De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 120: Synderesis as Natural Habit and Reason's First Principles

Transcript
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So Sophia perfects both natural understanding and reason of understanding, so he puts that as a separate virtue of reason. Of course, that's very important, because later on, you're going to find out that human happiness consists, especially in wisdom, right, of all the virtues of knowing God. A bit of a harmony between nature and grace there. Okay, so epistamia can divide out epistamia and Sophia, but is there any kind of wisdom that's not in epistamia? Well, sometimes they call foresight practical wisdom, and you'll find that term used, right? Okay. And Aristotle, at the end of ethics, he'll compare political foresight with wisdom, right? Yeah. Which is higher, right? Is it better to be Aristotle or to be Churchill? And he'll say, well, political foresight is really about human things, right? Sure. But Sophia is about divine things, and God is better than man. If man is the best thing around, maybe political foresight, but he's not. So Aristotle says it's better to know the divine, even though it's harder for Aristotle. So, okay. Okay. Now, it's interesting. If you look at Aristotle, he takes up the five virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, in book six. He divides it into three and two as well, right? But he doesn't divide it into this three and this two. So this scheme is, this plan is from Thomas. Thomas is at the Prima Secundae, yeah. Prima Secundae, yeah. Now, what Aristotle does is to take up these three here first, right? Which one now? Oh, one's of them now. Epistame, okay. Epistame, foresight, and art. Okay. And why does he put these two together, natural understanding and wisdom? Because they're about beginnings. Oh. Natural understanding is about the beginning of our understanding, right? Yeah. The axioms and so on. And wisdom is about the beginnings of reality, about God, about the first things, right? Two different kinds of beginnings, right? Yeah, yeah. And these things here are about things that are from the beginning, right? Yeah. It's very interesting he hasn't divided it. Yes. And I think the reason why Aristotle does that is because these are, in a way, more known to us, huh? Sure. You see? Yeah. So, in other words, you know, if you go out and, as I say, you meet the carpenter or something like that, the plumber, and the cook or what he is, and you find him useful and so on, right? Sure. You recognize that you have that virtue of that man, right, huh? You don't think what to do, right? Sometimes, yes. And then you get a man that's foresight, you know. Did you ever hear about Matt Anthony? Did you hear the Revolutionary War of Matt Anthony? No. He's the guy who took the Stony Point there on Hudson. Oh. Yeah. But anyway, who did the planning for him? I don't know. George Washington, right? Oh. You see? And he had this great respect for George Washington and for George Washington's, what? Military foresight, right? Yeah. And this is a very important thing there, you know, in the early parts there where they were discouraged, right? But Matt Anthony, you still don't know him because he would, he says, you're a brave man, right? Uh-huh. But he said, I'd storm hell itself, he said, to Washington, if you plan it. Oh, right. Yeah. And the, like when McCarthy returned to the Philippines, right, you know, he was afraid that the Japs were going to kill the prisoners there, you know, and the thing. So he personally directed that rescue of the prisoners, right? Uh-huh. So the Japs, before the Japs could hurt him, you know. And so it was really kind of a masterpiece, you know. Maybe, you know, not only the whole battle thing, but this, if Vicky wanted to get there and save those people, they were in the prison. Uh-huh. So, um, so, you know, they built their foresight of McCarthy, they built their foresight of, uh, Napoleon or somebody, right, you know? Mm-hmm. These guys. So, so, you can appreciate that, right, huh? Yeah. What's his name? My church has a famous thing on his, uh, uh, ancestor, you know. The Churchill that, uh, fought during the 17th century there, you know, for England, right? 18th century, I guess it was, too. Beginning of the 18th century. So, you admire that great culture either, right, huh? Okay. Like, Alfred the Great, huh? They've met, huh? Yeah, so I built their foresight. So, this is a standout, right? And then, uh, you know, the man like, what? The Thagoras, right? He discovered the Pythagorean theorem. It is this, right? So, these virtues in some way kind of, uh, stand out for us, huh? And wisdom is kind of more hidden, isn't it? True. And we don't think of that to understand it because it's come so naturally. You just don't even think about it being there, right? Sure. So, um, I'm aware, let's say, of the first time when I learned the Pythagorean theorem and the first time you, you know, you did some of these things, but when did you first come to know that the whole was more than a part? It seemed like I always knew it, you know? I mean, I don't know, I can't, you know? It becomes so natural that you don't even know. You're aware of it, huh? So, I think Aristotle thinks of these three as being kind of more known to us, huh? Yeah. Yeah. And these things are kind of more hidden, you see? So, um, I think, you know, Thomas' way of dividing it is good, too, though. I think they both, they both, um, and I've noticed in my own experience as a philosopher, that it is possible sometimes to divide the same in more than one way, and actually both ways are what? Valid? Yeah, yeah, and they both kind of illuminate something. Oh, I see. No. That's confusing. But, um, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, You're going from the singular towards universal? Yes. Remember the two differences that he saw between experience on the one hand and art or science on the other hand? Yeah. Well, the first difference he pointed out between experience on the one hand and art or science is that experience is still a knowledge of the singular or singularism, while art or science is a knowledge of the what? Universal. Yes. Okay? Oh, yeah, it has something to do with... Okay. And then the second difference he pointed out is that experience is only a knowledge that it is so. By art or science, as it is perfected, is a knowledge of why it is so. Okay? Now, it's interesting the way he proceeds to those two because he reasons from the first difference, right, to the man in experience sometimes succeeding better in doing something than the man of art or science. And the reason he gives is that what you do is always singular. Yeah. And so the man in experience is closer to the singular. And so the man who knows universal but doesn't know the singular so well, he might make a mistake because of that. Mm-hmm. And so I take the example, you know, of how my wife was in the hospital there giving birth to the babies. They give them a sudden, after they come out and so they give them a sudden, a dose of something, you know, to kind of relieve their discomfort and pain, right? And when they gave her the standard dose, she got, you know, these violent headaches from it. So then when she gets in for the second child, she knew that that standard amount they give everybody was not right for her. So she said, just give, you know, maybe give me half that amount of work. It was half or something. And that would relieve her discomfort without giving her headaches, right? Yeah. So she, in a sense, was a better doctor or nurse of herself than the doctor or the nurse, right? Yeah. See, because she knows herself, and it's not a woman who you're trying to make comfortable, but this individual woman, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And the same way you might, you know, in psychology, that's an example, right? You might not know all the kinds of depression, you know, and all the universal kinds of things that the psychologist would know, but you might know your own son or daughter. or your own friend, and know what to say or do or suggest, and they're a little bit down and out, you see? Yeah. So you might be a better psychologist for your son or some friend, right, than the psychologist, right? Okay. But then he goes on to argue that art or science is superior because it knows why. An experience really knows that is so, right? Yeah. But then I say, you can kind of guess at that point that as you go forward, you're going in the direction of the, what, universal and towards the cause. So you might guess that at the end of our knowledge, where you have wisdom, you're going to have the most universal knowledge, right? And you're going to go as far as you can go at knowing the cause, you'll know the first cause. And you eventually find that out, that's what wisdom is. But that's also why wisdom can cast light upon the axioms, because the words in the axioms are especially the most universal words, like whole and part. And wisdom is the most universal knowledge, so those are the key words of wisdom, too. So when wisdom, or when the wise man sees that those words are equivocal by reason, he sees the need to distinguish their meanings, right? And so that helps them, you know, in wisdom, but also helps them to, what, understand the axioms more distinctly than the average person does, right? Mm-hmm. And also to defend them against objections that are based upon mixing up those senses, huh? Mm-hmm. So again, you realize that there's something kind of unique about wisdom, huh? Mm-hmm. Actually, when Thomas grades these three virtues of looking reason, he puts, of course, wisdom on top, but he puts natural understanding above reasoned-out understanding, you see? Because natural understanding depends, I mean, reasoned-out understanding depends upon natural understanding, right? Mm-hmm. More certain. But wisdom, in a sense, is put on top because it perfects the whole. Yeah. So, um... Now, there seems to be a real likeness in the supernatural order. St. Thomas says, like, with the gift of understanding, we're able to penetrate the mysteries of our faith, which become the first principles of our supernatural knowledge. And wisdom perfects those first principles and the gift of knowledge, those two things. But the gift of knowledge doesn't seem to be perfectly tied in with this natural... Well, no, you've got to be careful about those words, you know, what they mean, you know, because the gift of the Holy Spirit is something different, but... Yeah. But there's some connection among, you know, why the words are used, right? Well, I think it's similar. Right. So wisdom is going to be more concerned with the divine, right? That gift of the Holy Spirit. Yeah. That's why it's attached to charity, right? Because the conformity of your heart with God by charity enables you to have a certain, what, experience of God, right? Right. And that can give you a certain wisdom about God, that the saint would have, huh? Mm-hmm. Why science is more tied up with the creatures, huh? Mm-hmm. So why not? But the thing you have to be careful about is, too, that when you get to theology, say, or even to faith, you're getting a partaking of God's knowledge, huh? Right. And God's knowledge is one, huh? Yeah. So God's knowledge is both, what, is primarily looking knowledge, you know? Mm-hmm. Because it is primarily a knowledge of himself, but it's also, what, eminently practical, too. Oh, yeah. See? To put the United of God in a way, they're not here, is it? Yeah. Yeah, of course. Yeah. Can you possibly go back to what you're saying? I mean, I guess the other two brothers really went over this a lot, but the whole equivocal by reason, and you kind of went down to... Oh, okay. Let me erase the board and shoot. Yeah, okay. You could please show that. Thank you. I'm trying to draw it, and it looks... This is a division of name, yeah, said of many things, huh? Okay? Okay. Now, when I say many, I don't mean many as opposed to two, I mean many as opposed to one, okay? Yeah. So it might be just two things, right? Okay, but more than one. Now, name is said of many things with the same meaning in each case, right? The same meaning. Or with other meanings, right? I have words for that, huh? If a name is said of many things with the same meaning in mind in each case, right? Yeah. Then it's being said univocally. Okay? If it's being said of many things with other meanings in mind, then it's being said, what? Equivocally. Okay. But now, when you examine those meaning meanings, sometimes they have no connection. No connection. It just happened, in other words, that the same name was said of both, right? Like the word bat, for example, of the baseball bat and the flying rotor, right? Okay. But sometimes there's a connection among the meanings, huh? Like, for example, in the word understanding we had earlier there, right? So, to distinguish by reason and by, what? Chance, huh? Now, take an example of that, huh? Take the word bat, right? Said of the baseball bat, right? Said of the flying rotor, huh? I said the baseball bat, you know? Yeah. And the flying rotor, flying mouse as the Germans call it, fighter mouse. Why should they both have the same name? No reason, really. I don't know, I took the dictionary, yeah. Okay, it just happens, right? Okay. Okay? It's like, I have two students with the same name, right? Did someone look at these two guys and say, Hey, you got something in common with them? Okay? Yeah. Now, what about the word see? Instead of the act of the eye, right? And then instead of imagining, right? And then later on, you'll have understanding. Yeah. There's a reason, right? Sure. Why do we say that, right? Certain likeness between them, right? Now, what Aristotle is... Okay, now, there's another distinction that's very much likeness, but you've got to be kind of careful here. When we speak of a word as being, what? Equivocal, right? Yeah. What that means is that it has many meanings, right? Okay? But even a word that is equivocal, that has many meanings, it could be said uniquely of many things. Okay? Let me give an example of that. If I say the word bat of three baseball bats here, then the word is being said uniquely of those three, isn't it? See? Same meaning, right? Yeah. Well, if you just take the word bat from the dictionary, right? Yeah. It could say it's equivocal. It could give you one meaning of the word bat, the baseball bat, meaning the five rodents, maybe others, some other meanings are all I know. Okay? You see that? Okay? Now, what Aristotle discovered was that the words used in the axioms, right, and used especially in wisdom, and therefore, because of the universality used to some extent everywhere, like whole and part, he discovered that all those words were equivocal by reason. All the words. That the words used in the axioms, and especially in wisdom, right? Yeah. But because of the universality, right, of them, to some extent in every science and art, right, he discovered that those words are equivocal by reason. Mm-hmm. That they have many meanings, but not by chance. Mm-hmm. And so what he attempted to do was to distinguish at least the central meanings, huh? Mm-hmm. Of those words, huh? Yeah. And therefore, he helped us in wisdom, because you've got to use those words expression, wisdom, right? He helped us in all the sciences, because they all use it to some extent, those words, right? Mm-hmm. He's got to help us to understand the axioms more distinctly, right, and to defend them. Ah. So he killed three birds with one stone. So this is all the words of wisdom in the axioms? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And to some extent, they're used everywhere, so. Mm-hmm. What about all the words of natural understanding? Is that...? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, natural understanding is of the axioms, yeah. Okay. Yeah. Now, that's the cause of the most common error in our thinking, particularly those axioms, misunderstanding. Yeah, yeah. The most common mistake in thinking is comes from mixing up the senses of a word, right? But in verse, Donald helped us to avoid being deceived everywhere by these words, and being deceived about the axioms by these sophists. We use these. Yeah. And wisdom to be seen earlier. Yeah. And that would... Now, you know, I read the two famous statements here. I say, which of these statements is... Are these statements true or false? If a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise, true or false. It seems it's true, isn't it? I would say it's false. Okay. Let's see. Let's see. In other words... But now, the next statement. If a man doesn't understand the words he uses, then he is not wise, true or false. That's true. Yeah. See? Because wisdom doesn't consist chiefly, and ultimately, in knowing the meanings of words. No. No. No. How does he not? So, that's why I say, if a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise, then that's not true. No. You know? That's what wisdom is chiefly about. That's why that's a perfection of wisdom, right? It's knowing God, really. Maybe you're prerequisite. Yeah. Yeah. But I'd say, if he doesn't even understand the words he uses, then he's not wise, right? You see? Right? In fact, let's say, you know, if you understand plain geometry, then you understand solid geometry, true or false. Yeah. Okay. So it's false, right? Yeah. You know? But, if you don't understand plain geometry, then you don't understand solid geometry. Okay. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. It's beautiful, you know, you know how Augustine saw through Faust, right? You know? He realized that, he couldn't judge whether what Faust was saying about God and heavenly bodies is true or false, right? But he discovered that Faust didn't know the liberal arts. Oh. Because he can't be, you know, wise if he doesn't know these things. Oh. Right? Oh, right. So I remember about C. Deontay, what if Augustine didn't know the liberal arts? Right. You know what C. Deontay said his way to do? You see? Well, he was the Manichaean. Yeah, yeah, he was the great match of the Manichaeans, right? And he came there and Augustine, you know, talked to him and then he began to get suspicious of the man, right? Yeah. Augustine was underwhelmed with it. Yeah, yeah. But no, this is what I say about the modern philosophers, they say. They say, they're talking about a lot of things, you know, sometimes it's hard to see exactly, you know, the mistakes that they're involved in, right? Yeah. You see? But one thing I know about the philosophers, they don't know how to use words. You see? So I say, I say, if a man doesn't understand the words he uses, right, then he's not wise, right? Mm-hmm. The fact that Aristotle doesn't understand the words he uses is not enough to say he is wise, right? Okay. But if these guys don't understand the words they use, they can't be wise. You know? It's not that this is the end-all-and-be-all, but obviously it isn't. But you don't even understand the words you're using. It's very interesting because the modern philosophers are so, they're so into words in general, right? I mean, they're just so focused on that's all there is, but they don't even understand those. Yeah. Yeah. Or they don't use them consistently either. Yeah. They don't define properly. Yeah. Yeah. Huh. So I'll finish the next two articles in the last article. It was in that question. I'm going to go on to the one and in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, think from the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Thank you, God. And help us to understand what you've written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Okay. To the twelfth article, one proceeds thus. It seems that Sinderesis, and that's again a kind of a unfamiliar word, right? Yeah. Not in my dictionary. Yeah. Yeah. It seems that Sinderesis is a certain special power distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division seem to be of one genus. But in the gloss of St. Jerome, on Ezekiel, chapter 1, verse 6, Sinderesis is divided against the irascible and the concupiscible and the rational, which are certain powers. Therefore, Sinderesis is a certain, what? Power. Moreover, opposites are of one genus. But Sinderesis and sensuality seem to be, what? Opposed, huh? Because Sinderesis always inclined to the good, sensuality, however, always to the bad. Once it is signified by the serpent. And it is clear through Augustine, the twelfth book of the Trinity. It seems, therefore, that Sinderesis is a power just as, what? Sensuality. Moreover, Augustine says in the book about free judgment, free will, we often translate that, the Greek, I mean the Latin has the word judgment there, which in the is a power and the Greek. And it is clear through Augustine, which in the Greek, Because in the natural judging power, there are certain rules and seeds of the virtues, right? Seeds that are true and unchangeable. And this we call cinderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules by which we judge pertain to reason according to its superior part, as Augustine says in the Twelfth Book of the Trinity, it seems that cinderesis is the same thing as reason, and thus there is a certain, what, power, huh? The third objective is a little different from the first two, huh? The first two are going to be solved in a somewhat similar way, but the third one will be solved in a different way. But against this is that the rational powers have themselves two opposites, according to the, what, philosopher in the Fifth Book, huh? When you talk about reason as reason, right? Or the will as will, then you have sort of openness to opposites, huh? Because reason can reason to, with probability anyway, to contradictory conclusions. And in the courtroom we can reason to contradictory conclusions that he is, and he is not guilty, right? And the will is able to choose to do something and not to do it, right? Mm-hmm. Or to do this or to do that, huh? But cinderesis does not have itself to opposites, but it inclines only to the good. Therefore, cinderesis is not a power. For if it were a power, it would necessarily be a, what, rational power, since it's not found in the, what, roots, huh? I was reading a little bit of Boswell's life with Samuel Johnson. Have you ever read that? Not interesting things in there, but his conversation is sort of interesting. But Boswell, in his publication there, The Rambler, and one of his conversations is repeating it. The question was, would the broods have reason, right? Mm-hmm. And he says, well, the bird makes its nest the same way the first time it makes it as the later times it makes it. Mm-hmm. So if he was really figuring out how to make a nest, right, he'd probably make an inferior nest first, right? Mm-hmm. And then make a somewhat better one. Mm-hmm. The way that man, you know, I mean, the first airplanes we didn't fly very well or the first cars didn't go very well or something, right? Mm-hmm. Or the first computers or radios weren't very good compared to the later ones, right? Mm-hmm. And so those things that we invent by reason and then we perfect by reason, usually it takes a course of time before we get the kinks out of them. Mm-hmm. Why the bird makes its nest the first time all around, as well as it's going to do it later on, huh? We could sign that they're not operating by reason the way we do. Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, answer ought to be said that synderesis is not a power but a, what, habit, huh? Although some lay down that synderesis is a certain power, higher than reason, right? Mm-hmm. And some say that it is, what, reason itself, not as reason but as a, what, nature. Okay? Now remember, we talked about that before, didn't we? Okay. Yeah, didn't we talk about that? When Aristotle distinguishes between reason and nature in the ninth book of wisdom, and also between nature and what will in the ninth book of wisdom, he says that nature is determined to one of two opposites. And the stock example is if you put the paper in the fire, in front of the fire, the fire's going to burn it, right? It's not going to burn sometimes and cool at other times, right? It's determined to one of two opposites going to heat the thing, right? Okay. And I put something in the water, it's going to get, what, wet, and then it's going to get softened. It's not going to be dried out by the water. So that nature is determined to one of two opposites. But reason, as you see in the case of human art, it's open to what? Opposites, right? And so by the art of grammar, I can speak correctly and say I am your professor, or I can speak incorrectly and say I is your professor, right? And by the art, the medical art, I can make you sick, right? As well as healthy, right? I can end your life as well as be served, right? So reason is capable of what? Contraries are opposites, right? And the same thing is about the will, because the will has the ability to choose, right? You can choose to do something or not to do it, right? Or you can choose the good or choose the bad, right? Okay? Now, some people misunderstand that distinction they're still bringing out, because they think the distinction there between reason and nature is like the distinction between, let's say, virtue and vice, or what is an entirely different thing, or black and white are entirely different, right? And actually, the distinction between nature and reason and will is like the distinction between, let's say, man and, what, animal, right? Sure. You see? And the distinction between man and animal, or between man and what is just an animal, right? It's because, not that man is something entirely different from an animal, it doesn't even know what an animal is inside of him, right? Well, he's not just an animal, he's an animal plus something more, right? Yeah. And the same way if you distinguish between, say, two and three, right? Well, three is a way, it contains two, doesn't it? But, so the distinction between three and two is not that two is in no way in three, right? See? But that two is just two, and three is two plus one, right? Sure. Okay? But, you know, if you say, well, two is half of four, three is not half of four, you know, you can see between two and three, right? Just in other ways. But in a way, three contains two, huh? So, there are some things that reason knows naturally, and you can't think the opposite of those things. And there are some things that the will, wills naturally, like you naturally want to live well, right? Do well, right, huh? Naturally, you know, like pleasure and dislike pain and so on, right, huh? Okay? Naturally, like love life and so on. So, we make the distinction then between reason as a nature, right? Yeah. Yeah. Where it has a determination to one, and where it knows something naturally, right? And then reason as reason as reason, right? Where in addition to that, reason is able to investigate things it doesn't actually know, and here it often, you know, arise at opposite conclusions, right? And sometimes a person thinks one thing, and then later on they think the opposite, right, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? So, but as far as a whole is more than a part, huh? I don't sometimes think one, sometimes the other, but I seem to naturally know, right, that a whole is more than a part, you see? Well, one is not the same thing as many, right? One is not more than one. I never have any doubt about that. Do you? I lost the truth. But it's more than one. One is not one. The one and the many are not the same, right? Yeah, right. So some things that we don't think the opposite of, right? We all kind of actually know these things. And so you can speak there for a reason as a nature, right? Yeah. Okay? Yeah. Just like you'd say, you know, man as an animal, right? Yeah. Has what pertains to an animal, maybe senses, right? And emotions and so on. So some things that belong to man insofar as he's an animal. But since he's not just an animal, some things that belong to man as man, right? Those are the things that he has, you might say, in addition to what he has in common with the other animals, right? Yeah. Okay? Mm-hmm. So this is not too far off when they say that, what, Cinderesis is reason as, what, nature, right, huh? Got it. And, of course, the reference here, I don't know if you have any footnote on your thing, but Alexander Healy's, right, huh? Who's that? He's an earlier scholastic. And I've seen his books in some of the larger libraries, you know, but I've never really studied his. His summa theologiae, right? Yeah. Teacher, St. Bonaventure. Oh, okay. That's interesting. Oh, okay. Yeah. That's all right. Yeah, that's interesting. Okay. So maybe in him was already a distinction, you know, as well as in Thomas, huh? Interesting. Okay. Now, to the evidence of these things, huh, or of this matter he says, it should be considered that it has been said above that the reasoning of man, right, since it is a certain motion, huh, you're going from one thing to another, right, it proceeds or goes forward from the, what, understanding of some things, huh, to it of those things known naturally without the investigation of reason. It goes forward from them as from a, what, immobile, unchangeable beginning, right? We talked about that before, the proportion of weight is, right, that reasoning is to understanding a bit like motion is to, what, rest, huh? And, of course, you find out when you study motion that it depends upon something, what, at rest, huh? Yeah. And this is the reason why you can't walk in the water, right? Because the water gives way. You just tip on it, right? I can walk in the earth because the earth remains at, what, rest, huh? Restartic is an example, it must have been a common sight, huh, where a mouse would get on top of a grain, a mound of grain, and he couldn't get off it because the grain kept on, what, moving, right? Yeah. So even that simple example, you see how motion depends upon something that is not in motion. Yeah, yeah. Okay? And we said that if you understood nothing before you began to reason, you'd have nothing to reason from, right? So you couldn't go anywhere by reasoning. So what you understand before you reason, you might be said to understand, what, naturally. Or you naturally come to understand it, but you don't reason it out. It's a natural result, maybe, of experience and the agent intellect, the act of acting upon understanding, right? Okay? So everybody experiences whole and parts, and the acting upon understanding separates whole and part, right? And so everybody understands in at least a confused way what a whole is and what a part is, and therefore sees that a whole is more than, what, one of its parts, right? Right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now that's something like an animal couldn't even have those first principles. No, no, no. Because it's tied in with reason. So we reason from those, and what we find in reasoning from them, we also bring back to those things to, what, judge it, right? And there's care for kind of a circle in a way. And to understanding it is terminated, right? In so far as we judge through principles naturally known to themselves, huh? We judge by those things, about those things which we have found by, what, reasoning, huh? Mm-hmm. That's really the meaning of, in Aristotle's two books there, on the perfection of reasoning there, the prior and the posture analytics, right? Mm-hmm. The analytics is the name of the last part of the books where you're coming back to principles and judging it, huh? You're resolving to the principles, huh? Okay. Do you see what he's saying now? Okay. Now he makes a little comparison here between the looking reason and the practical reason, huh? Now it stands that just as looking reason, reasons about lookable things, right? Okay? Things like that. So practical reason, reasons about things to be done, right? That's the argument by analogy here. It's necessary, therefore, that naturally there be within us, just as there are principles of the things we speculate about, so also there are principles of the things to be, what, done, huh? So just as reason naturally understands that something cannot both be and not be, right, huh? It must either be or not be, so it naturally understands, you know, that you should do good and avoid the bad, right, huh? Now, again, he continues in the analogy here. The first principles in speculative matters and looking matters are naturally found in us, huh? Naturally found in us. To not pertain to some special power, huh? But to a special, what? Habit, right? Which is called the understanding of beginnings, right? As is clear in the sixth book of the Ethics. That's one of the virtues we talked about last week, right? Okay? That's interesting that in the sixth book of the Ethics, Aristotle doesn't talk about noose, as he calls it, right? In the practical reason, huh? But he does talk about noose in the looking reason, huh? And so some people have rationally concluded he doesn't see that, but we call it, right, which is noose in the practical reason, huh? That's your understanding. But he does talk about it in the third book on the soul, if you recall that, huh? Where he said, he's talking about action there, right? That noose, he says, is always what? Correct, right, huh? He's referring then to something proportional to noose in the speculative reason. Something that we naturally know is to be done, like do good, and not to be done, namely the bad, right, huh? So the Greek, it is intellectus intrepiorum, is noose? Yeah, yeah, the Greek word would be noose there, yeah. Yeah. Yeah, in the sixth book of the Ethics. But then I mentioned how in the third book on the soul, he talks about noose in regard to action, too, right? You know, the practical reason, huh? And, uh... But in Latin, we have a special word for this, eh? Sinderesis, huh? Might be derived from the Greek, but I don't know where the word really came, but you find it here, Thomas, a lot. Yeah. So, whence also, he says, the beginnings of things doable by us are naturally in the mind. They also then do not pertain to a special power, but to a special, what? Natural habit, which we call Sinderesis. Now, you could say that this natural understanding is a work of nature. You see, it's an opus maturum, right? It's a work of nature, huh? While this reasoned out understanding, what in Latin they would call Shenzia, in Greek epistemia, what Thomas calls Shenzia. They're coming.