De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 124: Appetite as a Distinct Power of the Soul

Transcript
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nature. Thus, therefore, as forms exist in a higher way, in those things having knowledge, exist in a higher way, above the way of natural forms, right? So also it's necessary that in them there be a, what? Inclination, tendency, above the way of the natural inclination, which has been called, as we said before, natural desire, right? And this superior inclination pertains to the desiring power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire those things which it grasps, right? And not only those things to which it is inclined from its, what? Natural form, right? Thus, therefore, this is the reason that it's necessary to lay down that there's some desiring power of the soul, right? Do you see the force of the argument then? Yeah, what, um, the natural... In most cases in an argument, like in a syllogism, all you need is two to get one, right? Two statements to get a, what? Third, right? So that's why we compare the syllogism sometimes to adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing, because you need just two numbers to get a, what? Third number, right? And so very often in strict reasoning, you need just two statements, that's all a syllogism has, a regular syllogism, to get a third one, right? So what are the two kind of key statements here? Well, one is the statement that there's some kind of, of, uh, tendency, some kind of inclination following upon any form, right? Yes. And the other one is that things that know, right, have in a higher way forms, huh? Yeah. Than the things that don't know, right? Yeah. The things that don't know have only their natural form, that makes them to be what they are, right? Yeah. Now, things that know also have their natural form that makes them to be what they are, right? But then in addition, they are able to receive, huh? The forms of other things, huh? And therefore, they have forms in a way that the non-living things, or non-knowing things, do not have, huh? So you put those two together, that there follows inclination upon every form, and these form in a special way, right? Then they have a special kind of, what, desire, right, huh? Which is different from the natural form? From what, from what, yeah, from what the, uh, uh, other things that don't know have, right? Okay. And, um, that's going to directly answer the first objection, right? Because the first objection said that you shouldn't be laying down some special kind of ability in the soul that's shared by things that don't have a soul, right? And don't know, huh? Well, and he answers to that first objection. Um, it should be said to the first that to desire is found in things having knowledge in a way above the common way, by which is found in all things, huh, through their natural form. And therefore, necessary, huh, to determine some power of the soul for this act, right? It's got some ability for, for a desire that is not found in the things that don't sense, or don't know. Do you see that? That, that objection, as a sense, falls directly, or the reply to it falls directly from what you've seen there, right? Now, the second objection goes back to something else. And, you know, in some cases, you see, it's, it's easier to, to tell apart, huh, the, um, the, uh, powers by their objects, because the objects are in no way the same thing, like color and sound, right? Color is not a sound, and sound is not a color, right? That's cool. Yeah. But, uh, in some cases, you have, uh, the same thing that's an object of two powers, but it's not an object of two powers in the same, what? Same way, right? Right. Okay? Now, um, he has something like that with the senses there, when they know the same object, right? Yeah. So, I could know the shape of the top of this glass, right? Uh-huh. If I have my eyes closed, and you just gave me the glass, and I felt it, I can know it through touch, right? Uh-huh. But I can also know it through the color of the glass, right? Uh-huh. So, the shape of it is not known in the same way, right? It's not an object of the eye, and it's touched in the same way, is it? Right. Or the shape of the table here, I know it through this brownness, or whatever you want to call this color here, right? Uh-huh. The color extends this far, and then stops, then, you know. Sure. Uh-huh. Okay? But I could also know it through what? Not through color, but through hardness. Hardness. Right. You see? Okay, yeah. So, it's possible that the same thing might be, in some way, an object of two different powers, but it's not an object of two different powers in the same way, huh? Right. Okay. And, for example, truth, right? Truth is an object for the mind, as such, but since truth is as something good, it could be also what? An object of desire. Okay? Kind of subtle there, huh? Yeah. True. Okay? And it's especially true when you get to the powers that are very universal, like the will and the two intellects we talked about before. Okay? Okay? Because the one intellect is active and the other is passive with respect to the same thing. Yeah. Okay? What is the, for this natural form, what would be the power that is connected with the inclination? Well, no, it just follows upon the natural form, the inclination to that, huh? So, once something has the nature of this tree, or this plant, it might tend to, what, grow towards the sun, right? Or… So, then that would be the growing power, or… Well, yeah, but the inclination there would be… Well, it's kind of getting into the third objection a bit, what you were saying. Yeah. Okay. Okay. It seemed to them, you know, that a heavy body, once it has heaviness, right? Yeah. It naturally tends towards the ground, right? Yeah. Desire is to go to the earth. Yeah. Yeah. But, you know, desire there is being used, the word has become equivocal here, right? Yes. Mm-hmm. But equivocal by reason, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. And he was just asking, is that the generative power? It's one of the five general powers that does that, right? Wouldn't it really? Yeah. But that's getting a little bit into the inclination that each power has to its own object, right? And that's not a separate one, huh? Okay. If you go to the third objection here, now… Okay. …we don't distinguish the common against the private, right? Yeah. Okay. So notice, if you yell in my ear, I tend to hear you. Right? You know? If you wave your hand in front of me, I tend to what? See you, right? Yeah. Now, is that tendency, an act of this kind of power that he's talking about here? Hmm? See? If you put food in my stomach, I tend to what? Digest it, right? All right. Okay? Uh-huh. Do you see that? Yes. Um… So every power, you might say, has a tendency to its own act or its own object, right? Uh-huh. And the question is, um… Why then, in addition to the tendency that each power has for its own object, right, or own act… Uh-huh. …why, say, there's a ability to desire, ability to tend towards something in addition to that, right? Uh-huh. Maybe, like, saying, you know, in addition to dog, cat, and horse, there's an animal just an animal. It's not dog, cat, or horse, but it's just an animal. You don't divide the common against the private, do you? Uh-huh. Uh-huh. There's two kinds of number, odd number, even number, and number. Uh-huh. It doesn't make sense, doesn't it? You don't divide the common against the private, right, huh? Right? Uh, we could divide the human race into men, women, and human beings. Uh-huh. No, no, no. That doesn't make sense, does it? No. You don't divide the common against the, what, private or particular, do you? Yeah. All right. Okay. No. So, the third objection is saying, you're doing this, you're saying that, that, that, um, uh, isn't it true, the third objection is saying, that each power of the soul, right? Yeah. Uh-huh. All these other powers of the soul than the one you're talking about here, or claiming to talk about here, um, don't they all have a tendency towards their own act, their own object? Right? If you're laying in bed in the morning, someone's, you know, uh, cooking bacon or something, right? You know? Uh-huh. This guy's to work with the- I told you that I used to have on Labor Day or was he would cook bacon and eggs and everything on the grill outside, huh? And they have his children over in the families and so on. And every time they get to sleep, you know, it's pretty hard. And they smell, oh, it really smells good coming up, you see? So you have a tendency to smell something that comes into your nostrils, don't you know? See, you can actually do that. In the same way, if I blink a light in front of you, you know, the cop does or somebody, you tend to see that light that's blinking in front of you, don't you, huh? See? If somebody yells at you, you tend to hear that, right? Now, is that tendency, the tendency he's talking about here, this genus of power, this ability to desire, tend towards things? See? If what you meant was simply what's common to all those, right? Yeah. You wouldn't give that as a separate power of the soul from all those, huh? They'd be like saying, you know, we've got the ability to see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and the ability to sense. That's a separate ability, the ability to sense from all these, what's that, would you? Right, no, you wouldn't say that. You wouldn't divide the common against, that's what the objection is saying, right? Okay? So, what you have to see is that this ability to desire, that is, one of the five genera of powers of the soul, right, huh? Yeah. Is not simply talking about what's common to all the other powers, insofar as they all, in some way or other, tend towards their own act and their own object, huh? Okay? Because that's sort of like the natural power, again, huh? So, notice the reply that Thomas gives. To the third, it should be said that each power of the soul is a certain form or nature, and therefore it has a natural inclination to something, right? Okay? So, my eye naturally tends to see. It doesn't naturally tend to hear, does it? Hmm? Hmm? If I wave my hand in front of your eyes, they don't tend to hear it, do they? If I snap my fingers, right, your eyes don't tend to hear that, do they? But they do tend to see it, right? Whence each desire is right, its object, right, the desire is the object which is suitable to it, by a natural desire, by a natural inclination, by a natural tendency, huh? Okay? But, in addition to this, there is the, what? Unless he calls it the animal, right? Desire, right? I'm from Anima thinking now of animal and what it has that the plant doesn't have, namely knowledge, right? In addition to this, there is the animal desire following, what? Knowledge, now, right? Following apprehension, okay? By which is desired something, not for that reason that it is suitable to the act of this or that power, as seeing, the power, I guess, to seeing, and the power to hearing, but because it is suitable simply to the animal as a whole, right? Okay. So what, what's something simply suitable to the animal as a whole? Yeah, yeah. What kind of thing would that be? Well, it's suitable for me, suitable for me to eat, right? Yeah, okay. Okay. And not just to my stomach to digest, right? Not just because it looks good or tastes good or something, but because, yeah. Okay. So that's the subtle thing there, huh? Hmm. Sometimes they call this, used to be in the old textbooks, elicited appetite, right? Is that just a natural? That, it's, they call it elicited appetite, right? It's not a desire that just follows upon what you are, right? Okay. But you have to have some kind of knowledge, right? Reasoning. I don't say reasoning, it could be sensation too, right? Right. Okay. But then it follows upon that desire, huh? Okay. So this is saying, then, that there's a kind of power, but it's going to be divided into a number of particular powers, right? But a kind of power to desire that is different, right, from the natural desire of any other power of the soul, right? Because it's not following simply upon what something is, but it's following upon what? Knowing in some way, huh? Mm-hmm. Trying to figure out, I don't know if I'd like to see the big picture on this or whatever. Yeah, why does it reply to this? You know, when you gave that thing about this thing, you don't divide common against particular soul, for instance, man, woman, human being. Yeah, yeah. If by the ability to desire, you know, here, you meant nothing other than, right, what's common, right, instead of, right, every other power, right? But every other power has some kind of, what, natural inclination to its own act, its own object, right? You see? We're only talking about that. Yeah. Then you wouldn't give it as a separate genus of powers, would you? No. See? Okay. See? You're talking about the fact that my eye tends to see. Yeah. You see? And if something grabs, you know, things in motion sort of catch the eye and whatnot, stirs, right? So something in motion passing in front of me tends to, what, get the tension of my eyes, right? So I'm inclined to see that thing moving in front of me, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Of a strong smell, right? Yeah? Yeah. If I walk into some place with a strong smell, whatever it is, good or bad, if you're bad, that's a strong smell. But I mean, I tend to, what, my sense of smell tends to, what, to smell this. To know it in someone, in desire. Well, no, no, no, no, no, you're just saying, it tends towards its own, what, act or object, right? Okay? But the same thing, my digestive thing, right? I put food, you know, I chew up my food, I swallow it, and then my, what, digestive organs, right? Right. They start to attack that food and break it down, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Okay? So, you could say they naturally tend towards their own, what, object, right? Right. They naturally tend towards their own act, you could say, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Well, that tendency towards, of each power towards its own act or its own object, it would distinguish from all of them, right, what's common to all of that, what's said of all of that, right? Yeah. See? But it goes back to the fact that this special kind of tendency, this special kind of, or power to want, that's a separate genius, you might say, of the powers of the soul, right, huh? This is something that follows upon, what, something other than actual form. Yeah, okay. And it falls upon the form that you receive, did what? Yeah, yeah. Knowing, huh? Yeah. Okay? Mm-hmm. It falls upon something outside you. So the desire, object, like you said, is not the power, it's the thing that it apprehends. Yeah. And it's interesting, you know, food is the object of what? The digesting power, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But hunger is a desire for what? Food, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But it's a desire for food falling upon some sensation of that food, right? Yeah. Right? See? So I'm laying in bed, I don't desire bacon, but someone's cooking bacon, I smell it, and all of a sudden I, what, desire bacon, right? Mm-hmm. That's something different from the tendency that I have to digest bacon once it's in my stomach. See? You know, you ever know anybody had a spastic stomach, huh? I guess it's kind of an overactive stomach, I guess, I don't know. Yeah. So they have to, you know... In the old days in Lent, they had to be released from the fast, right? Because they had to keep, what, food kind of in the stomach. And they went for, they fasted the way the normal laws of fasting were. In those days, they'd have stomach troubles, right? So this was a confessing way to release them from the obligation to fast. I know a guy with a spastic stomach getting his cut out. In the old days, he had a fast, too, you know. He'd go to movies like that, and he'd eat a hot dog, and he'd get a big kettle of buttered popcorn, and he'd say, Dwayne Holmes, for me, you know. So I'd say, well, I can't eat it at all. But I mean, because the stomach kind of tends to go into operation, right? So you start digesting yourself eventually, I don't know. Oh, really? Yeah, I guess so. That's why I have to eat several times a day. Well, I guess that was some kind of, yeah, some kind of full-reactive thing. Actually, this guy... It happens when you eat hot dogs with popcorn. But actually, this guy got it. He was in a seminary where he was being prepared for a missionary. And they were preparing to be a missionary, you know. I mean, the bread would come out with the flies in it and everything, you know. And he came out with a spastic stomach. So yeah, they kicked him out because he couldn't take the regimentation or the tough life of being a missionary, yeah. And we have a piece there, an assumption there. He's not an assumptionist, but he was a missionary down in South America, you know. You can track some kind of, you know, I don't know, not the nurse. One of those things, yeah. And he had to be sent back, you know, and he went back to school. But, you know, once in a while, a couple times a year, he gets a re-tackle, a fever. I don't know what it is, something from South America, anyway. So this is something different, huh, than this thing here, huh? This here is following upon knowing in some way, huh? Okay? Yeah. And so when I'm hungry, I'm desiring really the object of my stomach, huh? The object my stomach wants to act upon, huh? Yeah. But the plant doesn't have any knowledge of that, right? It just naturally tends towards the water and so on, right? And soaks things in, huh? Yeah. Kind of automatically, right? But not as a result of knowing them, huh? There's a difference between the plant there, sending its roots down towards where the water is. Yeah. And you stopping off at the tavern to get a drink because it's a hot day or something. Mm-hmm. That's it. You see the idea? Yeah, I do. Yeah. Example of what the... Could you take a little break here and then we'll go to the second article? Sure. Yeah. Yeah. Article two, right? Whether the sense desire, right, and the intellectual desire are diverse powers, huh? As I mentioned before, petitus could be used for the very active of this, for the desire, right, huh? But petitus there is being used for the, what? The power, the ability to desire, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Okay. And they call, and they distinguish two abilities of desire. One that follows upon the senses, right? So you call that the sensing desire, right? Or sense desire. And the other following upon the understanding, huh? Okay. So as he figured out the difference between what we would call the will, the voluntas, as we call it in Latin, but the will, and then the ability that we have for, what, emotions or feelings, huh? Okay. Okay. The first objection is saying, well, sense and understanding are accidental to, what, desire, right? For powers, he says, are not diversified by accidental differences. But it happens to the desirable that it be, what, grasped by the sense or by the, what, understanding, huh? Therefore, the sense desire and understandable desire are not diverse, what? Powers, huh? And that's what the objection is saying. So I could have this desire for food. It might be because I know I need food. It might be because I smell it, right? It's accidental whether I eat the food because I smelled it or because I realize I need food to maintain my strength. He's saying it's accidental, right? It's accidental to the food, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. So you shouldn't distinguish it by what's accidental. To the desirable, huh? Moreover, the knowledge of the understanding is of universals. Now, we saw that before, huh? In the Dianima. And by this it is distinguished from the, what? Sense powers, yeah. Sense knowledge. Which is of, what? Singulars, huh? But this distinction has no place on the side of the desiring power, or on the side of the desirable. For sense desire is a motion from the soul to things. Now, notice what he's saying there, right? That's the opposite of knowing, huh? Knowing is a motion from the thing into the, what? Knower, right? Mm-hmm. But, um, desire is emotion from the soul to the, what, thing. Mm-hmm. I left my heart in San Francisco. I'm going out towards the, what, thing, huh? Rather than trying to put it inside me, right? Now, see, Bwetis had said, to take the famous quote that we're always giving, huh? A thing is singular when sensed, right? Universal and understood, huh? Okay? So, when I see this glass, right? It's a singular individual glass, isn't it, right? But when I come to understand what this is, that's a glass, I'm understanding something universal, right? But notice that distinction between us being singular when sensed, universal when understood is a distinction that takes place inside of my knowing powers. Outside here, there's only a, what, individual singular glass, huh? You see that? Mm-hmm. In the same way, huh? This chair, when I see this chair, or I feel this chair, I'm seeing an individual singular chair. Mm-hmm. I'm, um, uh, but when I understand what this chair is, in other words, when I understand what a chair is, I'm understanding something universal. Because what a chair is is common to all chairs, isn't it? But the objection is saying, okay, but that's taking place within the knowing powers, because that's where knowing takes place, when the thing gets into knowing powers, huh? Mm-hmm. So when it gets into the senses, it's still singular, but when it gets into a reason, whose object is what it is, it's now universal. But desire is, is not putting things into the heart, it's a heart going into the thing, right? And the thing out there is only, what? Singular. Singular, right? Okay? Um, so he says, that's what he says, but this distinction has no place, huh? On the side of, of, uh, desire, huh? For since desire is a motion from the soul to things, not the reverse, right? Which you have in knowing. And things are what? Singular out there, right? Every desire seems to be for a, what? Singular thing, right? Therefore, the intellectual desire, or understandable desire, ought not to be, what? Distinguished from the sense, huh? That's an interesting objection, huh? Mm-hmm. Moreover, just as under the, what? Grasping or knowing power is ordered the desiring power as a lower power, right? Because it's moved, right, by the apprehension. So also is the, what? Power to move around from one place to another, huh? But there is not two different powers to move around, right, in man. There's not another power, in other words, in man, following upon intellect, other than what you find in the other animals, following upon, what? Sense, huh? Therefore, for a like reason, Neither is there a, what, desiring power. That's what he's saying here, right, huh? If the distinction between the senses and the reason, right, were to make the powers that they move, right, or direct, maybe desiring powers to and kind, right, but then since they also, you might say, move or direct my walking and my running and so on, right, then my ability to move my body ought to be what, twofold too, right? I have an ability to move my body following upon sensation and another ability to move my body following upon understanding and nobody thinks that, huh? You see? So actually I have one ability to desire following upon sensation and another ability to desire following upon understanding, right? See? I don't have this in the case of the moving power, right? It's a very interesting objection too, huh? You wonder how Thomas sits up at night thinking about these things. I was first teaching at St. Mary's and I had a good student, you know, and he'd come in and do a nice objection every day almost, huh? Oh, really? Because I never heard them, you know, all these objections anyway, you know? So I'd always answer it clearly and calmly, you know? He said to me one time after the course, you know, I always thought I'd have you the next day, you know, but you always had an answer, you know? So I heard all those objections, they're all in Thomas, you know? But he was up every night and I'd try to think of it. Oh, yeah, maybe he thought of something, you know, I mean, there's an objection. He was never going to answer that. We don't realize how common these objections are if you've read the best office, you know? Did you ever get him interested in reading Thomas? I don't know if it happened to him. Okay, but against all this is what the philosopher, now I guess that's a, what? Antonomasia. Antonomasia for Aristotle, right? But against this is what the philosopher, that the philosopher distinguishes a two-fold desire, right, or a built-in desire in the third book about the soul. And he also says, Aristotle, that the superior desire moves the, what, lower, or it should move the lower, right? Mm-hmm, right. Okay. And he says, I answer, it ought to be said, that it's necessary to say that the understandable desire, or the desire of falling upon understanding, is another power of the soul from that falling upon sensation. Now, what's the reason he gives, huh? Well, it's that the desiring power is a potencia passiva, right? A power that is what? Moved by its object, right? Rather than a power that, what, acts upon or moves its object, huh? Okay. So, in that sense, it's like the, what, the senses, right, which are moved by their object, huh? Mm-hmm. Rather than, like, the digestive power which acts upon its object. But notice, it's a passive power which is apt to be moved by the, what, grasping power, right, huh? Because that fits in what we saw in the previous article, because that's the reason why this is a separate genus of power, right? That it's a desire of following upon, what, some kind of knowing or apprehension. So, is it accidental, then, to the, to these desiring powers, sensing or understanding? Well, if there was no knowledge, right, there would be none of these powers, would there? There'd be only that natural desire, only that natural tendency. The reason why this is a different, a unique genus of powers of the soul is that there's an inclination, a tendency, following upon every form, and these things have forms in a way that the non-knowing things don't, right? So, really, it's essential, the knowing, isn't it, to this kind of tendency or desire. You know, I'm sorry, but I, I, I, I'm trying to follow what you're saying, I, I just can't, I, can you say it a different way enough to think of this? Well, I'm saying, referring back to the previous article, you know, where the question was, why are you making a separate kind of power of the soul? The power to desire, right, huh? The power to, to, in other words, tend towards something, right? Right. When everything in the world tends towards something, right? And every power, every other power of the soul tends towards something, right, huh? Yes, it towards something. Yeah, yeah. Well, everything tends towards something by reason of its natural form, right? By reason of its form, therefore. But these knowing things have forms that the non-knowing things don't have at all. And so, it's because you are a knowing thing. It's because you have forms that non-knowing things don't have. That you have inclinations that non-knowing things don't have, right? Okay, yeah, yeah. So, is it really accidental, knowing, to this kind of desire? Well, it can't be accidental to it if you wouldn't even have that desire without that knowing, huh? It's because you have that kind of knowing, because you have that kind of form, that you have an inclination that non-knowing things don't have, right? Okay? Okay. So, it's not accidental to you that you are moved by an object that is known in some way. Okay. It's not accidental to me. It's not accidental to this kind of desire, right? That is unique to the knowing thing, you see? Why is it unique to the knowing thing? Because it's a desire that follows upon some kind of knowing, huh? So, if you have two kinds of knowing, sensing and understanding, right? And this is a desire that follows upon something as known, but then you're going to have two different kinds of, what, ability to desire, corresponding to those two different kinds of, what, knowing, huh? Okay. And therefore you could say, you know, the object, really, of the sense desire is the good as known by the senses. But the object of the will is the good as known by reason or by the understanding, huh? Mm-hmm. That's why sense desire really is tied up with what is pleasing to the senses, huh? Because the senses don't know good except as agreeable or, you know, to the senses themselves. Yeah. So they have, you know, more limited, you might say, knowledge of the good, huh? But reason knows good not only is agreeable to the intellect but as being the end or purpose or as being useful, right, or being the common good or something else, right? Okay. So he's saying that the desiring ability or the power to desire is a passive power ability, which is apt to be moved by what has been apprehended or is known in some way. Whence, notice there's two words there, a petibia de apprehensum, the, what, known desirable, right? Okay. There are the desirable as known, okay, is a, what, non-moved mover, as Aristotle says in the third book on the soul. But desire is a moved mover, huh? Mm-hmm. And I just, I just, I just bring that out in, in love and friendship there, huh? Because I, I start with these texts from the poets and from the theologians and so on. I had a whole bunch of texts, readings, where they seem to be saying that love is a giving. Mm-hmm. And of course, you give and you're active, right? Yes. And then I had a whole series of readings where they say that the lover is undergoing, you know, he's suffering. And then I had a number of ones where they speak of the wound of love. And I took them from romantic love, where they have, you know, Romans saying he's just such scars and everything, and invisible wounds that love make. And I took the ones from Teresa of Avalon and Teresa of the Sea where they receive an increase of this divine love under the likeness of being wounded by the angel, right? Mm-hmm. And, uh, well, I say, well, which is it? Mm-hmm. You know, I, is the, um, uh, heart active? Or is it passive, right? Because there's reason to think both, huh? And I'll say, you know, the common way of speaking, you know, where if you go to a party, say, and you see somebody, and someone makes an impression upon you, and you say, that's kind of a common way of speaking, huh? Well, their having made an impression upon you means that you begin to like them, huh? But impression means that their good qualities have been pressed upon your heart in some way, right? So that makes you think that your heart is what? Is active upon. Is active upon, huh? Sure. But then the next, the other readings, where we see Thomas and others speak about giving your heart, right? And even Juliet saying, I know you give more love, right? Mm-hmm. And Thomas is explaining how the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God because love is the first gift, right? Mm-hmm. And so on. Well, which is it? Mm-hmm. And then I have a text from Thomas, not from here, but from the coming of the sentences, but he's quoting the same passage of Aristotle, that the good apprehended is an unmoved mover, but desire is a moved mover, right? Yeah. Well, in the moved mover, I say, is it active or passive? Mm-hmm. Well, insofar as the moved mover is moved, it's passive, right? Mm-hmm. And so far as it's a mover, it's what? Okay. It has some other aspects, right? See? See? And I'll say up the chalk, things like that, you know, and I have one in the middle there, and it's moving one because it's being moved, right? I said, which is more fundamental, though, the moved mover? Is it being moved because it's a mover, or is it a mover because it's being moved? It's a mover because it's being moved. Yeah, so it's more fundamental that you're being moved when you have a desire, right? Mm-hmm. You have less of something active there because you're a moved mover. Sure. This is a very famous text there, right? Mm-hmm. The good known in some way, right? The good apprehended in some way, right? Is a, what? Non-moved mover. But desire, appetite, is a moved mover. Yes? Mm-hmm. Okay, and this is said both in the third book about the soul and the twelfth book of, what? Wisdom, right, huh? Because it's important, huh, that God is the first cause, not only in the sense of the maker or mover, the first maker or mover, but he's the first, what? Desirable. The first good. Otherwise, he wouldn't be able to get the first cause, would he? See? Mm-hmm. If God, in other words, is making for the sake of something other than himself, then that, in some sense, would be the unmoved mover, wouldn't it? Mm-hmm. And he'd be, in a way, a moved mover, huh? Mm-hmm. And I'll bring out to them, well. But God's love for us can't be the sort, because he's the unmoved mover. Mm-hmm. So God's love is only a giving. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. In no way is he being moved by us, huh? Mm-hmm. And I say, as the goodness of the creature is in no way a cause of God's loving him, but God's loving is a cause of the good of the creature. Right. We're in a reverse state, huh? Where the goodness of something moves us to what? Mm-hmm. To love it, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. But the goodness of something doesn't move us to love it until we, in some way, what? Know it, right? Right? Yeah. So if I'd never known licorice, I'd never known wine or whatever it might be, right, um, I would never have been moved to, to, what, desire it, right? Is that why they say it's more the essence of love to give? Because God is... Yeah, I was quoting that, too. You know, it's more divine to give than to receive, right? Mm-hmm. And, of course, God's love is only a giving, right, huh? Okay? But, and, you know, I'm not going to teach love and friendship right now, you know? But, um, a number of things you can say about this, right? See? Uh, God's love is only a giving, right? But our love is, what, more a, what, being moved, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. But if you compare, you know, the will with the emotions, um, the emotions is more being moved. The will is more, what, free. We're able to give, therefore, eh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But there's another way that you might call all loving as giving, and that's because the good is in thing. So, I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Mm-hmm. See? I gave my heart to you, right? I see? And since I gave my heart to San Francisco, if I left my heart in San Francisco, haven't I? Right? You know? Mm-hmm. That's what our Lord says, right? That where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. So, there's a way in which all loving is a giving, because love or desire is going out to the thing loved or desired, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. See? That's why, you know, same before, you know. Uh, the lover can be said to have lost his heart. Yeah. But the knower shouldn't be, have lost his mind. And if the knower was to lose his mind, he wouldn't have any more knowledge of it. Mm-hmm. See? But if the lover did not in some way lose his heart, maybe he doesn't love. Mm-hmm. You see? Now, God is also moved by himself when he apprehends himself. That moves him to love, too, when he apprehends himself. Yeah, but that's only in our way of understanding, right? Because there's no distinction, God, between his knowledge and his love, huh? Right. You see? But in us, there's a real distinction between our knowledge and our love. Mm-hmm. So, so, it's not just a distinction of reason, but it's a real distinction in us between knowing and loving, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Okay. Okay. So, I'll come back to that, but let's kind of go through the body a little bit. Once the desirable apprehended, right, the desirable is known, right, is a non-mover, but desire is a moved mover, as it said in the third book about the soul and the twelfth book, the metaphysics, huh? But passive things, undergoing things, right, and mobile things are distinguished according to the distinction of what acts upon them and what moves them, because it's necessary for the mover to be proportion to the, what, movable, right, and what acts upon something to what undergoes, the act of true passive. Okay, just like my kicking you is what? Proportion to your being kicked, right? Right? My punching you, proportion to your being punched, right? And, like everything passive, huh, and the passive power itself has its very definition from the order that it has to its, what, active, huh? Are you kickable? Mm-hmm. See? But you're kickable because you're able to be kicked by the active one, right? Mm-hmm. You see? But the very nature of the passive right to be defined, huh, in reference to the act for which it is passive. Since, therefore, what is apprehended by the understanding was apprehended by the sense of another kind, consequently, the desire that falls upon understanding, the intellectual desire, is a different power or ability from the one that falls upon, what, the senses, huh? Mm-hmm. I used to be helpful when you look at the objections here, huh? Because the first objection, now, which this is maybe the closest to resolving, huh? Thomas, I think, has ordered these objections in a certain way, that you want to see one and solve one before another one, right? Mm-hmm. Um, the first objection, if you go back to that, was saying that, well, isn't, it is something that is sensed or understood accidental to its being desirable, right? Mm-hmm. Um, Thomas says, uh, it doesn't simply happen to the desirable to be apprehended by the sense or the understanding, but it belongs to it, what, per se, huh? For the desirable does not move desire except insofar as it is, what? It's grasped in some way, right? So it belongs to it. as such, right? To its object as such. That reading in a sense follows on what we see in the previous article, right? There would even be this ability to desire without knowing, right? Whence differences of the what? Known are per se differences of the desirable. Whence the desiring powers are distinguished according to the difference of the things what? Grasped as according to their what? Own objects, huh? Now incidentally, when Thomas gets into talking about love there, and he talks about the cause of love right? And the first cause of love is the good, right? And that's a cause of love because it's the object of love, huh? And this is a, what, power that is moved by its object, huh? But then when he gets to the second article and says, knowing knowledge is a cause of love, right? And he says knowledge is a cause of love for the same reason as the good is. That is to say, it's on the side of the very object of the thing, huh? Because the object is the good as what? Known, huh? Okay? But think of that in the light of the previous article, right? Which is ordered before this, right? The previous article was objecting, you know, to there being an ability to desire other than the natural ability of things to desire, right? Or is objecting that there was not an ability to desire other than the inclination of each part of the soul, right? Meaning all the other parts of the soul, I should say, for their own act, their own object, right? Right. And the reason why there is this special kind of power of the soul is because there's always an inclination following upon a form, right? And these things that know have forms in a way that things that don't know don't have, right? Therefore, they have an inclination, right? A tendency, a desire that's not found in the things that don't know, right? So there wouldn't be this whole genus, right? That's being subdivided, right? Into these two here, sense desire and rational desire. There wouldn't be this whole genus at all without there being knowing, right? So it's not accidentally saying to this kind of desire that it has a relevance or it's relevant to a relative through knowledge in some way, huh? Because that's the reason why you have this kind of desire at all. And so a distinction of these two kinds of desire, these two kinds of knowing, is relevant to seeing that there's two different kinds of, what? Ability to desire. Let's go to the second objection, which is saying, hey, but the object is in things, and in things you only have the singular, so what is this thing doing, right? Okay. Now, Thomas says, to the second it should be said that the intellectual desire, although it is born towards things that are outside the soul, and these are singular, right? Born towards the... Nevertheless, huh? It is born towards them by what? Some universal reason, right? As when it desires something because it is, what? Good. Good, right? So, remember, we had that same kind of distinction there in the previous article, remember? Where it's saying, why distinguish between the desiring power and the knowing power? Because it's the same thing that's known that is desired, right? But it's not an object of both in the same way, is it? Mm-hmm. Okay? Just like I was saying, you know, why distinguish between touch and sight because they're both no shape? And sometimes my sense of sight and my sense of touch are the same sense because they both know the same thing. Is that true? No. It's the same thing to see the shape of the table and to feel the shape of the table. The sense and the feeling must be the same thing because you have the same object there. Mm-hmm. See? Well, you can see a difference, huh? Yeah. That even though in a way they're knowing the same thing, the name of the shape, right? The one is knowing the shape through color, and the other is knowing it through hardness, right? Mm-hmm. I'm going to use this in my hand, right? It's like it gets away, you're right. Okay? Okay, that's the reason why he said that there's a difference between the desiring powers and the knowing powers, huh? For a similar reason, huh? Well, now he's saying the same thing, that even if I desire the same thing by sense desire and by intellectual desire, right? Mm-hmm. I might desire it by sense desire because it's agreeable to my senses, right? Right. Mm-hmm. But my reason would see it in the light of something more universal. Yeah. So, okay? And I remember reading St. Francis de Sales there, you know, and he says, a tough man, you know, St. Francis de Sales in some ways, you know, and gentle in other ways, but he's talking about, uh, uh, when you sit down and eat, he says, you shouldn't just be following your, you know, your sense urging to eat, right? Mm-hmm. And say, well, Lord, I'm going to eat now because you made me such as I need food, right? And it's part of your plan that I should eat, right? You want me to maintain my health and so on? Yeah? Mm-hmm. And, uh, so in a sense, his will is dominating even his sense desire there, isn't it? Mm-hmm. See? So he's desiring to eat this food, right? Because this is the will of God that he eats some food, huh? You see that? Mm-hmm. See? See? Now, you might also have some bodily urge to eat that food, right? Mm-hmm. See? See? And, uh, so, um, I can be a little more like an admiral, right? And just eat my food because I'm hungry, right? You see? I can say, why am I going to eat this food? You know? Think about it a bit, you know? You know? God has given me, what? A body, right? Mm-hmm. And a body that's dependent upon food, right? He's given me the means of, what? Gathering this food, of eating it, and so on, right, huh? Does he want me to preserve my life, huh? God's pro-life, I think. Right? See? He wants you to eat this, right? See? Mm-hmm. Now I'm almost, what? I'm glorifying God by eating this food, huh? Mm-hmm. And not just satisfying my bodily urge, huh? Sure. So, even though eating the food is the object of my hunger, right? The food is the object of my hunger, my sense desire, right? See? Mm-hmm. But notice what may happen sometimes, too. I mean, it might happen at some time that, like, if you're sick or something, right? You don't have the desire to eat. Mm-hmm. See? And I always take the example in class, you know, where your mother or somebody might say, she's a child now. I know you don't feel like eating, but you've got to eat something because you're going to get weak if you don't, right? You see? I think your mother or somebody said to you sometime, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. And so now you see a reason to eat even though you don't have that hunger for it. See? I know myself sometimes, I never have a tremendous appetite for breakfast. Some people do, you know? My son, marking it up, you know, get two pans out, you know, so I need two pans for it. One for the eggs, one for the bacon or the ham or something. And I said, well, I see you do the bacon and the ham in there, and then you take it out and you put the egg in there. I don't like the color, but he said, I've got two pans. Well, usually I don't have bacon or eggs or ham or sausage, you know? Remember, Mark, about this house, he often has sausage with the breakfast there, you know, and I kind of like it, or my sister or my daughter has it too, you know? But I just tend to, you know, have maybe a piece of toast or two pieces of toast, you know, a little piece of toast, right? And an orange or something like that. And, uh, uh, because I suppose I don't, you know, need an act of a life, so I don't need a big, huge meal, you know, I'm not going to have to work, you know, and just like that. But I know sometimes, you know, I don't really have that idea, I don't have any desire to eat more than that really in the morning, you know? But I know sometimes I realize I'm going to be, you know, doing some prolonged things that morning, and I'm going to be away, and I'm not going to be eating for a while, and I say, and I see the, my reason tells me I should really eat some more than this, you know, because I know I'm going to get away.