are concerned, there is not a difference between man and the other animals, for they are, in a like way, changed by exterior sensibles. But as regards those forced intentions, right? There is a difference, huh? For the other animals perceive these intentions only by a certain natural instinct. There is a word instinct that we still use, huh? But man, through a kind of, what? Colatio, or bringing together, right? A kind of gathering, right? A kind of, almost, reasoning. And therefore, what in other animals is called the estimative, the natural estimative power, in man is called the, what? The cogitative, yeah. Which, through a certain, what? Bring together of these intentions finds something, huh? Whence it's also called the particular reason, right? Now that is in the brain. That is not the universal reason that's immaterial, huh? To which the medical doctors assign a determined organ, namely the middle part of the head, huh? And they say, well, they'll study the brain and they'll try to compare, find which of these four ones are what part of the brain, you know? But it's a very difficult thing, you know, to really pin that down, huh? But Thomas gave me the medical opinion of that time. There was an article in the Thomist, I think, trying, you know, bring together, you know, some medical observations of the brain and trying to tie up just in that region, right? It seemed like they never quite get down to really saying what's what. So it's in the middle part of the head, right? And it brings together individual intentions just as the, what, understanding reason, the universal reason brings together universal intentions. So it's a universal reason, not this particular reason that is, what, an immaterial power, huh? And on the part of memory, it has not only memory, it has the other animals in the sudden, what, recalling of the past, but also, what, recalling, right? Where, as it were, syllogistically, it inquires a memory of the past according to individual intentions, huh? And there he's thinking of the fact, you know, what you and I do. We're trying to recall where we were at some time, right? You know, if you get called into the courtroom, you know, and, where were you in that day, Mr. Burkowitz? You know, I knew, where was I, you know, when that happened, right? But maybe I can remember something about that day, right? What do I do on Thursday, right? You know, so why have I an 8.30 class and a 10 o'clock class, you know, then what do I do after that, right? You know, I can kind of, you know, step by step work my way back to what I was doing at 4 o'clock that day, huh? See? See? Well, Joe came by the office at 3 o'clock and then we went out and had a beer or something, right? Okay? And then, and I remember, yeah, see? You know? And it's a little bit like reasoning, right? See? When I was in it playfully, like, you know, I can't remember Paul's epistles, right? So I kind of played around, right? And I said, well, six is a perfect number, one, two, three, not square, one, four, nine. That's the way they were divided, one, four, nine, yeah. yeah. See? I just kind of, you know, it's still a bit like reasoning, right? But I'm using one image to get to another image, yeah? Okay? Now he says, Avicenna posits a fifth power in between the estimative and imaginative which puts together and divides imaginative forms. And that's the way we use the word imagination now. They speak of the creative imagination, the scientists, or the poets like to say that they're, you know, the artists that they, that they're not imitators of it, they're creators, right? Sure. See? As is clear, when from a form imagined of gold and a form imagined of a mountain, we compose and put together one form of a gold mountain, right? Which we had never seen, huh? And I'm thinking, you know, one fairy tale there with the kids and their little, there was a glass mountain, huh? And the guy's trying to get up there and the princess is up there, I forget what the whole story's about, but the difficulty of climbing a glass mountain, right? I can kind of imagination, right? Because I've seen glass and I've seen mountains, I can, what, kind of create, they might say, but I've really kind of combined the image of mountain with glass. They can't take it for the horse, they know how to get up that glass mountain, huh? Keep on sliding down, huh? But he says, this operation does not appear in the other animals for man in which the imaginative powers suffice, huh? Okay? So, and again, that's, what you see there is kind of the influence of the universal reason upon these sense powers in man that you don't have any other animals. Okay? Which action of Rivera was, the other famous Muslim philosopher, attributes it to the imaginative power in his book which he wrote about sense in the sensible song. Okay. And this is not necessary to lay down except four interior powers of the sensing part. And also these are the common sense, right? Which knows the sensible as such, and we'll see how it differs from the outward senses, and the imagination which is Thomas' word for what retains, right? What has been sensed. And then the estimated power which what? Preceives something as, it's not sensible as such, but it perceives what is useful, right? Or harmful to the animal. And then the memory which is what? Retaining that, right? Okay? So notice the distinction between the common sense and imagination. imagination. And then the imagination. imagination. imagination. And the estimative and the memorative, that's based upon the fact that what we see is easily and what we retain are not the same in body. But the distinction between the common sense and the estimative is whether the object is sensible as such or not, right? Or whether it's an intention, as he calls, the perception of what is perceived as being useful or pleasant. Now, I think I mentioned my experience with the little cap there that my friend Roy Munro, huh? And he had, you know, Richard's a kid in front of the tree there, and he knew I liked cats, so... The kid liked to go in the drawer, you know, and just close the drawer, and the cat would like to stick with him. I'd be, you know, I'll cost him over you, right? Right, yeah. So when I came over, he'd just pull over the door, and the cat just stomp, and I'd just know, and I'd probably get a good hand. So we started playing with the kid in the city, and we were, you know, things, you know, that the cat grabbed and chased and so on. And we had some belts there, see? And the cat was playing with the belts, and having a lot of fun. And then, finally, he took his belt that was kind of, what? It had bands on it, down straight, right? And all of a sudden, the cat was afraid of that. He'd been playing with all the other belts, having a lot of fun, you know, and he'd grab it with his claws, you know? And at least he was afraid of it. And if one of us held the kitten, you know, you could hardly hold it, and the other guy pushed that belt towards him. You know, he'd be... You know? And my interpretation of this was that the cat saw that as a, what? Yeah, as an enemy, right? See? And it wasn't because the color of that was hurting his eyes, right? See? It's not like he was taking a pin in his eye or something like that. But because he has this other power, this estimative power, right? Now, maybe an older cat would not be fooled by that, right? Uh-huh. You see? Yeah. But the little kitten, you see? Yeah. And of course, you know, if you ever had, you know, we had the female cat there, and the female cat had kittens, right? And they seemed to know exactly what to do as a mother. Yeah. You see? And you kind of predict it, you know, if you read up about it, what they're going to be doing, right? Yeah. But they're untaught, you see? And Moppet was a mother. Moppet was one of the litter of Kabatha. Moppet was a mother at one years old, right? Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Christ is talking to the Pharisees and he says you will perish unless you accept that I am. You know, maybe he's talking about I am who am, right? He's God, right? You see? But they confuse I am who am, who is the universal cause of all beings, with that most vague notion of our mind that is said of all things, everything is a being. And Hegel does that explicitly, huh? Hegel identifies the being, which is the most confused notion of our mind, the most general notion of our mind, huh? Something is, right, in some way or other, um, it says almost nothing about the thing, with the one who said I am who am. And I mentioned before how in the first book of the Summa Cana Gentilas, Thomas has a whole capitulum, a whole little chapter there, right? Besides refuting the idea that God is not the being that is said of all things. See? It's confusing what is said of all with what is a cause of all, huh? And you'll find students and other thinkers very commonly mixing up those two, right? Now, sometimes you see Thomas distinguishing the two when he talks about the universality and predicando, right? In universality and condando, sometimes he's talking about the word common, right? He'll say common by predication, meaning common in the sense of being said of all, right? And common in the sense of being a common, what? Source, huh? You can see it also at the word general in English, huh? If I have the army over there, right, huh? Well, Tommy Franks, I guess, is the general in charge over there, right? Okay? But he's general in the sense of a universal clause, right? He's in a way commanding the whole operation over there, right? But soldier is said of everybody and is general in the other way. It's said of everybody, right? It's general in predication, huh? Do you see that? In that sense, again, Shakespeare is wiser than Hegel, as they say, because he puns on the two beings of general, right? When, in present, Cressida.