De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 119: The Virtues of Reason: Speculative and Practical

Transcript
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That was my point to understand, but if you learn to drink at the dinner table with your mother and father, well then, you know, they probably, you know, watch you and you learn to enjoy it but not to, you know, go in excess, right? But even, you know, they say, you know, that freshmen, even in college, even in our crazy colleges nowadays, that freshmen get sick, you know, from drinking beer more often than seniors do, you know, because you don't, you know, you don't know how to enjoy this stuff really, you know? So since a person, you know, to some extent, from experience and so on, right, he can learn some of these things. But you have this game of things, you know, we had them, you know, irascible, they were given to anger, right? And some of them became very mild and gentle people, right, because they learned how to what? Control their anger. I think, say, friends in the sales today, they took around this. And he learned to do this, right? And he sent you home too, bro, I know. There's other men, huh? So, this is the basis for the distinction of human virtues. They all involve reason in some way, right? But the intellectual virtues are the virtues of reason itself, and the moral virtues are virtues of something other than reason, but that can partake of reason, huh? That can listen to reason, can be habituated to follow the lead of what? Reason, huh? Okay? And so, definitely, in the theological virtues, huh? Faith is in reason, although it has a dependence upon the will. Right? Hope and charity are in the, what? Will, right? Okay? I've got to stop this talking about, fellas, because they're supernatural, right? Okay? So, he divides the virtue into these two groups. By the day, we want to talk a little bit about the virtues of reason, because it's connected with this text we've got here, huh? On the distinction between looking reason, speculative reason, as Thomas calls it, or theoretical of some, archipaster, doing. So, we're looking, therefore, for the virtues of reason, huh? The virtues of reason are going to be the habits or dispositions, actually the dispositions in the sense of habits, which make reason and its own act good, huh? Okay? It might be good here to stop a little bit and talk about the word good, huh? Yeah? Something we've met before in our study of the causes, huh? When we talk about the good, we, a first definition by induction, huh? You know, if Socrates was to ask the slave boy, instead of, uh, how do you put the square? If he was to ask the slave boy, what is good, huh? Or if he was to ask the little boy, what is good, right? Would he give you a definition of good? By the demonstrations. Yeah, he's numerated many good things, right, huh? So, he'd say candy is good, right? He'd say, um, bicycles are good, maybe, right? Baseball is good, right, huh? Yeah, that's good. And he'd have a whole number of things, and Socrates would say, like he does in the dialogue, so people, very often, they'd get examples, right? Yeah. If he asked the little boy, what is the nose in there? A friend or my grandchildren has a nose. They'd point, you know, to my nose, your nose, this person's nose, right? What is a chair? This is a chair. This is a chair. So, then Socrates says, well, now, what do all of these things have in common, huh? The candy and the bicycle and the baseball and so on, right? What do they all have in common? Why do you call these things good? Are they all sweet, like candy? No. Can you all ride them like a bicycle? No. And probably the only thing the child could think of is, these are all the things he wants, right? Yeah. Okay. Remember my son, Paul, kind of figured this out on his own, you know. They saved the table there, you know. Sometimes, you know, when the dinner is served, oh, this is a good meal tonight, you know. Like a spaghetti or something, right? Or sometimes, oh, this is not a good meal. This is fish or something, see. And he says, he says, I hear him say to his little brother and sister, you know, that, see, when he liked the meal, you know, we called good, right? We don't like it. We called bad, right? Well, this is not good. So, you're right, what is called the first definition of good. The good is what all want. Now, that's the first definition of good? Yeah. Good is what all want, what all desire. And Socrates touched upon this, you know, right? And Aristotle began the Nicomachean Ethics with an induction for this. Now, we could, you know, spend some time talking about the good, but... But you remember when we talked about the four kinds of causes, remember that? I don't know if you read it. Material, formal... Yeah. We came to the cause called the end. And the end, if you recall, is defined as that for the sake of which, right? Yeah, okay. That for the sake of which. So, it makes no difference, I mean, whether you have a thing or an operation. You have the same kind of cause, right? So, the chair is for the sake of what? Sitting. So, sitting is the end of the chair. Taking medicine is for the sake of health, right? So, health is the end there of taking medicine. Studying is for the sake of knowing, right? So, knowing is the end of the study, right? Now, Aristotle made a connection there between the end and the good. You remember that? In the study of that fourth kind of cause. Unless the definition of the two is not identical, but even from the definition, do you see a connection between them? Well, something is good, or seems to be good at least, right? Then people will aim at it, won't they? Okay. And vice versa, you see people aiming at it, right? Yeah. That's a sign that something is good, or at least seems to be good, right? Right. Okay? Now, sometimes we speak of the means as being good, too, or as being useful, right? But it's useful because it leads to the end, yeah. Now, the end is especially important, too, when you're trying to understand what is better. Aristotle talks about perfect and imperfect and better. So, he says the whole is better than the part, right? And the end is better than what is for the sake of the end. But you could say the part is for the sake of the whole. So, especially, right? The end seems to be better than other things, huh? Mm-hmm. That's one way we show that God is the best thing, right? He's the end of the whole universe. He must be better than everything else. Now, I go into this a little bit here to see the relevance of the distinction, right? That we saw today of looking reason and doing reason, theoretical and practical reason, and the distinction of the virtues of reason. What's the connection between the two? Can you see what I'm leading up to? Can you pass me to repeat exactly what you just said? Yeah. You see what I'm leading up to? When Thomas is going to divide... ...the virtues of reason, and there are five main virtues of reason. And the way he divides it in the prima secunde is into the virtues of looking reason, right? And the virtues of practical reason, right? And he'll subdivide each of those. But now, what is the relevance of that distinction between practical reason and looking reason, right? For distinguishing the virtues of reason. What's the connection, right? Yeah, yeah. The looking reason and the practical reason, the looking reason and the doing reason, differ by their end, right? Okay? And end is tied up with the good, right? Good is tied up with what virtue is, right? Okay? So that the virtue of something has to perfect that thing with respect to its end or goal. If the end or goal of the knife is, what? The cut, right? What disposition, what quality, what condition of the knife, right? Disposes it for achieving that end, achieving that end well. Well, the main virtue is going to be sharpness, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Or the vice of the dolmens, huh? You see that? Could you say the sentence again? Yeah. The virtue perfects a thing... I say, a thing's own act is really its end or purpose. Yeah. Okay? And so, if a virtue perfects a thing with regard to, what, achieving its end, or helps it to achieve its end, then you can see the relevance of the end or reason for discussing the virtues of reason. And this distinction of two ends, right, will lead to a distinction of two kinds of virtue. The virtues of looking reason, which will perfect reason with regard to just understanding, right? And the virtues of, what, practical reason, which will perfect reason with regard to doing or making. You see the idea? I think so. See, everything fits together there, right? Yeah. The truth, all things harmonize, huh? Mm-hmm. See? So, if you have two ends there for reason, huh? In other words, reason is both for the sake of, what, understanding... Right. ...and for the sake of directing us at what we do and make. Mm-hmm. See? And so, you could say, in a similar way, that we have eyes not only to help us in making and doing what we do and make, right? Mm-hmm. We also have eyes to see rainbows and see sunsets and see beautiful paintings and so on, right? Mm-hmm. That's a part of... Right? Okay? So, we have reason, likewise, for these two ends, right? Something to understand, which is like just seeing, you might say, and for the sake of directing us and what we do in making. And everybody have two kinds of virtue, right? Mm-hmm. Or two groups of virtues corresponding to those different, what? Ends, right? Mm-hmm. It's like my tongue, right? Is my tongue for eating or for talking? That's it. Now, I noticed, you know, in my contact with French-speaking people, huh? They tend to, I want to say da rather than tha because they're not accustomed, their tongue, to forming that sound, huh? And vice versa, there's sounds in French that we're not accustomed to make in English, right? Mm-hmm. So it's hard for us to make those sounds, right, huh? Right. But now, when you start to drink, say, wine, right, huh, you have to use your tongue in a different way than you do when you, what, drink, yeah, or when you drink water, right, huh? Sure. Yeah. So you take a little wine over there and, you know, you have to draw Aaron over your tongue and so on, right, and let the wine roll to the sides, right? You can't take too much in there, right, huh? My father-in-law is trying to irritate me all the time. He's always done coughing and gaffing, right, because he takes a better amount and introduces Frank, you know? So his tongue lacked the virtue, right? He was not accustomed, right, to a certain way, huh, you see? But I just mention that, right? Because I'm not too good at pronouncing things, right? And some people are much better, you know, in foreign language than I would be, huh? And they learn how to pronounce these things in a foreign language, and so their tongue, you might say, is what? Accustomed or disposed, right? Or trained, right? Or in a say, right? Yeah. To form these sounds, huh? And I probably wouldn't say exactly right in the way the French man would say it, huh? Yeah. You see? In the same way, your tongue has to be used a certain way in eating, huh? Or drinking, huh? It shouldn't bite your tongue, for one thing. Yeah. Well, it happens sometimes, huh? Kind of painful when it happens, you know? Mm-hmm. Okay? But notice, the way the tongue would be accustomed to make those particular sounds in French or some other language, or I don't think I could ever speak Chinese, you know, but the way they'd be accustomed to drinking wine or something like this would be a little different, wouldn't it? Wouldn't it be the same thing, right? It's only able to do both. Right? Okay. So, Thomas is going to divide the virtues that perfect reason into two groups, right? The virtues that perfect looking reason, or what he calls spectator of intellect, right? As Tom calls it theoretikos, loose, right? And the virtues that perfect what? What I call doing, or what he calls practical intellect, right? Practical reason. Practikos in Greek, you know, so-called. And you see the relevance of doing that, right? Because a virtue is perfecting you with regard to your own act, which is also your, what? In your goal, right? And because the theoretical and the practical differ by in, right? That's a natural way of dividing the virtues, isn't it? Okay? Now, you know the old rule that I hate you of two or three, right? Yeah, okay. Which is a rule, for the most part, right? For the most part, to understand a division into more than three, you have to divide one way, right? Okay? So, the way cows divides them would be into two, right? Yeah. Okay? And that would be the... I'll give myself a little more move here for that. Let's even honor them with the other end here. The virtues of looking for reason and the virtues of doing, or practicing. Just like in the logic there, we had a division into five, genus, difference, species, property accident. And we divided them into, what? Three and two? Remember that? Yeah, three of them signify something inside the nature of the thing. Okay. And two of them signify something outside the nature of the thing. And then we subdivided those, huh? Okay? Okay. Okay. Now, how do you divide the virtues of doing reason? Well, here the fundamental distinction is between doing and what? Making. Okay. Now you might say, what are you doing, Mr. Parfus? I can divide making, and how can you divide, I mean, excuse me, I can divide doing, and how can you divide doing into doing and making? Well, that's no problem for you people anymore now, right? Because you've learned, what? You've learned many other examples of this, right? A carousel divides disposition into disposition happening. Sometimes one of the reticulars, right, keeps the general name as its own, and the other one gets a new name. That's right. Okay. Now, why does making get the new name? It's a specific kind of doing, so let's see. It's producing something that comes out with something, product. Yeah, yeah. Now, yesterday afternoon, I went for a walk. I've been up to exercise, I went for a walk, a 20-minute walk. Yeah. I went to have a chauffeur, I know. Then I had a chauffeur at the house, and I did some steaks, and, you know, I marinated them, and, you know, I did some pretty good tasting, you know? The guy just liked the steaks, right? Okay. So, in the case of making, apart from the doing, there is a, what? A product, right? Yeah. So these guys out here, right? Yeah. When they get through doing what they're doing out there, there's going to be a church there. Yes. See? So there's something in addition to a product, you might say, right? Yeah. Apart from the doing. Yeah. Okay? That's interesting. Yeah, that's interesting. When I'm going for a walk, or even I play a game of baseball or something, right? Right. When I get through, I'm going to show for it. Okay? Do you see that? Yeah. Yeah. So, because making adds something noteworthy, right? Adds something noteworthy, right? Yeah. And it doesn't mean necessarily that making is better than doing, right? In fact, doing is really going to be harder than making. Because, see, in warm-up, what you do at that steak, once you get it there, right? Whether you eat moderately or you eat too much, you know? Yeah. Or whether you drink too much wine or just the right amount, and so on. So, this is the fundamental distinction there, right? And, of course, making is really for the sake of the thing made. The way of doing could be more of its own end, huh? Yeah. So, the virtue that perfects doing should be called, in English, what? The force of it. Sometimes you see the Latin word, prudencia. Or prudence. Purnaces in Greek, huh? Okay? But, as Thomas explains in the question of the integral parts of prudence, the word prudence comes from the word for, what? Providentiamat. That's right. And that's not just Thomas' etymology, if I'm in the Latin dictionary, right? And providentiamat means, what, foresight does, okay? So, I have a whole bunch of things from Winston Churchill. He likes to use the word foresight rather than the word prudence, right? Because prudence takes a kind of a narrow meaning. You can't take prudence, you know? Quartion, right? But, foresight would be the real name of this, virtue in English, foresight. Now, sometimes you define this as right reason about doing. That's kind of the first definition. Right reason about doing. Now, making, huh? The virtue of making is called art, huh? And not art now in this artsy sense, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But art in the sense of which there are definite rules, right, to follow. So, the art of farming, right? The art of carpentry, right? The art of the shoemaker, right? The art of cooking, right? We have recipes indefinite, you know. That's right. So, art, huh? And this would be called right reason about it. Now, are foresight and art, are they, from a logical point of view now, are they species that are also genera, or are they lowest species? Oh, no, it sounds like genera. Yeah, yeah. So, under art, there are many arts, right? Yeah. Okay. And, under foresight, there's many particular kinds of foresight, huh? Okay? And we're not going to go into those details, but I just want to mention that, right? Yeah. Okay. Okay. And I might mention just a word, too, about how they distinguish them, right? Because you distinguish the arts by the matter out of which they make, more so than by what they make, see? Even though that might be a subdivision within there. Yeah. But, in other words, my brother-in-law, who's a carpenter in his spare time, his time's a full time, he might make a wooden house, he might make a wooden, what, table, right? He might make a wooden chair or desk. Okay? But a metal worker might make a, what, metal table and a metal chair, right? So, you don't have one art to make chairs, do you? No. But you have one art, more, which makes things out of wood. Another art that makes things out of, what, metal, or another art that makes things out of, what, plastic or something, right? So, a plastic company, they might make plastic tables and plastic chairs and plastic drinking cups, et cetera, et cetera, right? So, you say that arts are differentiated by their materials? Yeah, yeah. But the matter, you have a different matter that requires different tools and a different way of being worked. So, in my father's factory there, there's a wood shop and there's a metal shop, right? Yeah. I used to help in both of them. And in the metal shop, we might heat the metal and bend it, huh? We might weld things together, right? Mm-hmm. Well, in the wood shop there, we wouldn't heat the material, right? Bend it, but we would saw it and do things of that sort and nail or screw things together or something like that, huh? In the metal, we would weld things together, you see? Mm-hmm. So, you have different tools that you use, huh? So, my wife and my daughter make dresses sometimes and they use scissors and needle and so on, huh? Now, my brother-in-law, he doesn't use the scissors and needle when he makes something out of wood because those tools don't fit that matter, do they? You can't work with them in the same way, huh? A glass door, right? You can use a hammer. Mm-hmm. You see that? Okay. Now, foresight, again, as I say, is not a lowest species. Thomas would distinguish between the foresight of the individual man and the foresight of a father, right? And the foresight of a king or the ruler, right? And the foresight of a general, huh? It distinguishes at least those four. But notice, the foresight is not distinguished by the matter of which you're making something, right? Mm-hmm. But whether you're aiming at the good of the individual or some common good, like the good of the family or the victory, which is the good of the army or the good of the city, huh? So, yeah, so what did you call it? It's almost based on numbers. Well, you see, Aristotle, at the beginning of politics, he discusses the botanic opinion, right? That the rule of a man over his family, right? And the rule of the king over the city. Well, you see, Aristotle, at the beginning of politics, he discusses the botanic opinion, right? Well, you see, Aristotle, at the beginning of politics, he discusses the botanic opinion, right? Well, you see, Aristotle, at the beginning of politics, he discusses the botanic opinion, right? It's only a quantitative difference, and he says, well, no, no. The real difference of the kind, because the end or goal is something different in these two cases. The family is more to the necessities of life, right? Generation and nourishment and education. But the city is aimed at the good life period, right? And the army is aiming at what? Victory, right? Right. So the foresight, so you have the foresight of the individual, right? You can see that in doing, right? Because some things I do as an individual man, considering the good of Dwayne Burkwist, period. Other things I do as a father, right? Other things I do as a citizen, see? So when the children were little, I used to read before they go to bed, right? Sure. Now, is it better for Dwayne Burkwist to read this little child story, right? Oh, yeah. Beatrix Potter or something, or for Burkwist to read Shakespeare? Mm-hmm. Oh, just myself, right? I would read Shakespeare rather than Beatrix Potter, right? Mm-hmm. But children aren't ready for Shakespeare, right? Mm-hmm. So I choose to read Beatrix Potter, or I'm doing that as a father. That's the foresight of a father, right? Right. The common good of the family is really the children, huh? Okay, so I'm doing it with respect to their good, right? Yeah. So the choice I'd make would be something different, right? Mm-hmm. See? But now, say, if I was a good general or a good soldier, a good officer, right? Mm-hmm. In a time of war, they might draft me, huh? Or call me up, right? Mm-hmm. And this would not be for the good of my family, that I'd be separated from my family, you see? Mm-hmm. But now, this would be with respect to another good, right? Yeah. But likewise, when I go in to vote, let's say, huh, to my minimum participation here in the government of my country, should I vote, you know, say, what vote will help Dwayne Berkowitz the most? Or even what vote will help my family the most, you know? Or should I, so far as I'm able, think of what's best for the country, you see? Because what might be best for the country, or might it be best for my family, huh? Or vice versa, huh? I just want to tell you, my grandmother, you know, the hell of you with the people, you know? The family, you know? The hell of you with the people, you should say. They're kind of funny English. Let's see. See the idea? You know, when you had, you know, nepotism, say, you know, even in the church there, you know, in the time there, well, you know, you're considering, you know, not what was best for the church, huh? And, you know, making 12-year-old boys, bishops, and so on, right? Some things that, you know? And a lot of times you had the absentee bishops in those days, too, huh? That was a very common thing before Trent, huh? So, I mean, that's not for the good of the diocese, but he resides somewhere else living it up, you know, and just drawing funds, you know, to support his lifestyle, you see? So, you have these different kinds of foresight, right? The foresight of the individual man, we're considering you're as good as an individual. And, you know, some things I do as a father and some things I do as a citizen, right? And it requires a different kind of, what, foresight, huh? And it requires more foresight, let's say, to see what's good for the country than what's good for your family. But it takes more foresight to see what's good for the family than to see what's good for yourself as an individual. So, those are the two kinds of virtue, the two main kinds of virtue of the practical reason, huh? But one perfects us in doing, and the other in, what, making. And so you can see that, right, huh? The man who possesses the art will make things well. The man who's the chef, if he possesses it, he's going to make a very, what, good meal, right? My brother-in-law, I say, he possesses the art of carpentry, right? He's built, he built houses, and he built a dish for us, too, you know? But sometimes I do a little bit of carpentry out of the house there, down the basement, like that. And I say, what'd you do that for, Dwayne? You should have done that, you should have done that. Oh, yeah. I say, well, I'm not, you know, we've got to tear this off and do it over again, right? So, I've got making well, right? Right. Or with the, uh... But you're doing well. Well, maybe so, yeah. Same. And sometimes you try to do, fix the plumbing or something, right? Right. And if you get it for it, I found out it's better to call it plumbing. Yeah, right, yeah. Because, you know, heaven's. So, you know, it was one of the old relatives there, and they're supposed to make a coffee cake, you know, instead of putting coffee in there, she put the coffee grains in there, you know, to take the coffee. So everybody's trying to eat this, you know. So obviously it's possessed the art yet, right? Yeah. But no, so if a man possesses the art, then he can do these things, what? Easily, right, huh? This one, kind of refresh, hungry to come to the house here. You always see these stupid things that I've done, and I say, turn around, it's all about it to get. Kind of funny, yeah. But the point is, you know, it seems so easy when they do it, right? Yeah, yeah. You know exactly what to do, you know? So as Thomas says, the art enables you to do something orderly, easily, without error, right? Mistakes, right? Not fair enough. Some women, they get married, they possess very little of the art, right? Mrs. DeKaimba's a very good cook, you know. They say, what's the other cook? My husband taught me, she said. Oh, I don't know. No, I don't know. That was either a compliment or what? Yeah, yeah. But as time goes on, people have said, you've developed a sort of art, you know? Yeah. Of course, the grammar is sometimes, you know? Like that? It wasn't written down, you know, a pinch of this, a pinch of that. Yeah. So these are two of the five virtues of reason Darstow talks about in the saints' book. So, foresight, which in Greek would be called phronesis, huh? Prudential method, in the course of English. And technic. How might you spell phronesis? How do you spell it? I mean, if the English is spelled... What kind of, like... Like the Greek letters? Phronesis. Okay. Thank you. I guess the Greek letters, the Greek word for temperance, is sophroni. I mean, I understand this meaning. Preserves foresight or prudential. Interesting. Sophroni, yeah. Because, you know, people usually tend to, you know, because of drink or lust or something like that, they lose their mind, right? Yeah. Okay. There's always something to do with something crazy, favorite, because of drink and other drugs or something like that. Yeah. Or here you have Paris bringing back hell and destroying the whole city, right? Mm-hmm. Those sort of things. So temperance reserves, right? That's an interesting play there and very interesting thing. Sophroni, yeah, that's a Greek word for temperance, sir. Now, what are the virtues of looking reason, huh? Well, now, looking reason, the end is simply to, what? Understand the truth, right? Remember the distinction we pointed out before, that understanding is to reasoning, like what? Rest is to motion, remember that? Yes, yes, yes. Okay. And that rest can be before or after emotion, right? And likewise, by standing. I'm standing now before I move, right? Right. And now I move, and now I come to a halt or a stop, right? Yes. Okay? Now, is there something like that in the case of the other two members of this proportion, right? Mm-hmm. Is there an understanding before reasoning? Okay. And an understanding arrived at, as a result of reasoning, see? There's some things, like the Pythagorean theorem, and other theorems in geometry there. Are there things where we reason out? Yeah. That the interior angles of a triangle equal to two right angles, and all these other things you reason out? Yeah. Yeah. Reason out that in a right angle, a triangle is a square, right? Yeah, okay. And Socrates in the dialogue called Amino, right, he helps the study boy to reason out that the diagonal square would be the side of a square twice as big, right? Yeah. Okay. So there's what I would call a reasoned out understanding, huh? Uh-huh. And geometry is just, you know, a very clear example of a reasoned out understanding, huh, of all these things, huh? Now, because that standing is a kind of rest after emotion, in Greek you have the Greek word, what, episteme, huh? We get the word epistemology, so people know. Episteme, that's a long E, E to them, it's a short E, but episteme, yeah. That's what's called in Greek, episteme. Now, in Latin, they translate it by scientia, right? Okay. They name that virtual reason scientia. That's called a reasoned out understanding. But now, if reason, does reason understand anything before reasons? Is there an understanding also before reasoning? Well, I argue that if you understood nothing before reasoning, you'd have nothing to reason from. Okay? So there's an understanding, then, that comes to us about reasoning, and more naturally, therefore, right? Yeah. And so I like to call that in English, because of this other phrase I used, natural understanding. Like your understanding of the whole is more than a, what? A part, right, huh? Understand you can't have your cake and eat it. Something can't both be and not be, right? Remember the old famous thing there? The flowers, how do you decide whether she loves you? You know, pick the petals from the flowers, she loves me, she loves me not, that's it. It's a turn, okay? And you find out who gets the last one, whether she loves you or doesn't love you, right? But notice, in the face of all that uncertainty, right? Either she loves me, or she doesn't love me. It can't be both, right? That's right. You see? You're still accepting, right? That something can't both be and not be, right? There's a natural understanding, huh? There's some truth, therefore, we naturally understand. And when I say natural, I don't mean we are born understanding it, right? But we naturally come to understand it. So you don't have to go to school to know that a whole is more than a park. You had to share your candy with your brother or something like that. You realize that the whole is not because of a park, right? So I don't know when we've got a spot to be here. It gets to be here from a big family, right? So if you shared your candy with everybody, you wouldn't have any. You wouldn't have any. You wouldn't have any. You wouldn't have any. Yeah, right. So he says, you know, stop. The main candy is not before he goes in the house. So you can't eat, you know, without realizing that the whole and the park are not the same. Right? The whole is more than a park. Now. Now, is there another virtue here besides natural understanding and reasoned out of understanding? Aristotle in Greek will call what? He calls this natural understanding merely noose, right? It's like the Greek word for the understanding, huh? Correct. Thomas will call it intellectus, right? You can see how critical the word intellectus has become, right? Because we speak of the intellectus speculativus, you mean the power, right? Right? Here intellectus means a habit, a virtue, right? Okay? But Aristotle and Thomas named it that way because this is something that belongs more naturally to understanding, right? It doesn't suppose this reasoning out of things, right? Okay? Is that exhaustive or not? There'd be some virtue that's the motion. So, so far, right, we've talked about what's prior to the motion and then what's that? Well, I see the virtue is the idea of something, you know, that perfects something, right? And that makes it exactly good, right? When you're still reasoning, you might fall into error and so on. Okay. If you really reason it out, then you're not going to be mistaken. Okay. Aristotle's the third one there. I'm thinking that it has to be wisdom, but I can't think of one. Okay. Now, Aristotle says that wisdom is the head of both of these understandings, right? Really? Because wisdom is a knowledge of the first causes, right? Okay. But you'll also find out that wisdom knows the axioms, right, more distinctly if you can defend them, but naturally I understand you can't do that. Yeah. So if I give, as I tell you with my students, if I give them these sophisticated objections against the axioms, they're going to be deceived by those sophisticated arguments, huh? Yeah. And they won't be able to distinguish the various meanings of the word, what, whole one part type example I gave there, right? Remember, I gave an example there of, I get them to say, what is man? Well, man's an animal, isn't he? And they'll say, yeah. And I say, well, is he just an animal? No, he's an animal. He has reason. So animal's only a part of what man is. He's not just an animal. Okay. Yeah. So they all agree that animal's a part of what man is. Okay. And then I say to them, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, etc., right? Mm-hmm. Therefore, what she says is only a part of man, it includes much more than man. Therefore, sometimes the whole is more than the whole, and the part is more than the whole. You see, yeah, I guess you're right. But I'm not going to say, this is an argument, right? Yeah. And I played with two different meanings of the word, what? Part and whole, right? See? And Aristotle distinguishes, in the fifth book of Wisdom, the four central meanings of the word whole and part. And one of the meanings of whole and part is the definition and the parts of the definition. And that's a kind of composed whole, as they call it. And then you have the universal whole, and it's what? Parts, right? You have the whole, in other words, that is put together from its parts. Right. Like the chair is put together from the legs and the seat and the back. Sure. And then you have the universal whole, which is not put together from its parts, but set of them. Like animal is set of dog, cat, horse, and elephant. So what you're doing is mixing up two things, right? An integral whole, or composed whole, always contains more parts than one of its parts, right? And universal whole is always set of more than one of its parts, right? So when you say that animal is a part of man, you're taking part there in the sense of composing part. And when you say animal includes more than man, you're taking animals universal whole. Well, the average guy couldn't figure that out, could he? So Aristotle says that wisdom is the head of all understanding. It's the head of natural understanding because the wise man distinguishes the meanings of the words in the axioms, right? Like whole and part. And he defends them against the sophistical objections, right? And so he perfects natural understanding, doesn't he? See? But the guy who just has natural understanding, when he meets one of these sophistical objections, he begins to think he doesn't know what he doesn't know, right? And the foundation of all his understanding starts to get called into question, doesn't it? You see? Okay? At the same time, because wisdom is the knowledge of the very first causes, it's a knowledge of the causes of the causes studied in the other various forms of reason out of understanding. So sometimes Aristotle will say wisdom is a reason out of understanding, right? Really? Yeah, they say it's an episteme, right? Okay? You'll say sophia is an episteme. Other times, you'll divide it against episteme. Again, the same thing we mentioned before, down here, right? Yeah. It has a special excellence, huh? See? Just like man is sometimes, you know? So to be an animal, sometimes man is divided. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.