De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 103: Understanding as a Power of the Soul

Transcript
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Because she comes over to the Greek camp, Agamemnon, who's the general of the whole Greek forces, right, he gives her a kiss, right? And then Odysseus, once he's done, he says she's been kissed by the general, but she hasn't been kissed in general yet. Well, it's two different senses of general, isn't it, huh? In one sense, MacArthur is the general of the army, right? In another way, soldier is general, right? Because it's said of all, right? So people are confusing those two. And that's in its first objection, right? The common sense is not common in predication. It's not the word sense said of, what, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, right? You wouldn't divide that against that. That would be like dividing animal against, what, dog, cat, and horse, right? You've got the dog, you've got the cat, you've got the horse, and you've got the animal. No, no, that doesn't make any sense, right? Because animals divide it into these, right? But it's common in the sense of, what, a common source, a common root. It's also the common term, right? And this is the way Aristotle most clearly points out the existence of this common sense. And this is what he talks about in the second objection here. To the second, it should be said that the proper sense, the private sense, judges about its private sensible, discerning it from other things which fall into the same sense, as sight, for example, would discern between, what, white and black, right? Or from green, right? And the sense of taste would discern between sweet and bitter and sour and so on, right? But to discern or to discriminate white from sweet, neither sight nor taste can do that, right? Sight can't do it because it doesn't know sweet, right? And taste can't do it because it doesn't know white. Because it is necessary that the one who discerns or discriminates between two things, that he know what? Both, huh? So if you've tasted chocolate but never tasted licorice, and I've tasted licorice and never tasted chocolate, can either one of us discriminate between chocolate and, it's got to be the same person, right? Who's tasted both and who knows both, right? So, if we distinguish between the whiteness of the sugar and the sweetness of the sugar, right, it must be that the immutations, as Thomas says, of the outward senses come back to a common, what, center, huh? And that's called the common sense, huh? I call it sometimes the central sense to avoid some confusion in the word, but same thing. Whence, he says, it belongs to, is necessary, right, to pertain to the common sense, the judgment of discretion, to which are referred, as to a common term or limit, right, all the apprehensions of the senses. And by the common sense are also perceived the, what, intentions of the senses, as when someone sees that he does, in fact, see, right? For this cannot come about through the private sense, which doesn't know except the sensible form which it has changed, in which imitation, sight, or seeing is perfected, from which changed or follows another change in the common sense, which precedes vision. That's hard to see, that second one, you know, and in the animal, Aristotle kind of leaves that up in the air, right, where the outward sense can know its own act, right? But what's clear is that the outward sense can't distinguish between its object and the object of another outward sense. You've got to come back to a common center. And I say, if there's evidence in anatomy that the senses come back to a common center, to the brain in some way, right, that would be knowing by exterior experience what we also know by inward experience, huh? Okay, to the third one, which is saying that imagining, right, follows upon the senses and so on, he says that just as one power arises from the soul by means of another one, so the soul is subject to one power by means of another. And according to this way, the fantasticum, huh, the imagination and the memory are said to be passions of the first, what, sensitive power. But first sensitive power, does he mean the common sense there, or does he mean...? Well, he means the outward senses, maybe, and the common sense, right? But they are, what, ordered, these powers, right, to that other power. So their act, you know, presupposes the acts of the other powers. So I have to see you before I can remember you. But I don't remember you by my eyes. I don't see you by my memory. But I retain what I have seen of you, right, in my memory. Now, the fourth one, when people say that reason knows nothing that was not first in the senses, Thomas says, well, that doesn't mean that reason doesn't perceive something the senses don't perceive. So he says, although the understanding, the apparition of the understanding, arises from the senses, nevertheless, in the thing apprehended by the senses, the understanding, those many things which a sense is not able to perceive. Like the relation of one thing to another, huh? Or I perceive that you're alive, right? Even though your life is not something I can sense as such, huh? When I see you talking and smiling and moving around, I reason grasp that you're alive, right? Even though I don't sense your life, do I? And likewise, the estimated power, right, huh? Although in an inferior way, grasp something that the senses as such don't grasp, huh? So the eye doesn't grasp the wolf as an enemy as such, right? But something else in the animal, this instinct, grasp that there's an enemy here, right? When you see the shape of the wolf, huh? And notice a lot of times they say these animals, they know their mother or their offspring by what? Smell. Smell. And it gets to even know us, I guess, huh? Their owners maybe by smell, right? I think that's probably more so than anything that people realize. Yeah. Or is it smell? Yeah. So it's not that the smell, that he smells an enemy, right? But something else in it recognizes an enemy when he smells this smell, right? Or a friend, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? Now, the fifth one was talking about these things that seem to be different from the animals in our imagination or in our memory or in our estimated power, which is called the cogitative power. Thomas says to the fifth one, That eminence which the cogitative and the memory have in man is not through that which is proper to the sensing part, but through some affinity, right? And closeness to the universal reason, according to a certain kind of flowback or influence of it. And therefore, there are not other powers, but the same, more perfect than any other animals, huh? Now, you're going to see something like that with the emotions, huh? The emotions are something we have with the other animals, huh? But a lot of people will say, Well, yeah, but our emotions seem kind of different from the other animals, right? Yeah. The emotions of man, because of their, what, affinity to and proximity to his will and reason, right? Have something that, what, the emotions of the other animals don't have, huh? And so when you listen to the music of Mozart, right, which represents the human emotions in a very subtle way, huh? You don't think that the animal has those same kind of emotions exactly, huh? But that's because they're kind of, what, you might say, elevated, right, huh? Okay? Just like you were saying about the fine arts, right, that they seem to involve reason in some way, as well as, what, the sense of sight or the sense of hearing or the sense of, or the imagination even, right? So there's an order in the music there, right, that the reason precedes, huh? A certain partaking, you might say, a reason, huh? In the same way in the, what, emotions, huh? So it's not that we have a separate faculty there from the faculty for the emotions, but because of the proximity of our emotions to our reason and our will, they have, There's a certain elevation, right, huh? Because they're influenced by the reason and the will, huh? So you understand somebody's, say, kindness to you, what they've done for you, right? And you have certain emotions, right? Or you see somebody's predicament or something, and a terrible thing that's happened to them, and you feel sorry for them, and you pity them, right, and so on, right? And so that pity's a kind of sadness, though, right, huh? The animal has sadness, too, right? But not that sadness that's kind of elevated influence by reason and the will, huh? And therefore there are not other powers, he says, but the same, but more perfect than the other animals, huh? In the same way you can say, you know, am I really got a different power here? I eat and the cat eats, right? We both get up in the morning and we both want to eat. She eats and I eat. But I have a little more interesting food, I think, to eat, right? And I have a little more sophistication about this, right? That's part of the influence of my will and my, what, reason, right, huh? So I read up about wine, I read up about the food, or I read up about the recipes, you know, and we make these fancy things. But basically, I'm doing the same thing as the animals, so I'm eating, feeding myself, right? You see? But it's been elevated because of my affinity and proximity to my higher powers. Mm-hmm. Okay. Mm-hmm. Okay. The same way we do things like we dance with our legs or something, right? Yeah. A ballerina or something, and the animals don't like to quite dance, right? But basically, we've got legs, like they've got legs, right? Okay? But there's a certain thing to do with our legs, they don't do because of the higher parts of us. Now, the last objection was tied up with Augustine saying that there are three kinds of vision, right? And it says Augustine, the middle one of Augustine, the spiritual vision, which is through the likenesses of bodies and the absence of bodies. Once he's using that middle one as something common to all the interior, what? Apprehensions, huh? Okay? See, that's the way Thomas sells that, huh? It's easy enough. So now, the next time, we're going to go start question 79, which is on the intellectual powers, the understanding powers, in particular, right? Mm-hmm. And so let's try to look at the first two articles of that, huh? Okay. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand all children. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to question 79 here, huh? On the understanding powers, huh? When Thomas says they're going to ask about 13 things, huh? Tridatium, huh? And we'll look at the first two today, which is whether the understanding is a power of the soul or the very essence of the soul, huh? Of course, we saw that in general, distinction between the essence or nature of the soul and its powers, right? But he's going to come back to it on this power in particular, because there are some special questions about it. Oh, yeah, okay. And secondly, if it is a power or ability, whether it is a, what, passive power, let's say, a power or ability that is acted upon by its object, at least to begin with, huh? Mm-hmm. Or whether it's a power that acts upon subject. Of course, he's going to conclude that it is an undergoing or passive power. And the third question will follow upon that, huh? If it is a power that undergoes, that is acted upon, whether it's necessary to posit also in existence an acting upon understanding, an agent, intellect. And he argued that there is necessary to do that. And then the fourth article, whether this agent intellect is itself something of the soul. Now, the fifth article is in there because of the Arab philosophers who are very influential at this time in the Middle Ages and who think that the agent intellect is one for all men. Of course, with Avicenna, it would be, and probably Averroes, too, it would be a separate substance from us, right? Okay, rather than a power of our soul. The sixth question is whether memory is in the understanding, huh? Whether the understanding, in other words, retains what it receives, huh? Or whether it's just, what? What it's actually understanding doesn't have it in there. And then whether it's another power from the understanding. Like in the case of the sense powers, we saw that the power that receives and the power that retains are not the same power. So the common sense receives the changes of all the senses, but the imagination, so-called, retains those things that the common sense has received. But it's a different power. And likewise, memory retains what the cogitative power has received. But he's going to argue there's not different powers here in the case of the understanding, because it's not a material organ where what we see is easily and what retains are not the same. Now the eighth one is more a question about the name, but notice, huh? Ratio, or reason, is characterized by reasoning, right? And intellectus, or understanding, is characterized by the act of understanding. With my reason and my understanding the same ability, the same power. Well, you have two different words there, right? And he's going to argue that they are the same power, right? But we'll see what that is. Now the ninth article is one that arises primarily because I think of Augustine, people like that, huh? who speak of upper and lower reasons you could call, right? Yeah. And they're not really diverse powers, but he does ask whether they are two different ones, huh? And one's, you know, looking at the divine, and the other looking at more lower things. Okay. Now what are the intelligence? That's to get in the word there, I guess, where the intelligence is another power besides the understanding. And then a distinction that Aristotle talks about in the Dianima, whether the speculative or theoretical or, to use the English word, looking reason, right? Looking understanding. And the practical or doing one are diverse powers. Because you argue, like Aristotle would do, that it's really the same power but ordered to a different end, huh? Okay. So their understanding is called speculative or looking. Spectative comes from the Latin word for looking. When it's aiming really at knowing the truth about things. Well, it's called practical when it aims at doing or making something. It's directing us in our doing or making. And of course, when we take up the virtues of the intellect, foresight or prudence or practical wisdom and art, the right reason about making, are going to be virtues of the practical reason. But natural understanding understanding and reasoned out understanding and wisdom itself will be virtues of the looking intellect. Now, the twelfth one. Whether synderesis is some separate power that's like the part. Synderesis usually is the word he uses for what we naturally understand in the practical order, right? Like, do good and avoid evil, right? It's the same power that knows those things that underlie all morality and what we've spoken of before is reason or understanding. And then the same question asked about conscience, huh? Does your conscience bother you about some things you've done, huh? You know? All your life, you've probably heard, you know, the sister, the priest, or somebody talking about your conscience, huh? Was that some other power that you have there, right? But notice the word conscience comes from what? Con meaning with and she... with what yeah yeah with some knowledge right as if you are what judging something right as good or bad with some knowledge that you have right so it's not really going to be another separate power but maybe not even a separate habit or virtue but more an act okay let's look at the first article here whether the understanding be some power of the soul to the first thus one proceeds it seems that the understanding is not some power of the soul but is its very essence or nature of what it is and the first objection is taken from Augustine right for the understanding seems to be the same thing as the what mind means and those those two words there they say intellectus comes from Thomas understands anyway is coming from impetus meaning within and legere to read to read within as opposed to the eye that reads on the outside right so when I read these words my eyes see the words but even a man didn't know Latin could see these words right see but I read within huh the meaning of these things huh so where is the word sometimes insight right meaning you know the we have something up here that can see into things right okay um and so that seems to be something of the etymology of the word intellect uh okay you know shakespeare's that expression too at the end of um symboline right in the symboline the king king's uh wife dies huh and it's coming out what a horrible woman she was right and the king didn't realize what what a what a devil she was huh and so he says who is can read a woman uh huh yeah see huh as if you know you know I'm not the only man who's been deceived about the true nature of some some uh woman huh okay Samson was led astray by Delilah right I mean lost his power because of her right and uh but no it's what does that mean who is can read a woman who can what understand understand understand the woman you see he's trying to excuse himself and it's not being aware of the fact that that she's up to all kinds of evil things huh she'd been you know talking to the doctor you know and wanting to know about poisons right but she's experimenting with poison with animals and so on oh then she gives Imogen this this poison say now if you're weary and tired this will revive you of course the the uh the doctor doesn't trust her at all so instead of something that's going to kill Imogen what he's actually given her is something that will kind of you know make you fall asleep and appear to be dead like like like Juliet you know and baby Juliet but then after a while you revive refreshed huh he doesn't trust the doctor doesn't trust that queen right so he kind of is aware you know that she's not you know up to that up to good she has some evil intents but the king is kind of naive about this on some point huh and so who is can be a woman right who who who can understand a woman right there's some truth to that right but now the word men's mind they say comes in the word word for what mensura to measure huh oh because reason tends to what count things and measure them and so on so they seem to be the same thing just named from a different uh uh activity shall we say yeah but the mind is not a part of the soul but it's very nature essence for augustine says in the ninth book about the trinity that mind and spirit are not said relatively but to demonstrate the very what essence or nature of the thing therefore the understanding is the power itself i mean the nature itself the essence itself of the soul and a second objection moreover diverse genera of powers of the soul are not united in some one power but they're united only in the one essence or nature of the soul from which they all flow but the desiring power petitivum and the understanding are diverse genera of powers of the soul as is said in the second book of the soul they were two different genera among the five genera of powers if you recall but they come together over in the mind because as augustine um because augustine the tenth book about the trinity he lays down understanding and will which is the uh rational sign power they're they're in the mind right that's where augustine i suppose is talking about the image of the trinity right in in the mind huh being in the soul so if the mind according to augustine is is the soul and then the uh intellect or understanding is the same as the mind then it would be the essence of the soul and not some power of it okay this is a problem now with the way words are used sometimes and we'll see what those varieties are moreover according to gregory in the homily on the ascension man understands with the angels okay just like we sense with the what these animals and we grow with the plants oh yeah we're a little cosmos universe yeah but the angels are are called what minds and what understandings huh okay so sometimes people say an angel is a mind or intellect therefore the mind and the understanding of man is not some power of the soul but the very soul itself the fourth one more from this it belongs to some substance that would be understanding huh because it is what immaterial so when we study our own what uh understanding we find out that it's not a body that's something immaterial and that something has to become immaterial before it's understandable and that's kind of a clue to us that these immaterial substances are all going to be what understanding substances but the soul is immaterial through its very essence therefore it seems that the soul through its very essence is understanding so he's saying the soul is something immaterial and to being what immaterial you understand therefore the soul through being the soul understands it's just the ability to understand and the soul are the same thing but against this is that the philosopher lays down that the understanding is a power of the soul ability to the soul as is clear in the second book about the soul so the soul is in the genus of substance for aristotle and the powers of the soul are in the third species second species of quality so they're an accident right something the soul has but it is not the very nature of the soul right it's the nature of the soul to have these powers right but these powers not the nature of the soul itself they're accidents but natural this is the accidents now what's the reason tom is going to give for saying they're not the same answer it should be said it is necessary to say according to the four said things way back in earlier things that the understanding is some power of the soul and not the nature of the essence of the soul itself now then he says only is the immediate principle of operation unless that expression the immediate principle of operation right what is most proximate to right there's nothing between it you might say in the operation now the immediate principle operation um only is the very nature or essence of the thing operating when the operation itself is what the being of the thing okay now notice how this is based upon proportion for just as the ability has itself to operation as to its act so the nature to the act which is what Existence, huh? Okay, let's put that in a way of proportion here. It's saying that to be is to the nature, as, huh? To do is to the ability to do. Okay? It's a more familiar word, huh? In this, right? Or to be in the sense of being, that's the equivocal sometimes, because being sometimes means what is, right? But being now in the sense of what? To be, right? Existence. Being in the sense of existence is to the nature, but doing is to the ability to do. Just stating it. Different words, same idea. Now, if the being of a thing and what it does were the same, then the nature of the thing and its ability to do that would be the same. But if the being and the doing are not the same thing, right? Then the nature, which is proximate to being, it's what is, right? And the ability to do would not be the same thing. Just like I said, though, easier to see in this case. If I said, seeing is to the eye as hearing is to the, what? Ear. If seeing and hearing are the same thing, then the eye and the ear would be the same thing, right? But if seeing is not the same as hearing, then the eye is not the same as, what? The ear. So he's saying if to be is the nature of the thing, what to do is to the ability to do. If being or existence is to what the thing is, as doing is to its ability to do. In fact, being and doing are the same thing. In this particular case here, if to be and to understand are the same thing, right? Then the nature would be the same thing as the ability to understand. Now, in God, is there any distinction in God, any real distinction between his being and his doing? No. Because there's no composition in God when you study God. He's altogether, what? Simple, huh? God is pure act, huh? So, if in God to be and to understand were not the same thing, then God would be to understanding his ability is to act. He would be pure act. So in God, to be and to understand are identical. That's nice, right? It would be nice to be and to understand the same thing, right? For the fact that I am, I understand. Well, you know it's not the same thing, right? We are and don't understand any things, right? So to be and to understand are not the same in us, right? Therefore, what is proctimate to these two acts, the nature of the thing or what it is, and its ability to understand are not the same thing. But just as to understand in me is something in addition to my being, right? And ever since I've been, I've been trying to understand. At least for some time I've been trying to understand. But my understanding is something more than my being. So likewise, my ability to understand must therefore be something more than my nature, what I am, huh? There's an interesting fragment of the great Heraclitus where he says, the divine nature is understanding but not the human. You wonder what he understood by that, huh? Yeah. When we say that God's being is also his action, then how do we understand that? I could see now how you say this with being and understanding. The same way God's nature and his will, right? If they weren't the same thing, then God's nature would be to his understanding or willing, as ability is to act. So that would be an additional act. And therefore the divine nature would not be, what? Pure act. Right. Yeah. But what does that mean? Well, as I say, I say when we study act and ability in the ninth book of wisdom, which maybe we do some time after we do some natural philosophy, in what we call today the metaphysics, right? Right. But metaphysics means what? Meta, ta, physica, after the books of natural philosophy, where you meet act and ability, but in a kind of more narrow way. Yeah. But in the ninth book, eventually you understand act and ability in a completely universal way. Right. And then we take up the order of act and ability. And then you find out that in almost every way, act is before ability. And that only in the thing that goes from ability to act, only in that thing is ability before act. But the thing that goes from ability to act does so because of something already in act. So the air which is able to be hot goes from being able to be hot to being actually hot because of something already actually hot. So once you realize that in the whole picture, or simply speaking, act is before ability, then you realize that the first cause is going to have to be pure act. Okay, right. And once you understand that God is pure act, almost all the attributes of the divine substance, that He's simple, right? Yeah. That He's, which means He's not composed, right? Yeah. That He's, that He's perfect, right? You see? That He's infinite, right? Okay. All these things, that He's unchanging, right? That He's altogether one and so on. All He's going to follow from His being pure act. But then you get to talk about the divine operations as you do after the divine substance. And the reason why you have those two parts in the Summa there, like here you have the divine substance, when you take up the divine operation, is that we're approaching God through creatures, right? And in us, our substance and operation are not the same, right? Yeah. And so we have thoughts about the substance of the thing, and we have thoughts about the, what? the operations of things, and we start from those things, right? You see? But it's like the center of a circle, right? You know? That these are separate things in creatures, right? But in God, they're one and the same. But because we start from creatures, we have two sets of thoughts, right? But when we say that God understands, or God wills, then we have to negate any real distinction between God and His understanding. Any real distinction between God and His willing. And that's why later on, when they take up, after the treatise on the operation of God, you take up the treatise on the, what? Trinity, huh? And in order to understand why God the Son, the Word of God, right? As St. John calls them. And the Holy Spirit, sometimes called the love of God. The reason why they are both God, right? is because the understanding of God is the being of God. See? And the existence of the Word of God is in the understanding of God. But if the understanding of God was something other than the being of God, then the Word of God would not be God. Right? Okay. In the same way, um, um... The Spirit. Yeah. Proceeds by way of love, right? Well, if the loving or the willing of God was not the being of God, then the, um... The being of the love in the act of love itself would not be the being of God Himself, and the Holy Spirit would be an accident of the Father rather than... God himself, you see. So you have to understand that in God, to be and to understand and to love are one and the same thing, even though we have three thoughts, right? But no one of these thoughts is adequate to express the simple perfection of God. But we have to, in speaking of each one of these, negate the real distinction that there is in you and I between our substance or what we are, our very being, and our understanding and our loving. There are three different things in us. But in God, they're one and the same. So because these two are the same in God, then the ability, the power of understanding, or the power of willing, is the same as the divine nature. But in us, to be and to do or to understand, are not the same. And of course, part of the reason for that is also the fact that to understand is something whereby we're open to everything that we can understand, right? Well, our being is kind of contracted to the being of a man. So our being is very limited compared to the infinity of our understanding, the same with our love. So he says, in God alone is the same to understand as to be. And you'll find out again, if you study the angels, right, that even the angels, to be and to understand is not the same thing. And to be and to love is not the same thing, right? Okay. Whence in God alone is the understanding, meaning the power of understanding, his very what? What essence or nature, the divine substance, in other understanding creatures, meaning the angels and man's soul, the understanding is a certain power or ability of the one understanding. But it's in the genus of what? Quality, right? It's a natural result of the nature, right? But it's not the nature itself. It's like an effect of it. It's a property, huh? Just like when you say, what, two is half of four, right? Actually, necessarily, two is half of four, right? But to be two and to be half of four, is that the same thing? Or to be a third of six? And those are all things that follow upon being two, right? But two is in the category of what? Of quantity, right? And to be half of four is in the category of relation, or towards something. Oh, that's right. Yeah. In this case here, the nature of the soul is in the category of substance, but the power to understand is in the category of quality, the second species, innate power ability. So, but in God, there's no accidents, huh? All of these things are the very substance of God. Okay, but notice the basic reason he gives. Now, it goes back to understanding, first of all, this proportion. Sure. And secondly, seeing that to be and to understand are not the same thing, right? In this case, the to do is to understand. Okay? In the same way to be and to love are not the same in us, huh? So sometimes we love and sometimes we don't, right? Sometimes we understand, sometimes we don't. All the time we are. Now, the first objection here, where the questions need to say that mind signifies substance. There's a problem here in the word, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the word sensus, huh? Mata, huh? Is taken sometimes for the power, sometimes for the, what? The sensing soul itself, right? Okay? Oh, yeah. For the sensing soul is named by the name of its chief, what? Ability or power, its highest ability, which is sense, huh? Just like I call the plant soul sometimes, the, what? Reproducing soul, right? It's the feeding soul and growing soul, but the ultimate thing is reproducing, right, huh? So if you remember from the dionium, when we studied that, when Aristotle finally finishes his consideration of the plant soul, it's the reproducing soul, right? Because that's the highest activity that it attains to, huh? Okay? But the sensing soul has its highest activity sensing, right? Okay? But sometimes they use the word sense, and that's what's common for us, but I see it in Aristotle sometimes, and I see it in all the medieval authors, right? They'll use sense, not to name the sense power, but to name the, what? Sense soul, right? Okay? Now, of course, the word understanding, huh? In English, huh? We can use the word understanding to name the, what? Act of understanding, right? We can use the word understanding, though, to name, what? The ability to understand, right? And so when you see a treatise like, you know, John Locke there, the famous English empiricist, it's called a, what? An essay on human understanding, right? Well, is he talking about the act of understanding or the ability to understand, huh? Well, it's not going to be all together clear from the title, right? Maybe now they're clear in the author's text. But we tend to use that, right? Okay? And, you know, sometimes you find, even in these things, like the word taste, right? The word taste is used sometimes for the act, right? Sometimes for the ability to taste, huh? You see, taste is one of the five senses, right? But then we speak of, you know, taste meaning the act itself. And then even the object is called taste sometimes. Yeah, the taste of an object, right? Okay? It has a sweet taste or a bitter taste, right? Okay? That's not the act of tasting, is it? It's not the ability to taste, huh? So you'll see that we do sometimes use the word equivocally, right? To name even the object, the act, and the, what? Power, right, huh? So you see that very clearly in English. That the word understanding is used sometimes to name the ability to understand, right? Sometimes the act of understanding, huh? Okay? But in Latin, they're used sometimes to name, what? The soul which has that ability, right? Okay? And likewise, he says, the understanding soul sometimes is named by the name of the, what? Understanding, right? Now, Thomas is not inventing this. I've seen in other Latin authors, huh? Using it in that way, huh? I don't think in English we use it so much that way, right? As it were from its more principal power. As it's said in the first book about the soul, at least in the Latin translation there, intellectus is substantia quae del. Okay? Well, then he's talking now not about the power of understanding, it's a quae del substantia, but the, what? There is a substance which is capable of understanding, right? And we call that substance an understanding. And sometimes they call the angels in the same way a, what? Intellectus, right? And also in this way, Augustine says that the mind is a spirit, meaning, you know, this immaterial substance, or it's the essence, right? Okay? But I say, take my word for it. That is used by other Latin authors, right? And Thomas is aware of that, right? So it's a question here about, what? The way the word is used, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Now you have something like that in Aristotle. To the second, it should be said that the appetitive and the understanding powers are diverse powers or diverse genera of powers of the soul, according to diverse definitions of objects. But the desiring power, right? Partly comes together with the understanding, and he's thinking there of the will, right? Which is the desiring power of following upon the understanding. And partly with the, what? Sense powers. As far as a mode of operation to a corporeal organ. He's thinking of the emotions, right? Sense desires, right? Okay? So, as we were saying in our study of the four grades of life, remember? The reason why there was five The genre of powers growing in four grades of life, huh? Is that when you get to the sensing powers, the understanding powers, there follows some kind of desiring power upon each of them. And in Latin they call it the sense appetite, the intellectual appetite. But sense desire and reasonable desire, if you wish. What we call the will sometimes, right? And then the ability for emotions, which are something, what? Bodily, right? Right, huh? Okay? So when I'm afraid, you know, thump, thump, thump, thump, thump, you're aware the bodily changes you're undergoing, huh? And when a person gets fearful, maybe it gets a little bit chilly, right? And so on, huh? He gets embarrassed, he gets rid of the cheeks, and so on. And so the emotions, and sometimes they're called the passions, they're a desire following upon sense knowledge. But the will is desire following upon, what? Understanding, right? First time it says in general, appetite of desires follows upon, what? Apprehension. So when we get to study the treatise on love sometime. And the first article in the four articles on the causes of love is that whether good is the cause of love, right? And the second article is whether knowledge is the cause of love. Well, he's coming back to that here when he says that, what? Desire follows what? Apprehension, some kind of knowing, right? So the animal tastes something, and it's pleasant when he tastes it, and then he has this, what? Sense desire for that, huh? Okay? We smell something, right? And we have a sense desire, you know, to eat something, huh? If we're hungry, and so on. But will, the ability to choose, this follows upon, what? Reason, right? Now, the average person has a hard time distinguishing between the love, let's say, that is an emotion, and the love that is an act of the will, huh? Okay? But notice, take the words of Hamlet there when he talks about why he had Horatio as a friend, huh? And he says, since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, huh? And could of men distinguish, her election, which is another word for choice, right? Has sealed thee for herself, right? Notice the order there, right? Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice. And he says mistress, because soul, of course, is always feminine in Latin, right? I don't know. But what is the soul mistress or master of her choice? Why don't we think of a child as being, what, so responsible for what they do as an adult, huh? It's not a reason yet. Yeah. So he doesn't have a developed reason so he can, you know, compare and weigh things and then choose, right? So notice the words there. Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could of men distinguish, right? You can see the difference between men, right? Then her election, her choice, has sealed thee for herself, huh? And he goes on to give some of those reasons. For thou hast been as one in suffering all that suffers nothing. A man that fortunes, buffets, and rewards, has attained with equal thanks. You see, some people, when things go well, they get all crazy and wild, right? You know? Others, and the same people, when things go bad, they, they, they don't know, they take my life or something. I take myself, you see? But a man that fortunes, buffets, and rewards is attained with equal thanks. He's a man who's, what? No way, right? And blessed are those, he says, whose blood, whose blood and judgment, right, are so well commingled, they are not a pipe for fortune to play what stops you please, right? And he goes on, he says, give me that man that is not patched slave, huh? And I will wear him in my, what? Heart's core, hey, my heart of heart, that I do thee, huh? So he sees that, that Horatio is not, what, passion slave, huh? Or maybe most men are a slave of some passion, right? It may be a fear, right? The coward is a slave of his fear, right? And the, uh, uh, the glutton, or the drunkard, or the adulterer, or something, Um, is a slave of another passion, huh? Uh, the man who's, who's irascible, is a slave of his, what, anger, right, huh? See? So once his reason could see the difference between a man who is, what, in control of himself, and a man who's, what, a slave of some passion, right? He saw who to choose as a friend, right? You see? A man who stays on an even keel, when things go bad or go well, right? And a man who goes crazy one way or the other, when things don't go exactly the way he wants them to go on. So that's the kind of love or desire that follows upon, what? Reason, right? In Latin they have a word there for that kind of love sometimes, a special word. It's called dilexio. But it seems to come from the word choice, huh? So sometimes they translate the word dilexio as a, a chosen love, huh? Now there's, there's other kind of love, you know, that the poets talk about. Whoever loved, the love not at first sight, you know? And this is a kind of, what, of an emotion, right? A love that's an emotion. And Shakespeare talking about them in the play says, love and reason keep little company nowadays. It's a pity no one who makes them, you know, not better acquainted, right? So there's another kind of love which follows upon, what? Sense desire, right, huh? So you see this in Proteus, huh? Now Proteus is well named in the two gentlemen of Rona. Proteus was a sea god, remember the sea god? And Proteus always is changing his shape, huh? Well, Proteus is betrothed to what? Julia. And of course, a betrothal in those days meant more than an engagement, aren't they? A betrothal was really a solemn promise to what? Marry, so it's almost, what, equivalent to marriage, right? And he's confirmed with 20,000 soul-confirming oaths, right? So 20,000 soul-confirming oaths, right? He's pledged to her, right, huh? Okay. So he's fully committed to Julia, right? For all practical purposes, you know, he'd say marry to her, right? Valentine is the other gentleman of Rona. They're best friends, right? Valentine has gone off to the court to finish his polishing, right? And he's fallen in love with the Duke's daughter, huh? Sylvia, right? Well, Proteus' father said, that's a good idea. I think I'll send you off to the court, too, you know, to get some, you know, finish your education. And when he sees Sylvia, wow, right? And Valentine is planning to, what, elope with Sylvia. Well, now, what? Proteus has got kind of a thing here, right? He wants to pursue Sylvia. He's got to be unfaithful to Julia. And he's got to betray his friend Valentine, right? Okay? So now, here's a sudden love, huh? And he'd say it's, what, really an emotion, right? A passion, right, huh? Okay? And you can see that Shakespeare has some soliloquies where he's kind of turning these things over in his mind, right? Now, you know, and we can follow the play. It's a very interesting play, but the early play of Shakespeare, right? And I usually ask people in their love and friendship chorus, you know, beginning, what is love, you know? He's got some emotion. I say, I'm so angry. So is angry. So is fear. What's a very special emotion? But I mean, I mean, but that's the first meaning for us, right? Because our knowledge starts with our senses, huh? And that's the first meaning of love, huh? But then the word love is borrowed and applied to an act of the will. And later on, it's even carried over to God, right?