De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 113: Reason and Understanding: Powers or Acts of One Power?

Transcript
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What is meant by cat? The kitchen is not yet fully developed, right? Perfect. In the same way when you speak of a man and a boy, it's only a boy, it's not a man, right? But sometimes you say the boy is a man and the girl is a woman, right? Okay. Now there's another way in which you sometimes do this, which is for what? One is something from standing at it, like in one of men. Yeah. Okay. And this is the other way. Now the reason why Adam would piece the name is not because it has some more flowy, what is meant by it, right? But because what? Man has something more, has some reason. Yeah. In other words, animal, what we might call the beast, their own name, right? The beast has nothing noteworthy in addition to what it's meant by animal. So it keeps the name animal, and man has something noteworthy named reason and will and so on, so he gets, say, what? A new name, right? Okay. The gap on logic there is the word disposition, right? Disposition is said with disposition. And habit, right? Well, habit gets a new name because it's a firm disposition, right? Okay. The unfirm disposition keeps the common name disposition, right? Okay? And this is like the rule here, you know, the natures of things are like numbers, right? Okay. So two plus one and just two. Just two keeps the name two, and two plus one gets a new name three. Right? Because three is not just two, it's two plus one. You see that? Okay. Okay. So, because reason is an imperfect understanding, right? Okay? It's a, sometimes they call it in Latin, intellectus ab umratus, an overshadowed understanding, right? Okay? Okay. It gets the new name, right? And the understanding of God or an angel gets, say, what? Keeps the common name, right? So sometimes we say that we have reason or ratio, and the angels have an intellectus, right? But then some other time you might say we do have an intellectus, right? But a, what? Out in the practice, an overshadowed understanding, right? Okay? And that's because we can't understand without some discourse, for the most part, and without some images, right? And these show that we hardly be able to understand, right? We understand the difficulty, yeah? But now, if you just, you know, name these from their acts, and you say, well, reason, reasons, and understanding, understands, right? Thomas is kind of approaching it from that point of view, huh? Okay? He says, in the book about the spirit and the soul, which doesn't have much authority, as Thomas says, but it was attributed by some book to Augustine, huh? In the book about the spirit and the soul, it is said, that when we wish to ascend from the lower to the higher, first there occurs to us sense, then imagination, then reason, then what? Understanding. Therefore, what? Reason is a different power from the understanding, just as imagination is from what? Reason, right? Or sense from imagination, right? Okay? It's like we sense, and then we imagine, and then we think, and then we understand. And, of course, Thomas is going to reply that that book doesn't have a great deal of authority, but if you want to, you know, see something in that words, he says it's referring to, what? An order of acts, he'll say, right? And he'd reply to that, huh? Moreover, Boethius says in the book about the consolation of philosophy, that understanding is compared to reason as eternity at a time, a beautiful proportion there. But it's not of the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore, it is not the same power of reason and understanding. Of course, Boethius has a little less difficult proportion. He says that what reasoning is to understanding is what? Yeah, yeah. I often use that a lot of times. You hear me using that a lot, huh? Moreover, man has in common with the angel's understanding, but with the brute animal's sense. But reason, which is proper to man, by which he is said to be a rational animal, is a different power from the sense, right? Therefore, for like reason, is a different power from the, what? Understanding, right? Which properly belongs to the angels, once they are called, what? Intellectual substances, right? I mean, the distinction I make among pleasures, right? You know, I add something to him, and where, what's his name, Osterly said that the pleasures of the fine arts and so on are most pleasing proportion to man. They're too high for the animals and too low for the, what? Angels, right? So, they're seeing reason as, what, proper to man, right? And something, therefore, too high for the beasts, but too low for the angels, right? And there's some truth to that, right? Yeah. Because the beasts can't understand at all. Yeah. I try to make Moppet understand, but he doesn't understand. You know, try to understand the truth, that she's a beast, and I'm... And he should make less complaints in the morning. Okay? But you might say reason is too low for the angels because they understand without any, what, movement or discourse, huh? Okay? But against this is what Augustine says in the third book, upon Genesis to the letter, that that by which man excels the rational animals is reason or mind. They're using mind for the, what, power rather than the whole part of the soul, right? Or understanding, right? If you take it to intelligentsia like this, being like intellectus. Or if by some other vocabulary it can be more commodious, what, they named, huh? But reason, therefore, and mind and intellect or understanding are one power. I answer, it should be said that reason and understanding in man cannot be diverse powers, right? Which is known manifestly if the act of each is considered. For to understand is simply to, what, grasp the understandable truth, huh? But to reason is to proceed from one thing understood to another, to knowing some understandable truth, huh? And therefore the angels, who perfectly possess, huh? According to the way of their nature, a knowledge of understandable truth, do not have any necessity to proceed from one thing to another. But simply and without discourse, huh? Without running from one thing to another, they apprehend the truth of things, as Dionysius says in the seventh chapter about the divine name. So if you get around to studying the angels, right? I remember saying to Kisarek, I want to study the angels. Anytime, he says, we'll go down and study the angels, he says. You ready, Dwayne? We'll do it. Okay. But man, huh, in order to what? Understand truth, to know understandable truth. Or men, you might say, they arrive and understand they are knowing intelligible truth by proceeding from one thing to another, right? As is said there by Dionysius, right? And therefore they are called, what? Rational, right? So that's why the great Shakespeare defines man by, what? The ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right, huh? And looking means he's trying to understand, right, huh? But he's going to understand as a result of some kind of a, what? Discourse, right? And to some extent it's even true about natural understanding insofar as it involves somewhat memory and experience, right? And they bring together memories, right? There's a kind of a discourse there, right? In order to understand the, what? Universal, right? Though not a discourse maybe of universal reason, right? As you have in the case of geometry, right? It is clear, therefore, that to reason is compared to understand, as to move is to what? Rest. Or as to acquire is to having, right? Of which one is the perfect and the other the imperfect. And because motion always proceeds from the immobile, and is terminated at some kind of rest. Hence it is that human reasoning, in the way of inquiry or discovery, proceeds from some things simply understood, which are the first principles or first beginnings. And again, in the way of judgment, by resolving, it returns to the first principles, in the light of which it examines the things that it has, what, found. So Thomas Sonny speaks of a kind of a circle in our knowledge. And Aristotle actually teaches that in the analytics, in the prior analytics. It's kind of interesting that these are called analytics, because that's really the last part of it, right? When you return to the principles and you judge things in the light of them. But, you know, the first, like the first book of the prior analytics, the first part is the, you know, talking about the generation of syllogisms, right? And the second part is how you can discover the middle terms of syllogisms, therefore make syllogisms, right? The third part is really giving its name to the whole book, the taking part of syllogisms, right? And reducing them back to their, what, origin, to their principles, huh? So it's kind of a circle in our knowing there, right? Now he says it manifests that to rest and to move are not reduced to diverse powers, but to one and the same also natural things. And he gives a simple example from the ancient knowledge there. Because through the same nature, something is moved to a place, and what? Rests in that place, huh? Much, therefore, more through the same power will we understand and, what? Reason, huh? And thus it is clear that in man there is the same power, that reason and understanding are the same, what? Power, huh? I can't reason except through, what? Something I understand, huh? Now, sometimes, going back to this proportion between weightism, we can say that reasoning is to understanding, motion is to, what? Rest, huh? Okay? Now this is very clear in the word understanding itself, huh? Because the word understanding comes from the word, what? Understanding, right, huh? It's named from, what? Being at rest, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But it's not too hard to see that reasoning is like emotion, because you reason from one thing to another, right? So your reason goes from one thing to another, huh? Okay? Now sometimes we use the word thinking to name the movement of reason, too, but that's not quite as clear, right? Because sometimes we use the word thinking for, what? One's opinion, right? I think this is so, right? And there is a kind of rest, right? But not a complete rest, huh? Okay. Now, once you see that proportion, you can learn a lot of things from this proportion. Mm-hmm. And I say to the students, huh? You can understand rest as before or after motion, huh? See? And so I stand in front of the class and I say, now I rest, huh? Okay? And now I'm in motion as I walk from here, and now I stop. And this is what? I rest after motion, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, when we're reasoning and thinking about something, our mind is in motion, right? But if we succeed in thinking out something, then our mind comes to a, what? Halt or stop, right? And I call that reasoned out understanding, right? Because I don't have a word in English to really express that, huh? But the Greeks call that, what? Understanding. Yeah. Yeah, and both Plato and Aristotle point out that episteme comes from the Greek word for coming to a halt or a stop, huh? So the guy was thinking in the bathtub there, right? He said, Rika! I have found it, right? He jumped out of the bathtub. He was supposed to run off without putting his clothes on. But his thinking was over, right? He wasn't thinking anymore at this point. But this is an understanding understanding that comes after the motion of reason, do you see? Okay? And so the Greeks call it episteme, from the Greek word to halt or come to a stop, right? But as I say in English, I try to express that by saying it's a reasoned out, right? Understanding, huh? Okay? So episteme in Latin is... In Greek, episteme. Right. The Greek word, in Latin, it's translated by scientia, right? But scientia in Latin doesn't have any etymological connection with coming to a halt or a stop, at least. I know of, huh? So in what we've been just reading, though... I've got three, I'd say. Okay, I'm sorry. Okay, so I'm saying, I say, once you see this proportion, you can say that reasoning is to understanding as motion is to rest, then someone can say, now, rest can be understood as being before motion, right? Or after, right? And an understanding that comes after the motion of reason, right, could be called a reasoned out understanding, right? Okay? Now, the reasoned out understanding is a rest that comes after reasoning, huh? Okay? And the Greeks, as I say, have one word for that, episteme, huh? Okay? Which, as I say, comes in the Greek word to come to a halt or a stop, huh? So it obviously means a standing that is after emotion, right? So I try to translate that into English with some respect for the etymology of the Greek word, huh? I call that a reasoned out understanding, right? But that's obviously an understanding that is after emotion or reason. Now, you could also speak of that when you have thought out something, you have a thought out understanding of something, huh? While you're thinking about something, your mind is in a kind of motion, right, huh? When you finally succeed in thinking it out, your mind comes to a kind of, what, halt or stop, huh? And so this is a thought out understanding, huh? Reasoned out understanding. Now, the question is, is there a, what, understanding that is before the movement of reason, huh? Is there something you understand before you reason? Well, if you understood nothing before reasoning, you'd have nothing to reason from, right? So there must be an understanding before reasoning. Now, that understanding before reasoning is called by Aristotle simply nous, understanding. Because it doesn't be supposed pure understanding, you might say, huh? It's called by Thomas in Latin, intellectus, right? But I, I think I've spoken of reasoned out understanding, I call this natural understanding, huh? Okay? The things you understand before reasoning, huh? And this is called in Greek, there are nous, and in Latin, intellectus, I'm given the same name as the faculty of understanding, right? Because it seems to be an understanding that doesn't require this discourse, huh? Okay? Now, what Shakespeare is defining is, is what, not reason insofar as it is a nature, and that you understand some things, right? He's defining reason as reason, right? Okay? And that's what he's talking about. It has the ability for discourse, right? Looking before and after, trying to understand, right? It's kind of kicking it off the floor. What reason has in addition to what it naturally knows, right? Reason has a nature, right? I gave you a talk one time on the distinction between reason and nature, and the distinction between will and nature. Because the modern philosophers must understand that. They understand the distinction between reason and will, like the distinction between, say, virtue and vice. Not in terms of being good and bad, but it's a different species of cause, right? And different kinds of cause. While the actual distinction is like the distinction between one and two, or between two and three, right? It's a distinction between what is just a nature, and what is something more than just a nature, okay? Or it's like the distinction between man and animal we're talking about, right? Man is an animal, but he's not just an animal. It's something in addition to that, right? And so reason and will is something in addition to what nature has. But they have something of nature too in them. So they naturally understand something, and they naturally will something. I'm sorry, could you just repeat the last couple of sentences there? Yeah, yeah. But it's a very subtle thing, you know? See, all the modern philosophers, they make a kind of distinction between reason and nature, or between will and nature, for that matter, right? If you make a distinction of it between black and white, or virtue and vice, right, then, they're two entirely different things, right? So that what pertains to nature, to be determined, ad uno, right, determined to one thing, is something they deny of reason, something they deny of the will. As if reason knows nothing naturally, everything it knows is a result of some discourse of reason, some reasoning, right? And the will, for them, wills nothing naturally, okay? So that's explicit. I mean, if you read Sartre, for example, very clear, Sartre. In Sartre, everything is up for grabs, right? Everything is a matter of choice, right? And choice is of ends as much as of, what? Means, right? See? So that there's nothing that we will naturally. But, so that means even, you know, they would deny even that we will naturally, what? Happiness. They're denying a natural will. And likewise, they would deny that we naturally understand anything. So there's no determination left anywhere in reason. That's what it thinks, right? And there's no determination to all the will. Who will anything? And Sartre would say, if you're honest, right? No, all those things. Yeah. Go ahead. Yeah. Well, I mean, if you're honest, you know, you've got to admit, you know, that everything you will are free to will or not will, right? And, you know, I take something like in John Stuart Mill there, the essay of liberty, right? And one of the chapters in there was on the liberty of thought, right? And for him, everything is always probable, huh? See, you never know anything for sure. You never know in a strict sense, huh? And therefore, you've got to keep the conversation going forever. My brother, Mark, he said one time, you know, when he was trying to decide which is a greater wine, you know, Carbonet, Sauvignon, or Pinot Noir, he said, generally he's not in favor of perpetual seminars, he never comes to any conclusion. He didn't have any objections to a perpetual seminar trying to decide. So, we've seen our brother Marcus just in the last year or so, come down in favor of Pinot Noir, he's been in the world, much to the shockiness of some of my friends. But I still, you know, hold sometimes, I have enough guests, you know, and they can have a red music like that on the sides of Carbonet, so we're going to Pinot Noir, you know, for dinner. And so you can try them and compare them. And this is being known as a perpetual seminar dinner, right? On my birthday, I have a perpetual seminar dinner, right? But this is what kind of modern mind is like now, that all things can be discussed forever and you can never know anything, right? You never will know anything, right? This kind of a, you know, thing. But they have the same position there on the regard to the will, see? That the will never wills anything, but necessarily or naturally, right? There's no natural necessity in the will, right? Well, because that's going to destroy all knowledge, really, huh? It's going to destroy all kinds of things, huh? So, you know, it is a distinction, in other words, of, you're talking about causes there, right? And you divide cause, like say, into nature and reason or will. Well, the original basis of that distinction is that nature is determined to one. Like Shakespeare himself says there in that court of Madison, nature not being able to be more than one thing. So you put a piece of paper in the fire and the fire is going to do one thing. We're in the fire and the paper, right? It's limited to that, right? But you put a patient in front of the doctor and he can, what? Save his life or kill him, huh? The doctor can abort the baby or deliver the baby, right? And the doctor could kill you or, you know, save your life, right? Okay, and they do sometimes in both, right? Right. And the same word reason, you know, reason to contrary, contrary to conclusions, right? With probability and so on, right? So what you see is that reason and will are not determined to one. So that's the first difference we see between these two, huh? Okay. The will is able to choose to do or not to do something, right? Or to do this or to do that, right? And reason is able to reason on both sides of the question, right? Therefore, to think that something is so is able to think that it's not so, right? So reason and will are not determined to one like nature is now. That's what we see as the difference between them. That's the first difference we see. But does that mean that reason and will are in no way determined to anything one? Can the will, for example, not will to live well? Or does one naturally want to live well? Is one really free to want to be miserable? Let me say it to a kid, you want to be miserable? Does somebody really want to be miserable? Okay. In the same way for reason. I mean, some things that reason naturally knows, like a whole is more than a, what? Part, right? Does reason naturally know that, or is that just something? So that would correspond, the reason corresponds to the first principles we naturally know, and the will to send a recess. Yeah, yeah. You can see a distinction between reason as a particular nature, right? Mm-hmm. Whereby it naturally knows some things, right? Or naturally comes to know some things. Yeah. Like a whole is more than a part, right? And I say, now, sometimes you have a sophist who tries to, you know, argue against these things, but the arguments aren't any good. And people get something confused about, right? They don't know that they know them because of this fiscal argument. But, you know, some things he doesn't really know that, as I say, we'll give him part of his salary this week, and part of the dinner he ordered, and part of the car he bought, and so on. He'll scream and rave and rant because he really does know that the whole is more than the part, right? And we'll start the Islamic law here, you know, and chop a hand off or something, right? Because the part is equal to the whole. I mean, it's absurd, right? So there's some things that reason is determined to, that a whole is more than a part, right? See? That nothing is before itself, right? Nothing is before itself, right? It's the beginning of itself, huh? That's what it is. It's the first principles and the cinderesis for the will. Well, no, cinderesis is the name for the first principle. They have the first principles in the practical order, but we'll come to that eventually here and there. Okay. That's not what this is? Well, it could be, yeah. You could call it natural understanding, too, yeah. Like do good and avoid evil, huh? Yeah. We naturally know that or naturally come to know that, right? And that's what cinderesis is. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But the, so there's a distinction between reason as a nature, right, and reason as reason, right? Okay. And we call it reason a nature because it is something of the character of nature. But it's not just a nature. So the distinction between reason and nature is like the distinction between one and two, or like the distinction between two and three. In a way, three has two in it, doesn't it? See? But we distinguish between two and three, wouldn't we? Because three is not just two. It's two plus one. Okay? See? And so the distinction between reason and will and nature is like the distinction between two and three, not like the distinction between virtue and vice. You see? Vice is not virtue plus something, right? Mm-hmm. Or vice versa, huh? Virtue is not vice plus something, right? Mm-hmm. See? But that's what nature and reason are, huh? Reason is not just a nature. Or it's like the distinction, as I say, between an animal and a man, right? Okay? It's not as if a man is one thing, an animal is something entirely different. But no, a man is, in the way, an animal, right? But he's not just an animal, as my mother said, or got me to say. Yeah, right. Right? You see? See? I was calling man an animal, and my mother, you know, didn't like that, huh? Well, I don't mean he's just an animal. Well, okay, that's okay. You see? Yeah. You see? Yeah. Okay? So my daughter has, what? Two daughters. But not just two daughters. She's got three daughters now. I don't know who number four is a boy, but number five is, I don't know who that is. Anyway, you see the point? You see? So the moderns misunderstand the distinction between nature and reason, and the distinction between nature and will. And there's tremendous consequences for all our thinking and for our moral life. I'm sorry about the work for this. I don't know if you want to go over it all again, but I don't understand what you just said about nature and reason in two and three. I don't know. Okay. Well, let me come back to it. Let me just finish the article, and then we'll come back to it, okay? Here's a minute to release there. All right. Okay. Oh, let me finish my proportion of it, too. Yeah. Well, I gave you the reason why it says there's a natural understanding. And that is that if you understood nothing before reasoning, understood nothing at all, you obviously have nothing to reason from. Yeah. Yeah. So there must be an understanding that is before reasoning. And I call that natural understanding, huh? Because things that you naturally understand are naturally come to understand, right? Yeah. Okay. Because if you're acting upon understanding, right? Okay. I've struggled with this for a long time. Now, the first objection was quoting that text of not too much authority, right? But Thomas says, if you want to see something true in what they says, that enumeration is according to the order of what? Acts, right? Not according to a distinction of powers, huh? So I sense something, right? Like the triangle is something true on the board. Then I imagine the triangle, right? Then I think about the triangle, and then I understand it. Okay? But those last two are both acts of the same power, right? One imperfect, right? Compared to the other. Sense, imagine, think, and understand. Is this a trick model? Yeah. Yeah. The four acts there in that. Okay. Four things. Okay, now the second objection there from Boethius. Eternity is compared to time as the immobile to the mobile. And that's why Boethius compares the understanding to eternity, reason to what? Time, right? Okay. Don't get too much to carry away with that proportion, right? You know, to make it too much, because we can understand things in time, too, right? Or come to understand them in time anyway, right? Okay. But it's really beautiful, the way he sees that proportion, right? And to see that proportion is extremely important. And this proportion is here that reasoning is to understanding as rest is to motion, right? That's really very important for understanding, reason to how understanding and actual understanding, right? Because that understanding can, even to raise the question, right, is your understanding both before and after, right? Okay. And it's easy to see that there can be a rest before motion and after motion, right? And then you can see that there's two kinds of understanding then, right? And he says the other animals are so below man that they cannot attain to knowing truth, which reason inquires. But man, however, does attain to knowing the understandable truth, which the angels know, but he does so what? Imperfectly, right? And therefore, the knowing power of the angels is not of a different genus from the knowing power of reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the what? Imperfect, right? Okay. But notice, man is more properly said to have reason than understanding, huh? Yeah. It's the name of this overshadowed understanding we have, right? Now, let's come back to this. This is something taken up in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, although I still haven't been going through all this there yet. Okay. But in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, it's a book about act and ability and so on. And it distinguishes between the active ability and the passive ability, like you said a little bit, you know? And then it distinguishes between nature and, what, reason, right? The two main active powers in the world around this. If you look around this room, what do you see? Mainly artificial things, right? Right. But your face, your hands, there's something natural, huh? Okay? You went out in the woods, you might find mainly natural things, right? So some things are made by nature, some things are made by reason, huh? So Aristotle wants to distinguish between nature and, what, reason, huh? Between nature and art, I think it's that sort of thing. Got it. Okay. And the distinction he sees is that nature is determined, or limited, you could say, to one of two, what, opposites, right? Okay? So, the fire is going to warm the air, right? It can't also cool the air, can it? Okay. Okay? Okay? And yet, to reason, huh? And the same thing can be said about will, too. There, there's the same knowledge we see of opposites, huh? And this is something, you know, that Socrates is already pointing out at the end of the symposium, right? In the symposium there, everybody's drunk, let's say, under the table, except for Socrates and Aristophanes, the comic poet, and Agathon, who's being honored for his victory in the tragedy. Yeah? Okay. His tragedy has been honored. And he says, if you guys knew what you were doing, Aristophanes and Agathon, you could write both tragedies and comedies. Now, you, Aristophanes could write tragedies and you, Agathon, right, could write, what? Comedy. Comedy, right? Okay. Now, that's based upon the idea that there's the same knowledge of, what, opposites. This is a famous proposition in the chief philosophers there in Plato and Aristophanes. And so, I... I have some knowledge, say, of barbecuing, right? So I can cook the meat just the right thing, just all pink and juicy and flavorful, or I can burn it if I want to, right? And my knowing how much to cook it enables me to know how to cook it too much or how to cook it too little. The pork should have the temperature of 170, or they say, right? I know whether it be too much or too little, right? Now, what about the medical art, right? By the medical art, I know how to maybe heal you, but also how to make you sick, right? Aristotle has the fifth book of the politics, right? It's about how to preserve governments and how to corrupt them. Same knowledge, right? Yeah. Okay? I have the art of logic, huh? I know how to reason correctly and how to reason, what, incorrectly by that art, right? I know how to deceive by that art of logic, right? See what I mean? Yeah. And they're saying that the art is for both, right? Uh-huh. But it gives me the ability to do both, right? Uh-huh. Okay? Because of the same knowledge of contraries or opposites, art is not limited to one of two opposites. It can do both, huh? Okay? And I told you about this kind of a bright student when I was teaching at St. Mary's College, didn't I? And he had, you know, learned this idea that the same knowledge of opposites, right? And so he said to us one day, you know, the ethics course was required of everybody, huh? Like some days in Catholic colleges, the ethics course is required. And he says, well, you shouldn't be teaching ethics because it's the same knowledge of opposites. So if you teach them ethics, they learn not only how to become good, but they learn also how to become bad, right? They learn how to be bad as well as how to be good, since they're inclined to be bad. You're making them worse by teaching them ethics. That's probably the most reasonable, I might say, attack upon the teaching of ethics that I've seen, see? But the same way you see grammar, you know, I can say, I is your professor, and you have my students, huh? Is I not your professor, and you're not my students? I can speak incorrectly, right? And I know I'm speaking incorrectly, right? By grammar. And that's the famous, you know, dispute, not dispute, the famous point that Aristotle makes, and Plato kind of is approaching in one of the dialogues there, that the man who unknowingly does the bad, right, is better off morally speaking, right? But artistically speaking, right, he's defective if he doesn't know what he's doing, right? Mm-hmm. See? Because of this fact that there's the same knowledge of, what, opposites, right? See? If I give you a dose that is too much for you and kills you, right? If I unknowingly gave you a dose that's too much and killed you, my grasp of the medical art is better than if I unknowingly gave you a dose. Although morally speaking, it's you first, right? Mm-hmm. Is one dialogue, was it the less hippie, is it? The one where Socrates and the guy talking at the end, it seems, the guy who does something knowingly is better than the guy who does something unknowingly, and ends up there for the guy who would give the dose, right? Knowing may be better off. And so he says, there's something wrong with his argument, but that's where the dialogue ends, right? But Aristotle sees a distinction there between art and prudence, right? Right, huh? Okay? See? So if I knowingly overcook the meat, right? Right. You see? I'm a nasty fellow. I want to give you people a little dinner or something like that. Mm-hmm. I want to punish you like that. But my knowledge of the art of barbecuing is not defective, is it? Right. See? But if I unknowingly cook the meat too long, then you can say I don't have a full knowledge of the art of barbecuing, right? Mm-hmm. Do you see the idea? Mm-hmm. Okay? So that's the idea. They're the same knowledge of opposites, and therefore the knowledge enables you to do contrary things, huh? So Mozart wrote the musical joke, right? Which is supposed to illustrate all mistakes in the composer. Yeah. All mistakes. Yeah, yeah. I think it's kind of nice. I can't like the piece myself. But I mean, it's just obvious, you know, defects, but then there are more subtle ones, right, that you have to learn to. But it's by the same art that he did that, and these other wonderful pieces, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? So, you see? So that's the distinction he makes between reason there and art and nature, right? That nature is determined to want two opposites, reason is capable of what? Opposites, right? And the same distinction you can make between the will and nature, right? That if I, that the will is able to choose, right? To do something or not to do it, right? Or to do this or to do that, right? I can choose to eat steak or not to eat steak, right? I can choose to smoke or not to smoke, right? Or I can choose to eat this or eat that, right? Okay? So that's the first difference we see between these. And that's why when Aristotle induces this, you know, he talks about the soul, right? Because this difference really appears when you get up to the reason, the will, right? But even in the plant's soul, right, you see a little anticipation of this because the tree grows, what, up and down, right? And so it's starting to already transcend a bit what is characteristic of nature, right? Okay? But especially get up to these things there. Okay, so now, now, you know, is that distinction such that the will is in no way determined to one thing? Right, yeah. See? Yeah. See? Well, do you really choose whether you want to be happy in this life or miserable? Or do you naturally want to be happy and not miserable? Well, naturally want to be, yeah. Yeah, yeah. That's what I would say, yeah. Do you want to, you know, to live well, do well in this life? Or do you want to, you know, live badly and do badly, right? See? Well, there's something that we naturally will, right? Yeah. See? Did you choose at one time to want to be healthy rather than sick? Mm-hmm. Did you naturally want to be healthy? You know? Mm-hmm. See? Or you choose to prefer pleasure to pain? Did you choose to prefer pleasure to pain? Or do you naturally prefer? Philofer, yeah. You see what I mean? Philofer, yeah. Yeah. So, the will is determined to some things, isn't it? Yeah. Is it? Okay? And so, will is in some respects a nature, but it's not just a nature because it has beyond that, right? This ability to choose, right? But not everything does it choose. It doesn't choose happiness rather than misery. It chooses among things that might be not clear which is going to lead to happiness, right? Or, choose among things that are equally, you know? Like, say, when I go home to my house, and she was buried there, I can, you know, turn down this way and come around, or I can, you know, go all the way down here and come around this way, or I can go all the way and come through here, and there's a kind of go down there, I don't know this. And all of these get to my house at about the same time, right? See? So, it might be determined to one of those waves, you know? See? So, I'm going to say, why am I doing quite on this one? I got both of the way, you know? If you go down a walnut there instead of south, and then the house is going to upgrade, you know, something, you know? You see? Mm-hmm. See? So, it may, each of these waves are getting more or less equally there, right? Mm-hmm. There might be some time, I think, well, the police are watching this, I don't know. Or, or, or, or the, you know, the bus is coming there, the, you know, stop, and, and, so I have a reason to choose one, but in some cases, it just, you know, it makes no difference which one I take, right? You know, this way, you go that way today, you know? Um, so, um... And, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, To get my end or goal, which might be willed naturally, there are many means I could be. This is the way God is free too, right? There are many ways he can be as to himself, right? So the will wills some things naturally, right? And some things it chooses, huh? So we say the will is not just the nature, that's fundamentally the things it wills naturally are the reason why it wills other things, right? Because I naturally want to live well, I naturally want to be healthy, right? I choose certain things, right? I naturally want to live and so on, right? I make certain choices, you know? So the will as a nature, the will as naturally willing some things, is more fundamental, right? The will is choosing, right? But anyway, you can say the will though is not just the nature, right? Right. Okay? So therefore I say the difference between the reason, or the will, let's say nature, is like the difference between 1 and 2, or like the difference between 2 and 3, if you want to know. See that, right? See? It's not just 3 doesn't have 2 in it. It does have 2 in it, right? Okay. But why is 3 not a 2? Okay. Well, because it's not just 2. It's 2 plus 1, right? Yeah. Okay? So the will is what? A particular nature, right? Yeah. Because it wills some things naturally. Yeah. It's determined, you know? Okay. It has a natural necessity there. And likewise, reason naturally knows some things, right? Like the whole is more than a part. Right. Okay? And those are the beginnings of all its understanding. That's the reason for those things to get this other reason out of understanding. But later on, reason and reasons, things are not always that clear to reason. And it can see a reason to think something is so, and a reason to think it's not so, right? Okay? And even reasonable men can disagree about some of these things, you know, are things so and you know, right? Right? Okay? And, you know, courses of action and so on, right? Mm-hmm. You know? Often there's this reason to think this might be so. You know? She loves me, she loves you not, you know? Mm-hmm. A flower. So, to put it this way, I say, is the distinction between reason and nature, or is the distinction between will and nature, is it like the distinction between two and three, to take one example? Yeah. Or like the distinction between animal and man? Right. It's the same thing, right? Yeah. Same kind of distinction. Or is it like the distinction between virtue and vice? See? Yeah. See? But the moderns understand it, in a distinction like that of virtue and vice, two absolutely what? Different things, right? Nature and reason are two different things. Yeah. In other words, reason is not determined to anything. It's totally, yeah. It's like it's... It's just... Yeah, it's just talking. It's just talking, yeah. Yeah. See? It never reaches any conclusion, right? Right. And you're a dupe, you know, of your own thinking if you think you've reached a conclusion, right? Right. You're stuck in your categories. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I say, you know, praises, you know, open-minded, right? I think, you know, I've seen, what is it, Loper Sticker? Have you seen this one? If you haven't changed your mind, maybe you don't have one. Have you seen that one? I saw something like that. Yeah, I was saying that on campus somewhere, you know? I feel like a mind is like a parachute. It doesn't function unless it's open. It's the whole... Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But if you haven't changed your mind, you know? Well, this year I think that, and next year I'll think something else. Right. This summer, I think one thing... In fact, there's a sign of high intelligence to never stop anything. Yeah, I mean, you always call it out of a window, Holmes, you know, if he said, if I had to write down a piece of paper all the things I'm sure about, I'd leave the page blank. That's a common thing, right, among intellectuals. So who said that the mind has to have talons? I heard that somewhere. Is that... I mean, it's just this whole sense of this needing to, or to take, you know, the mind is like a parachute that doesn't function unless open. Well, you could also say, oh, he's so open-minded that your brain falls out. Yeah, yeah. But see, the way in which modern philosophy is rootless, therefore, right? It means what? Rootless. Rootless. Yeah, uprooted, right? Because it has no natural... These natural things that we naturally want, or these things we naturally understand, those are the roots of philosophy, right? The roots of all kinds of things. And they're kind of, you know, uprooted, you know? We speak that way. You don't have any principles. Yeah, yeah. There are principles. All right, so, Dr. Burkus, why did you have up there cause with nature, reason, and will all sort of coming down from cause? I have no idea why you did that. Well, when we say nature, we say nature is a cause of some things, and reason or will is a cause of other things, right? Okay. So, when you say, you know, art, artificial things and natural things, you're thinking of this difference, aren't we? Artificial things means things may be caused by reason, yeah. Art is something of reason. And, all right, okay, sure, okay. I see, if you study ethics, you'll meet the definition of moral virtue, which is a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us is determined by right reason, huh? But it's a habit with choice, and it's really a habit of choosing, huh? Habit with choice. Yeah, yeah. But ethics is really about things that exist in some way by choice. What's that again? Habit with choice, I'm sorry. Yeah, habit with choice, existing in the middle towards us is determined by right reason. Existing in the middle? Yeah. I'm sorry, that's the definition of what? Moral virtue. Moral virtue. Yeah. And we will meet that sometime each day. Oh, right. But I just mentioned, you know, how choice is in the definition there, right? When you say, when I define marriage, I say it's a stable union of a man and woman by mutual choice in the sake of children, right? Okay. Okay. But again, you know, I mean, if you take vows, in a sense, you're making a certain choice of life, right? Mm-hmm. So, some things are a choice, aren't they? Mm-hmm. Choice is a cause of some things, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? They say to the students, when you get up there from the priesthood to get married, you know, he doesn't ask you, do you have wonderful feelings about so-and-so? Mm-hmm. Do you have warm feelings about so-and-so? He says, I don't even do. But he's asking me, you know, are you choosing this person, right? You know, it's the act of choice, huh? The, the, um, the, uh, later on when you take the idea, when are you being true to yourself, right? See? Well, which is more you, your choice or your emotions, right? Mm-hmm. You know? So if a man, say, is an alcoholic, let's say, and he, he, uh, in a sober mood, he decides he's got to do something about this in his life, right? Mm-hmm. And he chooses, you know, to join, you know, AA or something, right? And, uh, well, suddenly he's going to have this rich drink again, right, huh? Okay. Well, he's, what is he true to himself when he, when he follows his bodily urge or he adheres to his choice? Well, which is more me, right? See? Mm-hmm. See? Well, like in this example there, Shakespeare's play, The Two Young and Verona, right? Proteus immediately has chosen Julia as his wife, right? His 20,000 soul-confirming oaths. Mm-hmm. He's pledged to her, right? And then he goes to the court and he sees, uh, Sylvia, right, huh? Then he has this, what, conflict, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And of course he says, you know, um, in order to pursue Sylvia, who's his best friend, the other gentleman of Verona's, real, um, he's got to betray his best friend. Mm-hmm. And betray Julia. Mm-hmm. He says, I can't be true to myself without doing this, right? Mm-hmm. Well, I often ask students to say, now contrast to what Polonius says, this is above all to thine own self be true, and it must follow as a night today. Mm-hmm. Now canst not then be false to any man? Mm-hmm. Who's right, Polonius or this man here, right? Mm-hmm. See, well, Chris, that goes back to what, which is more me. Mm-hmm.