De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 123: Figures of Speech in Scripture and Poetry

Transcript
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If you're a lover of wisdom, we don't call you a lover, right? But lover, we tend to use that for manic love. Some of these people stand out by their absurd behavior and so on. So it kind of deals with the universal whole? Yeah, in other words, you're giving the name of the universal whole to the part, right? Right. Or vice versa, right? Okay, now synecdoche is the other kind, huh? Synec. You'll find this word in the beginning. It's D-O-C-H-E. Now synecdoche is with the other kind of whole, the more known kind of whole part. The composed whole in its part, right? So he's a brain, huh? Okay. I've seen times, you know, this guy comes in, you know, how he does it? He's kicked the ball, right? And then we're meant to kick the field goal or to kick the extra point after he's done. So you might call him, you call him the toe, right? We call him the toe, right? You're nervous, right? When did the toe grow? See? So you call somebody a brain or the toe. You're thinking, right? Mm-hmm. So you might call somebody a bicep, you know, or something like that. It's not because he's always working out, you know, and he's, you know, high biceps, you know? But, you know, as one emphasizes, he was in that part, right? Yeah. But the most famous example of scripture is when St. John says, and the word was made flesh, right? Okay? Instead of saying that he became man, right? He was made man. It says he was made flesh. And you want to say, well, why do they emphasize that part? Because that's even not the best part of us, is it, man? But he went all the way down to flesh, right? To the bodily part, assuming even that. But, you know, the heretics, you know, they misunderstand that. And they say, well, some of them say that the word became flesh. It even turned into flesh. Which, of course, is one serious mistake. But others say they didn't have a human soul. In the place that the soul was the word, right? Saying, yeah, like that, I guess, in areas of people like that. So, they misunderstand the figure of speech being used there, right? Okay? Yeah. Now, you know, Thomas will often say, Sunday scripture will say, you know, you know, talking this, to you all flesh must come, right? See? Yeah. But other times, you know, it'll cause souls, right? You know? Mm-hmm. So, there's a reason why we'll emphasize this part, right? And I suppose, you know, just to say, do you all flesh must come? I suppose we'll emphasize the fragile part of man, right? And the fact that man is mortal and so on, right? Mm-hmm. You see? But that's the syncytity, right? You see? Yeah. Where it's the same man, you say flesh, right? And that's the same syncytity, the same word there in the Gospel of St. John, right? Yeah. There's another one you went over that I don't sure I understand totally either, methanom. Yeah. And you see, methanom, you know, we don't really have a good piece of these things. Methanom and the name of the figure of the speech would be methanombe. Now, here we have a name for the figure of speech plus the name for the name itself, called a methanom, right? Here we just have a name for the figure of speech. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Okay? Now, I think that methanom and methanom is used for both giving the name of the cause to defect or vice versa, right? But also, the container and the contained transferring one name from the other. So, you know, if we say, let the earth bless the Lord, right? Sometimes I understand that as a methanom, right? Meaning, those in the what? On the earth, right? Bless the Lord, right? Or we speak of, this is a wicked place. Well, the place is not wicked. But those in the place are wicked, right? Or we say, this is a bad time, right? I had a bad time. Well, the time itself is not bad, right? But the events contained in this time were bad, right? Okay? White House folk, I think you gave that example. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The White House announced today, right? Meaning, the man in the White House, right? See, you see the White House, you have what? Antona Masia. Oh, yeah, well, probably. White House means the what? President's house, right? See? Even though I live in the White House myself, right? Mm-hmm. But, you know, if you turn the radio on and it says, you know, the White House was bombed today by terrorists. Okay, okay. So, you know, what happened to my house? I got a White House too, you know? Yeah. You know, they wouldn't be saying that, though, see? Everybody would understand that they'd be in the President's house, right? My answer. Okay? Well, when you say the White House announced today, you got another figure of speech. Yeah. Because the House didn't say anything. But the man in the house, right? That's right. What about cause to effect? Yeah. You know, the famous words there in Hamlet, I mean, in the Roman, where he says, loving hate or hating love, right? Well, you know, you know, the love can be a cause of some kind of hate, can't it? See? Right, well, if I love the girl and someone else loves her, so we're in competition, right? I hate, you know? Or if I love my country, I might hate the country that is the enemy of my country, right? Well, so it's a hating love. And saying, you know, the effect of the, what, cause, or vice versa. Oh, okay, I think he gave scornful pride, too, last time. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The metonym of tongue, you know. The poets use these things a lot, too, you see, in the rhetorician. I think some of these names came in from the rhetorician, but that's why they're not named so well, you know. Philosophers didn't name these things. There's no treatise on the metonym that you know? There's nothing written about it, any? Well, I mean, you'll see Thomas sometimes in the scriptural commentaries, you know, you'll mention, you know, this is a metonym, right? Yeah. So you get a little bit of the doctrine of that. You find in the rhetorician sometimes there's a discussion of these things, but it's not, though, is that perfect, you know? Mm-hmm. I mean, you can learn, you know, the doctrine about it, Thomas and Snekdikey, and Thomas' scriptural commentaries. Oh, yeah? Yeah. But you probably should have learned it when you first read poetry, right? I just seem to be able to recall running across it, yeah. See, Shakespeare's first sonnet there, he says, From fairest creatures we desire increase, right? That thereby beauties rose might never die. I mean, what's he saying there? That beauties rose... He's talking about human reproduction, right, huh? From fairest creatures we desire increase, huh? Okay? That thereby beauties rose might never die. Right. But he's talking about what? You know, he's trying to urge somebody to marry, right, huh? Because their beauty is not going to last, right? And therefore we've got to reproduce it, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, he's talking about human beauty, but he's calling it beauty, right? Well, that's a metonym, right? If we say about the girl, she's a beauty, right? Mm-hmm. And we're talking about... We're applying the, what, the common word beauty to human beauty, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. But then when he speaks of beauty's rose, he's kind of doing the sense of the reverse, isn't he? You know? It's just the rose is beauty. Mm-hmm. You see? But it's not its particular beautiful thing, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Okay? But it's very striking, the line, right? From fairest creatures we desire increase, thereby beauty's rose might never die. As we push it by time to seize, his tender air might bear his memory. My daughter, my wife ran across this little baby picture of my daughter, you know, Rhea. And so she put her up there on the bookies, their next Rhea's own, his daughter, you know. Yeah. The light is there, you know. So beauty is the perfection of youth, isn't that? Well, yeah, that's another point Aristotle's making there in the ethics there when he's talking about pleasure. Pleasure perfects operation the way beauty perfects youth, right? That's another point he's making here. Shakespeare almost seems to have a double, a double, Antoinette Maciel there, he speaks of beauty's rose, right? Yeah, it's complicated. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because beauty is a metonym for human beauty, right? And rose is a metonym, I mean, excuse me, is Tomasya. And from the general, right? Yeah. For the particular, huh? And then, but rose is the reverse, right? From the particular to the general. Yeah, yeah. But Shantra does these things so spontaneously, you know, it's kind of hard to catch up with him, you know. We were looking before at memory, and we saw how memory was a habit, and not... No, a power. We were talking about memory was a power before, right? The four inward senses, right? Okay, I'm confused now. Yeah, you had four inward senses there. One was called the common sense, right? Which is like the common terminus from all the outward senses. And this is how we know the difference, we sense the difference between sweet and white, huh? The outward senses can't do that. Right. Because the sight doesn't know both, and the sense of taste doesn't know both, right? Yeah. But the common sense, and then the imagination, in the way you use the word, right, retains what the common sense is apprehended, huh? Mm-hmm. There's another power, which in the animals is called the estimated power, but in us the cogitative power, a little higher thing, which perceives something in the sensible that you don't sense. So when an animal, you know, sees that something is to be eaten, or to be avoided, or it's an enemy, right? Okay. I was mentioning that little cat, you know, that seemed to react to the belt, right? Because it seemed to have, you know? Mm-hmm. And the bird that recognized the twig is something to be used, right? Yeah. To build its nest, right? It's useful for its nest, right? Mm-hmm. That's the estimated power. And then the memory, which, what? In his use of the word there, right? Memories, estimated. Yeah, yeah, it retains that, right? Now, can that grow? I mean, because now there's stuff, you know, instinctively estimated power, but there's also things that we learn, like the dog, you know, if you kick it or someone's mean, you know, it remembers that, too. Yeah, yeah. Would that be a form of almost like expanding this estimated power? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But maybe you were referring to the intellectual memory with the passive intellect of being a habit. Yeah, we saw Article 7, that we just did. I thought we had the question that memory wasn't another intellect of memory. Oh, yeah, oh, yeah. I said to me, yeah, that memory, yeah, the reason, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's true, yeah. Okay. That's another sense of power, yeah. Yeah, so that's power, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Then this one, but this one, because there's a question with Augustine, because there seemed to be some that thought Augustine was saying that that was... Yeah, Thomas, you know, doesn't understand Augustine that way, right? Okay. But I was, what I was thinking of, it seems like you could see the confusion of, when we're talking about people reading Augustine, yeah. between habit and power. Yeah. Because we saw that habit it was a perfection of a power. Yeah. So you could see how it could be confused as a power. Yeah. There, you know. Mm-hmm. But that's kind of interesting now that we think of it, though, that the two memories, one is a power and one's just... One's a... Okay, perfection of a power. They have a feeling like a disposition of a power, right? Whereby it's disposed well or bad into the nature of the thing or to its act. Yeah. Yeah. Let's see. I'm trying to think now. Why would the sense memory be another power instead of some sort of... Well, you went back to the character of the body, see, that what is... What we see is easily, right? In material things, it doesn't retain well, right? What retains well doesn't receive well, right? Oh, yeah. So you see the difference there in matter, you know? Yeah. This particular reason, that almost seems like reasons involved. I mean... Yeah, it is. There's influence there, yeah. You see, it's when you get the emotions, you see. The emotions in us are what? Are... By nature, they're apt to obey reason to some extent, right? See? Oh, okay. But they have to be habituated to obey reason, to be perfected, you see. And therefore, the emotions in us are more... are more... elevated than they are in the other animals, huh? So the particular reason, kind of the... Our reason directs our estimated power to come up with conclusions, so... Yeah, yeah. You can see the influence of the universal reason on it, yeah. Oh, I thought it was... It's like you see the influence of the will and reason upon the emotions, huh? So when we talk about a particular reason, we're not limiting that totally to a sense power. It partakes of reason. Yeah, yeah. The same with the emotions, you see, the emotions are something bodily, but they partake of reason. Oh. Listen to Mozart's music, you can see how he represents the emotions as partaking of reason. I kept wondering, how is it? The 18th century does that. The dramatic period does not do that so much. The dramatic doesn't want to accept the... that the emotions should be ruled by reason, you know? Mm-hmm. Aristotle, you know, makes a very self-distinction there that the reason should rule the emotions as a father rules his son. Mm-hmm. Not like the master rules his, what? Slave, huh? Mm-hmm. So you see, the son has something to do, something to say about what he should do in life, right? And the father has to listen to the son, right? Mm-hmm. And at the same time, he has to direct the son. But the slave doesn't have any choice of what he does, right? Just what the master tells him to do. So does that mean sometimes you should give in to our reason and have hot fudge sundaes? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You see, the father is ruling the master, the master is ruling the slave for the good of the master. Yeah. Right? The father is ruling the son for the good of the son, huh? Okay. And so the rule of reason or the emotions is for the good of the emotions. And people whose emotions are not moderated and directed in some way by reason, they're emotionally, what, distraught, huh? Mm-hmm. You know? You see? You know, in the emotional sense, they're not pleased, right? You see? Mm-hmm. Distraught, huh? You know, people get all jagged from their emotions, huh? All kinds of ways. You're emotionally upset in various ways, huh? Mm-hmm. I told you, I was traveling to Quebec there one time, right? Went through Maine, you know, and they moved to President Kennedy, they called it, you know, but it was a lousy road between that President Kennedy. He had fock holes and everything like that. I was driving along kind of slowly because, you know, I was putting the brakes on something all the time. This French guy behind me, you know, he kept impatient, you know, so he'd go, roaring by me, you know? Yeah, yeah. And he kicked up a stone, you know? And I could hear it, when I hit the side of the car, I knew it did. Ew. After Mark, there was a new car, you know, so next time I stopped, you know, it was Mark there, you know, I'm a philosopher, I'm going to get excited about it, you know, I don't like it, I don't like it, I don't like it, I don't like it, I don't like it, I don't like it, I don't like it, like, you know, I get excited about that anyway, you know. One time I was driving to Assumption, right, and it was kind of this, the way the road had been set before, it changes now, but it's kind of a, because you had to cross, go across, and the guy in front of me was, you know, hesitating, you know, because waiting for a tent to go through, right, so I'm behind him like this, you know, like that, see, I can see this car coming behind me, this young lady, and I can see, oh, I don't think she's going to, you know, I raised myself, wham, she hit my car, oh, enough to, push me into the car in front of us, so you've got three cars lined up, and they can actually drive their cars after this, I was still able to drive my car and drive them down to a place where we could call them to help, you know, then I proceeded to my, to school with the car, leaking it all the way, so, I went and taught my classes as usual, you know, I'm not always that calm, but what can you do about it, you know. Yeah, I thought it was very excused, I thought it was very excused. For the first time when I went to the hospital, you know, for the first baby, right, you know, so it'll come in a few hours for it, you know, for the first child, I teach a couple classes and come back, you know, just going in to deliver it when I got back to the hospital. So, of course, my cat died, the little boy there, and so at noontime, my mother let me stay home, not go back to school. Her brother Richard came home, and I'm like, nonsense, don't let him stay home because the cat died. Well, they felt sorry, yeah, can't get him in order. Oh, that's bad. Yeah. Dr. Burke, I was just wondering about, there was a little sentence I put up from a novel years ago, and I understand it's a quote, I think you may have mentioned at some point, it's just, it loved to happen. Is that from one of the Greek fragments, or one of the... It loved to happen? That's a quote, it's one little quote from one of J.D. Selinger's novels, where they have all these, I think it's from Framing Zoo, where they have all these, there's a place in the family house where they put up quotes, and I thought it was Heraclitus or one of those guys, and I thought you mentioned at some point, there's some philosophical principle, or speculation, or what have you, about that, it loved to happen. Well, there's a way of speaking sometimes, where, you know, you say it doesn't want to do this, you know? Yeah. Yeah. There is that, yeah. You see, I'm kind of scared with speaking sometimes. Yeah. Oh, I thought maybe it was... Well, it has a more objective meaning, but, you know, you use the word, the volt, you know, doesn't wish. Yeah, I understood, I, I mean, I don't know, it's in my mental collection of question marks. Like you see, you know, Nietzsche doesn't want to be disordered, you know? Yeah. It's not wanting in that sense that... Right. Nietzsche didn't want something else, you know? Nietzsche was a vacuum. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's in a way of speaking, you know? But you might say even, you know, if you have the wrong nut for a bolt, let's say, right? Well, see, it doesn't want to go, right? It doesn't. Yeah, yeah. Or we're trying to put a square peg in a round hole, you know? It doesn't want to go, right? No. I mean, Aristotle's a way of speaking, and when he speaks of matter of desires for, right? What does that mean, see? Yeah, that's interesting. And of course, you know, Invera was just speaking like a poet. You shouldn't be speaking this way. But we do speak that way, right? We do. We mean that the matter is adapted to this form, right? Mm-hmm. In the face of Rissa, right? And we do use that way. We speak it, even when we talk about our, like I was just saying, you know, the square peg. It doesn't want to go, right? Mm-hmm. You know? Mm-hmm. The practical man will speak that way, you know? Sure. Because it's not made for that nut, you know? Mm-hmm. You see? And you're forcing it. You know, we say, you're forcing it, right? Mm-hmm. It doesn't want to, we see. You're forcing it against its will. Yeah, it's will. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You're forcing somebody to do something you didn't want to, right? Mm-hmm. We say, you shouldn't force it, you know? Right. So you will say that in the practical inning, you know, it, it, it, it, it, it, um, huh. This thing here, you know, I've been running around this thing that, you probably see that, that, you can't hide. Right, right, right. You know, the, the scoop came by and I lost it. And the kid had this one here, and this is too long for the action. But it's kind of, you know, finally got in there, because it's, it's held in there for several months now. But I mean, it's like, that's something in there, you know? Somebody looked at it, I said, hey, the scoop's coming out. No, no, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's solid now. It's too fine, yeah. But, uh, it didn't want to go exactly, you know? I think it's certainly the right one for that. But, uh, sometimes you, you know, you, you wreck the, the threads or something, you know? Ha, ha, ha, ha. But it doesn't want to go, see? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, orden and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Okay, we have to question 80 here. So we do one article and take our little break, and then do the second article like our custom was. So Thomas has a little premium in which he's going to introduce these group of questions. Then he says we're not to consider about the desiring powers. Now, petty to us, we get our word appetite in English. Originate names, what? Desire, okay? And then it gives its name sometimes to that whole ability to desire that includes besides the desiring, loving and enjoying and hoping and many other things. I think it's interesting that we name our heart, we want to use the word heart as kind of a name for this kind of power. We name it from desire rather than from love. And why is that, huh? Well, go back to Ulysses there and Troyes and Cressida, Shakespeare. He says in the famous speech there on fashion, he says that things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. And I always use that at the beginning of philosophy of nature because I say we're going to talk about moving things, changing things. We're going to talk about the first thing you think about. The first thing you think about is something you can sense in the world around you. And then I bring in the statement, but things in motion sooner catch that and what not stirs. So, if you want to get somebody's attention, you wave or move in some way, huh? If you want someone to not see you, you're in the thing to not move, aren't they? You won't be noticed so much, huh? Now, I think you see that in other things, too, besides the original there. In the newspaper, right? If there's a revolution in some country around the world, a noteworthy change, huh? There'll be the news right away, won't it? See? Okay? Or if the leader of some, you know, kingdom is overthrown or assassinated or some big change takes place there in the room, right away you get knowledge of that, right? Mm-hmm. So, in a sense, motion or change is what captures the attention of us at first, huh? Now, you're an animal with reason, huh? And what act is so characteristic of reason that it gets its name from reason? Reasoning, huh? But reasoning is a kind of what? Motion. Motion, yeah. Now, there's other acts of reason that are not like emotion, like understanding. Mm-hmm. But it's the one that is like emotion that kind of stands out, huh? Yeah. You may recall Shakespeare's definition of reason as reason, huh? It's the ability for a large discourse looking before and after. Sure. But discourse comes from the Latin word for what? Running, huh? And so it means an act of reason that's like emotion from one thing to another. If you take these three fundamental acts there in the heart, that I like something or I love it, right? I desire it or I want it or I enjoy it or I take pleasure in it. Which one is most like motion? A kind of seeking? Love. Huh? Desire, right? Desire. Because desire is kind of a, what? Emotion towards the good you don't have. Okay. And notice, huh? Hunger and thirst, right? They have a name, don't they? But hunger and thirst are what? Very common desires, huh? Okay. Okay? Does the love of food have a name? Does the enjoyment of food have a name? I can't think of one offhand, can you? Yeah, okay. Right? But the desire, the wanting of food, huh? Has a name, hunger, right? The desire for water, huh? Has a name, right? Hmm. Even in philosophy, does the love of wisdom have a name? But the desire to know has a name, wonder, right? Of course, we name things as we, what? Know them, right? So, the existence of a name for some things and not for others is a sign, right? That the name is more, what? Known to us, huh? But again, as I go back to this more general point, that desire is more naming something from its, what? Motion, huh? Okay? Later on, I'm getting a little ahead of myself here, but eventually you'll meet in the next question, huh? If you look at the second article there, the next question there, the famous distinction of the emotions or the power for emotions into two, right? And in Greek, they were called epithumia and thumos, but in Latin, the concupisable appetite and the irascible appetite, right? Okay? But concupiscence names, what? Sense desire. Desire for what is pleasing to the senses. But anger is a kind of desire, too. It's a desire to get evil and a desire to get, what? Revenge, huh? Okay? And these two stand out because they're kind of, what? Strong, right? We've got this old, old cat there at the house and she drives us crazy because when I get in bed, maybe at four in the morning or five in the morning, you go, and you hear this awful sound out there. I guess the name is even here, that means. My wife is getting a little embarrassed, you know? And he was here, this cat. And even after I put the food in the dish and I'm going to take it out and put a gift around the back thing there, even open the door, she's meowing until I get the thing right down on the ground there. I said, see, I've got the whole neighborhood. I sat there trying to sleep. But, notice how that hunger is very, what? Noticeable, right? But also, if an animal gets angry, that's very noticeable, huh? They're kind of strong emotions, huh? So we tend to name those two faculties or powers of emotion from just one of the, in one case, six emotions that are there, can be there, and the other one of the five emotions, huh? But the ones that are more, like emotion and have this kind of a strong exterior manifestation, huh? And Shakespeare, I notice how he puns kind of that in one of the plays there where he says, they're in the very wrath of love. There's a likeness between the two, huh? And there's a likeness between the virtues, too, the virtue of temperance or moderation, which restrains, you might say, sense desire, and mildness, the virtue that, what, restrains anger, In both cases, you have emotion that more often goes wrong than excess, right? Okay? So it's interesting that this power, which includes not only the ability to desire, but the ability to love, the ability to enjoy, the ability to hope, the ability to despair, the ability to fear, and so on, right? But this ability, or actually more than one of them we'll see, because the will is involved there, too, but they're called the what? Desiring power. Desiring power, I said. A lot of times they'll translate, you know, Thomas used the word appetitus in Latin, And it's desire now not naming the act, but it could be used that way, too, but it's naming the what? The power, But it's named from the act that is not the only act of that power, but the one that kind of stands out, huh? Okay? And I said, that's directly analogous to to our reason being named from the act that is like emotion, reasoning, see, rather than the act that is like rest, understanding. So, it says, then we're not to consider about the desiring powers, huh? As I say in Latin, they'll use a pituit, sometimes one word to name this kind of a power. Sometimes in English I say the heart, but, you know, I think that's pretty common, but, and about this there are four things that ought to be considered. First, about the desiring power in what? Genua, okay? Secondly, about what? Sensuality, now there he means what? Sense desire, right? Emotions, the feelings or the passions, right? It doesn't necessarily mean by sensuality, it doesn't mean necessarily lust or disordered thing, but it's just named from the senses, huh? Okay? And then about the, what? Will, huh? Okay? And you see, we have the will in common with the, what? Angels and God, huh? Because the will, like universal reason, is something immaterial. And so the angels and God have a will, huh? But then we have sensuality or sense desire, emotions or feelings, in common with the, what? The animals, huh? Okay? And people have at first a hard time distinguishing between, say, the love which is an emotion and the love which is an act of the, what? Will, huh? Yeah. And four, about free judgment is what they say in Latin, huh? We tend to say free will, but they name this free will from the fact that the judgment is free. And let's see that when you get there. It's interesting, huh? The way they name it in Latin, huh? Okay? Now probably when they translate that, they probably translate free will, huh? But that's not exactly what the Latin words say, huh? They say, what? Free judgment, huh? Okay? Interesting, yeah. Yeah. Because the judgment that the animal has of what is good or bad is kind of determined, see? But we, the weak, you know, have a certain freedom in our judgment and that's practically why we're free, huh? And that's because we have, in our will, we have universal reason, huh? And reason, you know, it's kind of interesting, huh? There's nothing in this world, no matter how good it is, that you couldn't consider to be bad in some way. Because no matter how good a thing is, right? It prevents you from doing something else that might be good, right? Studying prevents you from what? Doing something else that's good like eating, right? Praying prevents you from doing something else that's good like studying maybe or from eating or something, right? Or sleeping or something, right? So there's nothing so good that we couldn't in some way, right? Think of it as bad, right? And vice versa. So there's, you know, an ability there, right? There's a universality there to make a free judgment. Now today we're just concerned with the first of these four, huh? Yes. And it has two articles so we can just do this questionating. Yeah. Now first, whether the ability to desire, desire, huh? Nelson Latte just calls it a pity to us, right? Okay. Whether the, um, we're not to lay down that the ability to desire is some special power of the soul, huh? And then secondly, whether the desire, the ability to desire should be divided into the sense desire, right? The desire that follows upon having senses, right? And the intellectual desire that follows upon having, what? Reason or understanding, right? Okay. But it should be divided into them as into, uh, different or other powers, huh? Okay. So when I teach, you know, the love and friendship course, um, after I talk about what love is, then one of the two main distinctions I make among love, the fundamental ones is, is the love which is an emotion, and the love which is an act of the will, huh? Yeah. And it's hard for students to understand the difference there, right? Yeah. Right. Okay? Because they think simply of the emotion at first, right? Yeah. Yeah. But the love of wisdom, I don't think, is an emotion. Right. Okay. So let's look now at the first article. To the first, thus, one proceeds. It seems that the ability to desire is not some special power of the soul distinguished from the other powers, huh? For to those things which are common to animate, which means things that have a soul, right? They're for living things. And inanimate things, things that not have a soul, for those things that are common to both, one should not assign some power of the soul, right? But to desire or to want, the English word is to want, is common to living or animate things and inanimate things. And he quotes the first definition of good, which Aristotle touches on in the beginning of Nicomagian Ethics. The good is what all what? Yeah, what all want, huh? Therefore, desire is not a special power of the soul, right? Now notice, huh, you go to a nursery and you buy a plant sometimes and they'll give you a little advice on how to take care of the plant, right? Yeah. You know, say it wants a lot of sun or wants a lot of water, right? Yeah, sure. And, you know, that's kind of an actual want, right? Yeah. Okay. Of course, we sometimes even carry it over to our mechanical things, huh? If you're trying to put a square pig into a round hole, we say it doesn't want to go, huh? It doesn't fit, huh? Okay. So, in some sense, wanting or desire, right, is set even in, what, things that don't have knowledge, huh? Like the animals and man, huh? Yeah. Aristotle makes a strange remark there that matter desires form, huh? And of course, he's using the word desire there in kind of an extended meaning, huh? Sure. But he means that matter is ordered to form as it's what? It's good, it's perfection, huh? Isn't there a sense somewhere about, I don't know if it's referring to gravity or about things wanting to go to the earth? Yeah, they have a tendency towards something, right? Right. Okay. So, in that sense, you have desire, you know, things have a tendency towards what is good for them, right, huh? And even an inanimate thing resists being, what, cut up, right, or being broken up, right? No. Tries going on, huh? Split. Yeah, so... So that's the first objection. So inanimate, because a plant would fall into an inanimate, no? Well, you could, yeah, yeah. I'll just take it as a clear example, but sometimes, you know, we think of the animals having a soul more than the plant. Sure, sure. And that's shown by the word animal, right? Yep. Okay. And you can see in the body of the article, Thomas is kind of taking animatis there for the things that have some kind of knowing, at least the senses, right? Okay. Okay. Although in English, we tend to use the word animate for the plant as well, huh? Yeah, okay. It means literally animate has a soul, right? But the life is, as Aristotle said in the anima, life is hidden in the plants, huh? Life is hidden in the plants. And in the first book about the soul, when Aristotle recounts what his predecessors say, they investigated life from sensation and from moving around, something which the animals have that the plants don't have. Second, moreover, powers are distinguished by their objects, huh? Remember that thing there in the line? Yes. We distinguish powers by their acts and the acts by their objects, right? So from first to last, we distinguish the powers by their objects. But it's the same thing that we know and what? Desire. And Aristotle speaks of that in the Dianima there, right? Yeah. That the food is both known and what? Desired, right? Yeah. And so it's the original cause there, okay? Therefore, but, yeah, okay, therefore the desiring power ought not to be another power from the, what, grasping or annoying power. He often calls that the, what, apprehensive, right? Now, why is he... called the knowing power the vim apprehensivum, the grabbing or the taking power. Why is it called that? What's the difference? Why is it not the intellectum? Why is it not the intellect? Yeah, but in general, why is the knowing power said to grasp and the desiring power doesn't? It's more outgoing, yeah. Because you have it then, you've taken it in. Okay, okay. You understand, I think the analogy, you know, you grab it. Yeah, you're trying to get the thing into your senses or into your what? Mind, right? So the thing known is more in the knower than the knower and the thing known. But in love, it's just the reverse. Oh, yeah. I left my heart in San Francisco, right? My heart's not in it. Love goes out to the thing itself. And this is what Aristotle shows in the Sixth Book of Wisdom, that the good is in things. Why truth is primarily in the mind. So when you try to know something, you're trying to get into your mind, huh? Yeah. That's why when you see, you grasp something, it's contained in your hand, right? Yeah. So when your mind grasps something, it's contained in the mind. Well, you speak of love more in terms of what? Giving, right, huh? I used to ask the question, I'd say, is it good to lose your mind? No. What about losing your heart? Is that good or bad? Depends on who you lose it to. Who you lose it to, yeah. That's why we say that, though, see, huh? Yeah. You speak of keep your cool, right? Keep your mind, right? You don't say keep your heart sincerely, right? Now, would that be secondarily, truth is in things, in the thing itself? Well, no, see, you can see it in the case of our mind, clearly, that truth is found in statements, right? Uh-huh. And so I ask students, I say, where do you find truth, you know? You dig in the ground, you find it in the ground, you know? Some countries, you know, got more oil in the ground, or more coal, or whatever it might be, or more gold, or diamonds, right? Uh-huh. Do some countries have more truth in the ground? No, there's no truth in the ground at all. If you find the ocean, and you swim there, you bump into a piece of truth. If you go through the air, the airplane, you know, here's a nice big chunk of truth there. See? No. I tell them you find truth in the same place in general you find falsity. And that's in statements, huh? Yeah. And the two halves of the contradiction, huh? Yeah. You're sitting and you're not sitting. And one of those is going to be found truth and the other is going to be found falsity, huh? Mm-hmm. But the statement is what? In the mind, huh? Okay? So truth is primarily in the mind, huh? See? It's not until my mind affirms or denies something of you that truth or falsity. You are white, or you are not white. Yeah. Or you are black, or you are not black. Mm-hmm. Or you're sitting, or you're not sitting, or you're standing, or you're not standing, right? That has something true or false when I affirm and recognize something of you or something else. So truth is primarily in the mind, huh? But in general, knowing, you're trying to get something in the mind, huh? Mm-hmm. If I remember you when I leave here, I've got your, what? Oh, yeah. Shape and so on, right? Color in my, what? Knowing powers, huh? Yeah. Okay. But love is the reverse, huh? This is the reason why. That if you love something bad, that's bad, right? Mm-hmm. But if you know something bad, that's not bad, right? Oh, yeah. Because love goes out to the thing as it is in itself. Mm-hmm. That's why I can't love health and sickness at the same time. If I love health, I can't love sickness. But if I know what sickness is, that doesn't prevent me from what my health is. In fact, knowing what health is helps me to know what sickness is. Knowing what normal blood pressure is helps me to know what abnormal blood pressure is, right? But in things, one excludes the other. And because the heart or love goes out to the thing itself, you can't love the opposite, son. If I love virtue, I don't love vice, do I? I can't love both at the same time. Yeah. But I, in ethics, can know both of them, right? Yeah. And knowing one helps me to know the other. Mm-hmm. But loving one doesn't help me to know the other, does it? Okay. Right? See? Loving virtue prevents me from loving vice. And loving vice prevents me from loving virtue. I see. Yeah. I figured this out. Is it not the same paragraph as you use potentiary and vim? What's a vim? Well, just another, here it's more or less synonymous for potentiary, huh? All right. The vim, the power in a sense. Okay. Now, the third objection. Yeah. Moreover, the common is not distinguished against the private or particular, right? But every power of the soul wants its own, what? Or desires its own desirable. Yeah. Maybe the object that is suitable to it. Yeah. Therefore, with respect to this object, which is the desirable in general, one ought not to lay down a power distinct from all the rest, which is called the desiring power. So every, you know, you might say that the ear wants to hear, right? And the eye wants to see, right? And the stomach wants to digest. And the heart wants to pump blood, right? So why speak of the ability to want that's apart from all these other powers, right? Okay. So they're all good objections, huh? We'll see how Thomas answers them when they get to the reply, huh? I've often, you know, thought of, you know, you give them one piece of paper just the objections, right? That's due for a while, and then you give them the body of the article a day later or something, and then a day after that you give them the answers, right, huh? I did that once in Love and Friendship there. Towards the end, I took this article of Thomas in the Summa where he says that he asked whether to share it to his friendship, huh? I just gave him the objections to it, saying, I'm stupid. Okay. Okay. But against all this is what the philosopher, that the philosopher, and I guess that's the guy called what? His daughter. And what's the name of that terrible name for that figure of speech? The boy. Oh, yeah. Antonin Messiah. Antonin Messiah, yeah. The way Christ is named by Antonin Messiah, huh? Mm-hmm. The way the Bible is named. The way the White House is named. Okay? Mm-hmm. Very common. But the name is not very common. Yeah. But the thing is common, right? Yeah. That figure of speech is common. Okay. But against this is that the philosopher, in the second book about the soul, he distinguishes the genera of powers. He distinguished five genera of powers. Remember that? And this was one of the five genera, the desiring power, right? Right. Yeah. And then he also brings in a second great thinker there, St. John Damascene, right? Mm-hmm. In the second book, yeah? The Fide Orthodoxa, right? Mm-hmm. Kind of a summa. You might say St. John Damascene, right? Kind of a, not as complete as Thomas' Summas, but famous work. He was, what, a great fighter against iconoclasts, wasn't he? Yeah. And other things, yeah. So Damascene, in the second book of the day, Orthodox faith, distinguished the, what, desiring powers from the, what, knowing, huh? And viras and vir must be the same, what, noun, right? But viras is the, what? Plural. Plural. Okay. Mm-hmm. Okay. I answer, Thomas says, that it is necessary to lay down that there is some desiring power of the soul, right? Now, for the evidence of this, Thomas says, it should be considered that some inclination, right, follows in a, what, form, right? Now, notice, huh? If you've got contrast matter and form. It should be considered that some inclination. It should be considered that some inclination. It should be considered that some inclination. Going back to philosophy of nature, when Aristotle points out that, you know, nature has two meanings, matter and form. But which is more nature, matter or form? Do you remember that point? Form. Yeah. And the reason for that is that by matter you have a natural thing only in what? Ability. By through form you have one in act, right? Yeah. Okay. So, it's through its form that a thing is actually what it is, right? And found upon what a thing is, there's something that it does, right? Something it's inclined to do, huh? Like fire is inclined to burn, right? And he gives that example there from the ancient physics. Just as fire from its form is inclined to what? Go up, as we'd say, right? And also is inclined to this that generates another like itself, huh? So, this is going to be a general thing, huh? That falling upon form, there's some kind of a, what? Tendency or some kind of a, what? Inclination, right? Okay. And then he's going to point out that knowing things, things that sense or understand, right, have a form and that the things that don't know are lacking, right? In addition to their inactual form, that makes them do what they are, right, they're able to receive, as we learned when you studied those knowing powers, the forms of other things, right? Yeah. Okay. So, not only, if you take this book here, right, it has its own color, which is green, right? Okay. But now my eye, right, I've got what, brown eyes, right? Okay. In the same way that this book is green, huh? Okay. But my eye is also receiving the color of your clothing, you know, which is black, right? And it's receiving the, more or less, red of the fire engine, you know, I mean the fire extinguisher over there, right? And I'm receiving all kinds of colors in my eyes, right? You see? So, notice the difference between the knower and the thing that doesn't know, right? This glass that doesn't know, it has its own, what? Shape. Shape, huh? But I can receive the shape of you, the shape of the desk, the shape of the chair, the shape of the statue, the shape of the cross, the shape of the clock, right? I'm receiving the forms of all kinds of things, right? Okay. So, if it's true in general that there's some kind of inclination or tendency fouling upon form, right? Then, and it's true in particular that those things that know, right, have forms in a way that's their own, right? In addition to the way that everything else has a form, right? Well, then there's going to be an inclination, right? Because of that, huh? That's unique to them. And that inclination is referring to the act of this, what? Desiring power. Okay? And that's also the reason why, when you get to the second article, there will be a distinction between the, what? Ability to desire fouling upon, what? Sensation, right? Or sensing. Which you call sensualitas. That's why you called it before, because it goes back to the senses, right? Or, fouling upon the ability to, what? Understand, huh? Okay? And that would be the difference between the emotions, on the one hand, and the, what? The acts. The will, huh? Okay? So, he starts off, then, as I say, with this general beginning that there's some inclination, some tendency towards something fouling upon any form that you have, right? But then there's a special way in which things that know have a form. A form, however, in those things which partake of knowledge, he says, is found in a, what? Higher way, huh? Than in those things which lack, what? Knowledge, huh? For in those things which lack knowledge, there is found only, what? Form. Form, determining each thing, right? To its own, what? Private being. Its own private nature, you might say, right? Which also is the natural form of each thing, huh? Okay. The form that's responsible for what it is, huh? And a natural inclination follows upon this, what? Natural form, which is called, what? Natural desire, right? So, the plant, let's say, huh? Okay. Once it has the nature of this kind of plant, it might want to grow towards the sun, right? Yeah. Or grow down into the soil, towards the water, huh? Okay. Okay? So, it's an inclination to a certain, what? To go in some direction, right? Okay. Because of what it is, huh? Okay. But in those things having knowledge, huh? Okay. Each thing is determined to its own natural being, to its natural form. But nevertheless, it is also receptive of forms, huh? Uh-huh. Of other things, huh? Just as the sense receives the forms of all sensible things, huh? So, my ears receive the sound of the trumpet, and the sound of the violin, and the sound of the human voice, and the sound of breaks, and so on, right? Mm-hmm. And the understanding of all things that are understandable, what we see is the natures of these things. Uh-huh. And then he refers to what Aristotle said in the third book on the soul, if you recall that, after he'd taken up the senses, right? Mm-hmm. After he'd taken up the reason or understanding, and thus the soul of man is in some way all things, right? Yeah. By sense and by understanding, huh? Yeah. So if I have the definition of a triangle in my head, you could say I have the nature of a triangle in my head, don't I? If I have the definition of a tree or a plant of some sort, I have the nature of the tree or the plant in me, right? Mm-hmm. But the stone has only the nature of stone in it. See? Yeah. And the stone is only the color of a stone, right? But I have the color of the sunset and the color of all kinds of things in my, what? Eyes, right, huh? So my eye, through my eye in a way, I have all colors. And through my ear, all sounds, right? And through my nose, all smells and tastes, and so on, huh? So in some way, I'm all things, huh? In which he says in some way, then, things having knowledge approach to a certain likeness of God, huh, in whom all things preexist in a simple way, huh? As Dionysius, the Apigite, or Sudari Apigite, whoever he is now, says, right? Okay? I think I was mentioning how in Scripture sometimes God says to, like, he says to Abraham, he says to Moses, you know, follow me, and I will show you every good. And Thomas says, it est himself. I'll show you it myself, right? So in a sense, God is everything, but in a very, what, simple way, right, huh? But things that have, what, knowledge, right? And man more than the beast, because he's got understanding as well, sensing. He has a certain likeness, right, to God. He's more like God, right? Those that have knowing than those that don't know, right? But why are those that know more like God? Well, not only because they know, but because in some way they are, what? By knowing they are all things in some way. Do you see that? Yeah. Okay? That's really kind of an amazing thing to see, huh? It is, yeah. See? And if you realize your superiority, right, to things that don't know, then if it's all, you can see the superiority of God, huh? Okay? Okay. Just therefore. Now he's going to tie the two together, right? Yeah. The idea that upon every form there follows some kind of inclination, right? Right. And then the fact that the things that know have forms in a way that's unique. Yeah. Okay? Well, then they also have, corresponding to that, an inclination or a desire, right, huh? In addition to that natural desire that all things have for what is falling upon their...