De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 104: Love as Will, Not Emotion: Divine and Human Love

Transcript
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God is love. We speak of God as loving us, right? But is the love that God has for us an emotion? A feeling, as we call it, right? See, those words emotion, feeling, you know, the bodily nature of this act is connection with the senses, right? This feeling is taken from touch, right? So, but God's love is not an emotion or feeling. It's a chosen love, right? And St. Paul says he chose us in him, right? And we turn it to him. He chose to love us. Of course, you know, God's love for us is called a, what? Merciful love. Our love of God is a just love. We owe this love. That's why there can be a command, right? You know, for us to love God. The same with all of our neighbor, huh? St. Catherine of Siena says, don't forget to pay the debt of love to your neighbor, huh? But that very words there, debt of love, right, is if this is a matter of justice. I owe you some love, right, huh? And I owe God sometimes all my love, right? You see? But does God owe us anything? No. So God's love is said to be, what? Merciful. That's like St. Paul calls it merciful love. It's the truth is. Right? He owes us nothing. In fact, we're not even there to be loved before he loves us. It says love is a cause of our being, huh? Because God is good. We are. So, that's kind of interesting, huh? You can see that, huh? That's one difference between God's love for us and our love for God. It's merciful that he loves us. Pure mercy. But for us, it's only just that we love him, huh? So God's not obeying any command to love us. But we're obeying a command, huh? To love God, huh? I don't know if you get the Pope Speaks up here, but they had his address there. He was in Poland. The Pope Speaks, you know, is usually, you know, five or six months you get the documents after, you know. Because they, you know, this is a March-April, I guess, issue. But it had his speech there at the dedication of his church there to our Lady of Mercy there in Poland there. And I guess it's right around the place where he used to be when he was a working man there in Poland, huh? So it's like he's come back there full circle. But he talks there. I mean, it begins as a quote from Faustina connecting mercy and hope, right? And then the first part of the speech there, the Pope says, you know, the only reason we have for hope is the mercy of God, right? And he comes back to it later on. It's a very clear text, you can see it, on the connection between mercy and, what, hope. Of course, even in the Hail Holy Queen, you know, we say, we connect up mercy with hope, right? We say, Hail Holy Queen, Mother of Mercy, our life, our sweetness, and our hope, right? Meaning that she's the object of our hope, right? You see? It's tied up with her being the Mother of Mercy. Well, the justice of God is more a reason to fear him, right? You need that too, but the mercy is tied up with his hope. So it takes a long time before one fully understands the difference between the love which is an emotion and the love which is an act of the, what, will. And the love which is an emotion is more known to us and the word originates there and it seems more real to us, right? C.S. Lewis, he talks about the love of the angels, and their love is much more intense than ours is. But metaphorically, he speaks that our love is ferocious. You know, because you might think, you know, that the love of the angels being not an emotion but an act of the will is kind of a cold, you know? But it's not a way it is at all, right? Seraphim, you know, our name, because they're burning, right? In metaphorically speaking, they're burning, it's sending to God, right? Yeah. Sorry, I'm late. I'm not sure exactly where we're at, but I did read the article, right? I'm kind of curious, God is pure act, and love, obviously, God is also love. Would you say that we are never fully loving because in order to fully love, you have to be pure act? We can never love as much as he loves, that's true, yeah. But it's maybe a mixture of emotion along with reason? There's not total reason. We have both going on at the same time, but we can, you know, distinguish them to some extent, right? But it's not easy sometimes, eh? But I told you this funny thing there, huh? I used to drive this little Polish professor crazy when I was in college with my syllogisms, right? And so one day in class, he says, Mr. Berkowitz, he says, do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism? He's getting frustrated with me. And I just got laughed. I said, I could have an emotional attachment to a girl, I said, but not to a syllogism. You know, my love of the syllogism is based upon the fact that this is the only kind of argument where the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, huh? So your reason recognizes the goodness of this kind of argument, huh? And if you can syllogize, you have the best argument, right? But it's not the sort of thing that your emotions would recognize, huh? Is that the kind of love that the angels would have? Just seeing the good, the beauty? See, we might think that the angels' love is less intense than ours because they don't have emotions, right? But actually, our love is kind of divided, huh? You know how the flesh and the spirit war and so on, huh? So we're kind of divided and, you know, divide and conquer, right? I mean, you're weak in that way, huh? The angels are much more intense, you see? And as they say, C.S. Lewis, trying to get us out of our, you know, mistaken human way of looking at things here, describes the angels' love as ferocious, right? You know? Yeah. I mean, it's really, I mean, it's something intense. I mean, you've got no idea how intense that love can be, right? You see? You see? And regarding the angels' love of you is much more intense, you know, than any human love you've known. I guess you could say that angels' response to Zachariah when he doubted that his wife could be conceived at such an old age wasn't anger as much as it was an intense love that he showed, maybe anger, but maybe kind of a disappointment in that seeing how much God loved him. Saying, for doing this all, that ferociousness came out of you. Yeah. Yeah. See, like, love, like, you know, philosopher's name for the love of wisdom, huh? Peristado, you know, talking about the love of the philosopher and the metaphysics there, you know, he speaks of the philosopher and the sophist, right? And the philosopher is the love of wisdom. The sophist is the love of the honor of glory that comes from appearing wise, right? So he says that the philosopher and the sophist differ by their choice of life, huh? See? So we, the love of the philosopher, the love of wisdom, which is what the word means, is the love of wisdom, that is a chosen love, right? That's the love that's in the will, huh? See? But my love of candy, that's in my body, you see? You know, please my senses, right, huh? Okay? So what's agreeable to my senses moves my feelings, my bodily emotions, huh? Now these pleasures of the mind, the people who've experienced both the pleasures of the mind and the pleasures of the body, all universally say the pleasures of the mind are a much greater pleasure. Yeah, yeah. Now Aristotle says that, and even Mill says that, right? But most people don't get that, get past the pleasures of the body. Yeah, yeah. And that's why, that's why, you know, Thomas says, you know, that the, uh, the educated man, the truly educated man, um, when he sins by the flesh, right, it's worse than when the common man does, right? That's right. And as Thomas says, no man can live without some kind of pleasure. So if you have no taste at all for these higher pleasures, you're going to go to, what, excess in the lower pleasures, huh? One guy knew in high school, he got a rough job one summer, working with a lot of lower class people, right? And one Saturday, he used to be, you know, friendly, he decided to go out with them, you know, to their entertainments, right? But just like one amusement park after another, you know, and all this friendly pursuit of these outward and bodily pleasures, it leaves you exhausted at the end of the day, right? But people will tend to go to excess in those if they don't, what, have any taste at all for the higher pleasures, right? But then vice versa, as they say, if one knows these higher things and can pursue them to a greater or less extent, then one is even more guilty, you might say, right, of sin, if one succumbs to the, what, lower ones, huh? You know? Because he has power, right? Yeah, yeah, he's got more, he's got more, he should be able to distract himself from these things, you see? Right. You know, and occupy his mind with things. You know, the old idea of an idle mind still works out, but there's some truth to that, right? Right. And you have an occupied mind, and you just start to do this, huh? It would be a more grievous sin for him then, too, because he's seen the pleasures, the higher pleasures. Yeah, yeah. He experienced them. But I saw that out in the world, in the working world, that everyone is, every weekend, I've got to be doing this, got to be doing that. They just couldn't stand to be alone, it seemed like. You know, every weekend, I've got this pan, this pan, this pan, this thing. Yeah, yeah. Okay, so, in this, reply to the second objection then, right? He's talking about how the desiring powers, and the understanding powers, and the sensing powers of that matter, are different ones, but their one kind of desiring power follows upon having reason, right? Or understanding, another one following upon the senses. Or if you have both, like we have both, then we have both, right? The emotions are feelings and choice, huh? Now, when Augustine, according to this, he says, places the will in the mind, right? Or the philosopher places the will in reason, right? He doesn't mean that the will is in the power called the, what? Mind. Or Aristotle would mean that the will is in the power called reason, or the ability to understand. But he means it's in that part of the soul, right? That is elevated above, what? Matter, right? Okay? The part of the soul that is unique to the human soul, right? To the rational soul, and doesn't, not shared by the other, what? Animals, right? Okay? And so Augustine, he says, the will is in the mind, and the philosopher says, it's in reason. They're really saying the same thing, right? That this higher desiring power called the will, this ability to choose, and so on, it's something that we have because we have understanding or reason, huh? And it's something that belongs in the immaterial part of the soul. So the will, like the active and the passive understanding, will be all in the, what? Soul, not in the body, huh? It'll be in that higher part. Now, the third one is talking about the angels. To the third, it should be said that the angels, there is not another power except the understanding and the will. They don't have senses, and they don't have, what? Emotions, huh? But they have the understanding and the will, which follows upon the understanding. And on account of this, the angel is called a mind or an understanding, right? Because its whole power consists in this. But again, you know, it doesn't mean that the angel is his own, what? Power of understanding, huh? See? But how is he not? But you might say, you might call the angel a, the angel is an understanding substance, right? A substance that understands, huh? But sometimes you'd find in Latin, instead of calling the angel a substance that understands, they call him an understanding. Meaning by that, a substance that understands, right? Okay? And a material substance. Okay? But the soul is not so apt to be called that, because it has many other powers, as the sense powers and the feeding powers that we talked about in the previous question. Now, the fourth one is talking about the connection between immateriality, huh? And to the fourth, he says, it ought to be said that the immateriality itself of the created understanding substance is not his ability to understand, but you can say, nevertheless, that from being immaterial, from its immateriality, it has such a power for understanding. Whence it is not necessary that the understanding be the very substance of the soul, but that it be its virtue and power, right? Virtue is something that's taken for, I mean, power, or the excellence of power. So again, mainly in not understanding, the way the word understanding is, what? Used, huh? Okay? I say, in English, you see more clearly that understanding is used both to name the act of understanding, right? And the ability to understand. Okay? When I say man has understanding, I probably mean he has the ability to understand, huh? But sometimes you use the word for understanding, meaning actually knowing something, right? Okay? I don't think we're accustomed in English to use the word understanding for the soul that has, what? The ability to understand, right? But in Latin, that was commonly done, right? Okay? And sometimes men's, or mind, right? Was used, huh? For the substance, right? Yeah, yeah. That's the way Descartes does, right? Descartes has two substances, the extended substance and mind, right? And the mind is really, what? You know? It doesn't really make a distinction there between the two, huh? Okay? When you read Anaxagoras, right? Anaxagoras has really arrived at an angel, huh? But he speaks of a greater mind. What does he mean by a greater mind, then? Well, he means a substance that, what? Understands, right? And therefore, a substance that can distinguish things and order them, huh? But then, this greater mind, I said to ask the students, you know, is this greater mind that he's arrived at, is this the divine mind, or is this the angelic mind, huh? And, uh, it's the angelic mind, huh? Because this is not a mind that's responsible for the existence of matter, but it's a mind that can move matter from one place to another. Well, that's what the angel can do, right? He cannot bring matter into existence, but he can move it here or there, and so on. So he hasn't quite yet arrived at the divine mind, huh? And so, maybe, I remember De Connick's saying he was in class, but he didn't go into it at the time, never got back to him on it, but it's easier to know the angelic mind than the divine mind, huh? And by natural reason, it's easier to know the existence of an angelic mind than of a divine mind, huh? Of a mind that is, what? Not mixed with matter, it's altogether immaterial, huh? Sure. Then to know there's a mind that could bring matter itself into existence, huh? And not from anything else, except its own power. That's an amazing thing, yeah? It's hard to understand, see? So you have to come, in a way, to the angelic mind before you come to the divine mind, huh? That's why, you know, in that kind of false dichotomy that Marx has, huh? And Engels, that there's really only two positions among young thinkers. Either you think matter is the beginning of everything, even of mind, or else you think that mind is the beginning of everything, even of matter. Isn't there a third alternative? And that is to see matter and mind as two independent things, right? And one not owing its existence to the other, right? Perhaps mind being superior to what? Matter, can act upon it, but not responsible for matter's existence. Well, as a matter of fact, that's the position that Aang Segris has arrived at. And that's the position that Plato presents in the Timagos, where he has also the Demiurgos, this greater mind, and it's counteracting the chaos of matter and producing it to some kind of order, but it's not responsible for the existence of matter. So if you leave out that intermediary position, then you get a great gulf that no human mind could ever cull. You have to arrive at the idea that mind or understanding is something distinct from matter and not really material, right? Before you could ever ask, is there some mind that is responsible for existence of matter, right? You have to first of all see that mind is something independent of matter, and that's easier to see than to see that there's a mind that created matter. Is that the mistake of people that say that the egg came first or the chicken came first, they're only using those two things instead of seeing the intermediary? No, it's a different thing. Aristotle solves that question, the answer to the question, the ninth book of wisdom. Oh, okay. Yeah. And it involves a distinction of simply in some respect, huh? But we'll wait to get the ninth book of wisdom back. Oh, mm-hmm. Okay, that question will be answered. Which came first, the chicken or the egg? A definitive answer to that question. Don't count your chicken before the egg. Oh, yeah, right. See, those who say the chicken came before the egg, simply speaking, right? Yeah. They'll make the first of all things be the most imperfect to the most undeveloped thing there is, namely the first matter, right? But those who say the chicken came before the egg, right, will see the perfect is coming before the imperfect. And therefore, the first cause is being most, what, perfect. Of course, those who make the first cause the least perfect of all things, huh, can they end up in a, what, schizophrenia. Because the end of all our thinking is to know the first cause, and there's a good reason to say that. And you can also reason that the end of all our thinking is to know the best thing. And there's a good reason to say both. Now, if the first cause is also the best thing, then everything fits together. As Aristotle says in the Ethics, with the truth, everything fits together. Harmonizes, huh? But, if you think the first cause of all things is this unformed matter, this imperfect, undeveloped thing, then the first cause is not the best thing. Now you've got two last ends, but not the same. You know, permanent schizophrenia in the modern mind. And they can't, there's no way they can get out of it. So could you say that again? Yeah. But I say there are two reasons to say that, there's a good reason to say that the end of all thinking is a knowledge of the first cause. Right. And you can say that our mind naturally is moving in that direction, huh? Because our mind is not satisfied to know that something is so. Right. It wants to know why it is so. So it naturally wants to know the cause, huh? And many causes themselves have a cause, huh? So why did you hit me? Okay. And I discover you hit me because you're angry with me, right? Okay. But anger is the kind of cause that has itself a cause. So why are you angry with me, right? So you naturally seek to know the cause, and if the cause has a cause, to know the cause of the cause, right? And as soon as this doesn't go on forever, but Aristotle shows it doesn't go on forever, right? Then the ultimate goal, then, would be to know the very first cause, huh? Okay. That would be the end of all our desire to understand, huh? Because you try to understand, in effect, that means to know the cause that is said to stand under, right? And if the cause has standing under it, a cause, right? Then to know that, huh? So the ultimate goal of our natural desire to understand is to know the first God. You see the reason for it? Yeah. I was just wondering, is there any possibility that you could address how Aristotle showed that there's not the infinite regress that causes us forever? Well, I could, yeah. But, you know, I don't know if I want to do it right now. Okay. All right. He does it in the second book of wisdom, right? Oh. Universitally does it in the second book of wisdom. But he does it in particular for the end there of human life in the first book of Nicolaiic Ethics. Okay. And he does so for the mover in the seventh and eighth books of natural hearing, of the physics, so-called. And he does it for definitions there and demonstrations in logic, right? So in different parts of philosophy you'll see how a particular kind of causality has a beginning. But in the second book of wisdom he shows this universally. Bring it back when you get to the other article if we have some time. I'll talk a little bit about it. Okay. Okay? So, you can reason that the end of our natural desire to understand is to know ultimately the first cause. But then in the beginning of the anima, Aristotelic gives another criterion here of why one knowledge is better than another. And he said it can be either because you know a better thing or because you know it better, right? But in the parts of animals he says the main criterion is knowing a better thing. It's better to know a better thing a little bit than to know a lesser thing a lot. Okay? Now, the end of all our knowledge is going to be the very best knowledge. So, if knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge then a knowledge of the best thing must be the best knowledge. Okay? So, it's better to see a beautiful sunset tonight than to see a garbage can or something, right? Right? It's better to smell a rose than to smell things we won't even mention. Okay? It's better to see to hear music, right? Beautiful music than to hear noise and so on, right? So, if knowledge of a better thing is better then it follows necessarily that a knowledge of the best thing is the best knowledge. And since the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end then a knowledge of the best thing must be the end of all our what? It's hard to know. So, we have good reasons to say both of these both of them is being true. Now, if the first cause is also the best thing everything fits together, right? And especially in the ninth book of wisdom when you see that what goes from ability to act does so by reason it's something already in act, right? Then you're beginning to see that the first cause is going to be pure act. The first cause was an ability that had been actualized it would have something before it. Because ability can't give itself the act it doesn't have. I can't give myself something I don't have. It would be contradiction. But you also find out in the ninth book of wisdom that act is better than ability. In fact, ability is for the sake of act. Act is the end. So, if the first cause is pure act the first cause and the best thing are naturally the same thing. and now everything fits together, right? And that's the sign that you found the truth, huh? But now if you think that ability and potency to be actualized is what comes first and you think you have to be Some kind of what? Matter, right? It's the beginning of all things, and this matter gradually develops into things. Like the materialists think, and so on. Like Len says, mind is the highest product of matter, right? But you realize that wonderful thing, mind is nevertheless, huh? Yeah. In fact, you know, Feuerbach and Marx and so on, they think the human mind is the highest divinity, right? The highest thing there is, right? But notice, it's the highest product of matter, right? So the first cause is not the best thing. Now you've got a, what? Two last ends or goals for man, which are not the same. Yeah. It's an interesting thing you said, that when you know you have the first cause and the best thing, you have the truth. The thing is, how do you know it's the best? Maybe it's better, but it's not the best. So how do you know it's the best? Well, we show that when we take up God's goodness, okay? Okay. In many ways, we show that, huh? That God is the summa bona, right? But you have to go through that, like in the summa conscientilis, we first show that God is good, right? Then we show that God is goodness itself, right? And then we show the kind of thing bad of God. Then we show that he's the good of every good. And finally, he's the highest good, right? The one thing builds upon the other. So, you know, Socrates is always checking to see if the things you think fit together, huh? I mean, if you think the area of this is, what, 30, and you think the length is 10, and you think the width is 4, thinking doesn't fit together, does it? No. And regardless of which one is or may be wrong, one of them has to be wrong at least. It can't be that the length is 10, the width is 4, and the area is 30. That's what Socrates does, and as he tells students, they say, usually a person doesn't contradict himself directly, but two of the things he admits lead to a contradiction of the third thing. You need two things, right, to deduce something, right? And a third thing to be contradicted by the deduction. Now, I'd say the simplest example of that in the dialogue is when Socrates asked the slave boy, in the dialogue called Domino, how do you double a square? How do you get the side of a square twice as big as the square you have? And the slave boy says, well, you double the, what? Side. Okay? So if this side is x, then the square of each side is 2x, it's twice as big. Huh? Now, that, in fact, is false, right? But Socrates would take an example. Okay? Let's say this side was 2, then 2x would be what? 4. And you admit that 4 is double of 2, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Then you figure out the area here, 2 by 2, and the area is what? 4. Mm-hmm. Figure out this, and the area is what? 16. Okay? Now, notice what you're admitting, huh? You're admitting that 4 is double of 2, right? And you also say that the square of your side is twice as long is twice as big, right? Mm-hmm. And therefore, this square here is twice as big as that. Mm-hmm. But then 16 is not twice as big as 4. It's 4 times as big, right? Mm-hmm. So, these things don't fit together, right? So now the slave boy knows he's mistaken somewhere. And it's more known to him that 4 is double of 2, but 16 is not double of 4, right? Therefore, the mistake must have been to think that if you double the side, you get a square twice as big, right? So, um, that's what Socrates is doing, huh? And Socrates says, huh, in the Phaedo there, huh, that philosophy is the highest kind of music, huh? Musike. And if you think of music as harmonious sounds, right, maybe Socrates is touching upon the idea that the philosopher is aiming at a higher harmony than the harmony of sounds that you have in music. He's aiming at, um, the looking philosopher is aiming at the harmony of truth itself, where the different thoughts of the man fit together, right? With each other and with reality, too. Okay? And the practical philosopher is aiming at the harmony of, what, desire with reason, huh? Okay? But that first harmony is the harmony of truth itself. So one truth doesn't contradict another, what, truth, huh? And something like that is done by Perry Mason, or the detective, when he gets you on a witness stand, and some things you admit don't fit in with other things that you admit are that are already known in the part, huh? And then you're in trouble, huh? He's the guy who breaks down at that time, and you see Perry Mason or something like that, right, huh? But Socrates is doing that, huh? In a sense, he's cross-examining people, huh? And, uh, he finds out that the things they say don't agree, huh? I told you that time when, uh, when, uh, when, uh, Pete DeLuca wanted to bring by his cousin, did I tell you about that? You know, one of the beautiful times in this thing, and actually the time to do it, and his cousin and his cousin's friend, and they both had been to the Ayn Rand school, you know? And Ayn Rand is a cigar-smokin feminist, or she's a dollar sign, you know, laissez-faire, her, you know, she wears a dollar sign, you know, for her, let's tell, or, um, he would read all these novels, Ayn Rand, right, so he's kind of famous, and, uh, but, um, Ayn Rand, you know, has this exaggerated idea that freedom is the basis of everything, so, and they adopted the, the, uh, position of, uh, Ayn Rand, that a man is morally obligated to do what he has freely agreed to do, but only that, right? And, uh, so, um, I finally realized what the position was, they said, let me write in a piece of paper here, and you want to change in the words, and, no, no, okay. So then I started out, and I said, now, um, if you are morally obligated to do only what you are free to agree to do, then you have no obligations to your parents for having brought you into this world, because you didn't sit down and say, Mom and Dad, if you bring me into this world, I'll do this, I'll do that, I'll be a beautiful son, or something, right? Well, they were willing to admit that consequence of their position, right? Okay? And they said, now, if, when you're going to college, your father says, I'll help you with your tuition, but you gotta, you know, work hard, right? And you agree to those conditions, right? Then you're morally obligated to work hard, right? You see? Or if I say, I'll paint your house, you know, for a thousand dollars, and you're free to agree, say, then you're obligated to pay it, and so on, right? Okay? And I said, now, of course, you have no obligations to God at all, because you didn't agree to, you know, be created or something, right? Well, they're willing to admit that consequence of their position, right? So I was looking for an admission that they would make that would contradict their premise, And then finally I thought of it, right? I found out they're anti-communists, huh? I said, but, the communists have freely agreed among themselves to overthrow our government. And your principle is that a man is freely, is morally obligated to do what he is freely agreed to do, huh? Therefore, according to your principle, the communists are morally obligated to overthrow our government. But they wouldn't want to accept that consequence of their position, right? And, therefore, they couldn't hold on to that, right? Or I said, suppose the guy down the block said, Burkwist, I'll pay you $1,000 for rubbing out these guys, huh? And I agreed freely, right? To rub you out for $1,000. Well, you maintained that I'm morally obligated to do what I freely agreed to do, so now I'm morally obligated to rub you guys out, right? Well, they couldn't admit that, see? And I said, furthermore, you shouldn't criticize somebody for doing what you yourself say they are morally obligated to do, right? You see? And Pete says to his cousin, you know, never forgot this conversation, right? After Ritzley. But the point is, some of the things you say don't fit in with other things you say or think, right? And that's a sign, right? That there's something wrong or mistaken in what you're saying. Yeah. Instead of talking about freedom, I'm not sure this fits in with what you're talking about, but when you look at the New Hampshire license plate, is that a valid statement? Would you go by that, free or die? Is it free or die? Uh-huh.