De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 115: Higher and Lower Reason: Unity of Powers Through Diverse Acts

Transcript
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When you read the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle is distinguishing the virtues of reason, right? Okay, the perfections of reason. He'll distinguish between Epistame and Sophia. Two different things, right? And yet, in another book where he's talking about Sophia, right? He'll say that Sophia is the Epistame, and the names of the first cause, and so on. So, sometimes he'll distinguish Sophia against Epistame, other times he'll say Sophia is an Epistame. Is he coditating himself? No. No more than that woman is coditating himself, right? Right. You see? Okay. Yeah. Now you go into a nursery, right, a plant nursery, and usually they won't call a tree a plant. So if you're going to buy a plant, you're not, you know. I'm going to buy a tree. Yeah. So the tree gets its own name, so to speak, right? And the word plant tends to get kept for a smaller thing, right? Mm-hmm. And maybe not even a bush is called a plant so much, right? Sure. But certainly not a tree, huh? Certainly not. So I chopped down a tree in my yard the other day, and I don't say chopped down a plant, huh? There's a tree, you know. But my neighbor's asking me, you know, near that side where the tree was, did you know it was going to fall this way? Oh, it's nice to see I knew it was going to fall this way. And divine I read this towards his house, you know. But he's like, you know, there's a way to cut a tree so far some way, you know. He's saying, you know, he's kind of naive in a way, the way he explains these things to me sometimes, which I know that there's a way of cutting a tree. But I mean, probably the trees already lead that way to begin with, you know. Yeah. Plus there's some trees in his side, so if it went that way, it could go against the house anyway, it would hit the other trees. Yeah, that's pretty safe. But I was also cutting it, I mean, so it was going to fall that way too, you know. I was cutting more on that side. It was too short, I'll do that. One thing with this text here, St. Thomas, it seems like he's saying that sapientia and scientia are habits. Yeah, yeah. Is that always the case, or sometimes there's something else to sapientia? In other words, is sapientia defined as a habit? Yeah, it is a kind of habit, yeah. A virtue, right? You see, you know, you divide a habit here into a virtue and vice, right? Okay. So, in some sense, wisdom is a disposition of my reason, right? My reason is disposed in a certain way by this. Okay. It's habituated, right? Okay. And notice, what habit does is not to give you the raw ability to think about something, a habit of reason now, but to think, what, orderly and easily when you want to think about these things, right? So, for these, this habit that I have called geometry, I can go to the board whenever I want to, and at least those early terms, I can demonstrate them without any difficulty, huh? You see? So, it makes it easy for me to do those things, right? Okay. In the same way for the moral virtues, right, huh? If I'm a just person, I really have the habit of justice, right? Then I find it easy to give you what is yours, right? Okay, I don't have a struggle there to return your money or something, right? You see? Aristotle will distinguish, after he goes through the virtues, he'll distinguish those things like continence and incontinence, where a man has a, what, struggle between following his passions and following his reason, huh? Yeah. And sometimes the reason wins and sometimes the passions win, right? Yeah, absolutely. Batman doesn't have the habit of the virtue yet, huh? You see? Okay. So, man really has the virtue of temperance. He doesn't have this struggle, you know, to avoid eating or drinking too much or pursuing the woman too much or something like that, right, huh? You see? He just doesn't think about doing those sort of things, right? Yeah. Okay. So, I was taking off from the last words of St. Thomas there, huh? For to higher reason, he attributes the habit of, what? Wisdom, the virtue of wisdom. To the lower one, what? Shensia, right? Yeah. See? Now, notice, sapiensia and shensia are often used in more than one sense, but they always have that distinction, right? That they're opposed to each other that wisdom is of the higher things and shensia the lower things. They even use those two words and they talk about the gifts of the Holy Spirit, right? Yeah. And sapiensia is a higher thing than shensia in the... They call it knowledge, usually, in wisdom, right? Yeah. In English, huh? Yeah, yeah. But wisdom is something higher, huh? Okay. But the philosophers originally used that, huh? Wisdom to name the most divine part of philosophy. So he would say that the gift of the Holy Spirit called knowledge is... He would distinguish that as the lower reason. Well, I don't get into discussion now of the gifts of the Holy Spirit right now. But the one called wisdom would be a higher thing, right? A higher thing. Yeah, but the wisdom there is attached to charity, right? Right. Okay. Okay. I'm just mentioning, you know, that the word wisdom is used in more than one sense, huh? If you go back and again, the prima paris era, Thomas would be distinguishing between the wisdom that is theology and the wisdom that is the gift of the Holy Spirit. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But, I mean, when you contrast wisdom with sciencia, or knowledge, right, it's always a higher thing, right? Sure, sure. Ah, okay. Okay. Now, the first objection was taken from Augustine there, right, that he speaks of the image of Trinity being in the higher part of reason, and the emphasis upon the word part there, right? Okay. And Thomas says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that according to whatever reason there is for making a partition, right, one can speak about part, right? So, insofar as reasons are divided by diverse, what, offices, right, huh? Diverse acts, you might say, right, huh? Higher reason and lower reason are called, what, parts or partitions, right, huh? And not because they are diverse, what, powers, huh? Okay. Now, the second objection is saying nothing arises from itself, right? Mm-hmm. But lower reason arises from higher reason and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore, they have to be different, what, powers, huh? And he says that to the second, it should be said that lower reason is said to be deduced from higher reason or to be regulated by it insofar as the principles which lower reason uses are deduced from and directed by the principles of, what, higher reason, huh? Okay. You have that even in philosophy, right, or even in the natural order you have that same sort of thing, right? Mm-hmm. Because the higher is going to give principles to the lower reason in the way that arithmetic is principles to music, right? Mm-hmm. And geometry is principles to what? Principle. Yeah, yeah. And to astronomy, right? Mm-hmm. That's it. And even in medical order, apparently, they discovered in practice, that if I poke you with a round instrument, right, Yeah. instead of with a blade, right, Yeah. that the round wound doesn't heal as quickly as the other one does. We can see the reason for, right, huh? If I have a blade that can hit you, then the parts can come together more easily, right, to heal, right? But if I got a round hole, Oh, yeah. The parts can't, do you see? Sure. You see? Well, here it's like a personal, you know, like that, huh? You have this kind of wound, huh? Mm-hmm. I can, you know, insult more easily, huh? Stable it. But it goes back to the fact that in geometry you have a common, what, angle there, right, huh? to two lines of meeting, right? Oh. And therefore, they can close up more easily, right? Oh. See? A far round thing cannot so easily, right? Okay. It goes back to geometry, huh? Okay, now, the third one requires him to go into, uh, in discussion with Aristotle means. Yeah. It's kind of a obscure text in Aristotle in some ways. To the third, therefore, it ought to be said that the scientific over, huh? About which the philosopher speaks is not the same thing as superior reason, although there might seem to be some likeness there, right? Yeah. Um, for necessary noble things are found even in, what, temporal things, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. So, for example, when we're studying change there, right, uh, we always said, for example, the change is between, what, opposites, right? Okay? That's always true, isn't it? Yeah. So there can be things that are necessarily true even in, what? Temporal. Yeah, yeah. Man is always an animal, right? The cat is always an animal, right? Yeah. And about these things is what? Natural science and what? Mathematics, right? Now, you may recall that the distinction between natural science and mathematics, they're both about material things. They're both about what is found only in the material world. But the difference is that in natural science, you're dealing with things that must be defined by, what, sensible matter, like flesh and blood and bones. But in mathematics, you define them without sensible matter, right? So the geometrical sphere is either hard or soft or hot or cold or heavy or light or anything else, right, that is sensible. So you can see scientificism is not the same thing as what Augustine calls a higher reason, right? So the higher reason is studying these eternal things, huh? Not temporal things, right? So it's not the same thing as what Aristotle calls scientifico, right? Aristotle is thinking of scientifico here more in the sense of epistamia, right? It's a knowledge of what is necessary, right? Epistamia is a result of demonstration, right? These soldiers are making us know the cause, and that which it is the cause. That cannot be otherwise, huh? So you have this in geometry and mathematics in general, and at least in the general study of the actual things, huh? You have things that are necessarily so, right? They seem by reason to be necessarily so, okay? And it's always a result of a demonstration? Yeah, some kind of demonstration, yeah. A result of a syllogism? Yeah, yeah. Okay. Yeah, the syllogism whose premises are seen to be necessarily, what, true. Okay. Okay? So that scientifico doesn't correspond to higher reason, which is just about the divine or eternal things, huh? Okay? So, in a way, scientifico includes something more than, what, a knowledge of divine things. See? For higher reason, it's just the knowledge of divine things, huh? But what Aristotle calls there opinativum, et ratio sinativum, is in less than lower reason, right? Because the way Aristotle's referring to there is its knowledge of the contingent as contingent, right? Mm-hmm. 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So, because I understand what this is, I understand what it is for lines to intersect, right? I understand what it is for lines to be straight. Then I can demonstrate, right, a property that follows upon intersecting straight lines, huh? Because the intersector follows at their angles, and because the lines intersecting are straight, it follows necessarily that they are, what, equal, right, huh? Yeah. Okay? Now, they don't get theorems, you know, like the one about the triangle, which require even more theorems before you get to that, right, huh? Right. But, you know, the way Euclid does it, he extends one side, and he shows that this exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite ones by the parallel theorems, huh? But you can do it more simply if you don't want to show the other part, just draw a line through the vertex parallel to the base, and then by the parallel theorems, because the alternate angle is equal, when the third angle makes up the two right angles, right? Okay? So you demonstrate, by your understanding of what a triangle is, and by the previous theorems, that the triangle must form three angles equal to three right angles. Okay? And that's what... So I can know truly the truth of that, right, huh? That's necessary truth, right? Right. Ordinary triangles, that's a flat surface, huh? That's right. Let's say you get a modern mathematician, you know, who likes to talk about a triangle drawn on the, what? On the surface here. Yeah, yeah. But they're using the word triangle in a clinical sense, right? Yeah. Yeah. So here you're talking about a triangle, you know, on the flat surface, right? Yeah. You know, with straight lines and so on, right? Okay? So here you have a necessary truth, right? Yeah. Just like you had with these intersecting straight angles, right? Necessarily truth, right? Whence necessary things which have perfect being and truth, right, reason those perfectly, right? I know completely and perfectly, right? As it were pertaining to the, what? To what they are, right? Okay? Through which the proper accidents, or properties as they're sometimes called, it demonstrates about these things, right? So you demonstrate that the triangle has as a property, right, as a proper accident, those angles equal to right angles, right? We demonstrate of the intersecting straight lines that the opposite angles are, what? Equal, right, huh? But it knows contingent things imperfectly, right? Just as they have an imperfect being and truth, huh? So Brook was just sitting, right? Well, maybe you can know that, right, huh? But for all you know, maybe I've pushed the chair back and I'm just crouching here, right? But the point is, if you leave the room, I might, you know, stand up and walk around or something, right? You see? In other words, Brook was just sitting is sometimes true and sometimes what? True. Yeah. See? So the truth about this is hard to know, isn't it, huh? Mm-hmm. You can only know when you're right there and you can sense me sitting, right, huh? But he says, perfect and imperfect do not diversify a power in act, right? But they diversify the acts as far as the way of what? Yeah. Mode of acting. Mode of acting, yeah. And consequently, the principles of action and the habits themselves, huh? And therefore, the philosopher lays down two particular parts of the soul, the scientific one and the Rats of Sinitiva, not because they are two powers necessarily, but because they are distinguished according to a diverse aptitude to receiving diverse habits, whose diversity he there intends to inquire. You know, sometimes they'll talk about, what, foresight or prudence and art as being about the contingent, right? And science being about the, what, necessary, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm, yeah. But nevertheless, he says, contingent things, necessary things, although they differ according to their own genera, they come together in a common notion of being, right, huh? Which the understanding, what, regards, right? To which they have themselves diverse according to perfect and what? Imperfect, huh? Incidentally, because of the fact that the reason knows the necessary better than the contingent, right, right, and that it's more perfected by knowing the necessary therefore, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Um, that's kind of a sign of the immortality of the soul, right? That it's perfected by knowing the necessary, right? Mm-hmm. Rather than by knowing the contingent, huh? You know, what did the British statesmen say, you know? England has no permanent friends or enemies. Mm-hmm. We might have permanent interests, he says, but no permanent friends, huh? Mm-hmm. See? So what is the friend of England? Is it France or Germany, right? Well, in the Napoleonic Wars, Germany was the friend of what? Oh, oh. Of England, right? But in the First World War and in the Second World War, it was simply the reverse, right? Okay? Now, France was our friend there during the Revolutionary War, right? Mm-hmm. Maybe in the Second World War, they were more our friend. But now during this last war, you know, this, they're kind of opposing us, right, huh? Going into the Iraq War, huh? You know? So, there's been kind of a, I don't know if you follow it at all, but there's been kind of a, uh... You've heard a little bit about that. Yeah. People, you know, stopped buying French wines, you know. Oh, is that right? People were actually pouring out their French wine, you know. So, the sales of French wine have gone down, you know. And, uh, yeah, people were not buying French cheeses and so on, right? And then, you know, I know the French are going to an Italian subway, but we buy much more from French than they buy from us, so we're hurting them, you know. Yeah. So, uh, it's, uh, kind of, uh, pick you that way up. But anyway, you know, so, uh, the French are going to get a little concerned about that, see, so. But, no, it's the idea there, there's nothing permanent there, right, huh? See, we were actually supporting Iraq at one time when they were in a war with Iran, because Iran is, you know, the time when they captured our embassy there and they imprisoned our people there, you know, and, you know, Carter tried to rescue them and all that sort of stuff, you know. Well, they went from Iraq, didn't they? No, no, no, no, no, see, in Iran, yeah, we were supporting Iraq, you know, to kind of get even with the Iranians, you see. But suddenly, you know, in the last war, the Iraqi were enemies, right? Right. And, yeah, so, I mean, uh, uh, these things are always changing, right, huh? And the same way in politics, right, you know, you know, sometimes, you know, two politicians will be allies, you know, and then at the time they'll be, what, they'll be running for the same office or something, right? And then they'll be enemies, right, or maybe, you know, I need you to balance a ticket, you know, and you're, you know, you and I might be both from, you and I might be both from New England, you know, but you're not going to help me in the ticket, you see. Like Kennedy needed LBJ to carry the South, right, huh? You see, so you need to balance tickets, you see. Oh. So, I mean, uh, Kennedy might be an enemy of LBJ and they're both trying to get the nomination, right, but then when Kennedy gets the nomination, then he needs the LBJ to try to hold with the South, you see. And, uh, or sometimes you have a guy in the, in the, in the West, in the East, right, who gets away from the West, let's say, you know, so New Yorker might get a Californian to run with them or something, you know, sort of that sort, right? So, um, he's always changing, you know, who's your friend and who's your enemy, huh? Who's in competition, see? But that's the nature of the contingent, right, huh? Yes. You see? And, and, uh, uh, you know, Germany was a great enemy, you know, in the First World War, but especially in the Second World War, right? And now they're more, more friend, and now they're a little bit unfriendly, but they're still probably friends, right, you see? So these things are changing all the time, right? Mm-hmm. And it's hard to know who your friend or your enemy is, right? Of course. You see? It's a contingent thing, so. So reason, as far as knowing is concerned, is perfected by knowing more the necessary than the contingent. And when Bob was a contingent, it wasn't necessary to act and to make, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? Mm-hmm. But the, but the fact that the soul is perfected by the necessary and the, in the eternal, you know, more, is a sign that the soul is, what, immortal in its very nature. Because perfection, perfection and the perfectible are relative to each other. Will you repeat that again real quick? The soul is perfected more by? Yeah, knowing the necessary than by knowing the contingent. Knowing, okay. Okay, that's a sign that you're meant to, you, is that you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, you're meant to, I go along with the angels, we don't have any, you know, there's a reason for everything. There's nothing without a purpose. The fact that the reason is perfected by a knowledge of necessary shows that it's akin to the, what, necessary, huh? Because the perfection of the thing, the perfectible, are, what, relative to each other, yeah. Perfectible. And perfection, yeah. Going back to what Thomas is doing to apply to the third objection, right? He's first of all saying that the proportion that they made in the objection is not correct, right? That these two that Aristotle distinguishes, right, are not the two that Augustine distinguishes, right? So that's the first defect, you might say, in the objection, right? But then he's going on to point out that the necessary and the contingent both in some way come under the object of reason, which is being and the true, right? Okay? So if reason is the ability to know what is true, right, your reason can know, not only what is necessarily true, right, my reason can know that you are sitting, right? Okay, okay, I can know necessary truths and contingent, they both come under the object of truth, huh? Do you see? Okay? Even though I can know more perfectly that those angles equal in that you are sitting, huh? Right. You see? And that you are sitting will not always be true, but that's going to always be true, right? So I can know that more fully, huh? Now the fourth one, as I pointed out, it might be based also upon the, what do those words mean, huh? Are they naming powers in the Damascene or are they naming objects, I mean acts? To the fourth it should be said that that distinction in the Damascene is according to a diversity of acts, not according to a diversity of powers, huh? For opinion signifies an act of the understanding, which is carried to one part of a contradiction, but with fear of the other, right? Okay. But now this is the famous thing here, huh? Is it? This is the famous thing here, that in the second part of logic, we're talking about statements, right? Yeah. And we talk about statements that are, what, contradictory, right? Okay. Okay? Now, what are contradictory statements? Okay. Well, first of all, contradictory statements are statements with the same subject and predicate. Okay. Okay? They have the same subject and predicate. But one is affirmative and the other is what? Negative, right? Okay. And they're opposed, right? You might expect, right? Yeah. If one is affirmative and opposed such that both, both, let's put it this way, put it the same line, that both cannot be true, both cannot be false, right? That one must be true, and the other must be false. Now, you may not know which is the true and which is the false one, right? Right. But one must be true and the other false. Okay? Now, if the subject of the statement is a singular, it's easy to see what is the contradictory of that statement. So, the statement, Berkowitz is standing, right? What's the contradictory of that statement? Berkowitz is not standing. Yeah. Now, notice you have the same subject, Berkowitz, in both statements. The same predicate, standing, right? But one is affirmative, one is what? Negative, right? Now, can they both be true? Berkowitz is standing and Berkowitz is not standing? No. No. No. Can they both be false? No. No. One must be true and the other must be false, but you may not know which is the true, which is false, right? Okay? Okay? Okay? Now, it's a little more difficult, and maybe this is not a study of logic, if you have a universal subject like man, right? Right. You see? Because grammatically, man is standing, man is not standing, might seem to be like Berkowitz is standing, Berkowitz is not standing, right? Right. But Berkowitz is an individual. Unique person, huh? Why, man is something universal, right? So, if I say, you know, man is standing, you might say, do you mean every man is standing, or you mean some man is standing, what do you mean? You know? You see? And so, that's what Aristotle compares, the universal and the particular, right? And he says, what statements are contradictory? Is it every man is standing and no man is standing? Well, notice, every man is standing and no man is standing. They have the same subject and predicate, right? One is affirmative, one is negative, right? Right. But they're opposed such that both cannot be true. Well, that's true. They can't both be true. But couldn't they both be false? Every man is standing and no man is standing? And they're both false, huh? Yeah, just in this room we can see that, right? See? Because all you need is one man standing to make no man is standing false, right? And one man sitting to make false, right? See? So, that's how I think you have that. Now, what about some man is standing, some man is not standing? They're both true. You see? So, that's opposed, right? So, it's the universal affirmative and the particular negative that are contradictory. Or the universal negative and the particular affirmative. Every man is standing, some man is not standing. Can they both be true? No. No. Because if every man is standing, right, there's no exception, right? Yeah. So, man, some man is not standing would be false. But if some man is not standing is true, then every man is standing is what? False, right? In the same way if you take the universal negative and take affirmative. No man is standing and some man is standing. Can they both be true? No. Because if it's true that some man is standing, it's obviously false that no man is standing, right? And if it's true that no man is standing, then there's not even one man who is standing, is there? So, they can't both be true, right? Okay? So, our style over there teaches us in the prior peri-hermeneus what kind of two statements are, right? Okay? Now, what the logic of the second act doesn't teach you, though, is which half is true, which is not, right? Okay? How do you know which is the true side, which is the false side, right? Well, sometimes you know it by sensation, right? So, if Berkwist is standing is true, at least now, right? And Berkwist is not standing is false, at least now, right? You know by sensation, right? Okay? Sometimes you know which side is true and which is false by understanding the parts of the statement, right? If I say, for example, no odd number is even, and some odd number is even, which is true, which is false. First is true. Yeah. Now, there you know it through knowing what odd is and what even is, right? You see? I don't know the sense to see. But now, if someone says to you, every triangle, right, has its interior angles, you have two right angles, some triangle does not have it. Either you know what you mean by right angles and so on, and you know what you mean by triangles, it's not obvious from the definitions, is it? Like in the case of no odd numbers even, right? Sure. See? And then you have to what? Reason it out, right? But if you reason from statements that are known to be true, right, necessarily, then you would also eventually know that every right, every triangle has interior angles and interior angles. Yeah. Okay? Or if you can show there's a thing that if these sides are equal, these angles must be equal, right? Okay. And it shows the verse, too, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, when Aristotle distinguishes between dialectical reasoning and demonstrative reasoning, you point out that in dialectical reasoning, you reason to one side of a contradiction, one of the two... statements, right? But not with complete, what? Necessity, right? You reason with probability towards that, right? And therefore, you are, what? Has some fear, right? That possibly the other side might be true, huh? I see. Okay? In fact, you're right, you just said something, you know, very contingent, like, well, George Bush had a second, what? Term, yeah, see? Well, many people think it's likely that he will, right, huh? You see? But you could still have some fear that he might, huh? These terrorists running around say we might assassinate him, right, huh? Okay, the economy might, you know, go with the tailspin again if there's more terrorist attack, right? So it may make some political goof or something, right, huh? You know? So there's all kinds of things, right? So even if I have reason to think that he's going to get a second term, which I do, I'm in some fear that the opposite side, right? Right. I see. But in the case of demonstration, huh? That reason that I gave why the straight and hygienic section was two and those are equal, I see why they must be so, right, huh? And therefore I have no fear that they might not in some case be so, right? Mm-hmm. Do you see that? Yeah. So Aristotle speaks of dialectical reasoning as reasoning from probable opinions, right? Yeah. And you can reason even probability sometimes to both sides of a contradiction. Hmm. Like Socrates reasons in the dialogue called Domino that virtue can be taught, right, with some probability, right? And then he reasons some probability that virtue can, what? Not be taught, right, huh? Okay. And he might be able to reason more strongly to one side than the other, so you would incline to that side, right, huh? But you wouldn't know for sure, right? You wouldn't know in the strict sense, huh? You wouldn't be altogether sure. Okay? Yeah. And you know, you know, you get into the, if you're on a jury or something like that, and you hear one lawyer trying to prove he's guilty. Yeah. And he's somewhat convincing this lawyer, right? And then another lawyer proving he's not guilty, somewhat convincing too, right? Yeah. And then you might, what? You might even have a hung jury, right, huh? Sure. But sometimes they spend some time before they come down one side or the other, right? Mm-hmm. So when you speak of an opinion or a suspicion, right, one may be stronger than the other, but there's still something less than what? Certitude, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. All right. So what does he say here? We're down here. Yeah. So opinion signifies an active understanding which is carried to one part of a contradiction, right? But with some fear of the other side, right, huh? Okay? Mm-hmm. But the yudhikare, to judge, right, or to measure, is an active understanding applying certain principles to the examination of proposed things, right? And from this is taken the name of mentees, huh? Mm-hmm. So he's just taken the way our friend Danicene is saying this, right? Mm-hmm. And to understand is with a certain approbation adhering to what has been judged, huh? Okay, that's partly what the words are meant there, huh? But Thomas just used the word judgment there in logic to mean what? Certitude, right, huh? Okay, we sometimes use it in a looser sense today. Mm-hmm. We speak of judgmental, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. Okay. But Thomas is saying, you know, seriously, when I can judge it, this is, that this side of the contradiction is true and that is not, right? Because they have a definite reason, right, for saying, a necessary reason for saying one is so right than the other. Now, if you read the dialogue called the Phaedo, right, huh? Cebes is objecting to Socrates that his reasons are, what, probable but not, what? Necessary, right? He wants Socrates to give a reason why the soul must survive death, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And so Socrates attempts to do that with his last, what, argument, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But notice you can have many reasons for thinking that this or that side of the contradiction is, what, true, right? Okay? But in the case of demonstration, you have the reason why it must be so this side, right? In the case of dialectic, you don't have the reason why it must be so, but something weaker than that, right? Right. Okay? But you have some reason for thinking probably it's this side, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. And that's the second road to acknowledge reasoning from probable opinions to reasoned out of understanding. Is that what I recall? Do you know what I'm saying? Well, no, you see, that's not a question there, huh? The question of whether dialectical reasoning can prepare the way in some way for what? Demonstration, right? Yeah. And Aristotle says yes, and Descartes says no, right? It can prepare the way, that, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But you see, sometimes when you think about these things, you suddenly see something you didn't see before, right? Oh. See? And, you know, Descartes said, you know, well, if you're reasoning from things that aren't improbable, Oh. How can that enable you to see that something must be so? Mm-hmm. Whereas Aristotle's not saying that, huh? Yeah. You see? But I ask you a very simple example to bring this out, huh? Mm-hmm. He said, you know, suppose you're looking out the landscape there, and I say, do you see that dog out there? And you say, I don't see that dog. I say, wait, do you see that barn out there? Yeah. I see the barn, okay? Okay. Now, look to the right of the barn. What do you see? See that big tree? Yeah. Okay. Now, just to the left. Ah! Now I see the dog, right? Yeah. You see? Now, you came to see the dog by what? Seeing the barn and seeing the, what? Tree. Tree. But do you see the dog through seeing the barn and seeing the tree? No. No. Okay. See? But you could come to see it, right? Yeah. Yeah. It gets you to think about things that make you see. See something, yeah. Yeah. Oh, okay. I didn't see. That's kind of a subtle thing, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But you can't reason that something's necessarily so if it's only probable. Okay. See, but Aristotle would have seen that even better than Descartes thought, right? Obviously, that was just my question. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So, again, that's, you know, I can tell the details of this, but he's putting out the demo as he was talking about different, what? Acts of the reason there, huh? Okay. You notice all this arises because Augustine spoke of higher reason, lower reason. What did Augustine mean, right? Well, Augustine means obviously what Thomas Aquinas says he means, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. But Augustine itself says, as it says in the sentantra there in the twelfth book of the Trinity, that higher reason, lower reason are not distinguished except by their, what? Offices, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Not by different powers, right? Mm-hmm. Different locations. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So sometimes we have to, you know, your abbot has to think about what? The chapel, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. And the chapel could be made this way or that way. It's a contingent thing, right, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? And you suddenly have to deliberate these things, right, huh? See? My brother-in-law is a carpenter and he's going to make, you know, an addition to our house and a deck, you know? Well, how big is the deck going to be, you know? Well, you know, mm-hmm. I mean, there's a contingent there, right, huh? It could have been bigger than we made it. We could have made you a couple feet long or something like that, you know, or, you know? But, I mean, there's something contingent about that, isn't it? Right? There isn't a necessary link that has to be an addition, right? Mm-hmm. You see? And so there's something kind of arbitrary to say we're going to have this many, right? How many feet wide should your new church be, right? You know? Is there a necessary width it should have? Could it be otherwise? Mm-hmm. Is it? Could it be another foot wider, or, you know? Mm-hmm. See? See? A lot of contingency of these things, right, huh? Yeah. Ah. But you see, in the second straight lines, it cannot be otherwise, huh? Mm-hmm. Right, right, right. See? Could it have been a little bit bigger than the other one of those things? Mm-hmm. Not the intersection straight lines, right? Yeah. They cannot be otherwise, huh? Mm-hmm. They must be so, huh? It's a necessary thing, so. Mm-hmm. Take a little break. Okay. Okay. Okay. All right, go 10 here now. Wither intelligentsia, right, huh? Is another power from the understanding intellect, huh? Now, intelligentsia names more the, what? The act, huh? Intellectus, right, names more the ability or power, though it can act in the act, in the act, too, in some cases. Sometimes even the, what? The, ah, ah, ah, habit of natural understanding. 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