De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 117: The Speculative and Practical Intellect

Transcript
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There's a rumor going around Assumption College that I had a Ph.D. in physics, or I was about to get my Ph.D. in physics. Now, I read some of the, you know, semi-popular books of the great physicists, right? I know what they say. I try to get it from the horse's mouth so far as I can, and I often, you know, refer to something that Einstein said or Heisenberg said. So some of these people, you know, I must really, really know an awful lot of physics, you know. I mean, because they know nothing, right? Yeah. As I joke, I mean, whatever calculus I know, and I think I forgot about every calculus I ever knew, if I ever knew my truth, you know, so far from being a physicist, I mean, it's just ridiculous. And yet, you know, I mean, it's easy to impress me, though you're a fast knowledge, you know, see? Okay? So if I, you know, claim to have a knowledge of physics, right, huh? I'd be claiming that I have an excellence that I don't have, right? Okay? You see what I mean? And this is sometimes called boasting, right? Okay? And Aristotle talks about this form of pride himself, huh? He talks about the political rhetoricians, right, who claim that they're politically wise, right? Okay? Party-pronged from, right? Party-pronged from, right? That's okay. Now, that's one way of being proud, right? To think or claim that you have an excellence that you don't have, huh? Okay? Now, the second way of being proud is even when you do have an excellence, right? That you have it from yourself, okay? In other words, I know some philosophy, right? I know some logic, I know some philosophy, I know some philosophy of nature, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Right, right? So I have some excellence in philosophy, and some people are willing to judge, you know, think this is so, you know? Um, that seems like I could move myself, okay? In the one article, one of the articles I wrote for the Wall to Zik, that was the best thing I ever appeared in the Wall to Zik. He didn't say it to me directly, but he said it to other people. Okay? So, I have some excellence, right? Okay? But, I got this from, what? Thomas and Aristotle. Yeah. And so on, right? Yeah. See? So, the pride here would not be in saying that I understand some logic, right? But that I arrived at this through my own, what? Discovery, huh? These are my discoveries, right? You see what I mean? Yeah. You see? Mm-hmm. I know these things from my own, what? Discovery, rather than from my great teachers, right? Okay? Now, Thomas divides the second into two, though, right? Oh, yeah. Or, that I have it for my own merits, right? I remember the famous saying of the saint, there but for the grace of God go I, right? Mm-hmm. You remember that's supposed to be a famous saying, right? Some saint, huh? Mm-hmm. It seemed to come up being, you know, brought to execution, right? Remember what it was, huh? You're supposed to be marked there but for the grace of God go I, right? I don't know what it was saying, but I don't know what it was saying, do you? I heard that. I remember that story. I remember something similar to St. Francis, but not the same kind of story about seeing a criminal. Well, no, St. Francis, here's a saint, a man who's good, right? Has virtue or something, right? Good action, so on, right? Yeah. So, it would not be pride in his part to say, what, I'm a good man, or I mean, it could be pride in some sense, but he could see, you know, that there's virtue in him compared to this criminal, right, huh? Okay, so it would not be claiming that, you know, he's not in the other vices and so on the evil deeds that this criminal is going to suffer for. But if he thought he did this to his own, what, powers about the help of grace, right, then that would be pride of another kind, right, see, okay? So, it's one kind of pride to say that I'm good when I'm not good, see, or that I've done good things when I haven't done good things and done bad things, right? That'd be one kind of pride, right? Another thing is that when I am good in some way, or I have done good things, but I did so from my own, what, natural abilities, right, huh? And you know how Augustine was always dealing with the Pelagians and the semi-Pelagians, right, huh? And they want to hold on to some element of pride there, right, huh? Okay? That's the way I understand those words, you know, if he gives to his beloved in sleep, right? You know, that God's grace and his motion always precedes our action, right? But another way would be to say, okay, I got it from divine grace, but I deserve that grace, huh? Okay, yeah. You see? Okay? Now, you know, sometimes we say, you know, if you use the grace that God has given you, or you use the powers that God has given you well, right, huh, then to some extent you are what? It's suitable that you be given more grace, right? Okay? Just like, you know, if we make a man, what, you know, like in the parable there, right, you know, the man who, one guy buried his talent, the other guy used his talent well, right? So if you use what God has given you well, then you are, quote, unquote, deserving, right? Maybe receiving more, we say, right? But strictly speaking, are you? You see? I mean, strictly speaking, do you have a right to something more? Huh? See? You know, when people advance, you know, in the moral life or in the spiritual life, you know, go from virtue to virtue, right? You know? You kind of see this, you read some of the extended lives of the saints, and they're out of biographies and so on, that they use this grace well, and then they receive another grace, and, you know, and they go up like that. But still, it's still, you're kidding, you don't, you can't claim injustice that you should have a higher level, right, huh? You see? And some people in the spiritual life or in the monastic life, whatever it might be, they kind of level off, right? You know? And then, you know, Teresa Lucia is going beyond them, even though she's been in the religious life, you know, less than they have, right? Here's an old nun, you know, who gets kind of envious, almost, of St. Teresa Lucia, at least, the way they tell the story sometime, you know? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Um, because she seems to be excited in them all, right? Even though she's been less in, you know, less time in the religious order than the monastery this other woman has been. Um, okay. Now, uh, so those are two different species in him, but Thomas puts them together against the other ones because he has something in common, right? Right, huh? Okay? That is for my own positive, not everybody's help, right? Mm-hmm. Or that, um, okay, I got somebody's help, but I merited that help, right? See? Mm-hmm. I deserve that grace that God gave me. Mm-hmm. You see? No, no, no, because, um, someone else you didn't give the grace to, right? You know? You didn't have really, you know? You know, if you say to yourself, you know, well, um, okay, I got baptized and I had the sacraments and so on, so, um, I got that help, you know, but I deserve, you know, those things, you know? Well, no, you didn't. No, you didn't, see? See? And that's what kind of strikes me about Thomas' prayer there, right? Nullis meis meritis, huh? He received the Eucharist, right? He's thanking God for the Eucharist, right? Mm-hmm. Even though he's an unworthy servant, right? Nulli meis meritis, huh? Sidd sola dignatione misi coordinate way. Through no merits of mine, right? You see? Okay? But through the divine mercy alone, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Okay? So when he asks God for something, in a way, we should have both of those in mind, right? See? One is that we need his help, right? Mm-hmm. We're not able by ourselves to do this fully, right? That's part of the reason why they speak of the Incarnation is not coming right about right away, because man has to realize his own dependence upon these things, the grace. Mm-hmm. And even the law is not enough, right? Mm-hmm. That he can't conform the law, right? Before there's not the grace, huh? Mm-hmm. But even you're asking these things to God, and God says, you know, knocking it shall be opened and so on, asking you shall receive, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But is God saying, you know, ask, and you will have a right to these things? No. See? No, and it's a divine mercy again, that even when you ask, right, you don't merit to receive these things, huh? Although in some say, you can say, you're disposed, you know, in a way, that makes it appropriate for you to receive these things, right? But to be speaking, it's still on the divine mercy that you're getting these things. things okay now the the fourth the fourth and last kind of verses for what wants to be what above everybody else right now okay and and have even the goods that might have unique way right now okay i was giving this example here of the the uh i think alone i alone they didn't say thing i think alone and i don't think important yeah see i alone think would mean that i alone think about these things right okay but i think alone means that when i'm by myself in my room all by myself right you know i alone understand the triangle is i understand alone the triangle is right so this thing might be quite a little bit of pride right yeah so in other words suppose i really do understand book on the euclid then i really do understand the the agreement theorem right i don't really know it right so i'm not it's not prized for you to say i know the the agreement theorem right i'm not attributing to myself an accident i don't have right if i said you know well i didn't learn from euclid you know i thought out myself you know i was just in my room one day and i was spinning around i thought out that'd be another that'd be one another kind of pride see you see um but different kind right but suppose i didn't deny that i got it from euclid i deny that but i say that i'm the only guy who knows that green theorem these days you know you see i'm sure that my brother mark and some other people who are studying you know they know it right yeah but it seems to me that that the humility right the humility i suppose it's opposed to all those kinds of pride right but um there's a special connection though between humility and those two middle ones i spoke about right because you're relying upon god's help right and uh you're expecting god's help not from your own merits but from his what his mercy right and it's a sense um he says like saint faustina right he's associated himself with saint faustina we wish to proclaim that apart from the mercy of god there is no other source of hope for mankind right uh okay okay well then you then you see yeah for that that prayer that thomas say duly veis merites see so did he not soon he may be accorded to it to no merits my own right by receiving the eucharist right right right now as you say why was i born you know of catholic parents or you know and baptized and so that was a name you know you know you know one of those bohemians over there and he begged that some place right you know or some hindu down in uh in uh india or some place you know some place where where it'd be very hard maybe you know to uh you'd be exposed to christianity right yeah um you see you know you'd probably be against the law to convert you know and so and you wouldn't even have an opportunity you know so i was like blessed with you know this catholic environment you know i often mark you know to me um of the the most reasonable men i've known were the men who were very strong in the catholic faith right like the suric was and deconic and dion and so on and so it wouldn't be a problem you know about reason and faith i mean yeah but but if i'd had you know men who were um they didn't have the faith right and maybe a problem with faith or you know and they were still kind of you know you know smarter than the men who had faith right uh you know but why was i blessed with these kind of men you see why you know you know did i merit this okay i merit baptism right you know okay you didn't have time no no right you know if you get up in the morning and go to mass in the morning let's say you know daily mass like that uh now you got a right to to communion no see this is old jew now because of this wonderful act of getting out of bed but i think some people you know started to stick that way you know but that's really a form of pride right now you see yeah um uh these things are old to me right what i've done right you know it all kind of depends upon his mercy there yeah Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor. Amen. And help us to understand what you've written. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Okay, so let's look at Article 11 today. Okay, this distinction between the, as we call it in Latin, the speculative intellect, or in Greek, the theoretical intellect, right? Or in English, the looking intellect, right? And the practical, or the doing, intellect. This is a much more appropriate distinction for the philosophy to be making than the one that Augustine gave between higher and lower, what? Reason, right? That's one that's appropriate to make in the context more of theology, right? But this distinction is one Aristotle makes in the third book about the soul. And Thomas uses this in his distinction of the virtues of, the five virtues of reason. We'll maybe talk about that after we do the article in the first part of today. So, to the 11th, one proceeds thus. Yes, it seems that the, now speculative comes from the Latin word for what? Looking at something, okay? And it corresponds to the Greek word, what? Theoretical, huh? Yeah. Now, the trouble is that theoretical and speculative in English now have taken on other connotations or other meanings, really. You know, speculative thinking means today, what? Guessing, right? And speculation probably means what you're doing when you're trying to sell the stock market when you're going to go, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Mm-hmm. So, sometimes I have to put it into English and say it's the looking at, the looking reason, huh? Okay? That's where the word comes from, huh? Theoretical theorem, I get the same root there. Theorem and geometry is something to look at. So, he says the looking understanding and the practical or doing understanding, it seems, are diverse powers, right? That's not going to be his conclusion, obviously. The first objection says that the grasping and the mover are diverse genera of powers, huh? Well, you recall that in the distinction in the second book about the soul, you had five genera of powers, remember that? And you had the nutritive powers, the plant powers, right? Mm-hmm. And you had two groups of grasping powers, the sense powers and the powers of understanding, right? Right. And then you had the desiring powers and so on, and then you had the mover power, right? Okay. And he says, but the looking understanding is, what, knowing only, huh? It's grasping only, right? But the practical or the doing understanding is a mover, right? Okay. So, the practical mind is going to change the world, right? As Karl Marx said, right? Philosophers have talked about the world. The point is to change it, he said. Okay, but the practical mind did work out here in your chop order, right? Mm-hmm. It's, what, moving things around, right, huh? So, if that was correctly, the item of it, the mover, moving power is another, what, genus of power, right, huh? From the merely knowing power, well, then the active or doing understanding and the looking understanding would have to be different, what, powers, it seems, right? Therefore, there are diverse powers, huh? Second one. Moreover, a diverse definition of object diversifies powers. The powers are diversified by their acts, right? And the acts by their object. But the object of looking understanding is the true. But the object of the practical understanding is the good, huh? So, the true and the good, they differ in, what, definition, right? Therefore, the looking understanding and the practical or doing understanding are diverse, what, powers, huh? Moreover, this is a comparison of Stalameda, I guess, in the Niyama, in the understanding part, the doing understanding is compared to the, what, looking understanding as the estimate of power is to the, what, imaginative power in the sensing power. Now, notice, Aristotle made a comparison because the imagining power, it pictures something, right, huh? But it doesn't say go for it or avoid it or something, right? But the estimative power recognizes something to pursue or something to, what, avoid, right, huh? Oh, yeah. Okay? So, the estimative power seems like the practical understanding, doesn't it? Why, the looking understanding that doesn't issue at some kind of action in pursuing something or avoiding something and fleeing something or pursuing it seems to be like the imaginative power, right? But the estimative power differs from the imaginative power as one power from another, huh? We saw that back in the article on the inward senses, remember that? Mm-hmm. Therefore, the practical or doing understanding differs from the speculative understanding. It's a different power from it, huh? I know there's a likeness between those two, but maybe you're, what, extending the likeness where it isn't really found, right? Mm-hmm. Remember that example I was giving you there, four is to six, is two is to three. Take a very simple example over on math where they're very exact things. And someone says, well, two is to three is the ratio of a, what, prime number to a prime number. Therefore, four to six is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. Mm-hmm. Well, obviously you're not understanding the likeness, are you? Mm-hmm. Okay? Or if I say two is to three, it's a ratio of an even number to a, what, odd number, right? Therefore, four to six is the ratio of an even number to an odd number, huh? See? Yeah. Well, that's not in what the likeness consists, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, it's interesting when Aristotle talks about the fourth tool of dialectic, which is a tool of likeness, huh? He used the Greek word skeptic, right? Or he thought it was skeptic, right? Mm-hmm. Skepsics, a consideration, as it were, of the likeness, huh? Because you have to stop and kind of, what, savor the likeness and see exactly what way are these two things alike, huh? You know, the famous words of our Lord, you know, he says, he talks about us being one as the Father and I are one. Okay. But are we going to be like in the same way, exactly, as the Father and the Son are like? Exactly. Are we going to have one nature, individual nature? Right? No, no. So, you've got to be careful, as Plato says there in the Sophist, right? Likeness is a slippery thing, huh? Mm-hmm. Aristotle attributes, you know, to likeness, the deception there in the book on Ciccrafutations. One is deceived by, what? What is it quote from, that likeness is a slippery thing? It's from the Sophist of Plato, I think. But it's kind of common sense in a way that one is, what, deceived by likeness, huh? When I was a little boy, you know, they used to have ballpoint, I mean, not ballpoint pens, but the fountain pen, and you had a little bottle of, what, ink, right? You can imagine the number of upsets there were with little kids, right, and those things. So, and I remember the old desks, like in grade school, right, you'd always have these, you know. Well, you had a hole, you put the little bottle in, right? But I mean, they'd be, you know, stained with ink. Oh, yeah. I had one of those desks, yeah. Yeah. I saw the ink hole, and I saw the stains. Yeah. And so, they used to have these trick things, you know, I think it was like a little pool of ink, and you put it on your mother's nice white linen, you know. Ah! She'd come in, you know, screaming, you know. You know, and of course, she reached out, she realized it was that. Ah! You know, but it's kind of a comic thing, you know, because it was such a comic. I think that they have these accidents take place. But notice, the woman is deceived there by what? By likeness, huh? If you put salt in the sugar bowl or something like that, people are going to be deceived by the likeness, huh? But in general, the good sometimes looks like the bad, right? And the bad resembles the good, right? And the true is like the false sometimes, and vice versa. That's why they say the most dangerous mistakes are the ones which have a real likeness to the true, huh? No, that imaginative power we're talking about in a sense is that it's not the same as we think again, right? It functions more like memory. It's a memory. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's not saying, you know, pursue this or avoid it, right? Like the estimated power is saying. Right. And Serestal makes a comparison of the looking reason to the imaginative power, right? Where you're thinking about something, but your thinking is not, what, issuing in any kind of action or any kind of doing or making, right? Mm-hmm. And therefore, it's like when you watch a, what, a movie or read a play of Shakespeare, something like that, right? Maybe a murder being committed on the stage, but we don't show up to kind of stop the murder, do we? Mm-hmm. See, it's like, it's like in a picture, huh? Mm-hmm. And you see a painting there of somebody, you know, battle scene or something like that, you don't run away or something. You don't run to help somebody, do you? Mm-hmm. You know? Mm-hmm. It's like the last sacraments to the person dying in the painting there of Wolf or something like that. Mm-hmm. So, as far as though, kind of compares it to that, right? Mm-hmm. But, as I say, the likeness may not be so far as to what? The difference of powers in the case of the looking and the understanding. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. He just tells the very words, by extension, it becomes what? Practical, right? Mm-hmm. You know, as you're taking something you understand or know, you're now, what, applying it to doing something, right? Yeah. So it's kind of like an extension of that, huh? Yeah. But he says, one power is not changed into another, right? Right. Therefore, the looking, understanding, and the doing or practical one are not diverse powers, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, you know, another imagery, more appropriate to this, right, you know, would be to say, I can use my eye to what? Just to see. Mm-hmm. So I look at the beautiful painting in the museum, right? Or I look at the, what, beautiful sunset, right? Mm-hmm. I look at the beautiful mountains or the beautiful fall foliage, right? Mm-hmm. I look at the rainbow or whatever it might be that's beautiful, right? And so my looking is not for the sake of making or doing anything, is it? Mm-hmm. Just for the seeing, right? Mm-hmm. But when I drive up here, right, and I look at the stop signs and look out for the police and look out for the other cars and something coming across the road and so on, right? Mm-hmm. There, my looking is for the sake of, what, driving my car and getting here without an accident and so on, right, huh? Mm-hmm. So is it two eyes that I have? One eye for seeing beautiful paintings and sunsets and rainbows and so on, right? Mm-hmm. Another eye for driving, right? No. No. In the case of driving, my seeing is ordered now to, what, doing something, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And the same when I make something, right, I have to use my eyes, right? But still the same eye, isn't it? And so this distinction is like that, huh? If you might recall, I think we did the premium, didn't we, the wisdom in Aristotle? Yeah, when he's talking in the first sentence of the premium, he says, all men by nature desire to understand, right? And then later on he gives this comparison to the eyes, doesn't he? Where he says that men use their eyes not just to do or make something, but sometimes they use their eyes just to see something. Mm-hmm. And he recognizes there's something missing in somebody's life if they use their eyes only to make or do, huh? Yeah. And you look at any beautiful mountains or any beautiful ocean or any beautiful starlit sky or whatever it might be, huh? You see that? Yeah, sure. But that's the more exact likeness to this there, right? Because there you have the same power, right, being used just to know and then being used in some way to help you make or do something, okay? Yeah, something like that, of course, too, in the ear, huh? Because I got out there, he says, now, park your car in further, you're going to get all dirty for the car there. So, okay, I took his word for it, right? I heard him not because his voice was particularly beautiful, right? But someone, you know, yells, watch out, you know? He says, listen, but for the sake of what? Not because his voice probably is a little bit strange when he says that, but it's to avoid what? An accident or being injured or something of this sort, right? But then I also use my ear to listen to Mozart or something like this, and that's like looking at a beautiful painting, isn't it? But it's the same ear, right? Whereby I hear, you know, where I ask directions in the filling station, you know? I didn't get there, right? And so I listen so I can get directed to my destination. The same ear, I use it for that purpose, right? And then I use St. Peter Mozart, right? In one case, the hearing is itself the end, right? In the other case, what I'm hearing is being ordered to what? Doing something, right? What's your telephone number, right? It's not that I have any interest in knowing your telephone number for its own sake, right? But so I can call you up or something, right? Do you see the idea? Yeah. So that's the kind of distinction you're making there in the... Not between two different powers, right? Yeah. In all these cases, but between the power used for one end and the power used for another end, right? The power used simply to know, right? And the power being used for the sake of making or doing something. Do you see that? Sure. Okay. Let's look at the body of Thomas' article right now. I answer, it should be said, that the practical, or the doing, huh? Understanding, and the speculative, the looking understanding, are not, huh? Diverse powers, right? And the reason for saying this, he says, is because, as has been said above, what is accidental to the, what? Definition of the object, huh? Which some power regards, huh? Does not diversify the power. And he gives an example there. Like it happens to the colored, which is the object in the way of the eye, right? That it'd be a man, right? Or that it'd be large or, what? Small, right? Okay. Whence all of these are grasped by the same power of sight, huh? Same seeing power, huh? And he says, it happens to something grasped by the understanding that it's ordered to work, and to doing something, right? Or that it's not ordered, right, huh? Okay. Of course, sometimes you take an interest, even in how something is made, not intended to make it ourselves, right? They're kind of curious about it, right? Now, in this way, he says, that's going to apply it to the present question, in this way, the looking understanding and the doing understanding, the practical and the theoretical or speculative, right, differ. For the looking understanding does not order to doing what it apprehends or grasps, but it's ordered only to the consideration of the, what? Truth, right? But the practical, but the practical, but the practical, but the practical, but the practical, but the practical, the practical, the practical, Or doing, understanding, orders to doing what it grasps on. Okay? You see the difference between the two? That's why the consideration of truth belongs more to the looking reason than to the, what, practical reason. In the sixth book of wisdom, Aristobel says that the speculative has, as it's very in the truth, right, by the practical, if it considers truth, it's ordered to doing something, right? So the end of one is not the truth, but doing. The end of the other is truth itself, so it pertains more to the speculative. And of course, the truth of the, what, that the practical mind is interested in is often a truth that is very contingent on who's our friend, who's our enemy, right? As a British statesman said, we have no permanent friends. We have permanent interests, but not permanent friends. So this country or this individual can be your friend or your, you know, useful to you now, and then another time, not useful to you, right? Or even harmful to you, right? So France was useful to us in getting independence, right, from England, huh? But they were harmful to us in getting the Iraqi war resolutions passed in the United Nations, right? Okay? So these things are what? Contingent, aren't they? So they're not so true, are they? I'm sick today, so I need this medicine today, right? Another week I won't be sick with that disease or whatever it is. I won't need that medicine, right? So you're dealing with things that are sometimes true and sometimes false, right? I have a headache, or I do not have a headache, right? One might be true one day and another true the next day, right? So one day I might need an aspirin, another day I don't need an aspirin, right? But that's what you're concerned about, though, because what you do is something individual and singular, right? You're helping this man or this thing. Okay? So this is one way Aristotle speaks of the difference there, right? That the looking reason considers truth and doesn't order it to making or doing something, huh? But the practical reason is ordering whatever it considers to doing something. And this is what the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, that the looking, speculative, theoretical, differs from the practical, the doing, by its what? End, yeah. Whence both are named from their end, right? This one, speculative. Now, speculative, as they say, comes from the Latin word for looking at, right? For looking. And, of course, you can see in English that the word looking means what? You're trying to see. Looking is for the sake of what? Seeing, right? And therefore, for the sake of understanding. And that's the end or purpose, to understand the truth. But the practical is named from doing, a proxy, some in Greek or in Latin. And it's almost the same word in Greek and Latin, a praktike. It's operativos, right? It's doing something, right? So I translate theoretical or speculative in English by looking, which is the exact same root there, etymology. And the practical by what? Doing, right, huh? Okay. As I say, a nice manjadatsu for that is to go back to the eye, right? When I use my eye just to see, I use my eye to do something. It's not two different eyes, do I? My right eye is just for seeing beautiful things. My right eye is for... No, it's the same eyes I use for both, right? But I do have different, what, ends in mind, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, the first objection, as you recall, was saying that in the second book about the soul, the moving power is a separate genus, a separate general kind of power, from the grasping or knowing powers, right? And then the objection is saying, well, the practical reason is a moving power, right? It moves things, it changes them, huh? And the speculative understanding doesn't change things. So that's just a grasping power, right? Well, this is based partly upon misunderstanding, which you mean by the moving power. The moving power, you mean actually the bodily parts, right, that can carry out our desires and our knowledge, right? Okay. So he says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the doing understanding, the practical understanding, is a mover not in the sense of what? Carrying out the motion, because that's what the moving power is, huh? But as it were, what? Directing to motion, huh? Okay. So like when one man is directing other men, right? And they do all the work, huh? But they're being directed by this other man, right? So it's one man who's carrying out the order, another man who's giving the commands, right? So reason is directing us in the use of our body, right, huh? Okay. But the power to move the body and so on, that's that motive power that is distinguished from the grasping powers. And so the direct belongs to what he says, according to its way of what? Grasping things. Grasp things in order, is that right? And notice that comes under what Shakespeare said there, right, huh? When he defined reason, he put looking in the definition, didn't he? Yeah. Because that's going to be by kind of extension of that, right? Yeah. But when he says looking before and after, then he's already talking about order there, right? Yeah. And that can apply to both the speculative, we're trying to just see order, right? And here we're trying to order what you know to doing something, huh? Yeah. Can you see that first objection then, huh? It's a basic kind of misunderstanding of what you mean by the mover. Yeah. Yeah. You know, if you or I became paralyzed, right, then that would be a defect of that motive power that we talk about in the dianima, right? But my reason could still be quite, what, active, right? I mean, again, who was that famous scientist, you know, who, he was kind of a cripple and couldn't carry out his experiments, huh? But he had a faithful servant who carried out the experiments, but he would tell them what to do, right? I think he was a French scientist, but, you know, kind of a famous one back in the, I don't know, it was the 19th century, something like that. But there you see the difference between the two, right? The one guy's doing all the emotions, you might say, his emotive power, but doesn't have the mind in order to know what to do, right? And the other guy tells them what to do, huh? But you have something like that, maybe in the kitchen, too, where the grand chef is telling somebody else what to do. That's right. How he wants the details peeled, right? But you've got to... Okay. The second objection was saying, was trying to say that the object of the looking reason is true, and the object of the practical reason is the good, right? And actually, true and good do distinguish powers. They distinguish the intellect from the will, right? Okay? Yeah. But it's not good in that way that it's the object of the practical reason, huh? But let's see what Thomas says here, huh, to this. To the second, it should be said that true and good include each other, huh? That's a kind of interesting thing, huh? Yeah. Because one can know the truth about the good, okay? And how is it that there are two things? Why isn't it just one? Well, I guess... Yeah. Well, Aristotle talks about the distinction there, the true of the good, in the sixth book of wisdom, huh? And he says that the good and bad are in things, huh? But truth and falsity are primarily in the mind. Yeah. And bad are in things. Yeah. See? And especially in the second act of the mind there, where you have a statement that's true or false, right? Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay.