De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 116: Intelligentsia, Understanding, and the Acts of Reason

Transcript
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right now it is said in the book about the spirit and the soul which is a book that was apocryphally attached to what augustine but now they don't regard it as being by augustine right okay we mentioned that before right now but it keeps on cropping up and people always quoting it right just like the book libre de causis was attributed by some people de aristotle right but then eventually realized it was what say thames no the libre de causis thames would commenter on it oh but it's it's a uh arab work taken excerpted from proposes work and thomas is the man who wouldn't be able to discover that right you see it's not by aristotle right okay this is not by augustine right that's what thomas will say you know that uh you know he applies to always if or not to receive the authority of that book right it doesn't have the authority that some people attribute to it to it okay i was mentioning that famous conversation there that heisenberg gives between himself and einstein where where uh you know heisenberg says steinstein you know why i thought that that your theory was um based on the idea that uh the theory has to fit what you can really observe right you know and einstein says well well that's not what it meant at all no and uh i thought that's what they they said was so great about your theory and einstein says no no no no no no but the point is that the theory determines what you can observe it's not what you observe that determines the theory and i just heisenberg's kind of amazed you know you know you know they've got it all wrong you know but it shows importance you know i'm getting it from the horse's mouth right this is what he he meant right huh see and he said you know if i ever said that that's not what i mean you know that's not what it's all about and so heisenberg that already makes his own great discovery he recalls those words of einstein you see but it's kind of funny you know because the scientists are always saying you know they've seen this or that in the lab you know but the very thing that they claim to have observed is based upon what he said in theory he was able to interpret the what they actually do see in a certain way yeah would make no sense to the layman because he doesn't have that theory in mind yeah but anyway that's it's that's you know the minute slip tooks the cup in the lip but it's amazing you know how how uh you know my friend warren murray kind of jokes about the scientists you know they make these outrageous statements about what aristotle thought sometimes right and it's only there they don't practice experimental method they have an hypothesis of what aristotle thought they never go to verify it in the actual text you know so it's kind of amazing you go back and you see what aristotle actually saw sometimes or certainly actually yeah yes but anyway that's a little getting a little bit loose here um it is said in the book about the spirit and the soul that when we wish to ascend from what lower things to higher things right what first occurs to us is sensing right or sensation then imagination right then reason then understanding and last of all what intelligentsia whatever that means right that's the text huh but imagination and sense are diverse powers as we have seen before as we have seen before therefore also intellectus and intelligentsia should be right huh okay more of a way he says in the fifth book of the conservation of philosophy huh um that um in one way sense sees man right another way imagination another way reason another way what intelligentsia sees man looks upon him but understanding or intellectus is the same power with reason therefore it seems that intelligentsia is another power than understanding just as uh reason is another power than imagination and sense huh moreover acts are privy potencies huh that they are what on the road before the powers right then we have to know the act the powers through their acts right okay in general that's true we know act we know ability only by the act for which it is ability how do you know you have the ability to see well it's through seeing that you know that right but intelligentsia is a certain act divided from other acts which are attributed to the understanding for damascene says that the first motion is what called intelligentsia but when intelligence is about something it is called intention when it is permanent and fixing the soul to that which is understood it's called excogitatio excogitatio however remaining in the same and examining itself and judging is called phoenesis therefore that is wisdom phoenesis however spread out makes cogitation that is interiorly disposed speech from which comes about speech through what spoken language huh therefore it seems that intelligentsia is a very special power huh this is very much time with the text these problems huh what these different texts mean right when they use the word huh sure do you know uh station between phoenesis and sophia well phoenesis is is uh more used as uh practical wisdom then uh but sometimes people use it for what wisdom in general right okay okay okay so we call you know our forefathers wise right uh okay which we have practical wisdom okay it's not now it's the divine really yeah that george washington people had it doesn't seem to be a separate word like that for latin in latin for a practical wisdom well sometimes they do it in that sense though they do it that by the way on the wisdom right right even scripture says that now that prudence is wisdom for a man oh okay yeah yeah kind of human wisdom yeah yeah okay and usually say somebody's foolish are we what which is the opposite of wisdom what do we mean when we see somebody's foolish like imprudence yeah we kind of think it is in his actions he's he's foolish right okay okay although another sense we could say the fool has said in his heart there is no god right yeah and that's we the folly opposed to wisdom in the sense of the what knowledge of god right right okay but usually say you're a fool you know you mean in your life in your actions and what you do right right a fool and his money are soon part right okay but again this is what the philosopher says in the third book about the soul that intelligentsia as of indivisibles in which there is not a false well there aristotle was using intelligentsia or the latin translation here for a text where aristotle was talking about an act of reason right see that's the first act of reason the understanding of what something is but to know things of this sort retains the understanding therefore intelligentsia is not another power besides the understanding i answer thomas says that this word or this name intelligentsia properly signifies right the very act itself of the understanding huh which is to understand huh in some books translated from the arabic right the separated substances huh the material substances which we call angels right they are called intelligentsia in some of the latin translations huh perhaps on account of this fact that these substances always understand in what in act right huh so they're named from the very act of understanding right because they're always actually understanding right but in books translated from the greeks they're called what understandings they're called what understandings or minds right thus therefore intelligentsia is distinguished is not distinguished from understanding or intellectus as a one power from another power but as an act from its what oh yeah yeah i know that's something in the latin right in english we probably don't have two words like that do we you know we use the word understanding to mean the act sometimes right you know but understanding what a triangle is that's an act isn't it but we also might use understanding for the ability to understand right now usually understanding is translated by intellectus in latin sometimes we translate in english as well intellect right intellect means more the power the ability to understand right but then this word intelligentsia might um signify more understanding in the sense of the what act of understanding right okay so sometimes you have in one language uh more explicit words in another language i'll mention a couple examples of that though um uh in greek and latina they seem to use the same word for name and for noun nomin nominal right okay uh onama in greek right in english we have two words name and noun right okay more things well maybe in latin here in this case here you have what two words right one of which uh these relative to the other name is more of the act and the other names more of the what yeah yeah by name you should have just one word right yeah yeah okay so that's part of the problem right it is kind of a problem here with the word right huh um but i think that's that's probably what the word intelligentsia means more in latin right then although it could be used for the power too right or even for the angels right right okay okay it is found for there's found such a division even in the philosophers huh for sometimes they distinguish for what intellectuals right namely the acting upon understanding the possible understanding right huh and then the understanding and habitus and then the adeptum yeah right of which for the age intellect and the possible ones are diverse powers right just as in all things the act of power is other from the passive power right but i call the acting upon understanding and undergoing understanding right but the other uh three are distinguished according to three states of the possible understanding which is sometimes in ability only right and then is called possible sometimes it is a first act which is science and this is said to be the understanding and habit right sometimes in the what second act yeah which is to considerate huh and this is called the intellect and act or the intellectus adeptus right okay and i don't worry too much about that that's a problem in the latin right and practice but the fact is that they'll use all these things right huh okay can we go back to when he says uh the three other three are distinguished so so he's distinguishing um the active intellect versus possible and habitus and adeptum right yeah yeah and then those last three are you on the side of the possible or the undergoing understanding right in other words god gave me right this um ability to understand right huh yeah kind of the raw thing that aristotle compares to a tablet on which nothing has written yet huh yeah and then then the first act of this thing which is the habit right huh okay and then the second act which is the what use of the act yeah the activity yeah yeah yeah so in some ways it doesn't seem like i was asking the students the other day i said i was saying to them in the logic class i put on the board there i said is man the animal is man an animal using reason or an animal having reason they all said the animal having reason we don't use very much right huh okay yeah but here it indicates both right yeah yeah but sometimes you know people don't want to admit that man is a rational animal because they think that means what he's an animal using his reason right or acting reasonably right yeah see see when we say man is a rational animal we mean he's an animal that has reason we don't mean that he has a developed reason right but he's actually using his reason right you see what I mean yeah so you have a little bit of that you would think you speak of a rational animal yeah sometimes i quote you know the you know what's his name uh oscar wilde you know saying man is a rational animal that gets angry when called upon to live in accordance with the dictates of reason you see so i find i find often sometimes saying that you know that you you know really shouldn't call man a rational animal right or a supposedly rational animal right and you see this right i was having to see uh somebody taking pictures there you know in iraq there and taking pictures of the uh the iraqis the shiites there you know in the religious ceremonies right and there's one picture there all blood right yeah sure well apparently they inspired themselves yeah yeah yeah so i've seen pictures of that yeah yeah yeah i was waiting to go what is that you know i guess they actually cut themselves and they're beating down you know so i don't know how they stopped the beating or what they do but they really must be kind of you know you know it's like the prophets of baal among carmel when you read that description of elijah yeah because they're yeah it's cut themselves with the noise yeah yeah it's really interesting yeah okay so don't worry too much about this but i mean you'll find people in english having this problem too right right yes once more the oscar wild man is a rational animal that gets angry when called upon to live in accordance with the dictates of reason i think that's true that's true right yes man is a rational animal doesn't want to be reasonable right my old teacher kasurik you know he was pinning some guy down there some philosophical conference you know and kasurik said well you've contradicted yourself right you're in a contradiction right and the guy said well that's a contradiction i've learned to live with modern man i don't know not to the first therefore this is a text from the spirit in anima the first therefore it ought to be said that if one ought to receive that authority right you want to try to save that text right intelligentsia is laid down there for the act of the understanding right and thus is divided against intellectum as an act against its what power right no so this kind of a texture it's almost impossible to translate into english because they don't have the same problem in english that you have in the greek words to the second it should be said that boethius takes intelligentsia for the act of the understanding which transcends the act of reason right whence there he says that ratio or reason is only of the human what genus right but intelligentsia is only of what the divine for it's proper to god that without any investigation he understands what all things as heraclitus says the divine nature is understanding the human nature does not now to the third it should be said that all those acts which damascene enumerates are of one ability or power namely the understanding which first simply grasp something right and this act is called intelligentsia secondly that which it grasps it orders to some to knowing something else or to operating something and this is called what intention then when it persists in the investigation of what it intends it is called ex cogitatio thinking out right when that which it is thought out when it examines that in the light of some certain things it is said to what shire to know with certitude or to be wise which is phoenesis to use one of the greek words or wisdom what belongs to the wise man and to judge right as aristotle says in the first book of metaphysics from which when it has something for certain as we are examined in the light of what is certain It thinks in what way it can manifest that to other people, right? And this is a disposition of interior sermon, right? So a lot of times I think out of my head I want to say something, you know? And then from that proceeds one's exterior speech, right? Now, every difference of acts diversifies powers, but only that which cannot be reduced to the same, what? Principle, yeah. Now, in English I like to, you know, take words like this. In English they're not the same exactly, but you take a word like, say, thinking. Now, what would you contrast thinking with? Not thinking. Well, somebody contrasts thinking sometimes with knowing, right? Oh, okay, yeah. And you see this in daily speech sometimes, right? Yeah. Sometimes you say something, right? Sure. And someone will ask you, do you know that? Do you know that to be so? Yeah. Or are you just thinking so? Sure. See? Now, what is the distinction there between thinking and knowing in that case? That one's in a thinking versus... Yeah, yeah, yeah. So if I say, I think George Bush will have a second term. Do I know he can have a second term? No. I don't know he can have a second term, but I think he will, right? Well, then, in that case, knowing involves what? Being certain, right? Okay. Okay. But now some of them come back and say, okay, but I'm confident a little bit here now. Okay. Do I think that two is half of four? No. I don't think that two is half of four? No. You see? Well, now, this is another little application here, right? I thought I didn't. See? See? I'm thinking one. See? Now, if you ask me, Mr. Berkowitz, do you think that George Bush will have a second term? And I say, yes, I think George Bush will have a second term, right? Yeah. Do you think that two is half of four? Yes. See? Mm-hmm. But in the case of one of these, I'm not certain, right? Mm-hmm. So I just think that George Bush will have a second term, right? Mm-hmm. See? Okay? It may not be a wild guess, but I don't really know that. But I'm sure. So this gets a new name, doesn't it? Knowing, you see? Mm-hmm. But more commonly, we don't bother with that thinking as common to both, right? We just contrast thinking with knowing, most commonly in speech, right? True. But sometimes I'd say, yeah, but the man who knows that two is half of four, he thinks that two is half of four, too, doesn't he? He does. See? But not everybody who thinks something is so knows that it is so, right? Right. Like I ask my students, you know, do you think, you know, that the Tecranian theorem is true, right? Yeah. And they do think that, you know, it is true, right? Yeah. But that thing is not obvious, is it? No. And they haven't gone through the demonstrations, you see? Yeah. So I think I can demonstrate that. I, you know, help you could, right? So I know that that is so, right? Mm-hmm. But my students just think that it's so. Mm-hmm. They don't know that it's so, right? Mm-hmm. You see what I mean? So, um, okay. Now, uh, this phrase, thinking about, does that mean the same thing as thinking? It's often this imagination or memory or something. Yeah. It's different. But here, I'm apt to contrast thinking about something, often with understanding it, right? Oh, yeah. Okay. I always quote this example there. When Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity came out, right? Yeah. Um, uh, Douglas MacArthur was a student at West Point, huh? So the professor came in, and he was supposed to be lecturing on the special theory, I guess, that day, huh? And, of course, he couldn't understand himself, professor, right? So he called upon MacArthur, who was the best student in the class, right? Mm-hmm. And he said, MacArthur, he says, do you understand this? And MacArthur says, no, I do not understand it. The professor said, neither do I. Class dismissed. So, um, because you could think about something, right? You might say to somebody, the other time you say, no. Or you're thinking about it. And you say, well, yeah, I've been thinking about it, but I still don't understand it. Yeah. Yeah. Okay? Okay, yeah. See? But now, um, thinking about something could eventually lead to understanding, right? Absolutely. Yeah. And then we have another, it's a phrase in English, which is to think out something, right? Yeah. See? When you think about something, as the word about means you're kind of going around it, right? But when you think it out, you've penetrated it, right? Uh-huh. And come to understand it, right? See? Mm-hmm. So, um, you could say that one understands as a result of thinking out things, huh? Okay. And, uh, now I remember one time talking to one scene of the young, and I was teaching logic, right? And I kind of was thinking about this phrase, thinking out, right? Mm-hmm. And I, you know, had the fourth book of the physics there with Dechonic there. And in there, Thomas distinguishes, or Aristotle does, eight senses of the word in. Mm-hmm. But corresponding to the eight senses of in are eight senses of out. Mm-hmm. And so I was using that to think about thinking out. Mm-hmm. See? And that there are many senses of thinking out, corresponding to the many senses of in and out. Oh, gosh. You see? And so, um, uh, one sense of thinking out would be to, what? Think out the parts of some whole, right? Yeah. Another would be to think out the definition of something. Another to think out the particular kinds of something, right? Another to think out the order of something, right? Another to think out a conclusion, right? And he's, of course, on the different senses of in and out, right? Mm-hmm. And so I was saying to Monsignor, what would you think about this, what I'm doing? You know? Mm-hmm. He said, if that was good. He says, but then he says, but you can't say that in French. You can't say think out in French. Mm-hmm. And then he, you know, he went to his general observation, you know, that English is superior to French. Mm-hmm. For philosophy, right? Right. And, uh, both Monsignor, Dion and Father Boulay there, whose native language is more French, right? Yeah. And they're much more at home in French than English. Especially Boulay, or Dion was much more at home in French than in English. Oh. Um, uh, but they both thought that English was better for poetry and for, what, philosophy? You know, but for both. Right. And, uh, Dion used to say, you know, that French is to, uh, English a little bit like Latin is to Greek. Greek is superior to Latin for both poetry and for philosophy. Mm-hmm. But Latin is a more abstract language, huh? Mm-hmm. And in the French, especially since Descartes, they're very abstract. Mm-hmm. So the French is to English, he said, a little bit like Latin is to Greek, you know? Mm-hmm. Okay? But anyway, I just mentioned that. The reason why I go back to that thing in a part time that I like to put the French language a bit, I don't really have a chance to, um, because, I mean, people say, well, purpose, you're not very much a poem in the French purpose, so who are you to judge these things, right? But here are men whose native language is French, right? And they can see, you know, the superiority of English to French, both in poetry and in, uh, in, uh, in philosophy, right? Were all his classes taught in English, by the way? No, no, Dion was taught in French, see? Okay. Yeah, yeah. I mean, all the classes at Laval were taught in French. The only time a class was taught in English was in one of these advanced seminars. Yeah. And I kind of, um, um, uh, found out that most of the students in that class were English, either American or Canadian English. Yeah. So you got permission to teach in English. Oh, oh, that was a rarity. Or, of course, they had in English. At Laval, all the other ones were in French, you know. But, you know, the French, I mean, the, the words are very similar. I mean, la logique, you know, what you guys talking about, you know. It's mainly when a guy was maybe, you know, making a joke or alluding to some particular example, you might have a word you didn't know. Oh, he didn't. Or if a guy spoke a very rapid French and didn't, you know. Let's say Jacques de Molion, I could understand him. He just came from Paris. He spoke a very, you know, they call it the hour of charm, a perfect French. I can understand him the first day, you know. And I said to my mother, I don't understand everybody, but there was this Franciscan that talked to him. I couldn't understand that guy at all. Oh. Oh, he's very French, boss. And when we were having the first call exam with him, it was going to be about 45 minutes. I think it was because of the French, you know, but anyway, you see some of these things in English, right? Thinking about, thinking out, and understanding, right? That's kind of peculiar to English, right? But it's very good, right? So the reason it's thinking about something is, as a word, going around the thing without penetrating from understanding it, right? But if it succeeds in thinking it out, then it comes to a halt or a stop, and it now understands it. So what we call science or episteme, I call it in English, a reasoned-out understanding. When I say reasoned-out, I include all the other senses of thinking out that come before that. So thinking out definitions and thinking out the parts of some whole, thinking out particular kinds of something, right? And so on. All of those are included. The ultimate or the last thinking out is the thinking out of the conclusion, which can also be called reasoning out of them. So, I mean, we could make subtle things, you know, different than Thomas' thinking there, but you might ask in English sometimes, you know, what is the connection between thinking about something and understanding, right? You know, and then I make a connection through thinking out, right? That thinking about something is necessary in order to, what? Understand, right? That there are a few things we understand, right? Maybe only some very vague and general things we understand without having to think them out. But most things, we have to think them out before we understand them, right? And it has something reflective of that maybe in English, right? When someone is saying, you know, like, ex cogitatio is closer to thinking out, huh? I don't know how they translate your thing there, but cogitatio is often the idea of thinking, right? And ex, you know. And, of course, when Augustine defines to believe, right? You know, he defines it as assentire cum cogitatione, huh? To assent to something while thinking about it. See? Assent to there being three persons in God without fully, what, understanding this, right? Yeah, yeah. See? I have an interesting text, by the way, the other day in the De Potencia, the question was Disputate De Potencia, where Thomas is saying that we can conjecture that there is a thought in God, huh? You know? There's a certain likeness, huh? See, when we think about something, we form a thought about it, right? Yeah. Just like when we imagine something, we form an image, right? So when you try to imagine something, if you succeed in imagining it, there proceeds from your imagination an image, right? Yeah. And when we think about something, there proceeds from our understanding or reason a thought, huh? Yes. And so we might guess, he says, on conjecture area, that when God thinks about himself, right, there proceeds from him a thought, right? Huh. That's kind of interesting. He could guess that there is a... We wouldn't know, right? Yeah. But if his understanding is something like ours, right? You see? Who said this? He said... Thomas' everyday potentia, yeah. It's kind of interesting, huh? Because Thomas will always maintain that we can't know by natural reason that there are three persons in God. And being inside the Holy Spirit now, it's the most difficult one to know of all, right? Right. So just take the first two, you know? Yeah. Or take what St. John says at the beginning of the Gospel of St. John there. In the beginning was a word. Right. And the word was... And the Greek says towards God, right? And the word was God, right? And this word here is not the physical word, right? It's not the spoken word, but obviously it's a thought, right? Yeah. But this thought is in some way distinct from the one who thinks, right? Mm-hmm. Proceeding from him, huh? And could we know that by natural reason? Well, no. Thomas would say no, right? That we're being... It's being revealed to us, huh? Mm-hmm. You know? But that we could conjecture our hand to guess, huh? We might guess that if God understands, then he has a thought, right? Yeah. But that he understands everything by one act. He has only one thought. Yeah. But he expresses everything, huh? You know my little poem I made there, huh? God the Father said it all in one word. Mm-hmm. No wonder when that word became a man. He spoke in words so few and said so much. He was a reverent in soul of it. Mm-hmm. You know? But we might guess that God has a thought, right? Yeah. You see? That's kind of interesting, you know? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. It seems to almost belong to the nature of thought, of thinking, right? To have a thought. Mm-hmm. You see? So we might guess with some, like the word, right? You know? Mm-hmm. Kind of amazing thing to do that, man. It was Aristotle never guessed that one, huh? Did he? No, no, no, no, no, no. Yeah. It's kind of amazing, you know, to see. Right. Huh? You see that. Now, next time when we do this article 11, I think I'll just do one article next time, because I want to do that article very well, but also we'll make a, what, talk about the way Thomas divides the virtues of reason. Okay. Oh, okay. The basis of that? Okay. Virtues of reason. Yeah. The five virtues of reason that Aristotle distinguishes in the fifth, sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Five virtues of reason. Aristotle divides them in a certain way that if you read the sixth book, huh? Okay. Which is interesting to reveal it. This division here, this distinction here, is made in the Dianima, the third book on the Dianima. When Thomas divides the virtues, he divides them according to this. The virtues of speculative reason and the virtues of practical reason, right? So it would be, we'll do a kind of an ethical, we'll do something of the ethics of the sixth book there, the distinction of the five virtues, but in the way Thomas divides them in the primus secundae, right? On the basis of this distinction, right? Yeah. Virtues and reason. Yeah. So we'll just do 11 then, and then the next time we'll do the 12 and 13, right? Yeah. Now, I'm looking ahead too to question 80 there. There's two articles in this. I'd like to take those two together rather than take one of those with the last one here, right? So we just do one article next time, right? Yeah. That's great. But it's a reason for doing that article alone because we can use it as a foundation for understanding the distinction of the virtues of reason. That's a very important thing to understand. To know the virtues of reason would seem to be very important to understand. You have a little texture that I mentioned before when the Pope speaks. Oh, I know. One year I was talking about the connection between mercy and the theological virtue of hope, right? Mm-hmm. This is the one from John Paul II's Homony at the Dedication of the Shrine of Divine Mercy in Krakow, Liguniki, Poland, August 17, 2002. Okay. There's two texts I want to give you. The first one is the thing from, you know, this is St. Faustina, right? He's the one who's important for this, right? And at the beginning of his talk here, you have a quote here from her diary, I guess, huh? Mm-hmm. And this is the words, see. Oh, inconceivable and unfathomable mercy of God, right? Who can worthily adore you when seeing your praises, huh? Oh, greatest attribute of God Almighty, huh? You are the sweet hope of, what? Sinners, huh? Okay. Number 951. We got that. I think that's supposed to be your diary, you know? Yeah. You think, you know? Oh, yeah. Yeah, yeah. We got a couple copies of it. Yeah. Yeah, you have a number like that? Oh, yeah. Yeah, they're all numbers. What number was that again? 951, huh? 951. Okay. Anyway, she's admiring, right? Marveling at the divine mercy, right? Mm-hmm. And she says, you are the sweet hope of sinners, right? Okay. John Paul II here says, Today I repeat the simple and straightforward words of St. Faustina. So he's approving of her words there, right? In order to join her and all of you in adoring the inconceivable and unfathomable mystery of God's mercy, right? Okay. But now, the next page, he's more precise here as far as what I'm going to say. Like St. Faustina, right? We wish to proclaim that apart from the mercy of God, right, there is no other source of hope for mankind. Well, that's very strong. I don't know why I'm lying in the red there, you know? You see? No, I don't. No, if you have to look at it again, but the text there on hope, right? I don't know if it makes explicit the connection there between hope and mercy, but this text suddenly does, right? I mean, remember rightly, the text there on hope, it defines it as a theological virtue by which we desire, right? Eternal life in the kingdom of God, right? Right, huh? As our, what? Last end, right, huh? Okay. And then it says, what? Relying not our own strength, you know, but on the promises of Christ and on, what, the aid of God and so on, right? Yes. But in a sense, the help he gives us is from his, what, mercy, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, you know, I've talked to you before about how the catechism the catechism of the Council of Trent and the catechism, the new catechism, right? Mm-hmm. They divide consideration of the Christian religion there into four. It's distinguished from Thomas and Augustine, divided into three, right? Yeah. Okay? And I can see a reason for doing that, right? Right, huh? Okay. But in a way, you could say that the sacraments and prayer both have a connection with, what, hope, right? Yeah. Now, it's explicit, the connection between hope and prayer and Augustine and Thomas, right? Mm-hmm. And in the catechism of the church, right? It's explicit there, huh? Yeah. And that's why it speaks of the Our Father there, right, huh? Right. That's what Augustine and Thomas considered the Our Father. They explained the Our Father, what it means. Mm-hmm. What the petitions are and the order of the petitions and so on, when they take up the virtue of hope, right? Okay? But it seems to me that you have something like this in the sacraments, right? Because you're relying upon, what, the divine help there. Yeah. Right? Right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, and you could also say that, as far as the sacraments are concerned, we don't have a right to them in the sense of justice, right? Right. In other words, does Dwayne Berquist, or do you, have a right to be baptized? It doesn't seem to do, right? Okay? Now, I was thinking about, again, Thomas' prayer there after communion. Maybe you'll go to that. But, and he begins there by thanking God for this, right? But he said, Nulli meis meritis, right? By no merits of my own, right? But by your, what? Mercy, right? Right, right? Grazius ti viago, Domini Sancte, paternipotensi, eterni deus, eh? Qui mei pegatorum, indignum fabulum tuum, right? Nullis meis meritis, right? He said, sola dignazione misericordiae, right? Only, right? It's almost like the words here of John Paul here, right? Where he says, speaking in general here, somebody saying, apart from the mercy of God, there is no other source of hope for mankind, right? See, Thomas says, I receive the, what? I, your unworthy servant, right? Through no merits of mine at all, right? I have, what? But only through your mercy, right? Okay? I think it's kind of striking. You compare those texts, right? Now, when Thomas talks about the dispositions of will necessary for prayer, right? In the definition of the Our Father and so on, he always speaks of three dispositions, three habitus, right? Three things in the will that are necessary for prayer, right? And if you read the Enchiridion, you know, in prayer there, Enchiridion of intelligences, you'll see these three coming out. Sometimes, you know, one of them or two of them, you know, but if you go through the whole text, you'll see all three of them showing up eventually, right? Okay? What are the three dispositions of will that are necessary for prayer? Well, one, of course, is hope, right? Okay? Because hope is the theological virtue, right, of which we desire eternal life and the kingdom of God, right, as our last end, right, okay? But relying not on our own, what, ability, right, but on God, right, okay? So hope is one thing necessary for prayer, right? Okay? Many texts for that, huh? Now, the second thing Thomas will mention will be, what, humility, right? And, of course, this is very much emphasized in Scripture, right? Christ tells the parable there, right? You know, they went up in the temple there to pray, right? And, you know, the one way justified that they would have done it, huh? But it says that many times in the Old Testament, that God hears the prayers and the humble, right? So humility is, what, another disposition of the will, another virtue of the will, right, most necessary in prayer, right, most relevant to it, huh? Okay? Now, the third thing Thomas will mention, but it's more the name of an act, huh? But he'll speak of, what, devotion, right? Okay? Now, devotion, of course, is the primary act of, what, religion, right? Yes. Okay? Now, if you read the Titus on the virtue of religion, the primary act of religion is devotion, and then the second act is prayer itself, right? So prayer is an act of religion, right? Okay? So it's obviously tied with that. And this is, of course, the moral virtue that's closest to the, what, what do you call it, the theological virtues, right? But it's especially tied up with, what, charity, right, huh? Okay? So when Thomas takes up the Our Father, he has to show that it's based on all these, right? Okay? Now, I'm going to go into the whole exposition of that right now. So, these are three emphasized. If you go through the Incarnium indulgences, I'm talking about, you know, prayer, and how you have to say these prayers, be able to touch upon these three, right? Well, you know, usually no matter all three of them, but one or two of these, and eventually it names all three of them, if you go through the whole text, and those are kind of the key things here, huh? Okay? Now, Thomas and the Our Father point out how the word Father is a name of love, right, huh? Okay? When you say, Our Father, love your neighbor, and so on, right? And we say, you know, you pray for, give us, right? Not just give me, give me, but give us, right? So you point out how devotion comes from charity, in a way, right, huh? And so on. But let's go back to the day of humility here, right, huh? Now, in that text that we had from the Catechism, right, huh? And it touched upon humility, because you're relying upon, what, God's help, right, rather than upon your own power, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But I was thinking a little bit of that point beyond a little bit here, making it more explicit, maybe, than in the text there, but go back to, uh, and do kind of one of the ducks here by opposing time, okay? Um, when Thomas takes up the opposite of humility, which is pride, right, huh? Mm-hmm. He usually, and he talks about the, when he thinks out the various forms of pride, right, huh? He follows, what, Gregory the Great, right? Okay? Now, Gregory the Great gives four species, you might say, of pride, right? Okay? You're great in that text. No, I'm not. Okay? Okay? But Thomas, when he explains it sometimes, you divide into three first, and then some divide one of them, right? Okay? Now, um, the first kind of humility, of pride, right, is to claim to have some excellence that you don't have. I tell you about this thing, it's kind of funny. Mm-hmm. There's...